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ABSTRACT
The trafficking of illicit drugs by sea has become an industry 
comprised of many individual enterprises of variform size and 
organization. Seizure statistics for the 1980s indicate that 70% of the 
total quantity of drugs intercepted in the trafficking stage were inter­
dicted in the maritime sector or attributed to having been transported 
by sea. More significantly, it appears that only between 8 - 12% of the 
total volume of drugs trafficked are intercepted. The use of the sea­
borne modes of transport is the result of planetary geography which made 
the maritime medium one of only two ways by which drugs may enter 
several states.
In response, varying sophisticated counter-trafficking offensives, 
policies and strategies have been implemented and contemplated in select 
geographical regions - examples being the Caribbean and Pacific Basins. 
However, the importation of illicit substances to the primary consuming 
states has not been curbed and indications are that the overall flow of 
drugs remains unimpeded.
This thesis focuses on the maritime trade in illicit drugs during 
the 1980s by providing both qualitative and quantitative analyses of the 
activity. Specifically, the theme addressed is the question of why 
there is so little success in combating the maritime drug trade. 
Embraced by the study are the various geographical, physical, technical 
and socio-political elements supportive of the trade. Among the per­
tinent topics revealed are the flow structure to the trade, the 
categories of drugs transported, the classes of vessels utilized, the 
methods of concealment and deception employed, the involvement of or­
ganized crime, the contributing geographical elements and the unique 
variations to specific routes as determined by destination and region. 
Additionally, the international law suppressing the maritime trade in 
illicit drugs is examined. To lend completeness to the study a brief 
review of the historical dimension to the smuggling of drugs by sea is 
included along with analysis of drug production and consumption. Be­
cause the threat of drugs is perceived to be greatest, albeit wrongly, 
among the developed states this thesis tackles the subject from the 
perspective of the coastal member states of O.E.C.D. Lastly, recommen­
dations and innovations to old strategies are proffered specifically as 
they apply to the maritime component of the illicit drug trade.
2
TABLE of CONTENTS
Abstract 2
List of Tables 7
List of Figures 9
Abbreviations And Acronyms Used 10
Acknowledgements 14
Chapter I. Introduction 16
1.1 Premise Behind This Study.............................  16
1.2 Bases For The Study................................... 19
1.2.1 Literature Review.......  19
1.2.2 The Social Menace Of Illicit Drugs...........    23
1.3 Limitations In Scope Of The Study.....................   24
1.4 Research Methodologies Utilized.......................  28
1.5 The Research Questions ................................  29
1.6 Working Definitions For Select Terms Used In Treatise .... 31
Notes And References For Chapter I.....................  33
Chapter II. History Of Maritime Drug Smuggling 36
2.1 Overview Of The Historical Context And Concept ..........  36
2.2 The Earliest Incidences ...............................  38
2.3 The Opium Wars E r a ........   40
2.4 The Persian Gulf In The Late 1800s.....................  43
2.5 The Early Twentieth Century ...........................  45
2.6 The Post-World War II Era ..........................   46
2.6.1 The Late 1940s ........................................ 46
2.6.2 The 1950s ............................................  49
2.7 Genesis Of The Modem Trafficking Scene ................ 54
2.7.1 The 1960s ............................................  54
2.7.2 The 1970s ............................................  62
Notes And References For Chapter II ......   73
Chapter III. Global Patterns Of Drug Production And Consumption 76
3.1 Geography: The Concept And Its Role.................... 76
3.2 The Global Perspective ................................  78
3.2.1 Opiate Sources ...............    79
3.2.2 Cannabis Sources ..................................  85
3.2.3 Coca Sources .........................................  91
3.2.4 Chemical And Psychotropic Substance Sources .............  98
3.2.5 The Primary Drug Consumers ............................  100
3.2.6 Drug Consumption In The Coastal States Of O.E.C.D..........106
3
3.2.6.1 The United States of America........................... 106
3.2.6.2 Canada ................................................ 108
3.2.6.3 Japan...............   109
3.2.6.4 Australia ............................................. 110
3.2.6.5 New Zealand  ............      113
3.2.6.6 The United Kingdom.....................    114
3.2.6.7 Ireland............................................... 116
3.2.6.8 Spain ................................................  117
3.2.6.9 The Netherlands ...................      118
3.2.6.10 Italy................................................  120
3.2.6.11 France ................................................ 122
3.2.6.12 The Federal Republic of Germany........................ 123
3.2.6.13 Belgium ............................................... 125
3.2.6.14 Portugal ..........    126
3.2.6.15 Greece ................................................ 128
3.2.6.16 Turkey................................................ 130
3.2.6.17 The Scandinavian Drug Scene ............................ 131
Notes And References For Chapter III ..................... 135
Chapter IV. The Marine Geographical And Technical Dimensions 144
4.1 The Macroscopic Perspective. ...........................  144
4.1.1 Geopolitical Considerations And Assessment Criteria ......  145
4.1.2 The Marine Geography Of The OECD States ................. 150
4.1.3 Marine Geographical Factors Of Transit States ...........  158
4.1.3.1 Opiate Transit States .........    159
4.1.3.2 Cannabis Transit States ...............................  165
4.1.3.3 Cocaine Transit States ................................  178
4.1.4 Relevant Lakes, Rivers, Canals And Straits .............  182
4.1.4.1 Lacustrine Bodies Of Significance ......................  182
4.1.4.2 Riparian Trafficking Sites ............................. 183
4.1.4.3 Rivers Of Significance In The OECD States ................ 189
4.1.4.4 Pertinent Canals And Waterways.. .......................  195
4.1.4.5 Pertinent Straits And Passages.. .......................  200
4.1.5 The Role Of Commercial Shipping Routes ..................  209
4.2 The Microscopic Perspective ............................ 212
4.2.1 The Maritime Medium...................................  214
4.2.2 The Nature Of Ships And Boats .......................... 215
4.2.3 The Vulnerability Of Cargoes ........................... 218
4.2.4 The Character Of Ports  ..............................   222
4.2.5 The Role Of Free Trade Zones ........................... 227
4.2.6 The Susceptibility Of Coastal Zones And Waters .......... 229
Notes And References For Chapter T V .....................  235
Chapter V. The Maritime Drug Trade Today 240
5.1 The Global Overview....................     240
5.2 Maritime Drug Trafficking In The O.E.C.D.................. 256
5.2.1 The European Scene...............    258
5.2.1.1 The Netherlands .....................................  260
5.2.1.2 Spain ......................    264
5.2.1.3 Belgium............................................... 266
5.2.1.4 The United Kingdom............................    268
5.2.1.5 France .............................    271
4
5.2.1.6 Greece ...............................................  275
5.2.1.7 Italy ................................................  278
5.2.1.8 The Federal Republic of Germany.......................  280
5.2.1.9 Portugal .............................................  282
5.2.1.10 Turkey ...............................................  284
5.2.1.11 Ireland..............................................  287
5.2.2 The Scandinavian States ............................... 289
5.2.2.1 Sweden...................................    290
5.2.2.2 Norway...............................................  292
5.2.2.3 Finland  .......................................   294
5.2.2.4 Denmark.......................    295
5.2.2.5 Iceland..............................................  297
5.2.3 The North American Scene..............................  299
5.2.3.1 Canada.....................     300
5.2.3.2 The United States of America ..........................  304
5.2.4 The Situation Amongst The Pacific OECD Members .........  314
5.2.4.1 Australia ............................................  314
5.2.4.2 New Zealand..........................................  318
5.2.4.3 Japan ................................................  320
Notes And References For Chapter V ........    325
Chapter VI. The Role Of Organized Crime 331
6.1 Synoptic Overview..................................... 331
6.2 Bases For The Organizational Component ................. 332
6.3 The Organizational Structure Of The Maritime Drug Trade .. 334
6.3.1 Organization In The Cocaine Trade  .......    337
6.3.2 Organization In The Heroin Trade ....................  340
6.3.3 Organization In The Cannabis Trade..................  343
6.3.4 Organization In The Trade Of Other Illicit Substances .... 347
6.4 The Ethnographic And Anthropological Factors ............  349
6.4.1 The Role Of The Ethnic Chinese ......................... 351
6.4.2 The Role Of The Pakistanis ............................  354
6.4.3 The Role Of The Colombians ............................  355
6.4.4 The Role Of Joint Japanese-Korean Groups ...............  357
6.4.5 The Role Of Italian-Based Criminal Syndicates ..........  358
Notes And References For Chapter VI ....................  361
Chapter VII. The International Law Against The Maritime Drug Trade 362
7.1 Overview Of The Legal Problem........................   362
7.2 Conventions And Treaties Of Relevance .................. 365
7.2.1 Historical Synopsis ................................... 365
7.2.2 The 1961 Single Convention On Narcotic Drugs.........  368
7.2.3 The Convention On Psychotropic Substances 1971 .........  372
7.2.4 The Law Of The S e a .................................... 375
7.2.4.1 Overview Of The L a w ................................... 375
7.2.4.2 Archipelagic Waters, Internal Waters And The Territorial
S e a ..................................................  381
7.2.4.3 The Contiguous Zone ................................... 385
7.2.4.4 The Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) ....................    389
7.2.4.5 The High Seas ......   394
7.2.4.6 Archipelagic Sea-Lanes, International Straits And The 
Continental Shelf Zone (CSZ) ........................... 404
5
7.2.5 The 1988 Convention Against Illicit Traffic In Narcotic 
Drugs And Psychotropic Substances ..................  407
7.2.6 The Mutual Assistance Convention (1977) ................  41.4
7.3 Other Measures Of Law Enforcement On The Sea ...........  416
Notes And References For Chapter VII ...................  420
Chapter VIII. Conclusions And Recommendations 426
8.1 Treatise Theme Revisited.............   426
8.2 Solutions And Strategies For A More Effective Campaign ... 427
8.3 A Closing Caveat ...................................... 441
Notes And References For Chapter VIII ..................  445
Appendices 448
Bibliography 451
Books And Monographs ....................................... 451
Articles And Chapters In Books ......    453
Official Domestic And Intergovernmental Sources .............  457
League of Nations Documents ................................  462
United Nations Documents ...................................  463
Interviews ................................................  464
Personal Communiques To Author .............................  465
Public Statements .......................................... 465
Table Of Cases Cited....................................... 466
6
LIST of TABLES
2.1 The Maritime Opium Trade To China In The 19* h Century........ 40
2.2 Vessels Employed In The Persian Opium Trade.................  45
2.3 Principal Trafficking Routes By Sea In 1925 .................  46
2.4 Maritime Drug Seizures For Select Years, 1922 - 1979 ......... 47
2.5 Principal States Effecting Maritime Drug Seizures, 1950-58 .... 50
2.6 Principal States Effecting Maritime Drug Seizures, 1960-63 .... 59
2.7 Principal States Effecting Maritime Drug Seizures, 1971-79 .... 67 *
3.1 Illicit Opium Production In The 1980s .......................  81
3.2 Sources Supplying The International Cannabis Trade ..........  87
3.3 Illicit Coca Leaf And Cocaine Production In South America .... 96
3.4 Drug Addict And User Populations For Select Countries ........ 103
3.5 Sources Of Illicit Drugs In The U.S.A. In 1985 And 1986 ...... 107
3.6 Drug Seizures In The U.S.A. For The Period 1983 - 1987 ....... 107
3.7 Sources .And Types Of Cannabis Found In Canada In The 1980s .... 108
3.8 Canadian Drug Seizures In The Period 1983 - 1987 .............  109
3.9 Japanese Drug Seizures In The Period 1983 - 1987 .............  110
3.10 Australian Drug Seizures In The Period 1983 - 1987 ..........  Ill
3.11 Drug Seizures In New Zealand For The Years 1983 - 1987 .......  114
3.12 Drug Seizures In The United Kingdom For The Years 1984-87 ....  115
3.13 Irish Drug Seizures In The Period 1983 - 1987 ...............  116
3.14 Analysis Of Irish Drug Offences By City And Category........  117
3.15 Spanish Drug Seizures In The Period 1983 - 1987 .............  118
3.16 Dutch Drug Seizures In The Period 1984 - 1987 ...............  119
3.17 Italian Drug Seizures In The Period 1983 - 1987 .............  121
3.18 French Drug Seizures In The Period 1983 - 1987 ..............  123
3.19 Drug Seizures In West Germany For The Years 1983 - 1987  .... 124
3.20 Belgian Drug Seizures In The Period 1983 - 1987 .............  126
3.21 Portuguese Drug Seizures In The Period 1983 - 1987 ..........  127
3.22 Greek Drug Seizures In The Period 1983 - 1987 ...............  129
3.23 Turkish Drug Seizures In The Period 1983 - 1987 .............  131
3.24 Drug Seizures In Scandinavia For The Years 1983 - 1986 ....... 133
3.25 Principal Cities Of Drug Consumption In Finland.............  135
4.1 Classification Of States* Roles In The Maritime Drug Trade .... 150
4.2 Opiate Trade Routes Of The Near East .................   166
4.3 Source Areas And Regions Supporting The Cannabis Trade ....... 167
4.4 Places And Methods Of Drug Concealment Onboard Ships......... 217
4.5 Select Examples Of Cargoes Used For Concealing Drugs ......... 221
4.6 Select Seaports In The OECD States With Free Trade Zones 229
5.1 Maritime Drug Seizures In The World, 1980 - 1986 ............  241
5.2 Drug Seizure Ratios Amongst The OECD States  ..............  242
5.3 Principal States Making Maritime Drug Seizures, 1980 - 1986 ... 244
5.4 Maritime Drug Seizures Amongst The OECD States, 1982 - 1986 ... 257
5.5 Vessel Involvement In Spanish Drug Importations, 1984 - 1986 .. 266
5.6 Sources Of Cannabis Smuggled By Sea To France, 1981 - 1986 .... 272
5.7 U.S. Marijuana Seizures By Vessel Nationality For 1985-86 .... 310
7
5.8 USCG Seizure Statistics By Maritime Region For 1986 .......... 311
5.9 Major Ports And Sites Of Entry For Illicit Drugs In
Australia, 1982 - 1986 .....................................  317
5.10 Origin Points Of Australian Drug Imports By Sea, 1982-86 ..... 318
5.11 Principal Ports Of Entry For Drugs To New Zealand, 1984-86 .... 319
5.12 Japanese Seaports Effecting Drug Seizures, 1980 - 1984 ....... 324
7.1 Territorial Sea Claims As Of 30 June 1988  ...............  383
7.2 Contiguous Zone Claims As Of 30 June 1988 ...................  387
7.3 Net Breadths Of The EEZs And EFZs Subject To Inquiry......... 391
Appendix Table 1 Units Of Mass, Weight, Area, Distance And Volume
Used In Thesis ............................................. 448
Appendix Table 2 International Conventions And Multilateral
Treaties Regulating The Flow Of Drugs Or Providing Related 
Mechanisms For Control .....................................  449
8
LIST of FIGURES
2.1 The Persian Opium Trade Of The Late 19th And Early 20th 
Centuries .................................................  44
2.2 Principal States Effecting Maritime Drug Seizures By Drug 
Category In The Period 1946 - 1949 .......................... 48
2.3 Principal States Effecting Maritime Drug Seizures By Drug 
Category In The Period 1950 - 1958 .......................... 50
2.4 Trunk Routes In The Illicit Drug Trade By Sea, 1950 - 1958 .... 51
2.5 Principal Flag States Involved In Drug Smuggling, 1950-58 ..... 52
2.6 Principal States Effecting Maritime Drug Seizures By Drug 
Category In The Period 1960 - 1963 .......................... 59
2.7 Principal Flag States Involved In Drug Smuggling, 1962-64 .... 60
2.8 Principal States Effecting Maritime Drug Seizures By Drug 
Category In The Period 1971 - 1979 .......................... 67
2.9 Trunk Routes In The Illicit Drug Trade By Sea, 1971 - 1979 .... 68
2.10 Principal Flag States Involved In Drug Smuggling, 1971-79 .... 69
2.11 Prices For Southwest Asian Opium Delivered By Dhow To The 
Persian Gulf In The Mid-1970s ....................    73
3.1 Opium Production Sites In The Golden Crescent ............... 80
3.2 Opium Production Sites In The Golden Triangle ............... 82
3.3 Poppy Cultivation Sites In Mexico ..........    83
3.4 Coca Cultivation Sites In South America....................  97
3.5 Heroin Offences In Australia In The 1980s ................... 112
4.1 Opiate Transit States In Southeast Asia....................  163
4.2 The Caribbean Basin And Its Sieve-Like Structure ............  169
4.3 Marine Transit States For Cannabis And Cocaine In The
Caribbean Basin And Central American Region .................  173
5.1 Principal States Effecting Maritime Drug Seizures By Drug 
Category.................................   246
5.2 Principal Trunk Routes In The Maritime Drug Trade, 1980-83 .... 248
5.3 Other Major Trunk Routes In The Maritime Drug Trade, 1980-83 .. 249
5.4 Maritime Trunk Routes For Cocaine, Heroin And Other Opiates ... 251
5.5 Principal Flag States Involved In Drug Trafficking, 1980-83 ... 255
5.6 Analyses Of British Drug Importations By Method Of Shipment ... 270
5.7 States Of Embarkation And Ports Of Discharge For Drugs
Imported To The Republic Of Ireland....................  289
5.8 Finnish Maritime Drug Seizures by Drug Category, 1985-86 ..... 294
5.9 Modes Of Drug Importation To Canada, 1982 - 1986 ............  301
5.10 Modes Of Drug Importation To The U.S.A., 1982 - 1986 ......... 305
5.11 Modes Of Drug Importation To Australia, 1983 - 1986 .......... 316
5.12 Maritime Modes Of Drug Transport And Concealment In Japan ..... 322
6.1 The Role Of Organization In The Maritime Drug Trade .......... 336
7.1 The Maritime Zones And Areas Codified In UNCLOS III .......... 382
9
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS USED
ACS Australian Customs Service
ADA Administration Des Douanes Et Accises (Belgian)
AFP Australian Federal Police
AJIL American Journal of International Law
Art(s). Article or Articles
ATS Australian Treaty Series
Aus. Australia
Ave. Average
Bevans US Treaties and Other International Agreements of the US
1776 - 1949
BFSP British and Foreign State Papers
BINM Bureau of International Narcotics Matters (US)
BLPES British Library of Political and Economic Science
CCC Customs Cooperation Council
CDS Contraband Detector System
CE Council of Europe
C & E Customs and Excise
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
CICD Centro Investigacao Controle Droga (Portuguese)
Cir. Circuit (US court reference)
Cmnd. United Kingdom Command Papers
CND Commission on Narcotic Drugs
CNS Central Nervous System
Co. Company
Col. column
Com. Commission
CRI Centrale Recherche Informatiedienst (Dutch)
CSS Coastal Security System
CTS Consolidated Treaty Series
CSZ(s) Continental Shelf Zone or Zones
D.C. District of Columbia
DEA Drug Enforcement Administration (US)
Dept. Department
Divs. Divisions
DND Division of Narcotic Drugs
Doc (s). Document or Documents
Dom. Dominican
DPIJ Drug Problems In Japan
Dr. Doctor
d.u. dosage units
ECOSOC Economic and Social Council of the United Nations
ed. edition or editor
EEZ(s) Exclusive Economic Zone or Zones
EFZ(s) Exclusive Fishing Zone or Zones
ENACO Empresa Nacional de la Coca (Peruvian)
EP European Parliament
excl. excluding
10
EYB European Yearbook
FCO Foreign and Commonwealth Office (British)
F.R.G. Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany)
Gen. General (military title)
gm(s). gram or grams
GPCCD Gabinete De Planeamento E De Coordenacao Do Combate A
Droga (Portuguese)
GPO Government Printing Office
h hectare
HCG Hellenic Coast Guard
HC1 HydroChloride
HCT Hertslet's Commercial Treaties
H.K. Hong Kong
HM Her Majesty's
H.R. House Resolution (US)
Hrs. hours
Hudson International Legislation
ICC International Chamber of Commerce
I.C.D.A.I.T. International Conference on Drug Abuse and Illicit 
Trafficking (held in June 1987)
Ice. Icelandic
ICLQ International and Comparative Law Quarterly
IJIL Indian Journal of International Law
ILC International Law Commission
ILM International Legal Materials
ILS International Law Situations
IMO International Maritime Organization
Inc. Incorporated
INCB International Narcotics Control Board
INC-SR International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (US)
INTERPOL International Criminal Police Organization
ISDD Institute for the Study of Drug Dependence (British)
Isl. Island or Islands
JCNSWTF Joint Commonwealth and New South Wales Task Force (Aus.)
JDI Journal du Droit International
JOF Journal Officiel (French)
Just. Justice
Kg(s). kilogram or kilograms
k/h kilograms per hectare
Km(s). kilometer or kilometers
LSD lysergic acid diethylamide
m million (used with monetary terms)
MDA 3, 4-raethylenedioxyamphetamine
MDMA 3, 4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine
MEK methyl ethyl ketone
MHCA Ministry of Health and Consumer Affairs (Spain)
MHW Ministry of Health and Welfare (Japan)
mm millimeter or millimeters
Morph. Morphine
MP(s) Member or Members of Parliament (Britain)
MPO Ministry of Public Order (Greece)
M.Sc. Master of Science (academic degree)
m.t(s). metric ton or tons
m.t./h metric ton(s) per hectare
11
MWHCA Ministry of Welfare, Health and Cultural Affairs (Holland)
N. North
N/A data not available
NDIB National Drug Intelligence Bureau (New Zealand)
NDIE National Drug Intelligence Estimate (Canadian)
NDIU National Drug Intelligence Unit (British)
N.E.I. Netherlands East Indies
NIE Narcotics Intelligence Estimate (US)
n.m(s). nautical mile or miles
NNICC National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee (US)
No. number
NPA National Police Agency (Japanese)
N/R data not reliable
NSCCP National Swedish Council for Crime Prevention
N.S.W. New South Wales (Australia)
NWFP Northwest Frontier Province (Pakistan)
NZ New Zealand
OEGD/O.E.C.D. Organization For Economic Cooperation and Development
ONCB Office of the Narcotics Control Board (Thai)
P- page
para(s). paragraph or paragraphs
PCP Phenocyclidine
Peaslee International Governmental Organizations, 3rd Ed., 1974-6.
PJ Policia Judiciaria (Portuguese)
P.L. Public Law (US)
P.N.G. Papua New Guinea
pp. pages
Pres. President
Qty. Quantity
RCMP Royal Canadian Mounted Police
Rep. Republic
RTAF Recueil des Traites et Accords de la France
S. South
SCANLINK Scandinavian Link Project
SDRI Social Defense Research Institute of the United Nations
Sec. Section
SPO Soil Products Office (Turkish)
sq. square
S.S. Steamship (denotes propulsion system)
St. Saint
Stat. Statistical or Statistics
Stat. US Statutes at Large
Stiras. Stimulants
subpara(s). subparagraph or subparagraphs
Supp. Supplement
THC tetrahydrocannabinol
T.I.A.S. Treaties and other International Acts Series
TNAR Thailand Narcotics Annual Report
trans. translation or translator
TS Territorial Sea
T.S. Treaty Series (US)
U.A.E. United Arab Emirates
UK/U.K. United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
UKHO United Kingdom Home Office
12
UKTS
UN
UNAFEI 
UNCLOS III
United Kingdom Treaty Series 
United Nations
United Nations Asia and Far East Institute for the 
Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982
UNJYB United Nations Juridical Yearbook
UNTS United Nations Treaty Series
US/U.S. United States
U.S.A. United States of America
use United States Code
USCG United States Coast Guard
uses United States Customs Service
U.S.S.R. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
UST United States Treaties
V. versus
Vert A Vertrage der Bundesrenublik Deutschland, Series A
Vol. Volume
Volvon. Volvontatso (Finnish City)
W. West
y year
ZAORV Zeitschrift fur Auslandisches Offentiliches Recht und
Volkerrecht
13
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The author is indebted to a number of individuals, institutions 
and organizations. It was only with their assistance that I was able to 
undertake and complete the research project which this thesis embodies 
in scriptural form. As is only appropriate, I wish to thank the many 
people whom assisted me in one way or another in accomplishing my goal. 
For reasons of security or their preferences for anonymity most of those 
whom assisted me cannot be named. Instead, the agencies under which 
they serve or are affiliated with will be cited.
The author offers a most grateful thanks to the following agencies 
and organizations: the Australian Customs Service; the Australian
Federal Police; the Belgian Administration Des Douanes Et Accises; the 
Bundeskriminalamt in West Germany; the Bundeskriminalamt Liaison Officer 
to New Scotland Yard in London; Canadian Customs & Excise; the Dutch 
Centrale Recherche Informatiedienst; the Finnish Board of Customs; the 
Finnish Central Criminal Police; the French Customs Service; the French 
Embassy in London; the Greek Ministry of Public Order; the Hellenic 
Coast Guard; Her Majesty’s Customs & Excise (U.K.); the Icelandic Minis­
try of Justice; the Irish Garda Siochana; the Italian Embassy in London; 
the Japanese Embassy in London; the Japanese Ministry of Health & 
Welfare; the Japanese National Police Agency; the National Drug Intel­
ligence Bureau in New Zealand; the New Zealand Customs Department; the 
Nordic Council Narcotics Liaison Officer in Greece; the Norwegian 
Politikammer in Oslo; the Portuguese Attorney General’s Office; the Por­
tuguese Gabinete De Planeamento E De Coordenacao Do Combate A Droga; the 
Portuguese Policia Judiciaria; the Singapore Central Narcotics Bureau; 
the Spanish Narcotics Brigade; the Spanish Secretaria General Tecnica of 
the Ministerio Del Interior; the Swedish Board of Customs; the Swedish 
Customs Liaison Officer to HM Customs & Excise in London; the Swedish 
National Police Board; Thailand’s Office of the Narcotics Control Board; 
the Turkish Embassy in London; the US Coast Guard; the US Customs 
Service; and, the US Drug Enforcement Administration. Additionally, a 
very special thanks is given to the UN's Division Of Narcotics Drugs in 
Vienna for the gracious assistance and hospitality accorded the author 
on his visits there.
On the academic side I owe a great deal to Dr. S. K. Chatterjee of 
the Central Polytechnic of London and Prof. D. C. Watt of the London 
School of Economics & Political Science. Without their invaluable 
advice, assistance, guidance, patience and suggestions this thesis would 
never have come into existence.
In all research endeavours of some scope financial resources com­
prise an important component in their attainment. The research work be­
hind this thesis was no exception. I gratefully acknowledge the support 
given to me by the London School of Economics & Political Science 
through their LSE 1980s Fund and, most specially, my parents.
14
Lastly, the author acknowledges Nicole, Pat and Vivian for their 
small but essential contributions to the research project.
In closing this section I must note that while many individuals 
and organizations contributed to the data, facts and text contained in 
this thesis, I, alone, bear responsibility for all that is said and 
projected herein. Any errors whether by commission or omission are to 
be attributed to the author.
B. R. Aune 
London, 1989
15
I. INTRODUCTION.
1.1 Premise Behind This Study
The transport of narcotic drugs by sea is not new or a recent 
trend. It dates back to antiquity. History is full of anecdotes about 
the drug trade. Relative to the other forms of modem transport such as 
motor vehicles, railroads, airplanes and post the maritime medium is the 
oldest. Vessels of one form or another have been utilized for several 
thousand years. Only the use of animals and mankind’s own bodily form 
of locomotion predate the maritime sector. What is new is the diver­
sification in methods of conveyance and concealment utilized and the 
categories of drugs trafficked within the maritime medium. There is an 
entirely new complexity to the trafficking scene. Primarily, this is 
the result of modem technological, industrial, legislative and ad­
ministrative developments interacting with economic motives. Vis-a-vis 
the historical context these dynamic changes and their continual 
propagation in society today may be simply summed up in the phrase ’’the 
world has changed." This reality applies to all facets of life and ac­
tivity inclusive of the drug trade. Commensurate with the changes and 
structuralization of life and activity an inverse relationship of 
progressively stronger anti-drug efforts contraposed by increasingly il­
licit and furtive drug-related activities has materialized. The result 
is that less is known about these underground economic enterprises and 
enforcement is complicated.
The significance of the maritime component of drug trafficking has
16
not been lost. The United Nations through its specialized agency, the 
Division of Narcotic Drugs, has gathered considerable information on the 
maritime drug trade for years.1 It maintains a Commission on Narcotic 
Drugs which in turn is subdivided into units of special interest, one of 
which is the Expert Group on Countermeasures to Drug Smuggling by Air 
and Sea (hereinafter referred to simply as the Air & Sea Group). They 
convene regularly to discuss developments and issues of a direct bearing 
and draft proposed countermeasures. The results are published as agency 
reports.2 Most recently, an international convention has been drafted 
to combat illicit trafficking which includes three maritime related 
articles. Realistically, it stands a fair chance of ratification. The 
question is more a matter of the degree of active application conferred 
and obligated upon the signatories.
On the regional and multilateral level the Council of Europe’s ef­
forts is an example of joint participation against drug trafficking in a 
specific geographical locale. From 1983 to 1988 the Pompidou Group 
worked on drafting a treaty for European waters, but this project was 
terminated in deference to the above-cited multilateral treaty.3 In­
numerable examples of drug control measures abound on the national and 
municipal levels. Collectively, but often misguidedly called national 
policy, they run the gamut from preventive education and public policy 
campaigns to amended or new legal, criminal and penal codes to direct 
counter-offensives and operations. An example of the first are the many 
media campaigns against drug use such as those broadcast on television 
and radio in the U.K., the U.S.A. and Sweden. An example of the latter 
are the sporadic blockades of the Ports of Miami and New York by the US 
Coast Guard.4 For periods of 24 hours at a time on selected days all
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vessels entering these ports are searched for drugs.
Midway through researching this topic the International Conference 
on Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking was held in Vienna in 1987.5 
Fortuitously, the author was able to attend that conference. The oppor­
tune timing of it not only assisted the author’s research but vividly 
demonstrated the importance attached to fighting the drug problem by the 
world community. Being the first and largest of its kind, the 
I.C.D.A.I.T. Conference highlighted the perceived threat from narcotic 
drugs and psychotropic substances. It was well attended by individuals, 
organizations and states of diverse origin, culture and political per­
suasion representing virtually all countries in the world. That con­
ference has become the pivotal axis around which this study derives its 
thrust and momentum. The discourse which ensues in the subsequent pages 
is an indepth study into the maritime trade in illicit drugs. 
Specifically, research and analysis focuses on the trafficking of nar­
cotic drugs and psychotropic substances by maritime modes of conveyance 
and the international legal framework in effect to combat the trade. 
This treatise is divided into two themes of discussion. The first con­
cerns the trade itself of which quantitative and qualitative data 
presented by others are minimal. The other reviews the legal structure 
for suppressing marine drug smuggling which is both unclear and somewhat 
lacking. Among the aspects analysed in detail are the categories of 
drugs transported by sea, annual volumes shipped, classes of vessels 
used, methods of concealment and deception employed, flow routes and 
composite trade matrices, contributing geographical factors and 
attributes, role of organized crime and the international law repressing 
maritime drug smuggling. The drug trafficking situation in various
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states of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development is 
specifically emphasized for reasons explained later in the chapter. It 
is hoped that this treatise will be accepted els the most definitive, 
comprehensive and ’’state of the ELrt” Etnalysis of the naritime drug trade 
- that is its objective.
1.2 Bases For The Study
Two factors have determined the need for this reseELrch. Imprimis, 
there is a lack of published material on the topic. While there hELS 
been a multitude of articles, books, studies ELnd texts on social aspects 
and phenomena related to illicit drugs, there is relatively little on 
the subject of trafficking - especially the maritime component. Con­
sidering that the trafficking component is an essential stEige in the 
process by which drugs come to infiltrate society and create a problem, 
it mandates attention. The second factor is the growing social menEtce 
which drugs pose to society today. The negative sentiments presented in 
literature, projected in public opinion and stated by government leaders 
all attest to a communal and global anti-drug outcry.
1*2,1 Literature Review
In Eissembling a bibliography for this dissertation and referencing 
many of the points stated it became evident that little information in 
either a descriptive, authoritELrian or quantitative format exists in 
relation to the first theme. This should not be construed els meaning 
the data, statistics and documents necessary for preparing such a study 
are non-existent. On the contrary, they do exist, but are incomplete or 
not in a readily understood format. In either case work wels required to
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complete, decipher and translate them into something easily presented 
and grasped. While a reasonable bibliography, in terms of references 
and sources, has been complied, it must be noted that there have been 
very few publications encompassing the scope of the research contained 
herein and none possess the comprehensive detail proffered herein. The 
few publications around today that do focus on the maritime aspect of 
drug trafficking present their findings and viewpoints in a manner 
wholly unsuitable from the perspective of proper scholarly endeavour; 
that is to say, they lack the detailed quantitative and qualitative 
analyses required of true research and for which proper deductive
thought is derived and documented. The majority of them succumb or sub­
scribe to market forces present in selling a commercially successful 
book or owe their origin in faulty format to the profession of the 
author. Most of them deal in sensationalism or are written 
journalistically. High profile and attention-grabbing figures,
intrigues, events and exploits are paraded through the text to hold the
reader’s interest. Moreover, none of them are devoted exclusively to 
the maritime drug trade. Instead, discussion on the subject is
presented in the form of a chapter or as interspersed and anecdotal sen­
tences and paragraphs incorporated into a larger body of text. Examples 
in the 1980s include The Fix.6 Outlaws of the Ocean.7 The Cochin 
Connection,8 The Heroin Trail9 and Drug Trafficking - A North-South 
Perspective.10 For those interested in the historical dimension see:
H. J. Anslinger and W. F. Tompkins’s The Traffic In Narcotics (1953),11 
A. B. Lubbock’s The Opium Clippers (1933),12 D. M’Laren’s The Opium 
Trade (1907),13 J. Goldstein’s Philadelphia And The Opium Trade. 1682 - 
1846 (1978)14 and S. E. Morison’s The Maritime History of Massachusetts
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1783 - 1860 (1921).is
In addition to books and texts there are numerous periodical^ 
which contain articles on drug trafficking. However, as noted above, 
there is a paucity of information on the drug trade by sea. Several 
authors acknowledge the maritime dimension and some cite actual inci­
dents and cases or provide a general synopsis of the role of ships. The 
Bulletin On Narcotics is a noteworthy periodical with frequent articles 
on the trafficking aspect.16 It usually contains good analytical ar­
ticles on trafficking in relation to a specific state or geographical 
area.
The third and most important source of data on trafficking are 
governmental reports and documents. They offer the best up-to-date 
data. Most government agencies and departments concerned with drug mat­
ters publish reports and summaries on the drug scene as it affects their 
domain; and their concomitant activities in dealing with the problem. 
National police forces, intelligence agencies, customs services along 
with special commissions and task forces possessing special anti-drug 
mandates or policy formulation authority are typical examples. They 
proffer the best raw data, statistics and assessments available on the 
smuggling of drugs by sea. However, here too, specific information and 
data may be limited, incomplete or theoretical. It varies from agency 
to agency and state to state. Among the best are the National Drug In­
telligence Estimate and Drug Report published by the Canadians 
annually.17 The American equivalents are the Narcotics Intelligence Es­
timate and Customs U.S.A.18 Drug Problems In Japan is a highly analyti­
cal Japanese publication with excellent statistical data.19 Thailand’s 
Office of the Narcotics Control Board publishes a good annual report.20
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A fair amount of the data presented in this treatise in relation to 
select states comes from the aforementioned sources. For other states, 
though, this is not the case. Their reports are either too general or 
lack data on drugs altogether.
Vis-a-vis the legal theme there is an abundance of published 
materials including books, texts, articles and documents available on 
the subject of narcotics control and legislation. However, a review of * 
them finds little analysis of either maritime anti-drug doctrines or of 
prevailing international legislation as it applies to the maritime com­
ponent of drug smuggling.21 Essentially, there is no comprehensive 
treatise on maritime legislation repressing drug trafficking by sea or 
operational control measures in place to combat that trade. Recent good 
books on the aspect of international legal control of narcotics traf­
ficking include S. K. Chatterjee's Legal Aspects Of International Drug 
Control (1981) and S. D. Stein's International Diplomacy. State Ad­
ministrators and Narcotics Control (1985).22 Neither book specifically 
deals with or elaborates upon the international legislation in effect by 
which states may combat drug trafficking by sea. It is germane to ob­
serve that Chat ter jee agreed on this point in personal conversation with 
the author and further indicated the need for such a study.
Additionally, the DND and EOOSOC provide information on legal and 
penal aspects of drug control through published documents, reports and 
summaries but they are not the most analytical and often incomplete. On 
the national level, governmental reports and documents inclusive of or 
similar to those cited earlier Eire helpful in explaining the law, its 
bases and objectives, but often detail on the functional and hypotheti­
cal applicability of them is lacking.
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1,2.2 The Social Menace Of Illicit Drugs
The second factor endorsing this study is the growing and undeni­
able drug problem in the world. Drug use and abuse are reaching 
epidemic proportions in many countries and one may say they have become 
endemic to society today. Though exact figures are unavailable, it is 
estimated that the total number of drug users in the world is in the 
millions, that the annual production of illicit drugs is in the hundreds 
of thousands of tons annually and that the gross value of the global 
drug industry today is in the vicinity of 350 billion dollars (US$). It 
is clearly evident that drugs are a major source of crime and social 
degeneracy. The illicit status of many narcotic drugs and psychotropic 
substances induces criminal activity and behaviour. The addictive and 
harmful effects of drugs foster destruction of the human mind and body 
and lead to decay of the social fabric of society. One cannot avoid 
hearing of the problem as the media is constantly providing reports and 
details of drug-related incidents. There is not a day which does not 
pass without mention of drug-related events somewhere in the world. The 
scope of the drug problem and its many facets defies cursory 
description. Thousands of articles, books and reports have been pub­
lished to date ranging the gamut from epidemiological studies to law 
reviews to policy doctrines to social commentaries. Because of the ex­
tensive collection of literature on the topic aside from the maritime 
dimension of drug trafficking, it is senseless to duplicate what has 
been said elsewhere several times over. Suffice it to say that drugs 
are one of the more pressing problems facing the human population today 
and in this regard all should be done to understand the problem includ­
ing uncovering the extent to which illicit drugs are shipped by sea. It
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should be obvious that for certain states geographically isolated from 
the production sites of drugs (at least in their raw or crude forms) 
such as Australia, Canada, Iceland, Ireland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, 
Sweden and the U.K. the importation of drugs is limited to either the 
atmospheric or maritime mediums. Consequently, marine drug trafficking 
does play an important role.
1.3 Limitations In Scope Of The Study
This study is limited in scope to the coastal member states of
O.E.C.D. Many factors have necessitated curtailment of the breadth of
research. Imprimis, many states in the world simply do not maintain
records, archives and statistics on the subject - certainly not on a 
level of efficiency one is accustomed to in the ultra-developed Western 
states. Government documentation is poor to non-existent. This is true 
even among certain developed states where you would not expect to find
data problems. In states which are decentralized or republics the
required data may be spread out among a number of provincial government 
seats thus handicapping access to it. Another factor forcing curtail­
ment of the study area is the fact that many states, notably of the 
Third World and Communist Bloc, consider such data sensitive and 
classified. There are other states, the names of which will remain 
anonymous, whose governments or officials thereof are corrupt and ac­
tively involved in drug trafficking. For some states drug production 
and smuggling are ways of earning foreign exchange. While their govern­
ments do not officially condone drug trafficking they do little to ar­
rest it. For the researcher this means there is little chance of ob­
taining legitimate facts and figures. A third reason for limiting the
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scope is that some countries only offer up information, data and statis­
tics which are biased in their favour for whatever grounds they have 
decided to so. As to why states do this one can only speculate upon, 
but fear of embarrassment is undoubtedly a factor. Alternatively, false 
information may be proffered to give the appearance of political 
stability or social reform being extant. Countries which are bene­
ficiaries of foreign or international aid have a specific motive to do 
so since the provision of such aid may be contingent upon progressive
developments internally. Obviously, for the researcher this is un­
desirable as studies are tainted and the findings prejudiced.
In providing reasons for limiting the scope of the research the 
question naturally arises as to why study the maritime drug trade of the 
coastal member states of O.E.C.D. The answer is comprised of several 
factors. First, the O.E.C.D. represents 24 countries, primarily of the 
Western world, where the awareness of drugs and the perceived threat 
from them is greatest. It is not by coincidence that the majority of 
information concerning drugs and various drug-related phenomena come 
from OECD states. Collectively, the majority of OECD states epitomize 
the Western world and all its commensurate successes and shortcomings. 
In other words, they represent a unified political, economic, social and 
cultural sphere - and in light of their position on the planet they sure 
the most important indicator of stability or change. From an economic
standpoint they alone account for nearly 67.7% of all economic produc­
tivity in the world.23 An analysis of the political structures extant 
in OECD states demonstrates an overall preponderance for parliamentary 
democracy - which is perceived to be the ideal political system. A 
threat of disintegration or destruction of the moral fibre of Western
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0society as posed by drugs, both from the criminal and physical 
perspectives, is a threat to world order. As such, the OECD states are 
an index by which to measure the deterioration of society as a whole. 
Though this may sound like the whimsical, fanciful and banal gibberish 
of a neurotic pessimist or rightwing pro-establishment radical it is not 
fiction that all levels of governments and many international organiza­
tions spend a considerable amount of time, effort and money on attempts 
to control a growing problem with marginal to diminishing success.
While the O.E.C.D. comprises predominantly Western states it also 
represents a diverse cross-section of the world’s states. Some have 
distinct political, economic, social and cultural characteristics. They 
are also far-flung encompassing a number of regions and continents. The 
U.S.A., West Germany and Japan typify the ultra-developed states, yet 
are culturally different and found on different continents; Portugal, 
Greece and Turkey are developing states with internal political strife 
and the latter two feuding; and Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden are 
exemplary of the socialistic doctrine. These unique distinctions among 
OECD states are similar to the differences and diversities between 
states outside the organization. For those Third World countries, 
isolationist states and hard-core communist nations not typified by an 
OECD state and not adversely affected by a drug problem, the drug 
dilemma facing the OECD states serves as an example of what may happen 
and, in that sense, is indicative of the future if drugs Eire not brought 
under better control.
In studying the OECD states it must not be construed that the rest 
of the world will be omitted. In fact the nature of the maritime drug 
trade prohibits such ignorance. Rather, this study focuses on the OECD
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states as drug consumers. The fact that a majority of drugs originate 
from outside OECD states requires that the producer, exporter and tran-i 
sit states be pinpointed and the trade patterns defined. Efforts in 
drug control including police actions, bilateral agreements and interna­
tional conventions have been effected outside the O.E.C.D. which affect 
the overall maritime drug trade and thus have a bearing on any review on 
the subject. A further limitation on the scope of the study is prompted 
by the geography of the OECD states. By definition, maritime trade can 
only occur between states which abut the sea - or more precisely put, 
coastal states. Of the 24 countries constituent in O.E.C.D., Austria, 
Luxembourg and Switzerland are land-locked. Hence, these three are not 
included per se, but any riparian and lacustrine drug trafficking of 
note is cursorily mentioned. Therefore, the following 21 states are the 
focus of the study: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland,
France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, the United Kingdom, 
the United States and West Germany. Another limitation to be fully un­
derstood is that the focus of this study is on the marine trafficking of 
illicit narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. The timeframe is 
the present which means the 1980s. Although it may seem redundant to 
state, this is not a study of drugs, drug use and abuse, drug 
rehabilitation and domestic drug control unless the latter is of a spe­
cial marine orientation. Neither is this a study in the maritime com­
merce of pharmaceutical drugs or supplies except where they are stolen 
and diverted for illicit consumption. Nor is the author attempting to 
make any social statements about drugs. It is accepted that drugs are 
harmful to the body, detrimental to society and provoke criminal
behaviour. Simply put, this is a research treatise on the maritime 
trade of an illicit commodity.
A final limitation concerns the degree of accuracy which one may 
hope to attain in such a study. In response to questions of accuracy 
the following caveat is proffered and quoted from the Narcotics Intel­
ligence Estimate 1984:
’’Since production and distribution of illicit drugs are, by 
definition, illegal, there are little reliable data upon which 
to base estimates of the quantities of drugs involved. Most 
of those statistics which are available tend to reflect the 
results of law enforcement activity (e.g. the numbers of indi­
viduals arrested, quantities of drugs and assets seized, and 
conveyances from which seizures were made). They do not re­
flect the quantities of drugs which were not interdicted and 
which consequently were assumed to have entered user popula­
tions Because of gaps in some of the data used to derive
the estimates, there is a high degree of uncertainty to the 
resulting estimates. It is believed, however, that they are 
sufficiently accurate that the general trends portrayed can 
be considered to be reliable. Separate data bases and metho­
dologies are used to produce separate estimates of drug pro­
duction and use.”24
The figures, statistics, trade patterns and other data offered herein 
will undoubtedly be lacking in the quantitative sense as they only 
reflect interception results but, and this is a big but, their value in 
a qualitative sense is unsurpassed and irrefutable. Where feasible, to 
resolve the problem of differing databases and compilation metho­
dologies, the data has been reconciled to a standardized format. Hence, 
the data presented is in harmony and the comparative analyses are valid.
1.4 Research Methodologies Utilized
A good portion of the research necessitated original investigation 
of government documents, files, reports and statistics along with per­
sonal interviews of officials involved in drug control. This was par-
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ticularly the case with the part of the study concerned with the actual 
trade. A major portion of the research was of the investigatory nature 
where the source had to be determined, the raw data located, then 
extracted, analysed and, lastly, arranged into a format of presentation 
representative of the points to be portrayed. Visits were required to 
the appropriate agencies in various countries and to pertinent interna­
tional organizations. In other cases, correspondence by post and
diplomatic channels sufficed for obtaining the data sought after. Where
fieldwork was conducted, the data was derived by sifting through 
documents, files, records and by interviews. Participation in actual 
marine drug patrols and raids were an adjunct aspect done to give the 
author a real sense of the enforcement dimension. For the part of the 
research dealing with the legal framework literary sources tended to 
prevail. In some instances, original fieldwork, usually done simul­
taneously with the above research, was required in order to obtain the 
latest doctrines and codes, or clarification of them. Law texts, treaty 
series, official documents, legal and criminal codes as well as general 
publications on the topic were reviewed. This portion of the research 
was of the more passive and typical scholarly nature. The sections
herein of a purely descriptive nature Eire based on materials found in a 
general survey of literature on the topic under review. To insure that 
all feasible avenues of finding data and reference sources were
traversed library card catalogues, literary reference indexes and com­
puter publication databases were all consulted.
1. 5 The Research Questions
In all research endeavours certain unanswered questions in the
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researchers’ minds preface all inquiry into the subjects under 
investigation. The research upon which this treatise is founded is no 
exception. Several lines of query existed in the author’s mind concern­
ing the maritime drug trade. Instead of discussing them individually at 
length the principal questions to be addressed are simply but formally 
set forth below.
1) Why is such a study of value?
2) What is the objective of this study?
3) What has been the history of drug smuggling by sea?
4) How has geography fostered the illicit drug trade by sea?
5) What are the geopolitical and economic factors involved?
6) How do free trade zones support drug smuggling by sea?
7) Which categories of drugs are heavily trafficked via the sea­
borne modes of conveyance and what are the volumes involved?
8) Why are vessels a successful mode of drug trafficking?
9) What are the classes of vessels utilized in maritime drug 
smuggling?
10) What are the principal trafficking routes by sea and why?
11) What are the predominant modes of shipment, concealment and 
deception employed to effect successful conveyance?
12) What is the extent of maritime drug trafficking amongst the 
coastal member states of O.E.C.D.?
13) What are the differences in the maritime trafficking scenes 
amongst the respective coastal member states of O.E.C.D. and 
why?
14) What role does organized crime play in the maritime trade of 
illicit drugs?
15) What is the international law for suppressing the trafficking 
of illicit drugs by sea?
16) Is the extant international law an effective suppressant of the 
illicit drug trade? And, if not, why not?
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17) What does the future hold in store in terms of seeing the 
maritime trade in illicit drugs brought under control?
18) Can the maritime trafficking pf drugs be stopped and, if not, 
why not?
19) What recommendations can be made which, if implemented, may 
better suppress the illicit drug trade by sea?
Within the pages of this thesis the objective is to answer these ques­
tions in a definitive and concise manner.
1.6 Working Definitions For Select Terms Used In Treatise
A final task to be done before proceeding is to provide working 
definitions for six locutions and terms used frequently herein. This is 
essential because in many cases there is more than one meaning or nuance 
to a locution or term depending on how it is used or the subject to 
which it is applied or the background of the user. The definitions 
presented below do not necessarily represent the complete body or scope 
of meaning to the respective terms and words listed. Nor is it sug­
gested that the definitions proffered are the most precise in either 
legal, pharmacological, scientific or technical terms. However, rela­
tive to the research topic and how the respective locutions and terms 
are used, the definitions provided are both appropriate and correct.
As used herein, the term "narcotic drug(s)" refers to all sub­
stances which numb the senses, induce lethargy and drowsiness or coma, 
if ingested in large doses, and relieve pain. The large number of drugs 
under this classification defies description. For the purposes of this 
thesis all the substances listed in Schedules I, II, III and IV of the 
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs. 196125 along with others of that 
ilk not listed therein shall be deemed narcotic drugs.
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As used herein, the term "psychotropic substance(s)" refers to all 
drugs which actively change the consciousness of an individual when con­
sumed (ie. the consciousness of the consumer has been altered for the 
duration of the drug’s presence in a potent form in the body). The num­
ber of drugs under this classification defies description. For the pur­
poses of this thesis all the substances listed in Schedules I, II, III 
and IV of the Convention On Psychotropic Substances 197la 6 along with 
others of that ilk not listed therein shall be deemed psychotropic 
substances.
As used herein, "cannabis" is a generic name for all forms of the 
hemp plant cannabis sativa L. containing the alkaloid tetrahydrocan­
nabinol. In actuality, cannabis has a myriad of diverse names.
Basically, the distinction in nomenclature stems either from phar­
macological differences in potency or because of diversity in the 
etymology and vernacular of the various terms for cannabis found in dif­
ferent languages. In english, the common terms and synonyms for can­
nabis are hashish, marijuana and sinsemilla.
As used herein, "opiates" is a generic term embracing all narcotic 
drugs which have as their natural origin the poppy plant papaver som- 
niferum L. Among the substances derived from this plant and subsumed 
under the term in this thesis are codeine, opium, morphine, heroin and 
hydromorphone.
As used herein, the term "commercial carriers" embraces all 
registered merchant vessels engaged in bonafide trade either of the 
liner category or tramp category.
As used herein, the term "private vessels" refers to all vessels, 
both registered and unregistered, which are not formally engaged in
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commerce, but which have assumed an explicit but covert role in the 
transport of illicit drugs. Military craft and other government vessels 
sire not included within the scope of this term.
Notes And References For Chapter I.
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early 1920s.
2. See for example: UN Docs. DND/WP. 1985/10, DND/WP. 1985/11 and 
E/CN.7/1986/11/Add.3.
3. See: Council of Europe/Pompidou Group Doc. P-PG (87) 7 of 27 March 
1987.
4. Fran time to time the USCG institutes unannounced blockades of these 
ports and searches all vessels entering them for illicit drugs. 
Generally, the emphasis is on the private craft and those commercial 
carriers which either have arrived from known source areas abroad or
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(University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1978).
15. S. E. Morison, The Maritime History of Massachusetts 1783 - 1860 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1921).
16. The Bulletin On Narcotics is published by the DND in Vienna, 
Austria on a quarterly basis though since 1986 the issues have been less 
frequent due to budgetary constraints within the UN.
17. For recent examples refer: RCMP, NDIE 1987/88 (Ottawa, 1988) and 
Canadian Customs & Excise, 1987 Drug Report (Ottawa, 1988).
18. For recent examples refer: NNICC, The NNICC Report 1987
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(Washington, D.C., 1989).
19. For a recent issue refer: NPA, DPIJ 1986 (Tokyo, 1986).
20. For a recent issue refer: ONCB, TNAR 1985 (Bangkok, 1986).
21. Just as this thesis was completed and being prepared for submission 
a couple of articles on the maritime component did appear. However, 
they do little more than provide a cursory review of the applicability 
of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 (Qnnd. 8941) and UK-US 
Exchange of Notes concerning Co-operation in the Suppression of the Un­
lawful Importation of Narcotic Drugs of 13 November 1981 (Cmnd. 8470) to
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Gilmore, "Narcotics interdiction at sea," Marine Policy, Vol. 13, No. 3 
(July 1989), pp. 218-230 and U. Leanza, "Policing the Sea - Foreign 
navigation viewed from the point of view of the law of the sea," Inter­
national Criminal Police Review. No. 416 (January-February 1989), pp. 9-
17.
22. Refer: S. K. Chatterjee, Legal Aspects Of International Drug Con­
trol (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981) and S. D. Stein, International 
Diplomacy, State Administrators and Narcotics Control (London: Gower, 
1985).
23. Percentage figure is derived from data found in The Economist's The 
World in Figures (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1987).
24. NNICC, NIE.1984 (Washington, D.C., 1985), p. i.
25. 520 UNTS 204; UKTS 23 (1979); 18 UST 1407; ATS 31 (1967); 2 Ind JIL
104; 1969 RTAF 32; T.I.A.S. No. 6298; 45 Vert A 612.
26. 1019 UNTS 175; 32 UST 543; Cmnd. 7330; 10 ILM 261; JOF 19 Jan 77;
1977 RTAF 9; T.I.A.S. No. 9725; 55 Vert A 724.
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II. HISTORY OF MARITIME DRUG SMUGGLING.
2.1 Overview Of The Historical Context And Concept
Providing a detailed account of the history of the maritime drug 
trade is, unfortunately, beyond the scope of this treatise. However, 
neither can the historical context be fully ignored, particularly as 
aspects of the modern drug trade have their origins in the past. The 
use of narcotic drugs dates back to the origin of man. The primitive­
ness of early human existence was of such harshness that preliterate man 
consumed natural narcotic and psychotropic substances as a means of al­
leviating the consonant anguishes of life.1 The paucity of data to be 
found in early records, literature and artifacts regarding the consump­
tion and flow of narcotic substances sustains our lack of understanding 
about drug use in historical times. Consequently, the time-frame for 
when drugs first began to flow between points with some form of 
regularity such that it can be said a drug trade existed is, from the 
standpoint of precision, undefinable. Before going any further, a 
couple of important points of clarification are required. The first 
concerns the definition and scope of the terms "drug." Because of 
scientific and technological advancements in the past one hundred years, 
give or take a little depending on the subject, it is only today that we 
categorize drugs so precisely. The terms "narcotic" and "psychotropic" 
not to mention all the diverse chemical, pharmacological and 
behavioural-effect terms used now did not exist in the earlier periods
of history. Neither did the myriad of drugs we have today which are 
either wholly synthetic or chemical derivatives of some natural drug, 
plant or organic substance. Hence, the drugs referred to in historical 
documents and studies are strictly natural substances which, without un­
dergoing refinement, produced the effects experienced today from cur­
rently consumed narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. Poppy 
juice, crude opium and cannabis are the prime examples of naturally oc­
curring narcotic drugs consumed early on. Belladonna, gingseng, 
henbane, peyote, snakeroot and soma are additional examples of the mul­
titude of other natural substances extant and frequently consumed in 
historical periods which induced either a narcotic or psychotropic 
effect, but which are not commonly recognized as potent drugs today. 
The second point to be remembered is that the use of these early nar­
cotic and psychotropic substances was not illegal. In other words, they 
were not prohibited from use though in some cases restricted to select 
castes and classes of people. To the contrary, they were often socially 
accepted and important components of early tribal and societal rituals. 
Religious rites, official ceremonies, social gatherings and private 
parties were all occasions for drug use. The notion that certain sub­
stances were elixirs of passion which inflamed one's sexual prowess and 
ability promoted their consumption. More sedate uses were as medicines, 
cures and therapies for an array of afflictions. Furthermore, it should 
be observed that even in the early societies and cities there existed 
subcultures of individuals who lacked the ability to deal with life be­
cause of circumstance, class structure, poverty or physical ailment and 
resultantly resorted to drug use as a method of coping. This situation 
of then is identical to the problems we have today concerning inner-city
blight, social decay and the young. In summary, there was nothing il­
licit about the production, transport and consumption of drugs and to
use the term "smuggling" or "trafficking" is, with few exceptions, in­
appropriate for describing the early movement of drugs.
2.2 The Earliest Incidences
Having said the above and considering the topic of this thesis, 
the discussion naturally swings to the question of how, when and where 
did drug smuggling first commence. The first documented occurrence - 
period is a better word - of drug smuggling dates back to the days of 
the Roman Empire. However, the basis behind it is totally dissimilar to 
that behind the illicit drug trade of today. During the Social War in
89 B.C. a brief prohibition was placed on the importation of the drug 
unguenta exotica, an ointment, and foreign perfumes to Rome.2 This 
socio-economic legislation was promulgated to preserve currency which 
had become scarce; the reason for banning the drug was because it was 
expensive and contributed to currency depletion.
The next documented occurrence of true drug smuggling by sea dates 
to the late 17th century. Again, the basis for it was not analogous to 
that behind the trafficking of drugs today but a politico-economic
situation of the period. Following the decline of Arab superiority in 
Indian Ocean commerce the Portuguese had become the dominant force in 
the region. One of their primary trade objectives was to develop an ex­
clusive export trade in opium between their colonies of Damam and Goa in 
India and China.3 By the 1600s opium had become a problem in China, but 
with the advent of opium smoking in 1683 it quickly escalated in mag­
nitude to a dilemma of addiction.4 It is here that the first instance
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of drug smuggling in the true essence of the meaning occurs. The 
problem was that the Arabs who had enjoyed a lucrative trade in opium 
with China for centuries did not relinquish such activity easily. 
Therefore, to protect their maritime commerce and ensure revenue for the 
Crown, the Portuguese imposed restrictions on the Arab dhow traders and 
categories of cargoes they could transport.5 The Arabs naturally dis­
regarded the regulations and henceforth were engaged in the carriage of 
illicit commodities (from the European point of view) to prohibited 
Asian ports.6 Subsequently, the Portuguese shipping of opium to China 
likewise fell into disrepute in 1729 when Emperor Yung Cheng issued the 
first edict declaring opium-smoking and opium dens illegal.7 It is at 
this point in history that the concept of drug trafficking first begins 
to emerge. The banning of opium use in China meant two things.
Imprimis, for the first time recognition had been given by a society to
the deleterious effects the drug posed to it and steps were taken to ban 
the drug on those grounds alone. Secondly, by virtue of the decree the 
trade in opium to China was no longer justifiable and thus assumed a
sinister dimension. It must, however, be noted that the carriage of
opium by sea had not at this stage become illegal because the edict did 
not extend to that aspect. Furthermore, there was no global or interna­
tional scope to these developments since they only involved China and 
its opium trade.
It was not until 1796 when the Chinese banned opium importation 
that drug trafficking in the true meaning of the term first commenced.® 
Hereafter, the opium trade was illicit and strictly a drug trafficking 
enterprise. This point in time laid the foundation for all the conten­
tious debate, negotiations and conflict over opium which subsequently
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ensued through history in legal and political circles, social institu­
tions and international forums. The emergence of Great Britain in the 
India-China opium trade, following the demise of the Portuguese in the 
late 18th century, only saw the trade purposefully and zealously 
developed into an industry of gargantuan proportions. The British East 
India Co. owes its entire success to that trade.
2. 3 The Opium Wars Era
The British trade in opium escalated dramatically in the early 
1800s. All attempts by the Chinese to halt the flow of opium only 
proved futile. As Table 2.1 depicts, opium importation grew rapidly in
Table 2.1 The Maritime Opium Trade To China In The 19th Century.
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the period prior to the Opium Wars. Subsequently, it continued upward 
to even higher annual volumes. Besides the India-China opium trade 
there existed a Turkey-China opium trade. Comparatively speaking, it 
was minor, in the hands of the Americans and visible only in the early 
part of the 19* h century. Turkish opium was deemed inferior to Indian 
opium and consequently its importation remained insignificant compared 
with the latter.9 In 1833 - 1834 Turkish opium amounted to only 4% by 
value of total opium imports to China.10
The illegal nature of the opium trade nurtured the development of 
fast ships. The slow British indiamen were supplanted by fast clipper 
ships. Baltimore brigs and Boston clipper schooners in the 1830s 
through 1840s built for speed with fast turnaround times in mind and 
reduced cargo capacity became the mainstay of US involvement. The 
British constructed clipper-rigged brigs, barks and schooners with the 
same emphasis on sleek design. India and Burma built clippers as well, 
but they were employed by British dominated companies sailing under the 
British colonial flags. The topsail schooner, designed for speed and 
built on the coast of Britain, became the preferred vessel in the 
1850s.11 They were armed and cost more per ton to build than the finest 
yachts of the period.12 Chinese vessels which lightered the big ships 
and did the actual landings of opium within China included Canton fast- 
boats, junks, lorchas, sampans, smug boats, and tanka-boats. Indian 
wallachs were also used. American pilot boats were another fast vessel 
employed for drug-running into China.13 The crews of these trans­
shipment vessels were locals. In regards to the long-haul clippers and 
schooners, the officers were of the same nationality as the vessel’s 
country of registry. The ethnic composition of the crews varied while
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in other cases there was homogeneity in nationality based on the flag 
stated ethnic or racial structure. Examples of crew nationalities in-, 
elude British, American, French, Dutch, Portuguese, Greek, Chinese, 
Indian, Malay, Burmese, Filipino and Lascar seafarers.
Because much has been written about the opium wars and the many 
intrigues and issues related to it, little will be said here.14 The 
First Opium War (1839 - 1842) resulted from the opium embargo the
Chinese implemented in 1838 in Canton which the British opium traders 
took great exception to. It ended with a decisive victory for the 
British and the signing of the Treaty of Nanking.15 Opium importation 
per se was not legalized. However, for the Chinese to actively inter­
fere with such activity was deemed foolhardy in lieu of Britain’s 
military superiority. The reason for Britain and its allies not pursu­
ing the legalization of opium trafficking was that they expected the 
liberalized trade policy in legitimate cargoes to be more than adequate 
from an economic standpoint. In subsequent years the opium trade 
resumed full operation. Internal strife and rebellion in China in the 
early 1850s coupled with bitterness over the loss of prestige incurred 
and trade concessions made in the First Opium War fostered smouldering 
discontent in China. Trade relations remained a major irritant. In 
1856 a local dispute in Canton between foreign traders and the Chinese 
precipitated the Second Opium War or Arrow War as some call it. This 
time British and French forces together went into China and after four 
years succeeded in taking Beijing. The 1858 Treaties of Tientsin, which 
had been signed in the middle of the war, but not fully respected, 
opened more ports to trade and formally legalized opium trading. The 
1860 Treaty of Peking reinforced the prior ones and ceded Kowloon to
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Britain.16 In subsequent years, a number of countries concluded 
treaties on commerce and trade with China which effectively legitimized 
the trade in opium by sea.17 Additionally, the French established their 
own opium monopoly in Indo-China along lines similar to that of the 
British one in India. In hopes of obtaining revenue from the legalized 
opium trade China instituted a tariff on opium imports.18 Opium became 
China’s biggest import in monetary terms in the period 1875 - 1885.19 
It was not until 1908 that opium importation stopped. A combination of 
pressure by native opium growers on the Chinese government and rampant 
cultivation of opium within China made importation a senseless 
enterprise. Instead, China became a major exporter in the later decades 
with Southeast Asia and the U.S.A. becoming its best customers. Between 
1871 - 1884 opium exports to the latter averaged 34.5 m.ts. annually.20
2 . 4 The Persian Gulf In The Late 1800s
One other important area of opium commerce in the 19* h century was 
the Middle East. Opium was produced in Iran in considerable quantities. 
Precise quantitative figures are unavailable. Transported overland to 
the ports of Bushire and Bandar Abbas, opium was then distributed by 
dhows within the Persian Gulf and exported to the westcoast of India in 
the 1850s.21 Muscat in Oman became a major entrepot trading centre for 
drug trading and in the 1850s more than 800 kgs. of opium were shipped 
from Persian ports.22 It is worth observing that the . Iran-Oman trade 
was legal. From Muscat opium was shipped licitly and illicitly by dhows 
to India, Kenya, Pakistan and Zanzibar.23 Among the ports involved in 
the opium trade were Karachi, Kutch, Malabar and Mombasa along with 
those mentioned above. At an agreed price the dhow traders would
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transport anything and everything without much query. Figure 2.1 
depicts the Persian opium trade. The Persian opium trade of the period 
was heavily dependent on the use of a multitude of diverse local craft 
and vessels. The types of vessels utilized were basically determined by 
the trade points and the locally-evolved designs found therein. Table
2.2 lists them.
Figure 2.1 The Persian Opium Trade Of The Late 19th And Early 20th 
Centuries.
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Table 2.2 Vessels Employed In The Persian Opium Trade.
baghlah —j
boom all are forms of 
mashua Iranian dhows 
sarabuk— ■
boom - Arab dhow form 
lancha - Arabian fishing boat 
belem - Iraqi trading craft 
of Shatt-al-Arab
kotia - Indian dhow form 
jahazi - Kenyan (Lamu) dhow form 
mtepe - Kenyan sewn boat 
dau - Zanzibari dhow 
dau la mtepe - East African boat 
shewe - similar to sambuk but of 
East African design
Source: E. B. Martin & C. P. M 
Elm Tree Books, 1978).
lartin. Cargoes Of The East (London:
2.5 The Early Twentieth Century
Throughout the first half of the 20th century the maritime traf­
ficking of drugs continued but became more diversified. Heroin, mor­
phine and cocaine, along with other newly developed narcotic and 
psychotropic substances, became prevalent drugs of abuse. Drug consump­
tion was no longer an activity confined to a few states or regions but a 
world-wide phenomenon. Slowly, but surely, a global anti-drug doctrine 
began to form. Anti-drug laws were promulgated and counter-smuggling 
actions were instituted by several states. On the international level 
the League of Nations worked hard at developing international consensus 
on the issue and promoting international drug agreements. For a list of 
treaties concluded during this period the reader is directed to Appendix 
Table II. The net effect of all these developments was the affirmation 
of drug trafficking as an illicit enterprise. . Because maritime commerce 
was the only means of effective and economic transport of commodities 
and passengers, both inter-regionally and intercontinentally, in the 
first half of the century, it was only natural and inevitable that drug 
trafficking by sea was rampant. However, compared to the volume of 
opium transported in the 19l h century, the total quantity of drugs
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smuggled by sea in the first half of the 20th century was relatively 
small. Table 2.3 summarizes the significant maritime trafficking routes 
of the mid-1920s based on seizure data.
Table 2.3 Principal Trafficking Routes By Sea In 1925.
Route Kiniaua Quantity Categories Of Drugs Trafficked In Percent (X)
(froa) - (to) Trafficked (kgs.) Opium Morph ine Heroin Cocaine Cannabis
China - Indonesia 49,593.7 100.0
China - Singapore 9.758.8 99.9 0.1
Belgiun - Singapore 1,131.1 1 0 0 . 0
Belgiua - Cuba 600.7 100.0
Israel - Egypt 583.3 100.0
Hong Kong - Australia 407 .7 100.0
India - Sri Lanka 352.3 96.8 3.2
Japan - China 339.0 1.6 20.3 53.9 24.2
Netherlands - China 304.8 100.0
Netherlands - New York 280.6 56.7 43.3
India - B u m 174.7 73.7 26.3
Hong Kong - China 173.5 14.4 85.6
Geraany - China 133.3 97.7 2.3
Geraany - Canada 125.0 1 r : rfi
Geraany - Hong Kong 100.4 1 0 0 . 0
Japan - Singapore 91.7 100.0
China - Hong Kong . 58.9 15.3 84.7
Singapore - Australia 45.8 100.0
Japan - India 45.3 100.0
India - China 38.4 100.0
China * India 33.7 95.8 4.2
India - Mauritius 30.0 U l J d U v L l l  i C U
Belgium - China 24.5 100.0 i
Note: The Quantitative :igures presented are only seiz ure figures. It aust be assuaed that
the actual figures were considerably higher - perhaps by a aultiplicative factor of as
high as 20. This does not, however, prevent the segregation of trafficking routes
since the premise used is that the seized drugs and the facts surrounding their aove-
nent are a microcosm of the real situation.
2.6 The Post-World War II Era
2.6.1 The Late 1940s
Opium remained the principal drug transported by sea followed, to 
a much lesser degree, by cannabis. Heroin and morphine ran a distant 
third and fourth respectively. However, bearing in mind the potency
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factor of the latter two drugs vis-a-vis opium and cannabis, it should 
be interpreted that the quantities shipped were substantial. Table 2.4
provides a statistical summary of maritime drug seizures for select 
years between 1922 - 1979. In the latter part of the 1940s during the
Table 2.4 Maritime Drug Seizures For Select Years, 1922 - 1979.
- - - - - Cannabis Cocaine Opiua Morphine Beroin Others Global Suas
Year (kgs.) (kgs.) (kgs.) (kgs.) (kgs.) (kgs.) (kgs.)
1922 20.0 97.4 466 .1 390.2 753 .7 0 1,727.4
1923 0 33.4 5,539.7 703 .7 525 .8 87.8 6,890.4
1924 12.7 83.3 10.677.1 457 .0 123,7 3.8 11,357.6
1925 598.9 326.0 57,949.1 1,504.9 490..4 5.5 60,874.8
1946 2,276.6 0.6 10,177.4 0.7 566.2 0 13,041.5
1947 699 .9 0.9 3,379.6 130.7 5.5 21.1 (Cd) 4.737.7
1948 2,002.5 2.7 20,142.0 27.2 20.9 0 22,195.3
1949 2,147.9 8.7 3,074.2 1.3 8.9 0.8 5,241.8
1950 2,231.4 0.3 4,256.8 29.1 32.8 0.4 6.550.8
1951 1,805.9 0.1 2.852.6 19.3 36.2 0 4,714.1
1952 1.950.9 0.4 4,384.5 137.3 9.7 0 6,482.8
1953 749.9 0 2,507.1 57.9 34.9 0 3,349.8
1954 990.2 0.3 4,703.9 20.3 13.5 0 5,728.2
1955 827 .3 0 4,607.3 16.3 30.0 0.2 5,481.7
1956 1.099.9 0 3.581.4 39.4 84.6 0.3 4,805.6
1957 455.8 0 9,648.9 143.0 66.3 0.9 10,314.9
1958* 118.6 2.3 3,899.7 51.9 20.6 0 4.093.1
I960* 304 .3 0 2,912.0 241.8 34.0 0 3,492.1
1961 619.8 1.6 2,380.1 64.3 17.2 0 3.083.0
1962 750.5 5.8 6,369.3 61.2 55.9 0 7,242.7
1963 8.532.3 5.0 2,574.1 194.6 11.6 44.9 (B) 11.362.5
1971 3,271.7 2.5 54.2 362.6 270.2 0 3,961.2
1972 16,351.0 2.0 1,140.7 125.8 743.8 0 18,363.3
1973 38,296.6 53.1 7,236.9 311.2 64.2 36.0 (D) 45,998.0
1974 28,325.5 7.3 204.8 0.1 7.5 0.7 (S) 28,545.9
1975 51,846.1 60.8 5.6 0 4.9 1.2 (S) 51,918.6
1976 167,804.7 3.7 690.7 169,2 281.3 10.3 (S) 168,959.9
1977 583,659.4 3.1 113.9 3.2 27.0 691.3 (Me/S) 584,497.9
1978 1,720,531.6 90.7 119.1 0 52.1 1.9 (S) 1,720,795.3
1979 1,411,273.0 40.3 7,408.5 10.2 9.5 244.9 (D/P) 1,418,986.4
B = Barbi tone Cd = Codeine D = Depressants Me = Methaqualone
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 8 = stiwulants_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ P = Other psychotropic substances_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
* - Figures for these years are ainiaua figures due to incoaplete data._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Sources: Data for years 1922 - 1925 derived froa LN Docs. 0.C.294.1925.11.1; O.C.294(a).1926.XI.2: 
1 O.C.294(b)(1).1926.ZI.2(a). Data for years 1946 - 1979 derived froa UK Docs. B/NS 
Series for years 1946 - 1980 and USCG’s General Law Enforceaent Digest of Interdiction 
Statistics of 16 January 1987 (Washington, D.C.).
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years 1946 - 1949 a total of 45.2 m.ts. of illicit drugs were inter­
dicted in the maritime sector. Of that total, opium accounted for 82.4% 
of all maritime seizures while cannabis accounted for an additional 
15.8%. During that four-year period opium seizures averaged more than
9.3 m.ts. annually while cannabis seizures averaged nearly 1.8 m.ts. 
annually. Based on quantity confiscated Singapore was the principal 
state effecting maritime seizures followed by Egypt, Japan and India out 
of the 44 countries and territories reporting such confiscatures. 
Collectively, these four states accounted for 90.1% of all maritime drug 
seizures effected in the world during that period. However, when ana­
lysed by drug category it becomes evident that other countries and ter­
ritories figured prominently in the maritime drug trade of the late 
1940s. Figure 2.2 provides a categorical analysis of state involvement.
Figure 2.2 Principal States Effecting Maritime Drug Seizures By Drug 
Category In The Period 1946 - 1949.
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2.6.2 The 1950s
Overall, the 1950s reflected a congruous state of affairs to that 
of the 1940s regarding the maritime trafficking of drugs. The primary 
change in the global trafficking scene was the emergence of the air sec­
tor as an important mode of drug transport. Consequently, as the 
volumes of drugs produced and trafficked grew, the maritime sector did 
not experience a commensurate increase in its role. In the early days 
of passenger and cargo carriage by air control at airports was neither 
the formalized nor sophisticated system which would evolve in later 
decades. This lax state of affairs permitted a fair amount of drug 
trafficking; the scope of which may only be speculated upon because 
successful shipments went undetected. However, extrapolation of data on 
the frequency of drug seizures effected from air transport indicate the 
role to have been large.
Opium and cannabis remained the principal drugs trafficked by sea 
followed distantly by morphine and heroin. In the period 1950 - 1958 a 
total of 51.5 m.ts. of illicit drugs were interdicted in the maritime 
sector. Opium accounted for 78.5% of all maritime seizures while can­
nabis accounted for 19.9%. However, in comparison to that of the late 
1940s these percentages denote a perceptible change indicative of the 
decline in opium and rise in cannabis. The 3.9% drop in opium seizures 
was virtually wholly accounted for by the 4.1% increase in cannabis 
seizures. During the nine-year period opium seizures averaged nearly
4.5 m.ts. per annum while cannabis confiscatures averaged 1.1 m.ts. 
annually. In volumetric terms, Thailand, Singapore, Egypt and Hong Kong 
were the principal states effecting maritime drug seizures. 
Collectively, they accounted for 62.6% of all such seizures. Table 2.5
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lists the top ten states effecting such seizures. When the same 
analysis is conducted based on the type of drug instead of a lump group­
ing a ruore diversified picture is elicited. Figure 2.3 presents the 
categorical analysis of maritime drug seizures. Rather expectantly, 
this categorical analysis yields a picture synonymous with the flow of 
drugs throughout the world. All the major states listed are either
Table 2.5 Principal States Effecting Maritime Drug Seizures, 1950-58.
State Quantity (kgs.) Percent Share Cumulative Share
Thailand 9,610.5 18.7% 18.7%
Singapore 9,072.6 17.6% 36.3%
Egypt 7,607.9 14.8% 51.1%
Hong Kong 5,939.8 11.5% 62.6%
India 4,325.5 8.4% 71.0%
Malaysia 4,098.5 8.0% 79.0%
Burma 2,638.6 5.1% 84.1%
Lebanon 1,226.0 2.4% 86.5%
U.K. 986.0 1.9% 88.4%
S. Yemen 947.8 1.8% 90.2%
Remaining 
49 States 5,067.8 9.8% 100.0%
Sources: Data derived from UN Docs. E/NS. Series, 1950 - 1961.
Figure 2.3 Principal States Effecting Maritime Drug Seizures By Drug 
Category In The Period 1950 - 1958.
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principal producers or refiners of drugs in the illicit trade, transit 
states or consumers of illicit drugs. The picture is further sharpened 
when a review of the principal flow paths of illicit drugs by sea is 
done. Though innumerable routes existed, the bulk of drugs trafficked 
by sea flowed along certain prescribed pathways. Basically, these 
select maritime routes constituted the trunk routes in the global flow 
matrix. Figure 2.4 depicts these routes in linear schematic form.
Figure 2.4 Trunk Routes In The Illicit Drug Trade By Sea, 1950 - 1958.
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In regards to vessel nationality it is observed that the majority 
of commercial shipping carrying illicit drugs belonged to states which, 
in some way, were connected directly or indirectly to the origin and 
production sites of illicit drugs. This meant that the principal flag 
states involved in drug trafficking were either colonial powers or 
states reliant on shipping for commerce and revenue generation. As 
Figure 2.5 shows, the five principal states were the U.K., the U.S.A.,
Figure 2.5 Principal Flag States Involved In Drug Smuggling, 1950-58.
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the Netherlands, Norway and France. Further substantiating the point 
about an element of association being extant between the vessel flag and 
sources of drugs were the next five flags of registry found involved. 
Four of them were principal drug producing countries while the fifth was 
a flag-of-convenience. Considering the economic and political situation 
of the decade and the fact that the 1950s was the final decade of expan-
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sive dominion it was hardly surprising that the five principal flags of 
registry were the ones noted. An analysis of the British, Dutch and 
French vessels involved shows a clear correlation between the seizure of 
drugs thereon, the routes plied and the extensiveness of the flag 
states* possessions. The dominant presence these three states had in 
the Far East, Middle East, Caribbean and throughout Africa ensured the 
prolific roles their merchant fleets played in the maritime drug trade. 
The high degree of involvement by the US merchant fleet was based on a 
congruous but contrived and short-lived predicament. The extensive role 
of the American fleet in drug trafficking in a century that was other­
wise marked by its decline in prominence was largely the by-product of 
the occupation and reconstruction period in Europe and Japan. To sup­
port the occupation forces, transport materials and supplies in large 
quantities for reconstruction and sustain the adjunct logistical aspects 
supportive of these activities the US fleet obtained much needed 
employment. Norway’s prominent role resulted from its status as a 
cross-trading nation. In effect, Norway practised a form of shipping 
colonialism. The country maintained a large fleet, operated it between 
countries needing transport units and earned substantial revenue from 
its maritime enterprise. The basis for Norway’s success was because it 
provided an alternative transportation service for countries wary of the 
colonial powers. Inherently, it meant that Norwegian ships became in­
volved in drug trafficking on a scale proportional to their fleet’s per­
vasive presence in world commerce. This was clearly evidenced in the 
Far East and Southeast Asia, notably in ports in Malaysia and Singapore, 
where Norwegian ships were often found to be carrying drug shipments 
both inbound and outbound from these states and in transit. In closing
this analysis one last point needs mentioning. The pie chart in Figure
2.5 does not, for the most part, include the flags of private vessels. 
This is because little data was collected regarding their roles. As a 
consequence, there is no viable basis by which to construct an analysis 
of their flags.
2. 7 Genesis Of The Modern Trafficking Scene
2.7.1 The 1960s
The 1960s saw a change both in the attitude towards and use of 
narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, particularly in the U.S., 
Canada and select states in Western Europe. The latter part of the 
decade and the first half of the 1970s was figuratively referred to as 
the "Psychedelic Period" because of the prevalent use of highly hal­
lucinogenic substances. Heroin became the mainstay drug of that scene. 
Other substances inclusive of LSD, mescaline and powerful stimulants 
emerged as potent drugs widely used and abused amongst those within the 
drug subculture. Cannabis occupied a lower but more expansive niche in 
the drug subculture because of its milder effects and resultant 
widespread use by individuals desiring to be, or at least appear to be, 
part of the contemporary scene, but wary of injuring themselves. Though 
many reasons and factors sire cited as the bases for the radical change 
and prolific growth in the use of illicit drugs the general cause was 
discontent amongst the young generation24 which induced rebellion in 
ideals and perspectives on their part vis-a-vis ongoing current events. 
A peculiar metamorphosis resulting from the misguided and naive inter­
pretation of fundamental ideals centering on civil rights, personal 
privacy, political integrity and freedom of expression led to the con-
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ceptual manifestation of "doing your own thing." Though sociologists 
and psychologists will say that throughout history there hats been a gen­
eration gap between young and old it was not until this point in time 
that the anti-establishment doctrine assumed new meaning by embracing 
more extreme tenets and forms of physical expression. In the U.S. the 
Vietnam War (1964 - 1975) quickly became a controversial socio-political 
issue receiving widespread attention and disaffection amongst the young 
generation. Though it would not become apparent till a decade later the 
U.S.'s involvement in Southeast Asia contributed greatly to the sub­
sequent global pattern of illicit drug production and flow routes. The 
presence of American military personnel in Vietnam combined with a 
rather decadent atmosphere therein promoted the cultivation of cannabis 
and opium and synthesis of morphine and heroin in Southeast Asia to sup­
port that market. In essence, the production of these drugs in Burma,
Laos and Thailand was propelled upwards to higher levels of magnitude 
hithertill unknown and, prior to then, untenable in market terms. The 
vacuum created by the US withdrawal from Vietnam forced the drug sup­
pliers to expand their trafficking into the international market on a 
much larger scale in order to sustain their illegitimate enterprises.
Canada’s involvement in the 1960s drug scene steirened largely from 
it neighbouring position with the U.S. and similar cultural structure. 
While not plagued by the turbulent politics of its southern neighbour 
the Canadian society simply could not avoid the transposition of the 
American drug subculture and assimilation of it by the young generation 
in some areas of the country. Consequently, the trends evolving in the 
U.S. regarding drugs were repeated in Canada. The fact that the problem 
was never as severe was merely the result of Canada’s smaller population
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base and demographic distribution. Within Europe it was France, the 
Netherlands, Sweden, the U.K. and West Germany which saw similar 
developments regarding their respective drug subcultures. It is not
coincidence that several of these states associate the origins of their 
modem drug problems with the mid to late 1960s. Furthermore, it was 
not coincidence that these countries saw the problem simultaneously 
materialize as it did at that time. The represented the portion of
European society most cosmopolitan and thus lacking the cultural in­
sularity and cohesiveness common to other select European states. 
Essentially, they were predisposed to change. Though the basis for drug 
use in Europe was that cited earlier, the socio-political factors nur­
turing it were somewhat different. There was no European equivalent to 
the U.S.’s Vietnam crisis around which the young could easily muster 
their rebellion though they included the Vietnam War under their banner 
of issues to be repudiated. Instead, it was the internal constraints 
placed on the young generation in Europe by the old and rather stagnant 
regimes, social systems and conventions of culture which triggered 
rebelliousness. The unreceptiveness and incapability of these struc­
tures to cope with the inevitable and then emerging liberalization of 
ideals, perspectives and values essentially foresaw and ensured the 
socio-cultural insurrection. In simply terms, the inflexibility of the 
in situ social structure to understand the changes merely aggravated the 
anti-conformity behaviour projected by the young. One of the principal 
ways in which the revolt manifest itself was via the increased consump­
tion of drugs and concomitant experimentation with new substances as an 
expression of repudiation of old values. However, in ending this 
analysis it has to be understood that though the operative factors in­
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volved were somewhat different from those factors provoking the North 
American situation they were not exclusive to the European states cited.* 
Arguments can be made that many of the factors attributed as causitive 
of one state’s problem were also instigative, either directly or 
indirectly, of the drug problem found in another state. Consequently, 
the resultant drug scene of the 1960s and early 1970s afflicting the 
Western developed states possessed a common origin and purpose. 
Moreover, it was only an inevitable and natural aspect of progressive­
ness that drug use would attain greater magnitude in these states.
The maritime trafficking of drugs remained in a subdued state 
partly as a result of the increased role of aircraft for drug carriage 
and partly because of the shift in emphasis on drugs consumed. Overall, 
opium and cannabis remained the principal drugs transported by sea fol­
lowed by morphine, heroin and barbitone. Unfortunately, incompleteness 
in the data provided by states to the CND led to a deterioration in the 
global data base for the latter half of the 1960s. Hence, the quantita­
tive data presented here applies only for the first half of the decade. 
Limited qualitative description based on national reports and intel­
ligence information is used to indicate the trends in those later years. 
For the four-year period 1960 - 1963 opium seizures from the maritime 
sector averaged over 3.5 m.ts. annually and accounted for 56.5% of all 
maritime confiscatures. Cannabis continued to gain on opium as clearly 
evidenced in the seizure statistics. Its share jumped to 40.5% of total 
maritime seizures and the quantity confiscated annually rose to an 
average of 2.5 m.ts. In the late 1960s cannabis finally eclipsed opium 
as the principal drug trafficked by sea. The emphasis on hard drugs and 
cannabis in Western society in the late 1960s combined with the con-
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tinual decrease in the consumption or raw and prepared opium elsewhere 
assured this denouement. However, it must not be construed that actual 
opium production fell for it did not. In reality, larger amounts of it 
were being synthesized into the higher derivative forms. This was 
evidenced by the growth in morphine and barbitone seizures and increas­
ing revelations coming to light concerning Turkey's prominent role as a 
source country for substantial amounts of the opiate derivatives found 
in Europe and North America. In the four-year period 1960 - 1963 the
total quantity of morphine seized from the maritime sector exceeded the 
total amount confiscated in the nine-year period referenced for the 
1950s. In the case of barbitone actual seizures were small with the 
largest ones in the hundreds of tons and effected in the late 1960s. 
Heroin continued to be shipped by sea but it is believed that the air 
sector assumed greater significance as a means of transport. The two 
principal locations of maritime heroin smuggling were the 'French 
Connection' route, involving Turkish opiate products exported to the 
eastcoast of North America, and the Far East involving Southeast Asian 
opiate products. In the first half of the 1960s the principal states 
effecting maritime drug seizures were Egypt, Malaysia, Hong Kong and 
Singapore. Of the 44 states and territories reporting maritime seizures 
these four states accounted for 76.3% of the total quantity confiscated. 
Table 2.6 presents the top ten states effecting maritime drug seizures 
in the period 1960 - 1963. As to be expected these ten states were all 
either major producers, consumers or transit states. An analysis by 
drug category further elucidates on their importance relative to 
specific trades. Figure 2.6 presents the categorical analysis of 
maritime drug seizures. Though not presented here, an analysis of the
Table 2.6 Principal States Effecting Maritime Drug Seizures, 1960-63.
State Quantity (kgs.) Percent Share Cumulative Share
Egypt 9,300.1 36.9% 36.9%
Malaysia 3,670.3 14.6% 51.5%
Hong Kong 3,317.1 13.2% 64.7%
Singapore 2,918.9 11.6% 76.3%
Cyprus 1,500.0 6.0% 82.3%
Thailand 1,452.8 5.8% 88.1%
India 664.9 2.6% 90.7%
U.K. 479.3 1.9% 92.6%
Cambodia 450.0 1.8% 94.4%
Lebanon 292.8 1.2% 95.6%
Remaining 
34 States 1,134.1 4.4% 100.0%
Sources: Data derived from UN Docs. E/NS Series , 1960 - 1965.
Figure 2.6 Principal States Effecting Maritime Drug Seizures By Drug 
Category In The Period 1960 - 1963.
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trunk routes for illicit drugs transported by sea in the 1960s reveals a 
picture congruous to that portrayed for the 1950s. In other words, the
status quo was, with minor alteration, maintained. The large quantities 
of opium and cannabis moving by sea on the traditional routes offset any 
marginal increase there may have been in the quantity of hard drugs
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transported by sea in the latter half of the decade. Apropos the prin­
cipal flags of registry involved there were some abrupt changes. Figure
2.7 denotes the major vessel flags involved. The U.K. retained its top 
position even though more of its colonies gained independence. The 
close relations maintained by the U.K. with its former colonies combined 
with the latters’ lack of fleets ensured the continued employment of
Figure 2.7 Principal Flag States Involved In Drug Smuggling, 1962-64.
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British flag carriers. Contrastingly, the U.S. dropped out of the top 
five grouping denoted for the 1950s. This was to be anticipated con­
sidering that the period of high employment for US flag vessels had come 
to an end. The decline in American involvement overseas terminated some 
of the grounds on which US flag carriers had justified their participa­
tion in world commerce. This development, in turn, resulted in a 
decrease in availability of US flag carriers for drug trafficking. The
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increased share of participation by Dutch flag carriers reflected in 
part the demise of US involvement in trade, but also the gradual conver­
sion of the Dutch fleet's role to one of cross-trading. Similar to the 
post-colonial experience of the U.K., the independence of Indonesia from 
the Netherlands did not mean the rapid demise of the Dutch presence in 
the Far East. The appearance of the Indonesian flag in drug trafficking 
was to be expected, particularly as the country needed a merchant fleet 
to sustain linkages throughout the many islands of the archipelago. In­
donesian vessels incurred the same exposure to trafficking opportunities 
as had their Dutch predecessors; undoubtedly, the only difference being 
that the degree of vigilance for drugs and scrupulosity maintained by 
Indonesian crews were considerably less than that projected by the Dutch 
mariners and operators. This fact combined with the high volume of drug 
trafficking in the region meant it was inevitable that Indonesian flag 
carriers were to become involved in the illicit drug trade. The slow 
but perceptible growth in the roles of the Indian, Turkish and 
Panamanian flags in maritime drug smuggling was also predictable for the 
reasons noted earlier in context with the previous decade. The first 
two represented major drug producers. The latter was a flag-of- 
convenience and, in terms of shipping economics, was becoming increas­
ingly prevalent in commerce throughout the world. Consequently, its 
proportional rise in involvement in drug trafficking was normal. It 
should also be borne in mind that the Panamanian flag represented, to a 
fair degree, the U.S.'s continued participation in international ship­
ping in that American interests and business entities were behind many 
of the Panamanian companies.
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2.7.2 The 1970s
The social, cultural and political factors dictating the drug 
scene in the first part of the decade were summed up in the review given 
for the late 1960s. The later years of the 1970s saw another change in 
the overall social setting in the Western states which further reshaped 
the drug subculture. The earlier conflict in ideals, perspectives and 
values partially resolved itself by yielding to moderation in and in­
tegration of the opposing viewpoints and tenets. By the late 1970s a 
fair degree of permissiveness had become manifest in Western society and 
constituted an acceptable dimension of their culture. Concurrently, 
there was a move within the drug subculture away from some of the hard 
psychotropic substances which had been so fashionable in the 
"Psychedelic Period." To a fair extent, this was because there was no 
longer a need for the radical expressions of suiti-conformitism and anti- 
establishmentarianism once the ’victory' had been obtained suid the per­
tinent socio-political barriers and factors either destroyed or 
overcome. The Vietnam War had ended and European society had shed much 
of the stagnancy deemed stifling by embarking on a new course of 
openness, tolerance and less social convention. For the illicit drug 
users this meant a re-emphasis on traditional drugs, but also a recep­
tiveness for substances which were new and could be seen as in vogue 
with the contemporary social scene then extant. Resultantly, there was 
an explosion in the consumption of cannabis along with a surge in the 
use of heroin. Cocaine use, which had languished in what may be called 
a backwater position in the drug milieu for the past three decades, re- 
emerged dramatically with consumption increasing geometrically in the 
later years of the decade. Conversely, morphine use declined con­
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siderably because of the primacy of heroin. The INCB noted in their an­
nual report for 1979 that there had "been no significant traffic in 
morphine" for a number of years in the.1970s.25 The significance of 
these trends was in their affect on the global pattern of drug 
trafficking, particularly the maritime component. A restructuring of 
old routes and matrices transpired accompanied by the development of new 
ones thus creating a new global pattern which, with same minor 
alterations, remains extant today. In the U.S. during the late 1970s 
the rate of increase in cannabis consumption was of gargantuan propor­
tions with each year showing massive growth over the prior one on a 
logarithmic scale outstripping that of any other country. The hither- 
till lesser amounts consumed became wholly inadequate hence creating 
demand for additional sources. Colombia and Thailand became new major 
suppliers of cannabis to North America while Jamaica, Lebanon, Mexico 
and Morocco, which had been the existing external suppliers, attained 
even greater importance as source areas. The same developments occurred 
in Europe with the roles of Lebanon and Morocco as major suppliers 
greatly enhanced. However, diversification in sources developed with 
Colombia, Pakistan, Jamaica and West Africa gaining noteworthy shares in 
the European cannabis market; the latter two becoming significant sup­
pliers to the U.K.
Heroin consumption likewise grew to new heights but not with the 
magnitude observed in cannabis growth; the potency factor being the 
basis for less volumetric consumption. A major factor inducing the 
reshaping of the global heroin routes was the temporary success of the 
Western states in pressuring Turkey to totally ban opium production in 
1971. The basis for the pressure applied on Turkey resulted from the
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shared view of many Western states that it was responsible for much of 
the heroin found in their illicit drug markets. While this was 
reasonably true, it was unrealistic to fault Turkey for the heroin 
problem much less expect the problem to be solved through the implemen­
tation of a ban on poppy cultivation in that state. The net effect of 
the ban was to impel other cultivation areas in the world to dramatic­
ally enhance opium production and distribution to fill the void created 
by the withdrawal of Turkey. In a short period, figuratively analogous 
to virtually overnight, Mexico became one of the world’s new major 
heroin producers with virtually all its product being absorbed by the US 
market.26 Mexico had been producing minimal amounts of opium since the 
1920s els a result of its introduction by Chinese opium smokers emigrat­
ing there from the U.S. However, the global heroin market extant 
hithertill had precluded Mexico’s role from being something other than 
negligible. Another region benefiting from the Turkish bain was the ad­
jacent region of Southwest Asia encompassing Afghanistan, Iran and 
Pakistan. Dramatic increases in these states’ production levels oc­
curred between that found in the early 1970s and that observed in the 
last few years of the decade. Iranian opium production increased from 8 
m.ts. per annum to 305 m.ts. annually and Pakistani production increaised 
from about 175 m.ts. per annum to over 800 m.ts. annually.27 Though 
these states had always produced opium to support both their domestic 
user populations and their shares in the overseas opiate markets, the 
Turkish ban provided an entirely new basis by which their production 
could be sustained and enhanced.28 The scenario just described regard­
ing the Southwest Asian sources also applied for the SoutheELst AsiEtn 
sources. The void created by the Turkish ban granted them an open in-
temational market in drugs which was easily penetrated on a large 
scale. Though it was pointed out that the Vietnam War induced expansion 
in the production of Southeast Asian heroin the amount actually exported 
to the U.S. comprised only a minor share of the overall US heroin market 
in the late 1970s. However, for Canada and select countries in Europe 
like France and the Netherlands the Southeast As ism source became very 
significant. The more important legacy of the Vietnam War was its in­
troduction of heroin consumption within Southeast Asia thus creating a 
high level of intra-regional demand for the drug. An estimated 500,000 
heroin addicts are thought to have existed at the time of the American 
withdrawal from Vietnam.29 This granted the Southeast Asian traffickers 
diverse options for distributing their heroin either within the region 
or westward to Europe or eastward to North America. Relatively 
speaking, the restructured pattern of global heroin trafficking just 
described for the late 1970s has remained so into the 1980s.
Cocaine, like heroin, is a drug of high potency and high unitized 
value. Consequently, the volume of it trafficked was minor compared to 
cannabis. Air transport was the popular and preferred transportation 
mode. However, the growth in illicit cocaine consumption and continuing 
improvements in airport control impelled the involvement of the maritime 
sector on a gradually increasing scale. Because cocaine use on an ex­
tensive level originated in the U.S. and, relatively speaking, remained 
an American phenomenon throughout the 1970s, the global trafficking 
scene was basically one of northward movement from the South American 
source states to North America with all states in-between constituting 
plausible transit sites.
Aside from the drugs analysed above it should be noted that other
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substances did appear on the drug scene, some of which were frequently 
shipped by sea, and in quantities which could not be construed as negli-' 
gible considering their potency. Depressants, notably methaqualone, 
were often transported via the maritime sector; the principal destina­
tions being the U.S.A., Egypt and other countries in Africa. Also, 
stimulants like amphetamine and methamphetamine were being diverted from 
licit stocks and shipped by sea to distant consumption sites. The 
sources for many of these substances were the pharmaceutical industries 
in the European states.
The volume of cannabis shipped by sea exceeded that of all the 
other drug categories combined such that for the 1970s as a whole it ac­
counted for 99.5% of the total quantity of drugs interdicted in the 
maritime sector. The majority of cannabis seized from the seaborne 
modes was intercepted in the latter half of the decade and involved 
marijuana being shipped from Colombia, Jamaica and Mexico to the U.S. 
primarily and Canada second. Cannabis confiscatures in the period 1971 
- 1975 averaged 27.6 m.ts. annually while for the next four years it 
averaged 970.8 m.ts. annually - a 35-fold increase. In comparison,
opium seizures averaged only 1.9 m.ts. annually for the entire nine-year 
period and accounted for a mere 0.4% of the total quantity of drugs 
seized from the maritime sector. All the remaining categories of il­
licit drugs interdicted in the maritime sector collectively accounted 
for a fractional 0.1% of the total with heroin, morphine and 
methaqualone being the pertinent drugs of confiscature. In relation to 
the total quantity of drugs seized in the world for the years 1976 - 
1979 the maritime sector accounted for just over 21%. However, this 
figure is misleading. When the portion of illicit drugs confiscated at
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source, either being cultivated or manufactured, are discounted - in 
other words, the quantity which had yet to enter the trafficking stage - 
the figure nearly triples and for cannabis alone more than quadruples. 
Of the 45 states and territories reporting maritime drug seizures in the 
1970s the U.S. and the Bahamas together accounted for 97% of the total 
quantity interdicted in the maritime sector. Table 2.7 lists the top 
seven states effecting maritime drug seizures while Figure 2.8 presents 
the analysis of state seizures by drug category. As to be expected, the
Table 2.7 Principal States Effecting Maritime Drug Seizures, 1971-79.
State Quantity (kgs.) Percent Share Cumulative Share
U.S.A. 3,824,947.6 94.6% 94.6%
Bahamas 94,445.5 2.4% 97.0%
U.K. 21,571.4 0.5% 97.5%
France 18,899.0 0.5% 98.0%
Greece 17,337.0 0.4% 98.4%
Canada 13,072.7 0.3% 98.7%
Egypt 10,255.4 0.3% 99.0%
Remaining 
38 States 41,498.0 1.0% 100.0%
Sources: Data derived from UN Docs. E/NS Series. 1971 - 1981 as
modified/verified bv national drug reports.
Figure 2.8 Principal States Effecting Maritime Drug Seizures By Drug 
Category In The Period 1971 - 1979.
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changes in drug production and usage brought on in the late 1960s and 
1970s inherently meant that the pattern of drug trafficking for the 
decade also showed alteration. Figure 2.9 depicts the major trunk
routes of the maritime drug trade in the 1970s. As is seen, the picture
Figure 2.9 Trunk Routes In The Illicit Drug Trade By Sea, 1971 - 1979.
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of trafficking dually reflects the continuance of select traditional 
patterns of drug trafficking by sea fused with new routes resulting from 
the changes in consumption trends.
An analysis of vessel nationalities involved in drug trafficking 
in the 1970s shows a radically altered picture from that of previous 
decades. Figure 2.10 portrays the involvement of the various flag 
states. As with before, the piechart predominantly depicts the role of 
merchant fleets and little of the private vessel component. To a fair 
extent, it may be said that the diversification in flags of registry in­
volved in drug trafficking reflected a broader trend simultaneously oc­
curring in world shipping. The proliferation in new flags reflected the 
escalating integration in shipping by new states following independence. 
Correspondingly, the decline in the eminent roles of the colonial powers 
and cross-traders denoted their displacement by the newcomers. 
Interestingly, the flags-of-convenience did not attain roles of involve-
Figure 2.10 Principal Flag States Involved In Drug Smuggling, 1971-79.
WEST GERMANY ( l , l  X ) 
TURKEY ( 1 . 1 1 )  -  
SWEDEN ( 1 . 1 Z )  —
PERU ( 1 . 6 Z )   -
PANAMA ( 1 . 6 Z )  -------- >/
N I GE R I A  ( 1 • 6 Z )  -----
KUWAIT ( 1 . 6 Z )   A X .
DENMARK ( 1 . 6 Z )
LEBANON ( 2 . 1 Z )  —
EGYPT ( 2 . 1 Z )  --------
CYPRUS ( 2 . 1 Z )   f—
PAKISTAN (.2.71) ~
ITALY ( 2 . 7 Z )  ------
INDONESIA (2.71)
I N D I A  ( 2 . 7 Z )  -------
UNI TED 
KINGDOM 
( 2 8 . 1 Z )
COLOMBIA (2.71) — ' X
SINGAPORE ( 3 . 2 Z )  --------'
U . S . A .  ( 4 . 3 Z )
( 4 . 3 Z )  NORWAY 
( 4 . 3 Z )  GREECE)
( 4 . 9 Z )  L I B E R I A  
( 4 . 9 Z )  NEW ZEALAND
N o t e :  P e r c e n t a g e  f i g u r e s  b a s e d  on f r e q u e n c y  o f  o c c u r r e n c e  w h e r e
f l a g  o f  r e g i s t r y  was r e c o r d e d .
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inent proportional to their positions of dominance in the world registry 
list, as measured by tonnage, though some gain was noted. However, the 
anomaly is explained by the fact that much of the shipping on which il­
licit drugs were smuggled involved carriers of the liner category. In 
comparison to the tramp operators, the vessels of this category com­
prised a larger percent of the world fleet not under flags-of- 
convenience. Their regularity in schedule, routes traversed and ports 
served coupled with cargo shipment methods suitable for concealing drugs 
within made them attractive and reliable transport modes. Conversely, 
the bulk carriers, tankers and other vessels in the tramp category, 
which accounted for most of the flag-of-convenience tonnage, generally 
did not figure prominently in the illicit drug trade. The very nature 
of their operation was, for the most part, simply ill-suited for such 
activity. Except in the cases of lengthy time charters involving fixed 
routes there was little consistency in the routes plied by tramp vessels 
and the cargoes carried were inappropriate for concealing drug consign­
ments within. Moreover, the ports they often served were either distant 
from the intended destinations of drug shipments in some states or the 
infrastructure of the port made it difficult to land the drugs. In the 
trafficking context, the piechart in Figure 2.10 shows clearly a posi­
tive correlation between vessel nationality and the role drugs played in 
the respective flag states. Ignoring some of the flags-of-convenience 
it is observed that nearly every other flag represented in Figure 2.10 
was that of either a principal drug producer, significant consumer, im­
portant transit state or cross-trading nation. The continuing large 
role of the British flag which, at first glance, would seem to con­
tradict what has been said was in actuality not that odd. The British
merchant fleet was one of the top ten fleets in the world at the time, 
based on tonnage, with a large portion of its fleet composed of ships
operated in the liner capacity. The basis for the large fleet was
three-fold: first, the high level of the U.K.'s foreign trade generated
sufficient volume to warrant a large fleet; secondly, a fair share of 
affinity continued to be maintained between the former colonial power 
and its former colonies thus permitting the British fleet to involve it­
self in the latter's commerce; and, thirdly, a consequence of the second 
factor was that the British fleet became something of a cross-trading 
one. Combined, these factors meant that the British fleet sustained a 
high profile, particularly in regions where illicit drugs were produced 
and extensively trafficked. Resultantly, it was vulnerable to utiliza­
tion in drug smuggling. Of the top five flags involved, the continuing 
roles of Norway and the Netherlands reflected their sustained status as 
cross-trading states though in the latter’s case the development of 
Europort in Rotterdam undoubtedly contributed to the Dutch fleet’s 
higher profile in world shipping. The Liberian flag’s share of involve­
ment reflected its widespread use as a flag-of-convenience. Though a 
considerable amount of tanker tonnage was under Liberian registry so 
were a number of other types of vessels; some of which operated in the 
liner capacity while others were small vessels expressly acquired for 
drug trafficking. Relative to all the rationalization proffered so far
I the appearance of New Zealand's flag in the top five is a mutation which
cannot be readily explained. Statistically, it occurred and since 
frequency in incidence is the measuring unit it is assumed that New 
Zealand’s close commercial links with Australia, the Far East and South­
east Asia meant its merchant fleet was exposed to increased opportuni­
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ties for drug trafficking associated with many of the states therein.
Though the above analysis reviewed the flags of connnercial ship-? 
ping found involved in drug smuggling it must not be construed that 
private vessels had only a minor role. The 1970s marked the rise in the 
long-haul carriage of illicit drugs by private craft. The increasing 
amounts of drugs to be shipped, notably cannabis, combined with the con­
straints that commercial shipping posed on such carriage nurtured the 
rise in use of private vessels to transport drugs large distances. The 
U.S. was one of the premier focal points of such activity but little is 
known about the flags of the craft utilized. Another prime example was 
the dhow trade in the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea. During the 1970s 
dhows often engaged in drug smuggling between points in southern Asia, 
the Arabian Peninsula and East Africa. Indian dhows transported hashish 
from India to the Rufiji Delta in Tanzania where it would be exchanged 
for ivory.30 Another common route involved Dubaian manjis which carried 
gold from the U.A.E. to India and Pakistan and returned with hashish and 
opium.31 Man jis were fast dhows designed and equipped to outrun patrol 
craft and, generally, could make the 1,200-n.m. voyage (one-way) in 5 - 
6 days.32 The secrecy surrounding the dhow trade not to mention lack­
lustre efforts of some of the regional law enforcement agencies to 
recognize and combat the activity precluded the procurement of any 
credible statistics on the trade. What is certain is that the value of 
the trade was in the millions of dollars and it constituted the most im­
portant form of commerce, licit or illicit, in the western Indian 
Ocean.33 Figure 2.11 shows the positive correlation between distance 
and unitized value of the opium trafficked by dhows in the mid-1970s. A 
third region seeing a high degree of drug smuggling involving private
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craft was Southeast Asia, notably amongst the Indonesian and Philippine 
archipelagos. However, as noted for the U.S., there was little data 
gathered on the nationality of the private vessels involved by which one 
can generate viable statistics.
Figure 2.11 Prices For Southwest Asian Opium Delivered By Dhow To The 
Persian Gulf In The Mid-1970s.
INDIA & -------
PAKISTAN --------> DUBAI-----
--- >
--- > KUWAIT ----------> EGYPT
---- >
(Base Price)
[S5 - S 1 5 / k g . ]
($72/kg.) ($200/kg.) (S3,000/kg.)
Note: $ = United States Dollars (1977)
Source: E. B. Martin & C. P. Martin. Cargoes Of The East (London, 
Elm Tree Books, 1978), p. 187.
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III. GLOBAL PATTERNS OF DRUG PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION.
3, 1 Geography: The Concept And Its Role
Geography regulates the character and structure of the maritime 
drug trade while economic gain is its motivator. All the physical and 
operational flow matrices and patterns of drug consumption are deter­
mined by select geographical factors. Before embarking on an analysis 
of the current drug trafficking scene it behooves one to clearly un­
derstand the underlying foundations of the trades. First, a loose but 
adequate definition of geography for this task is required.
Geography, in general, is a study of the distribution of multi- 
various commodities, resources and social issues spread over a myriad 
of natural landforms, settings and communities along with the flow 
matrices providing interconnectivity between all segments and across 
all planes.1 The concomitant morphologies of the influencing and 
entwined natural and social phenomena such as spatial arrangement, 
topography, climatology, botany, demography, economics, politics and 
social behaviour must be incorporated in the analysis if one is to 
reach valid conclusions. The effects of man-made structures which are 
artificially imposed upon the natural environment and induce unique 
effects and interactions among the entities and phenomena involved 
constitute part of the subject. Examples include foreign trade zones 
and freeports which represent applied geo-economic concepts, political 
boundaries which form artificial barriers and law which creates ad-
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ministration and regulation over both geographical and natural 
entities. It is from this that the multidisciplinary nature of geog­
raphy is established. There are, of course, several orders of mag­
nitude or hierarchial planes by which one can analyse geographical 
aspects. The order of magnitude or plane utilized is usually deter­
mined by the natural breadth of the particular topic under research 
though artificial parameters of greater or lesser scoj)e may be 
imposed. Having defined this unique nature about geography per se it 
must then be integrated with the research topic - maritime drug traf­
ficking — so as to reveal the geographical basis for the illicit 
trades. In analysing the drug trade two things become readily 
apparent. Imprimis, geography has a profound impact on both the 
structure of the numerous flow systems found and modes of conveyance 
used. Secondly, three orders of magnitude need to be considered: the
global, macro and microscales. The global is the most general in ex­
planation but provides the overview and basic answer. It takes into 
account the world as a whole in terms of the distribution of cultiva­
tion areas in relation to consumption sites and the spatial arrange­
ment of land and sea. The bases for the various drug routes are 
established. The macroscale concerns the national and regional levels 
of scale. It yields insights to particular unique phenomena of the 
drug trade as they apply to the state or region in question. The 
peninsular configuration of Italy, the insular form of New Zealand and 
the basin/island structure of the Caribbean are examples of macro­
scopic structures (ie. the second order). The utilitarian role a 
state and region plays is ascertained. The microscopic scale con­
siders things in precise detail regarding the intricacies of drug
smuggling. The structure of ports, harbours and desolate coastal 
sites along with the nature of ships are analysed. In this context 
the impact of politics and economics along with the human response 
must be reviewed where appropriate.
3•2 The Global Perspective
All drugs derived from natural organic substances are limited in 
origin to select areas around the world. Cannabis is something of an 
exception since it has been shown that it can be cultivated in areas 
far removed from historically traditional sites or areas naturally 
suitable for propagation once introduced.2 However, in the context of 
bulk trafficking it can be categorized as limited in origin to select 
areas. Overall, the biogeography of the various drug plants is such 
that relative to certain OECD consumption sites their cultivation 
areas are quite distant. Hence, the basis for flow paths are 
established. Because heroin, morphine, codeine and opium are all 
derived from the poppy plant and hashish, marijuana and sinsemilla are 
of the cannabis plant, the discussion on geographical distribution of 
sources centers on three plants: the poppy, cannabis plant and coca
bush. Though their cultivation areas may be far from the sea the spa­
tial arrangement of land and sea combined with economic factors en­
sures that the sea will often be the preferred medium for transport. 
Economic considerations in the drug trade include risk, transport ef­
ficiency and profit maximization. The chemical and psychotropic 
substances, on the other hand, generally originate in countries with 
well-developed industrial bases where pharmaceutical production is an 
important component. Hence, discussion of their sources focuses on
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the manufacturing states. However, because the quantities of syn­
thetic drugs trafficked by sea are relatively inconsequential, only 
cursory mention is made.
3.2»1 Opiate Sources
In this discussion one must first distinguish between licit and 
illicit production. It must be borne in mind that opium is legally 
produced in severed states under the UN control system; the purpose of 
which is to provide adequate opiate supplies for medical and scien­
tific needs. Consequently, all drug production occurring under that 
system is licit. Conversely, all drug cultivation, production, 
manufacturing and trade transpiring outside of the UN regulated system 
is illicit.
Illicit opiates are derived from poppy plants growing 
predominantly in the following four regions of the world: the Golden
Crescent, the Golden Triangle, India and Mexico. The Golden Crescent 
is a figurative name applied to a region of Southwest Asia comprising 
Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan. In the past Turkey figured 
prominently but the institution of a ban on poppy cultivation in 1971 
followed by limited resumption under strict control in 1974 removed 
Turkey from being deemed a source of illicit opiates.3 The Turkish 
amount finding its way into the illicit trades today is deemed small. 
The Northwest Frontier Province of Pakistan, the east-northeastern 
part of Afghanistan embracing the Provinces of Ghazni, Paktia, 
Nangarhar, Konar and Laghman across the border from the NWFP and a 
large area centering around Baluchistan and enveloping eastern Iran, 
western Pakistan and southern Afghanistan are the prime sites of poppy
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cultivation. Based on data for the period 1982 - 1987, Afghanistan
accounts for 47.7% of all Golden Crescent production followed closely 
by Iran, with a 43.9% share, and then Pakistan, with a 8.4% share. 
Lebanon is a secondary production site. Figure 3.1 depicts the opium 
production areas in the Golden Crescent while Table 3.1 contains data 
on production in Southwest Asia for the 1980s.
Figure 3.1 Opium Production Sites In The Golden Crescent.
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Table 3.1 Illicit Opium Production In The 1980s.
AVBRAGB P S0DUCTI0N PEB ANNUM In MBTRIC TONS Percent Ave. 1986
Country 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 Share* Hectarage
AFGHANISTAN 275 487 .5 220 525 500 600 22.71 21,429
IRAN 500 500 500 300 300 300 13.71 N/A
PAKISTAN 75 63 45 40 130 107.5 5.91 7,143
BURMA 500 550 740 525 775 1,100 35.31 90,000
LAOS 50 35 35 75 195 225 8.91 N/A
THAILAND 48.5 32.5 45 37.5 19 25 0.91 5,375
MBIICO 17 17 21 35 46.8 50 2.11 5,357
INDIA N/A 250 250 225 225 N/A 10.21 7,408
LEBANON N/A N/A N/A N/A 6.7 6 0.31 400
Totals 1.465.5 1.935 1.856 1.762.5 2.197.5 2.413.5 100.01 -
* - Based on suanation of 1986 country rroduction figures.
Sources: All figures conpiled from RCMP’s NDIE 1986/87 1 NDIE 1987/88 (Ottawa. 1987 A 
1988). NNICC’s NIE 1984 (Washington, D.C.. 1985) A BINM’s INCSS • March 1987 (Washington.
D.C.) with calculations done by author.
The Golden Triangle comprises a region in Southeast Asia where 
the borders of Burma, Laos and Thailand converge. The Shan, Kachin 
and Kayah States of Burma, the 8 northern Provinces of Chiang Mai, 
Chiang Rai, Lampang, Mae Hong Son, Nan, Payao, Petchabun and Tak in 
Thailand and areas around Ban Na Mo, B. Houei Sai, Phong Saly and 
Luang Prabang in north-northeastern Laos are where the prime cultiva­
tion areas are located. However, in looking at the map one suspicious 
aspect arises and that is the question of China and Vietnam. Pub­
lished intelligence reports and data make no mention of these two 
countries. Obviously, the 'closed curtain* nature of Vietnam and 
China makes intelligence gathering difficult. The northwestern corner 
of Vietnam around Dien Bien Phu, Lai Chau, Lao Cai and Son La and the 
Yunnan Province of China adjacent to northeastern Burma and Laos are 
prime sites for poppy cultivation els the conditions essential for 
growth prevail there.4 Though the idea that opium production occurs 
therein is officially denied, it must be considered. Hence Figure 3.2
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which depicts the Golden Triangle includes the plausible sites in 
China and Vietnam. Based on data for the period 1982 - 1987, Burma
accounts for 83.6% of all Golden Triangle production followed by Laos, 
with a 12.3% share, and Thailand, with a 4.1% share. Table 3.1 con­
tains the production trends for Southeast Asia in the 1980s.
Figure 3.2 Opium Production Sites In The Golden Triangle.
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Poppy cultivation is wholly illegal in Mexico. Yet the tri- 
state area of Chihuahua, Durango, and Sinaloa is the primary growing 
area.5 Secondary sites of cultivation are found in the western States 
of Chiapas, Culican, Guerrero, Jalisco, Michoacan, Nayarit, Oaxaca and 
Sonora.6 Figure 3.3 shows the areas of poppy cultivation in Mexico. 
Based on data for the years 1985 - 1987 it is estimated that between
Figure 3.3 Poppy Cultivation Sites In Mexico.
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5,200 - 7,300 hectares are used for poppy cultivation.7 In terms of 
heroin, 10 kgs. of Mexican opium yields, on average, one kilogram of 
heroin.8 The cultivation plots are generally small-scale operations
involving about 1,000 sq. meters (1/ioth of a hectare) per plot and 
situated in ravines surrounded by steep sloping terrain.9 Refer to 
Table 3.1 for the production values during the 1980s.
The diversion of domestically-produced opium from licit produc­
tion sites to illicit consumption and trafficking is the basis for In­
dia being classified as a source of illicit opiates. India is the 
world’s largest producer of licit opiates which confers great 
responsibility, mandates strict control measures and requires stalwor- 
thy personnel. Unfortunately, India faces massive difficulty in ful­
filling its responsibility due to the socio-economic situation induc­
ing a corruptibility in society. Drug traffickers and dealers have a 
bountiful source of opium to tap into. Although the UN mechanism for 
controlling licit production and supply is laudable, in many 
instances, owing to lack of effective machinery, the system is prone 
to abuse. Additionally, wholly illicit cultivation occurs. It is es­
timated that 225 - 250 m.ts. of opium end up in the illicit market
yearly and retrospective analysis indicates that this has been the 
case for several years.
Information on opium production in Lebanon is scant. Most opium 
is cultivated in the Bekaa Valley. The few reports available es­
timated cultivation to be around 400 hectares for both 1986 and 1987 
and heroin production at between 600 - 670 kgs.10 Via mathematical 
calculation, incorporating known values of heroin refining, one can 
backtrack to obtain the opium production from the 400 hectares and the 
yield factor. The result is 6.0 - 6.7 m.ts. of opium with an average 
yield ratio of 15.0 - 16.8 k/h.
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3,2*2 Cannabis Sources
Cannabis is a hardy plant found globally in the warmer climatic 
regions of land areas. The latitudinal range extends from the tropics 
to the higher latitudinal boundaries of the temperate zone (in both 
hemispheres). Exceptions are the interior areas of continents where 
structured summer seasons occur permitting permutation of the boundary 
beyond the normal limits to envelop those areas. An example is 
northwestern Canada embracing the Yukon and Northwest Territories.11 
Because water is vital the plant grows naturally in areas which 
possess the necessary mix of topographic, climatic and agronomic 
conditions. Where the soil’s nutrient content is lacking and 
precipitation is inadequate the plant requires artificial inducements 
in the form of fertilizers, irrigation and attention. With these 
provisions, the cannabis plant can thrive equally well. The inter­
relationship of the three growth criteria affects the THC content of 
the plant. This, in turn, determines the grade and type of cannabis 
the plant produces (ie. hashish, marijuana, sinsemilla, etc.). Market 
forces are the external determinant affecting cultivation. In regions 
of constant warmth the plant is capable of two crops per year and thus 
cultivated to yield two harvests annually. Usually, the autumn har­
vest (northern hemisphere) will yield a larger volume. Cannabis 
production is predominantly illegal, but there are countries where 
limited cultivation is allowed for licit purposes. India is an ex­
ample where cultivation is permitted to obtain fiber and seed and for 
horticultural purposes.12 Additionally, there are several countries 
which do not share the view over the perceived and real threats to 
society from cannabis. The use of the substance is not regarded as a
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dangerous evil or decadent anti-social behaviour. Hence, in their 
prioritizations of social campaigns, the emphasis is on other social 
issues deemed more important and they appear* lenient on this topic. 
Jamaica, Spain, Thailand and the Netherlands are examples of states 
which are lax in dealing with the cannabis issue.
At least 27 countries figure significantly in the production of 
cannabis and contribute to the international trade in the drug. 
Several more have been identified as sources of cultivation but are 
not considered here because either all cannabis produced is consumed 
domestically or their contribution to the trade is negligible or their 
cultivation of the drug falls within the definition of 1 experimen­
tal*.13 Table 3.2 lists the states which have been linked to the in­
ternational trafficking of cannabis and, where available, the data on 
production. To facilitate analysis, orders of magnitude are 
prescribed so as to differentiate the levels of significance states 
possess in the illicit trade.
The seven principals of the first order are Colombia, Thailand, 
Mexico, the U.S.A., the Philippines, Paraguay, and Jamaica. Colombia, 
Thailand and Mexico vie for the position of largest producer of can­
nabis in the world. For the four-year period 1984 - 1987 Colombia 
produced about 17,630 m.ts. while Mexico produced 16,670 m.ts. The 
foothills and slopes of the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta and Serrania 
de Peri j a mountain ranges in the northeastern Departments of Magda­
lena, Cesar and La Guajira are the principal cultivation areas in 
Colombia.14 Other sites of lesser cultivation include the Serrania de 
San Lucas mountain range in the Department of Bolivar and the moun­
tainous and jungle areas of Antioquia, Choco, Cordoba, Llanos,
86
Table 3.2 Sources Supplying The International Cannabis Trade.
AVERAGB PRODUCTION PER ANNUM Id HBTR] C TONS
Country 1984 1985 1986 Cannabis Type(s)
1«‘ COLOMBIA 5,750 3,300 3,080 Marijuana
THAILAND N/A N/A 4,000 Marijuana/S inseii1la
0 ME2IC0 2,750 3,500 5,000 Marijuana
R U.S.A. 1,700 3,250 4,413 Marijuana/Sinseailla
D PHILIPPINES N/A 1,960 3,164 Marijuana
B PARAGUAY 2,250 2,250 2,250 Marijuana
R JAMAICA 1,875 953 1,755 Mari juana/Sinseiilla/Hashish
KENYA N/A 1,000 N/A Marijuana
2»* BBLIZB 1,100 645 550 Marijuana
LBBANON 300 720 900 Hashish
0 SOUTH AFRICA N/A 305.7 622.3 Marijuana
R MOROCCO 345 345 341 Hashish/Marijuana
D AFGHANISTAN 300 300 300 Hashish
E PAKISTAN 200 200 200 Hashish
R GUATBMALA N/A N/A 275 Marijuana
INDONESIA No Data Available But Deeaed High Marijuana
BRAZIL No Data Available But Deeaed High Marijuana
VENEZUBLA N/A N/A 80 Marijuana
3rd COSTA RICA N/A 110 90 Marijuana
PANAMA N/A 818.2 30 Marijuana
0 MAURITIUS N/A N/A 75 Marijuana
R P.N.G. N/A 40 N/A Marijuana
D GHANA N/A 5.5 N/A Marijuana
E NIGERIA No Data Available But Deeaed Low Marijuana
R INDIA No Data Available But Deeaed Low Marijuana/Hashish
LAOS No Data- Available But Deeaed Low Marijuana
NEPAL No Data Available But Deeaed Low Hashish
Sources: All data extracted froi the following publications: BINM, INCSR - March
1987 (Washingtont D.C,); NNICC, NIE 1984 (Washington. D.C., 1985); and, UN Docs.
E/CN.7/1987/CRP.6 ft B/CN.7/1988/CRP.8 All figures have been rearranged by author.
Santander, Sucre, Uraba and Valle. Roughly 63% of the annual amount 
produced is exported.15 On the other hand, every state in the Mexican 
Republic has some degree of marijuana cultivation occurring within 
them. However, the significant growing areas are situated in western 
Mexico in the States of Chihuahua, Guerrero, Jalisco, Michoacan, San 
Luis Potosi, Sinaloa, Sonora and Zacatecas.16 Durango and Oaxaca are 
two other States which have figured prominently in cannabis cultiva­
tion and probably still do though omitted from the latest intelligence
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surveys.17 About 95% of Mexican cannabis is exported.18 The deepen­
ing economic plight of the 1980s is seen as the basis for the expan­
sion of cultivation in Mexico. For the specific states just mentioned 
cannabis cultivation has become the * bread and butter* industry for 
many farmers.19 Both Colombia and Mexico have two harvest seasons 
with yield ratios of 1,000 k/h per harvest or greater when optimum 
growing conditions prevail. Peak harvest times occur during the 
months of March through May and September through November in Colombia 
and during February and September in Mexico except for Oaxaca where 
favourable conditions allow thrice-annual harvestations.
Insufficient data on Thailand prevents accurate analysis. Based 
on seizure data and a review of the global drug market, it appears 
that Thai production is extensive. Because of a relatively high THC 
content Thai cannabis in the form of "Thai sticks" is both well sought 
after and easily marketed. Thailand, like Mexico, is burdened with 
severe economic conditions which have fostered the substitution of 
crops with cannabis. As in Mexico, marijuana has become an important 
cash crop. Northeastern Thailand is one of the poorest parts of the 
country. It is infrastructurally isolated and prevailing agricultural 
conditions are unsuitable for many legitimate crops. Cannabis cul­
tivation occurs in 12 of the 17 provinces of northeast Thailand as 
well as in other provinces in the central and northern regions of the 
country. Nakhon Phanom Province is where the highest quality 
marijuana is grown.20 Other principal Provinces seeing marijuana 
production are Chaiya Phum, Kalasin, Mukdahan, Roi Et, Sakon Nakhon, 
and Yasothon.21 Sites of secondary importance are found in the 
Provinces of Chacheoeng Sao, Chanthaburi, Chumphon, Kanchana-buri,
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Kamphaengphet, Lampang, Loei, Nakhon Ratchasima, Phetchaburi, Phrae, 
Prachin Buri, Prachuap Kirikhan, Ranong, Sukhothai and Udon Thani.22
The United States, like Mexico, possesses the status of having 
cannabis cultivation in all 50 states. In the period 1985 - 1987 ap­
proximately 281.4 million plants were seized. Of that total, 265 mil­
lion were wild marijuana plants and 12.2 million were cultivated
plants while the remaining 6.1 million were sinsemilla.23 Domestic 
production accounts for 12% of the total US cannabis supply. The com­
bination of strong demand and unfavourable natural conditions for 
growth in areas has promoted the use of diversified agricultural prac­
tices to increase marijuana production. California, Hawaii, Kentucky, 
Tennessee and Texas are the principal states for marijuana production 
under the category of active cultivation.24 Illinois, Indiana,
Kansas, Oklahoma and Texas are the primary states of production under 
the heading of wild growth.25 California, Hawaii, Oregon and 
Washington are the major sites of indoor cultivation.26 Sinsemilla is 
found predominantly in California, Hawaii, Kentucky, Tennessee and 
West Virginia.27 Indoor cultivation and cloning appear to be the
rising trends in marijuana cultivation as they ensure continual 
supplies. The areal extent of cannabis cultivation is difficult to 
assess and no reliable figures exist. US cannabis production is 
restricted to one harvest per year, in general, though twice-annual 
and multiple harvests are occurring in those areas where indoor cul­
tivation and effort-intensive outdoor cultivation exist. Production 
has averaged 3,153.3 m.ts. annually for the past four years. Nearly 
all US production is confined to usage and trafficking within North 
America. Between 1 - 2 %  enters the international trade.28
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Philippine production averages 2,562 m.ts. annually based on 
1985 and 1986 data. More than 25.7 million plants were seized during 
these years.29 Data on hectarage and areas of cultivation is lacking. 
It is believed that the depressed economic conditions in the country 
combined with strong domestic consumption are the prime inducements 
for production. The notion that rebel factions, notably in Mindanao, 
are growing cannabis to sell or barter for weapons is uncorroborated.
Paraguayan production averages between 1,500 - 3,000 m.ts.
annually; the majority of which is exported to Brazil.30 Overall, 
details are sketchy but it is believed that virtually all cannabis is 
consumed within South America, hence precluding Paraguay from figuring 
in maritime narcotics trafficking.
Marijuana use has been a tradition in Jamaica since its intro­
duction. It is used in folk medicine and by the Rastafarians daily as 
they consider it a sacramental herb. The Parishes of Clarendon, 
Hanover, Manchester, St. Ann, St. Elizabeth, St. James and 
Westmoreland situated in the north-central and south-central parts of 
Jamaica are the primary cultivation areas.31 The agricultural plains 
of St. Elizabeth, the exposed slopes of the Santa Cruz Mountains and 
the foothills of Blue Mountain are specific sites of marijuana growth. 
The wetlands of Black River Morass and Negri 1 are prime areas of cul­
tivation of sinsemilla.32 Jamaica is the only significant source of 
hashish oil in the western hemisphere.33 The Jamaican climate is 
highly conducive to cannabis cultivation and permits two crops per 
year with an average yield ranging between 676 k/h per harvest, ac­
cording to US sources, and 1,250 k/h per harvest, according to 
Canadian figures.34
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The second order of magnitude encompasses states deemed major 
sources of cannabis but where annual production is in the hundreds of 
tons (as opposed to thousands of tons which denote the principals). 
Ten countries fall within this classification but quantitative data is 
only available for eight of them. Unfortunately, here the categoriza­
tion scheme begins to disintegrate. Because data is either incomplete 
or lacking for sane countries it becomes arduous to accurately portray 
the situations. Moreover, the radical vacillations in production from 
year to year in some countries make determination of their roles ten­
tative thus preventing categorization with certainty. Because of text 
constraints, these countries are not reviewed here. However, so as to 
give some insight to their respective production roles the reader is 
redirected to Table 3.2.
The lowest order of magnitude includes states where annual 
production is in the tens of tons. The total number of states Which 
may be included herein is imprecise. The countries listed in Table 
3.2 under the 3rd order were singled out because they are involved in 
export and consistently linked to cannabis products in transit via the 
maritime medium. Generally, information on thou is scant and some­
times hearsay, hence making it difficult to assess the role each one 
plays. The list is subject to variation and may be increased, reduced 
or restructured in order to reflect new trends as recorded from one 
year to the next. For the same reason noted above neither will a 
descriptive review of these states be proffered here.
3,2,3 Coca Sources
Coca is the most unique of the drug plants because it is con-
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fined to one region of the world. The western to northwestern part of 
the South American continent embracing the states of Bolivia, 
Colombia, Peru and, to a lesser degree, Brazil constitutes the sole 
source of all cocaine HC1. Venezuela and Ecuador have minor cultiva­
tion sites. The only external areas that have come to light as pos­
sible coca cultivation sites are Costa Rica, Panama, Indonesia and the 
Philippines but intelligence data is sketchy. The basis for this 
region of the world being the sole area of coca cultivation appears to 
be the result of a unique combination of climate, topography, 
agronomy, geographic isolation and botanical evolution. The highest 
purity coca is grown on the slopes of the Andes Mountains at eleva­
tions ranging between 500 - 1,200 meters. Optimal production yields 
occur where the temperature averages 25° C with 70 - 80% humidity.35
However, coca grows equally well in lowland jungle areas at the base 
of both sides of the Andes mountain range particularly in watershed 
areas and river basins where fair amounts of rainfall (-2,400 mm/y) or 
distinct rainy seasons prevail.
Peru and Bolivia are the prime sites of high quality production 
because of the existence of ideal areas meeting the above criteria. 
In both countries limited coca cultivation to meet domestic needs, 
based on historic traditions of usage, and external pharmaceutical 
markets is permitted. In Peru between 17,000 - 18,000 hectares are 
set aside for the licit cultivation of coca by the governing monopoly 
(ENACO).36 In Bolivia 10,000 m.ts. of coca leaf (= -20 m.ts. of 
cocaine HC1) per year is the ceiling on quasi-licit production.37 
Contrastingly, approximately 144,000 hectares were devoted to illicit 
coca cultivation in Peru in 1986 and 1987 while illicit production of
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coca leaf in Bolivia averaged 60,200 m.ts. per year during that 
period. In both cases illicit production exceeded licit production at 
least six-fold. The principal cultivation sites in Peru are the Hual- 
laga River basin in the Departments of Huanuca and San Martin, the 
Maranon River basin in La Libertad, Amazonas and Loreto, the Ene and 
Apurimac River basins in Ayacucho and Junin while the Urabamba and 
Tambopata Rivers feed sites in Ucayali, Cuzco, Puno and Madre de 
Dios.38 The best quality coca leaf is found in the Huallaga River 
basin where the natural setting subscribes to the ideal conditions 
stipulated earlier. In Bolivia illicit coca cultivation occurs in the 
Chepare and Valle Alto sections of the Department of Cochabamba, the 
Yungas and Apolo region of La Paz arid throughout the Departments of 
Beni and Santa Cruz.39 Of late, the Departments of Chaquisaca and 
Tarija have become prominent cultivation sites. The Chepare and Yun­
gas regions are the most important cultivation areas as they respec­
tively account for 75% and 20% of all production in Bolivia.40 The 
Chepare is the prime example of the ideal lowland conditions required 
for growth while the Yungas typifies the highland criteria.
Colombia in comparison produces a less desirable grade of coca; 
thus, the reason why much Peruvian coca and, to a lesser degree, 
Bolivian coca is transhipped to Colombia for refinement. Colombian 
refineries are considered superior and better equipped than their 
counterparts. The lower cocaine alkaloid content of Colombian coca, 
which is the result of a different prevailing interaction of the 
natural conditions of growth, makes the coca a less desirable product 
because it is more expensive to refine into cocaine HC1. The cost of 
acetone, ether and N-hexane - the principal precursor chemicals
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required for synthesis - combined with the difficulty in obtaining 
them in bulk raises the costs. The best analogy to this predicament 
is the petroleum refining process. Heavy crude oils and high sulfur- 
content oils Eire less desirable than light crude oils and low sulfur- 
content oils because they require more processing to attain the 
marketable stage which necessitates additional equipment, higher capi­
tal expenditures and greater overhead costs. In contrast to the two 
states discussed above coca cultivation is wholly illegal in Colombia. 
Hence, the 25,000 hectares in cultivation are devoted exclusively to 
illicit production. Coca traditionally grew in the Departments of 
Amazonas, Cauca, Caqueta, Meta, Narino and Putumayo, but in the late 
1970s it expanded to encompass areas in Boyaca, Choco, Guaviare, 
Santander, Vaupes and Vichada.41 One Colombian hectare yields on 
average 0.8 m.ts. of coca leaf (dry) which when refined will yield ap­
proximately 1.6 kgs. of cocaine HCl. Colombian areas that most 
closely parallel the ideal growing criteria are found in the Sierra 
Nevada de Santa Marta Mountains and jungle areas around the Amazon and 
Orinoco River basins within the departments noted above.
Ecuador is a secondary supply source with cultivation hectarage 
at around 1,300 hectares. Coca is not a traditional crop but it has 
been introduced as a cash crop by drug traffickers whom sure taking ad­
vantage of the socio-economic plight of the farming communities. The 
Provinces of Napo and Pichincha are the primary cultivation sites.42 
Secondary sites Eire located in the Provinces of Carchi, Esmeraldas and 
Zamora Chinchipe. The grade of coca is high with a yield ratio of 
about 1 m.t. of coca leaf per hectare which, when refined, translates 
into 2 kgs. of cocaine HCl with an alkaloid content superior to that
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of other source countries.
In Brazil coca is also a cash crop and production is relatively 
new - a result of socio-economic forces which have forced fanners and 
peasants to turn to it as a source of income. The upper Amazon region 
enveloping the Provinces of Acre, Amazonas and Rondonia in the 
northwestern part of the country abutting Colombia, Peru and Bolivia 
is a prime location. The natural conditions present therein are 
similar to those across the respective borders in the areas discussed 
earlier. Data on hectarage devoted to cultivation or production 
volume cannot be offered because of no reliable intelligence surveys. 
The inaccessability and isolation of the region creates this dilemma. 
However, it is known that the quality of the coca is considerably in­
ferior compared to its Peruvian and Bolivian counterparts. Known as 
epadu, it is harvested twice yearly, first in May to August and then 
later again in December to January.43 The low-yield nature of epadu 
means that the desirability for this coca by the processors is less as 
the refining demands associated with Colombian coca apply here and, 
undoubtedly, on a greater scale. However, it is fair to presume that 
market demand coupled with enforcement pressures in the primary 
producing states will ensure the need for Brazilian epadu.
No figures or estimates can be offered on Venezuelan coca 
production. Venezuela’s situation is similar to that of Ecuador in 
that coca cultivation is a new development; it is small-scale and a 
result of drug traffickers expanding into new areas because of en­
forcement pressures in the traditional locales. The Sierra de Perija 
mountain range in northwestern Venezuela near the Colombian border is 
one area under cultivation.44 The plots are between 1 - 5  hectares.
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In terms of alkaloid content Venezuelan coca is congruous to Colombian 
coca. Other South American countries which have been linked to coca 
cultivation are Argentina, Chile and Paraguay. The proximity of these 
states to the principal growing areas combined with the fact that 
adequate conditions do exist within them suggests that cultivation is 
possible. Apparently, however, suitable sites are very limited and 
thus the extent of cultivation is minute and production is deemed vir­
tually non-existent. Table 3.3 sums up cocaine production in South 
America while Figure 3.4 depicts the areas of coca cultivation.
Table 3.3 Illicit Coca Leaf And Cocaine Production In South America.
AVERAGE PRODUCTION OP COCA LEAF AND COCAINB HCl (i.ts.) World Share 
(1984-86)
(%)
Ave. 1986 
Hectarage 
Utilized*Country
19 84 19 85 19 86 19 87
Coca Cocaine Coca Cocaine Coca Cocaine Coca Cocaine
Bolivia
Coloobia
Peru
Ecuador
Brazil
52,500
11,080
100,000
895
N/A
105.0 
22.2
200.0 
1.8
N/A
47,600
12,400
95,200
1,000
N/A
95.2
24.8
190.4
2.0
N/A
48,460
12,800
107,500
1,300
N/A
96.9
25.6
215.0
2.6
N/A
47,509
12,800
121,833
N/A
N/A
95.0 
25.6 
243 .7 
N/A 
N/A
29.4X
7.7X
62. IX 
0.7X 
N/A
34,614
16,000
107,500
1,300
N/A
TOTAL
ILLICIT
OUTPUT
164,475 329.0 156,200 312.4 170,060 340.1 182,142 364.3 99.9X 153,414
l - The average yield ratios are: Bolivia = 1.4 a.ts./h, Coloobia = 0.8 it.ts./h and Ecuac 
Peru : 1.0 n.t./h. On average, 500 kgs. of coca leaf are required to process 1 kilogi 
cocaine HCl. N/A - data not available
or and 
*ai of
Sources: Derived froi the BINH, INCSR - March 1987 (Washington. D.C.), NNICC NIB 1984 (Washington, 
D.C., 1985) and RCMP, NDIE 1987/88 (Ottawa, 1988) with lathenatics by author.
Coca cultivation outside of South America is negligible and in 
the experimental stages. Presumably, as pressure increases on the 
drug producers and traffickers in that continent they will go farther 
afield in search of new suitable areas for coca cultivation. His­
torically, the basis for coca not being found elsewhere is its endemic 
relationship with South America and the Andean region. The spatial
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Figure 3.4 Coca Cultivation Sites In South America.
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arrangement of the continent with vast oceans both to the east and 
west, the Caribbean Sea to the north and the progressively cooler 
zones to the south precluded natural dissemination of the plant in any 
direction. The narrowness of the Panamanian isthmus and Central 
American land-mass coupled with unsuitable natural conditions therein
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prevented the spread northward along that land bridge to the North 
American continent. The coca plant in the wild is sensitive and, if 
it were not for artificial means, it would never have naturally 
propagated to some of the areas in South America where it is currently 
found. Hence, in mentioning these new sites it has to be recognized 
that artificial means of transmittal were involved.
Costa Rica and Panama have become involved because they straddle 
the main trafficking routes to North America and are close to 
Colombia. Coca plots have been found in southern Panama near the 
Colombian border. Darian Province is one named area of cultivation 
though activity is labelled experimental.45 Far afield in the western 
Pacific coca has been cultivated in Indonesia and the Philippines. 
The upland areas of both Bali and Java have seen coca cultivation.46 
In the Philippines a coca plantation was discovered along with a 
refining laboratory.47 Though the operation was small in size and 
supported very limited production, such a development indicates the 
ability of the plant to survive, though not necessarily thrive, 
elsewhere. Cultivation has also been attempted in Australia, Mexico, 
the Seychelles, the West Indies and in several sites in Africa.48 Ap­
proximately 121,560 m.ts. of coca in various stages of refinement were 
exported from the principal source countries in 1986.49 Though dis­
tributed throughout the world most of the cocaine illicitly produced 
goes to North America and, on a much lower volume, to Europe.
3,2*4 Chemical And Psychotropic Substance Sources
This is the most difficult category of illicit drugs to explain 
because the degree of illicit trafficking in these substances via the
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maritime medium is minor yet the number of substances involved is 
many. The few quantities which find their way into the maritime drug 
trade are either diverted from licit sources and shipments or Eire out- 
rightly manufactured in illegal laboratories for the illicit market. 
Hence, discussion focuses on those countries where the pharmaceutical 
industry is an important component of industry or where there has been 
a proliferation of clandestine laboratories geared towards the 
manufacture of such substances. Based on 1983 production data the 
principal source countries for semi-synthetic, synthetic and pjsycho- 
tropic drugs before diversion into the illicit markets, in descending 
order, are: the U.S.A., the U.K., Italy, Switzerland, France, West
Germany, India, Japan, Belgium, the Netherlands, the U.S.S.R. and 
Hungary.50 Embraced by this list are the world’s traditional and 
major pharmaceutical suppliers. India has been a prominent source of 
diverted methaqualone which is being smuggled in large quantities into 
southern Africa.51 Licit methaqualone use in India was banned in 
January 1984 but there are large stockpiles just sitting and vul­
nerable to theft. Additionally, amphetamines, barbiturates, ben­
zodiazepines along with methaqualone are being diverted from licit 
suppliers in western Europe and finding their way into Africa and the 
Middle East.52 Data on countries with clandestine manufacturing 
operations is sketchy. This is understandable considering the nature 
of the activity. To a certain degree it may be said that wherever 
there is illicit use of chemical and pxsychotropic substances the ex­
istence of a laboratory is possible. However, based on information 
available, only the following countries appear to have significant 
levels of clandestine manufacturing of semi-synthetic, synthetic and
psychotropic substances: Canada, Czechoslovakia, Mexico, the
Netherlands, South Korea, Taiwan, the U.S.A. and West Germany. 
Methamphetamines, amphetamines and FCP accounted for 82% of the 312 
clandestine laboratory seizures in the U.S. in 1984.53 Fentanyl, LSD, 
meperidine and methaqualone are other chemical drugs produced in the 
U.S.A. Canada’s illicit production scene is relatively similar to 
that of the U.S., but the principal psychotropic substances appear to 
be methamphetamines, PCP and MDA according to 1984 and 1985 data on 
discoveries.54 Amphetamines, LSD, meperidine and fake methaqualone 
(containing diazepam) are other drugs manufactured illicitly in 
Canada. Mexico’s status as an illicit manufacturer of these sub­
stances stems from its proximity to the U.S. and the demand therein 
for such drugs. Mexico produces amphetamines, fake methaqualone 
(containing secobarbital), phentermine and fenthylline.55 South Korea 
and Taiwan are prominent sources of illicitly manufactured 
methamphetamines.56 Both West Germany and the Netherlands are sites 
of illicit amphetamine production while LSD is also produced in fair 
quantities in the latter.57 Czechoslovakia is a minor manufacturer of 
illicit methamphetamines.58 Though the other main European states are 
not mentioned by name, it is fair to say, based on an overall assess­
ment of the illicit production of this category of drugs, that they 
account for the majority of other manufacturers in the world.
3,2*5 The Primary Drug Consumers
In order to list those states which belong in the category of 
primary drug consumer it becomes necessary to segregate the consuming 
states based on the magnitude of domestic consumption thereby allowing
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a ranking of their respective drug scenes to be derived. Often, the 
producers are also significant consumers. Hence, the role illicit 
trafficking plays and the quantities moved sure a useful criteria by 
which to determine the major external consumption sites. 
Unfortunately, this does not work in practice - at least not from a 
standpoint of precision. Because there is no method to accurately 
assess how much of each substance enters a given consumption area or 
state the analysis is generally reliant on descriptive information. 
Though one may use seizure statistics, epidemiological data and intel­
ligence findings to support a demand scenario they all lack complete­
ness. The first represents only a fraction of the drugs in the trade 
while the second is the result of extrapolations of data on arrests, 
hospitalizations and surveys and the latter is qualitative, imprecise 
and suspect. Additionally, the dilution factor of a marketed illicit 
drug is a variable of ill-defined measurement which dramatically af­
fects retail volume. However, quantitative assessments do exist and 
to the extent that others rely on them they will be incorporated here 
as well. Among the sources utilized in determining the respective 
levels of drug use described herein are the published estimates on ad­
dict and user populations, national seizure statistics and, where 
available, official projections on drug importation and consumption. 
Bearing in mind that the emphasis of this study is on the states of 
O.E.C.D. the analysis is divided into two parts. The first simply 
summarizes the principal drug consumers in the world irrespective of 
their status for the record. The second provides an analysis of the 
OECD states. Interestingly, but not surprisingly, a fair number of 
states within the O.E.C.D. constitute major consumption sites. Can­
nabis and select opiates are the most widely consumed drugs while 
cocaine is relatively limited in area of consumption. The chemical 
and psychotropic substances of abuse also show a less extensive pat­
tern of usage.
The world*s principal consumers of illicit opiates, primarily in 
the form of opium and heroin, are, in descending order, Pakistan, 
India, Iran, the U.S.A., Afghanistan, Malaysia, Italy, West Germany 
and Thailand. Egypt belongs to this grouping but there is no quan­
titative data available by which to determine the ranking of the 
country vis-a-vis the others. The sheer number of users and volume 
consumed in each exceeds that of other countries by an order of mag­
nitude unequalled. At minimum, there are at least 220,000 opiate 
users in each state. Collectively, they have more than 8.5 million 
addicts and habitual users. They consume perhaps 65% of the total 
available opium derived from illicit production or diversion annually. 
On a per capita basis these countries may not see the heaviest con­
centration of abuse but they dominate in numbers. Table 3.4 provides 
data on user populations for select countries.
In reviewing cannabis consumption one finds the poorest qualita­
tive data. Realistically, the scope of the problem is not appropri­
ately assessed. However, based on descriptive intelligence observa­
tions, government reports, published documents and some quantitative 
data, it is possible to determine the principal consuming states. Be­
cause cannabis is a pervasive drug with variform potency and indeter­
minant distribution a minimum user figure of 400,000 has been chosen 
as the threshold level above which all countries are labelled as major 
consumers. Based on quantitative data, the U.S.A., Bangladesh, Spain,
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Table 3.4 Drug Addict And User Populations For Select Countries.
Country
Opiates
Coca A 
Cocaine
Chenical A 
Psychotropic 
Substances
Cannabis 
(All f o n s  
of the drug)
References A 
Sources for 
figures givenHeroin
Opiui I 
Morphine
AUSTRALIA 17,000 N/A N/A Minute N/A Royal Coi. Inquiry (83).
BELGIUM N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A -
CANADA 20,000 Minute N/A N/A N/A RCMP NDIE 1985/6 (1986).
DBNMARK . . . . . 8 ,000. . . . Minute N/A N/A Swedish GPO (1987).
FINLAND N/A 1 N/A N/A N/A N/A -
FRANCE . . . . 200,000. . . . 10,000 N/A 800,000 Douanes (1987) I EP.
GREECE . . . . . 20,000. . . . Minute N/A N/A Greek MPO (1988).
ICELAND Minute Minute Minute N/A N/A Ice. Just. Dept. ( 1986).
IRELAND N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A -
ITALY 250,000 Minute - 600,000 400,000 500,000 UN Docs. (1987).
JAPAN Minute Minute Minute 1,500,000 30,000 UN Doc. B/CN.7/1987/9.
NETHERLANDS 17,500 . . . 17,500— N/A Dutch MWHCA (1985).
NEW ZEALAND t -"utflLcu vi i i v i a n j  no vuouvmu-- Nu vUSvOOS UcpL«
NORVAY 1 7,500. . . . . 52,500 Politikaaoer (1988).
PORTUGAL N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A -
SPAIN 102,500 Minute 70,000 444,500 1,500,000 Spanish MHCA (1986).
SNSDEN 1,000 3,250 Minute 7,750 12,500 NSCCP (1986).
TURKEY Minute Minute Minute N/A N/A UN Doc. B/CN.7/1987/9.
U.K. 200,000 Minute . . . 25,000— UKHO (1985); EP (1986).
U.S.A. 492,000 Minute 12,000,000 N/A 20,000,000 UK A UN Docs. (1985-7).
N. GERMANY . . . . 200,000. . . . N/A 550,000 20,100 G e n a n  Docs. A BP ( 1986).
AFGHANISTAN 100,000 250,000 Minute Minute N/A BINM (1987).
BOLIVIA Minute Minute 80,000 Minute (v/cocaine) SDRI (1987).
BURMA 17,600 159,700 Minute Minute N/A UN Doc. B/CN.7/1987/9.
COLOMBIA Minute J Minute 500,000 Minute 800,000 Gooes (1989).
INDIA 475,000 4,000,000 N/A N/A N/A The NNICC REPORT 1987.
IRAN 100,000 500,000 Minute N/A N/A BINM (1987).
PAKISTAN 660,000 1,000,000 Minute 425,000 800,000 RCMP A BINM (1987).
PERU Minute Minute 300,000 Minute N/A FCO (1987).
THAILAND __ inn nnft- flMPR /10 fl7 \7 V V , V V V v/NOD 1 X 3 0 1 1 .
ARGENTINA Minute Minute .. .. 450,000-v. . . . . . . SDRI (1987).
BANGLADESH 10,000 30,000 Minute 1,000,000 2,500,000 UN Doc. B/CN.7/1987/9.
HUNGARY _ _ _ _ <n nnn- Tina MQB7Iline 11v0 IJ •
MALAYSIA 226,188 28,823 Minute Minute 22,235 UNAFEI Report 1984.
MAURITIUS 12,500 450 Minute 17,500 4,500 UN Doc. B/CN.7/1987/9.
POLAND . . . . . . . 400,000... N/A Tine (1987).
SRI LANKA 24,000 N/A Minute N/A N/A UN Doc. B/CN.7/1987/9.
SWITZERLAND 10,000 Minute N/A N/A 10,000 UN Doc. B/CN.7/1987/9.
U.S.S.R. .. . 151,000 Soviet UN Delegate!1988).
Minute - no quantitative figure available but official sources and intelligence reports indicate
that it is relatively snail or inconseouential. N/A - data not available.
Explanation 1 Disclaiier Note: The purpose of this table is to live a loose idea of the purported
drug user populations based upon published figures derived fron a variety of sources. It oust be
stressed that these figures cannot be considered exact or accurate. A nuiber of factors too
nuierous to aention preclude precision. Nor should one atteipt to add the figures listed in each
colunn for any selected country and presune the sui to be the total drug-user population therein.
Drug users often consune lore than one substance or vary their consunption over tine. Consequently,
aultiple counting occurs. (References as listed here say not necessarily appear in bibliography.)
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Pakistan and France rank as the top five. Descriptive data, however, 
indicates that Afghanistan, Brazil, Colombia, Egypt, India, Iran, 
Italy and Poland are also in this grouping. Census numbers alone do 
not always convey the true picture and depth of the problem. There 
are several small countries and regions that have serious cannabis 
problems if one views the consumption aspect in context with the 
population base. While the national addict and user figures in- 
dividually do not approach the threshold level noted earlier, when 
seen collectively, sis a region, they do come close or exceed that 
level. The Caribbean which encompasses all island states of the 
Netherlands, Lesser and Greater Antilles, West Africa which embraces 
the coastal states from Nigeria westward to Sierra Leone and the 
Arabian Peninsula are regions of such consumption.
Until recently, cocaine use has been virtually an American 
problem with the Canadians replicating the degree of use on a minor 
scale. The magnitude of use in the U.S.A. is unsurpassed. Reasonable 
figures put out by various sources on the extent of habitual use say 
12 million Americans use cocaine.59 Beginning with the early to mid- 
1980s cocaine use spread to Europe. By 1985 approximately 20 m.ts. 
were being shipped to Europe.60 Italy has seen the greatest intrusion 
of cocaine use. In 1987 there were an estimated 600,000 regular 
users.61 Spain, at yet a lower order of magnitude, is believed to be 
the third major consumer of cocaine. There were about 70,000 regular 
users in 1986.62 The U.K., West Germany, France and the Netherlands 
round off the bottom of the list based on descriptive assessments. 
However, so far the discussion has centered on cocaine and not its 
lesser refined forms of coca paste and bazuco. In South America these
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substances are heavily abused. While the effect may not be as severe 
in the short-term the outcome in the long-term is similar - addiction 
and habitual demand. The principal countries are Argentina, Bolivia, 
Brazil, Colombia and Peru. In 1987 there were about 600,000 users in 
Colombia while in Peru they numbered 300,000.63
Amphetamines, methamphetamines and PCP are the most commonly 
abused psychotropic substances followed by methaqualone and LSD. 
Based on quantitative data the two largest consumers of chemical and 
psychotropic drugs by a two-fold order of magnitude over the nearest 
rivals are Japan and Bangladesh. Regular users of these substances 
number 1.5 million in Japan and one million in Bangladesh.64 Metham­
phetamines and volatile solvents are the primary substances abused in 
Japan while in Bangladesh it is benzodiazepines.65 The other main 
consumers are West Germany, Spain, Pakistan and Italy. The countries 
which must be added to the list though quantitative data is lacking 
are the U.S.A., India and Canada. The U.S. probably ranks number one 
though no figure is included in Table 3.4. This is because there is 
only descriptive information available to support this premise. In 
1985 an estimated 3 billion d.u. of these substances, which crudely 
translates into 300 kgs., were consumed in the U.S.66 A figure of 8 
million abusers of tranquillizers has been stated for 1986.6 7 
However, it is presumed that this is more a result of abuse of 
prescribed drugs and not substances obtained illicitly. In addition 
to the major consumers noted above there are several countries where 
chemical and psychotropic substance abuse is acute, but which are not 
commonly recognized as important problem areas because of their 
"smallness.” This point was introduced previously in the discussion
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on cannabis consumption. Africa in particular is affected by this 
dimension. Among the African countries experiencing severe problems 
with psychotropic substances are Botswana, South Africa and Zambia.68 
Mauritius with 17,500 abusers of benzodiazepines is another country in 
this category.69 The Arabian Peninsula and Egypt cure also considered 
to have problems of a higher degree.
3,2,6 Drug Consumption In The Coastal States Of O.E,C,D, 
3.2,6.1 The United States of America
The U.S. is the leading consumer of cocaine, marijuana, chemical 
and psychotropic substances in the world.70 Though not the largest 
consumer of opiates the U.S. consumes 60 - 70 m.ts. annually; nearly 
all (6.45 m.ts.) in the form of heroin.71 As Table 3.5 shows, about 
47% came from Southwest Asia, 39% from Mexico and 14% from Southeast 
Asia.72 Golden Crescent heroin is prominently used (~85%) in the 
eastern third of the country while Mexican heroin dominates (~60%) in 
the Midwest, Southwest and West.73 Golden Triangle heroin is notably 
used ('27%) in the West but is still second to Mexican heroin.74 Can­
nabis consumption is between 8,000 - 10,000 m.ts. annually. In 1986 
marijuana imports totalled about 9,575 m.ts. and domestic production 
contributed a further 2,100 m.ts.75 Hashish importation is believed 
to be about 175 m.ts. annually. Cocaine imports were 100 m.ts. in 
1986.76 Roughly 75 - 80% is actually consumed. Table 3.5 provides a 
breakdown of the sources of illicit drugs and their roles. The U.S.’s 
consumption of chemical and psychotropic substances was discussed in 
an earlier section. Essentially, the U.S. supplies itself with lesser 
amounts coming from Canada, Colombia and Mexico. Primary consumption
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Tab le 3 .5  Sources Of I l l i c i t  Drugs In  The U.S.A In  1985 And 1986.
H E R O IN
Share Aiount 
Sources (XI ( i. t. )
C A N N A B IS
Share
Sources (X)t
Aiount
( i. t . )
C O C A IN E
Share Aiount 
Sources (X) ( i. t . )
Afghanistan Coloibia (M) 47.14X 4,596.0 Coloibia 75X 75.0
Pakistan 47X 3.03 Mexico (H) 23.671 2,298.0 Bolivia 15X 15.0
Iran [U.S.A.]a (M) (excl.) 2,100.0 Peru 5X 5.0
Jaiaica (M) 15.711 1,532.0 Others 5X 5,0
Mexico 39X 2.52 Beli ce (M) 7.85X 766.0
Others (M) 3,931 383.0
fiuria Afghanistan/
Laos 14X 0.90 Pakistan (H) 1.121 109.4
Thailand Lebanon (H) 0.50X 48.0
Morocco (H) 0.19X 8.8
Others (H) 0.19X 8.8
TOTALS 100X 6.45 TOTALS 100.3 X 9,750.0 TOTALS 100X 100.0
Notes: t - Will not tally due to rounding. H - Marijuana H - Hashish
a - included for conparison’ s sake but not counted in tabulation above.
Sources: BINM, INCSR - March 1987 (Washington, D.C.), pp. 3, 27, 32 & 50; NNICC, NIB 
1984 (Washington, D.C., 1985), pp. 17, 21 I  31; k NDIli, Drugs Arena, No. 3 
_______ (London, 19861 . p. 9 with all aatheaaties by author._________________
s ite s  f o r  i l l i c i t  drugs w ith in  the  U .S .A . a re  th e  urban c e n tre s , p a r­
t i c u l a r l y  th e  b ig  c i t i e s  l i k e  Boston, Chicago, D a lla s , D e t r o i t ,  
Houston, Los Angeles, M iam i, Newark, New Y o rk , P h ila d e lp h ia , Phoenix, 
San D iego, San F ra n c isco , S t. Lou is  and W ashington, D.C. Tab le  3 .6  
p ro v id e s  a s t a t i s t i c a l  summary o f  US drug s e iz u re s .
Tab le  3 .6  Drug Se izures In  The U .S.A. For The P e rio d  1983 -  1987.
Year
Cannabis
(kgs.)
Cocaine
(kgs.)
Heroin
(kgs.)
Morph./Opium 
(kgs.)
All Psychotropic 
Substances (d.u.)
1983 828,824.729 8,901.731 300.372 16.243 20,238,938
1984 1,320,633.144 11,495.099 385.043 8.013 18,326,621
1985 854,620.758 25,776.014 419.097 26.107 18,372,464
1986 663,070.620 <5,000.000 410.400 11.150 38,961,450
1987 625,059.011 56,400.000 501.006 43.035 34.404,021
Sources: UN Docs. B/CN.7 Series for the years 1987 - 1989 as lodified by US data.
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3,2, 6,2 Canada
The Canadian <±rug scene is similar to that of the U.S. but on a* 
smaller scale. For the 1980s as A whole virtually all heroin comes 
from Asia with the Golden Triangle accounting for 62% and the Golden
Crescent accounting for 38%.7 7 Heroin use is most prevalent in the
Provinces of British Columbia, Alberta, Ontario and Quebec. Montreal, 
Toronto and Vancouver are the principal domestic distribution
centres.78 In terms of volume, cannabis is the principal drug
imported. It is readily available and widely used. Table 3.7 denotes 
the contribution shares of the source countries. Cocaine is also
Table 3.7 Sources And Types Of Cannabis Found In Canada In The 1980s.
Marijuana Hashish Hashish Oil
Country (% share) (% share) (% share)
Canada 7.7 % - 2.0 %
Colombia 35.8 % - -
Jamaica 21.7 % 2.8 % 74.0 %
Lebanon - 70.3 % 20.8 %
Mexico 9.8 % - -
Pakistan/India - 20.7 % 2.2 %
Thailand 16.7 % - -
U.S.A. 7.0 % - -
Others 1.3 % 6.2 % 1.0 %
TOTALS 100.0 % 100.0 % 100.0 %
Source: RCMP. NDIE - various years (Ottawa, various years).
easily obtainable, but distribution and use tends to be focused in the 
large urban areas with Montreal being the primary site.79 The chemi­
cal and psychotropic substances Canada produces are also the ones it 
consumes. Table 3.8 provides the Canadian seizure statistics for the 
mid-1980s.
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Table 3.8 Canadian Drug Seizures In The Period 1983 - 1987.
Year
Cannabis
(kgs.)
Cocaine
(kgs.)
Heroin
(kgs.)
Morph./Opiua 
(kgs.)
Psilocybin
(kgs.)
Aaphetamines
(kgs.)
PCP
(kgs.)
Other Psycho- 
tropics (kgs.)
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
27,021.781
11,344.577
22,960.025
26,256.168
45,553.268
116.288
154,433
170.082
247.142
282.796
33,011
40.259
64.915
48.108
<4.891
2.561
1.299
0.751
14.499
1.974
72.000
48.000 
318.000 
128.713 
115.308
79.771
5.951
8.286
11.508
0.552
15.381
6.011
20.191
7.212
3.212
197,201
157.206
103,626
17.846
47.974
Sources: All data eicent 
1986/87 A 1987/8 
1985 - 1989.
‘or cannabis, torphine and opiui froi RCMP’s NDI 
1. Cannabis, torphine and opiui data froi UN Do
1984/5, 1985/6, 
cs. B/CN.7 Series
3,2.6.3 Japan
Stimulants, specifically methamphetamines, are the most 
prevalently abused drug in Japan followed to a lesser degree by can­
nabis and, more recently, cocaine. Comparatively speaking, heroin and 
other opiates and psychotropic substances are used on a minor level or 
are virtually non-existent.80 Cannabis and poppy grow wild in Japan. 
In 1985 alone the authorities destroyed 5.1 million cannabis plants 
and 280,000 poppy plants.81 An analysis of stimulant confiscatures 
for the period 1980 - 1985 reveals that of the total 56.3% came from 
South Korea, 37.4% came from Taiwan, 1.8% came from Hong Kong, 1.6% 
came from the Philippines and 2.9% came from a number of other minor 
sources.82 In contrast, the majority of cannabis seizures show that 
the U.S.A., the Philippines, Thailand and India are the principal 
source countries for marijuana in Japan. Table 3.9 contains the an­
nual seizure figures for drugs in Japan. Since 1981 more than 20,000 
individuals have been arrested annually for drug offences in Japan. 
In 1984 there were 37,267 cases and in 1985 there were 35,587 cases.83 
It is estimated that the total quantity of stimulants confiscated in 
1985 could, in theory, be consumed by 14.7 million people though .from
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the addiction standpoint it could only support between 163,000 -
490,000 addicts based on the Japanese definition of toxicosis.94 It 
is believed that the actual drug user population is ten times that 
which is known to the authorities.85 Tokyo followed to a lesser 
degree by Osaka, Fukuoka and Kanagawa are the primary consumption 
sites of stimulants based on annual seizure data.
Table 3.9 Japanese Drug Seizures In The Period 1983 - 1987.
Stimulants Cannabis Cocaine Heroin Morph./Opium LSD
Year (kgs.) (kgs.) (kgs.) (kgs.) (kgs.) (d.u.)
1983 100.630 336.996 1.028 1.422 0.488 220
1984 199.333 563.230 12.455 6.832 0.194 5,713
1985 295.527 124.442 128.634 16.349 0.420 131
1986 350.418 230.790 2.122 1.831 0.615 69
1987 702.732 196.354 1.660 4.695 0.047 97
Sources: MHW, A Brief Account Of Drug Abuse And Counter-Measures In 
Japan (Tokyo, 1986), p. 23 & NPA, DPIJ 1986 (Tokyo, 1986) 
in conjunction with UN Docs. E/CN.7/1988/CRP.8 &
________ E/CN.7/1989/CRP.5.______________________________________
3,2,6.4 Australia
The drug scene in Australia is somewhat ambiguous because of 
lack of data. Though two Royal Commissions provided estimates on the 
drug using population they were considered speculative.86 There has 
been a multitude of epidemiological studies of narrow scope and thrust 
but none offer reliable and comprehensive statistics on drug use on 
the national level. Based on seizures and recorded offences, cannabis 
is the principal drug consumed followed by heroin. Cocaine use is the 
growing trend. Amphetamine is present but the extent of usage is not 
understood. In regards to cannabis no specific country can be singled 
out as the primary source of the drug in Australia. Cannabis is grown 
locally and though there is no quantitative data on production it is
no
not deemed insignificant. External sources of origin most frequently 
noted include the Philippines, Thailand, India, Pakistan and Lebanon. 
Heroin from the Golden Triangle dominates the Australian market while 
Golden Crescent heroin is found notably in Victoria.87 An analysis of 
1986 Customs seizures shows that 75% of all heroin interdicted came 
from Southeast Asia while the Middle East accounted for 12.5% and 
Southwest Asia provided 9.9%.88 Contrastingly, all of the cocaine 
found within the country originates in Colombia and Chile with more 
than 77% of it transhipped via islands in the Pacific basin.89 Most 
of the amphetamine consumed is produced domestically in illicit 
laboratories, notably located in Victoria.90 Though labelled specu­
lative, in 1985 the ACS made estimates on the total quantities of 
drugs imported to Australia annually. These estimates were as 
follows: cocaine = 254 - 3,690 kgs. with a median figure of 1,972
kgs.;91 heroin = 410.5 - 1.123.5 kgs. with a median figure of 767 
kgs.;92 hashish = 10.1 - 62.7 m.ts. with a median figure of 36.4
m.ts.;93 and, marijuana = 30.9 - 864.1 m.ts. with a median figure of
447.5 m.ts.94 Table 3.10 provides a summary of drug seizures in 
Australia.
Table 3.10 Australian Drug Seizures In The Period 1983 - 1987.
Cannabis Cocaine Heroin Morph./Opium Stimulants
Year (kgs.) (kgs.) (kgs.) (kgs.) (kgs.)
1983 1,725.460 8.797 97.071 1.138 0.512
1984 6,912.860 13.100 101.550 0.044 1.330
1985 3,129.568 12.801 57.886 8.985 2.397
1986 3,916.794* 21.581 30.937 0.807 0.883
1987 935.995 10.688 65.836 0.613 32.742
* - includes 1.000 kgs. not nhysically recovered.
Sources : UN Docs. E/CN.7 Series for years 1987 - 1989 as
corroborated/corrected by ACS & AFP statistics.
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Cannabis is consumed throughout the country. Cocaine use, on 
the other hand, is confined to the eastern States of New South Wales, 
Queensland, Victoria and Tasmania.95 Heroin use has been rising 
steadily in the 1980s. Figure 3.5 depicts heroin use in Australia. 
In the early 1980s it was estimated that 0.9 - 1.3 m.ts. had to be im­
ported to support the hard-core addict population existent then.96 
Heroin use is most prevalent in the urban areas of Brisbane, 
Melbourne, Perth and Sydney. Overall, about 800 deaths per annum are 
directly attributable to drug use.
Figure 3.5 Heroin Offences In Australia In The 1980s.
S: 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Source: N .S .W .  A t t o r n e y  G e n e r a l ' s  D e p t . ,  " H e r o i n  Use and
C r i m e , "  Crime And J u s t i c e  B u l l e t i n . No. 3 (J u n e  
________  1 9 8 7 ) , _________
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3.2.6.5 New Zealand
Drugs have been abused in New Zealand since the arrival of the 
first European settlers.97 During the period 1981 - 1986 a total of 
79,599 drug offences involving 71,013 offenders was recorded.98 
Overall, New Zealand lags 5 years behind the world drug scene and all 
developments therein. Polydrug use is the norm. Cannabis is, by far, 
the most widely consumed drug. Cocaine, heroin and LSD are less ex­
tensively used substances. Domestic cannabis production contributes a 
significant percentage of the total quantity of cannabis consumed with 
areas in and around the Districts of Nelson, Coromandel and Northland 
being diligently cultivated.99 In the mid-1980s (1984/5/6) plant con- 
fiscatures totalled more than 121,000 plants annually. The high level 
of domestic production stems from the fact that New Zealand cannabis 
is considered equal in strength to Southeast Asian cannabis.100 
Consequently, the demand for external supplies is somewhat negated. 
Domestically produced cannabis oil is also abundant. In contrast, 
most of the hashish imported originates from Southwest Asia, India and 
Morocco while all heroin comes from the Golden Triangle and Golden 
Crescent. Illicit synthesis of morphine and crude heroin from codeine 
base is prevalent in New Zealand with over 140 covert laboratories 
discovered in the period 1983 - 1987.101 In contrast to the drug
scenes of most other countries LSD remains a popular hard drug in the 
1980s.102 Most of it originates from the Netherlands while the U.S. 
and the U.K. are the sources of minor amounts. In regard to all im­
ported heroin, LSD and hashish, it is observed that the drugs either 
transit or originate in Australia before arriving in New Zealand while 
all cocaine comes from Argentina and Chile, either directly or via
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Tahiti. Table 3.11 provides a summary of drug seizures in New 
Zealand. Not much is known about the demographics of drug use. As ife 
typical elsewhere, the use of hard drugs tends to be confined to the 
larger urban areas like Auckland, Christchurch, Hamilton and 
Wellington. Quantitative data on the drug-using population is lacking.
Table 3.11 Drug Seizures In New Zealand For The Years 1983 - 1987.
Cannabis Cocaine Heroin Morphine/Opium LSD
Year (kgs.) (kgs.) (kgs.) (kgs.) (d.u.)
1983 328.112 0.208 0.339 1.488 2,414.5
1984 502.738 0.290 0.129 0.507 557
1985 363.482 0.032 0.684 0.018 9,006.5
1986 328.717 4.030 1.150 0.034 8,753
1987 497.469 3.207 0.018 0.648 4,515
Sources : NDIB, Drug Summary (Wellington, 1987), Annexes 3 & 4
and UN Doc. E/CN.7/1989/CRP.5.
3,2,6,6 The United Kingdom
In the United Kingdom cannabis is, by far, the most prevalent 
drug followed by heroin, cocaine and amphetamines. Comprehensive and 
reliable figures on the extent of drug consumption nationally are non­
existent. However, a statistical extrapolation made from seizure data 
for heroin in conjunction with overall estimates on trafficking and 
consumption indicates that the U.K.'s population of heroin users num­
bers around 200,000.103 Though cannabis is cultivated domestically, 
on a minor scale, the vast majority of it is imported from the Golden 
Crescent, Lebanon and Morocco. West Africa and Thailand contribute a 
minor share. About 80% of the heroin intercepted originates from the 
Golden Crescent with India and Sri Lanka being the prominent transit 
states; at least in the first instance of trans-shipment. Cocaine 
comes from the usual South American source countries while the
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majority of amphetamine imported is manufactured in the Netherlands. 
There is some amphetamine and methylamphetamine production within the 
U.K. In 1986 thirteen illicit laboratories were detected.104 Diver­
sion from licit supplies occurs but the quantities pilfered are small. 
Table 3.12 provides a summary of drug seizures in the U.K.
Table 3.12 Drug Seizures In The United Kingdom For The Years 1984-87.
Year
Cannabis
(kgs.)
Cocaine
(kgs.)
Heroin
(kgs.)
Morph./Opiui 
(kgs.)
Stias.
(kgs.)
Methaqualone
(kgs.)
Others
(kgs.)
1984 29,072.240 65.502 361.601 8.203 58.806 31.100 0.857
1985 22,667.188 85.391 356.374 0.587 77.123 3.350 1.610
1986 24,386.974 101.885 222.287 1.673 105.506 0.147 2.913
1987 16.265.295 360.146 187.641 0.009 18.255 0 0.003
Sources: UN Docs. B/CN.7/1388/CEP.8 and B/CN.7/1989/CRP.5.
While cannabis is consumed throughout the country prolific use 
is concentrated in the big cities as a result of population demo­
graphics. Heroin use, on the other hand, appears scattered and
variable. In general terms, it tends to be an inner urban problem 
among the young, unemployed and disaffected. Based on areal and 
regional studies there is an extremely high correlation (-95%) between 
heroin use and petty crime.105 Cities and areas seeing a high density 
of consumption per capita sure Greater London, Greater Msuichester, 
Liverpool, Glsisgow, Wirral emd Carlisle. Cocaine is seen sa the 
"champagne" drug.106 At present, cocaine use is bstsically confined to 
London and adjacent counties in southeastern England. In 1984 there 
were 28,600 seizures of drugs and 25,000 people were convicted or 
reprimanded for drug violations.107
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3*2,6.7 Ireland
Cannabis and heroin are the drugs of abuse in the Republic of 
Ireland. Most other drugs are to be found, but the quantities are 
minute. The extent of drug consumption is not known. The majority of 
cannabis originates from Lebanon, Morocco, Thailand and West Africa 
with the U.K. and the Netherlands often serving as transit states. 
Domestic cultivation is minor. In the period 1984 - 1987 9,992 plants 
were seized along with 1,520 poppy plants.108 Heroin either transits 
the U.K. or undergoes further refinement there thus masking the origin 
of its base. Table 3.13 contains data on Irish drug seizures.
Table 3.13 Irish Drug Seizures In The Period 1983 - 1987.
Year
Cannabis 
(kgs.)
Cocaine
Ikgs.)
Heroin 
(kgs.)
All Others 
(kgs.)
1983 530.773 0.097 1.379 0.248
1984 15.171 0.080 0.525 0.403
1985 73.361 0.293 1.220 0.424
1986 12.748 0.171 1.896 0
1987 101.109 0.030 0.051 0.315
Sources: Garda Siochana. Annual Reports for 1983/4/5 (Dublin, 
1984, 1985 & 1986): UN Doc. E/CN.7/1989/CRP.5.
The abuse of heroin is confined to Dublin where it is a serious 
problem in the inner urban area.109 A summary of drug offences for 
the period 1983 - 1985 shows that Dublin accounted for 79.2% of all
drug indictments. Cork followed with an 8.9% share and Limerick ran a 
distant third with a 3.5% share. When viewed by category of drugs 
involved, cannabis accounted for 56.3% of all drug offences while 
heroin accounted for 25.7%. Table 3.14 presents the actual number of 
offences by drug category and city.
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Table 3.14 Analysis Of Irish Drug Offences By City And Category*
CITIES TOTAL 
INDICTHBNTS 
PER ANNUM
DRUG CATEGORIES
Others
Year Dublin Cork Linerick (15 Divs.)
All
Others Heroin Cannabis Year
1983 1,389 184 62 187
1984 1,105 118 59 87
1985 1.041 93 33 103
1,822
1,369
1.270
328 449 1,045 1983 
282 340 747 1984 
191 359 720 1985
Sources: Garda Siochana, Annual Reports for 1983/4/5 (Du blin, 1984, 1985 I 1986}.
3.2.6.8 Spain
Based on seizure data for the period 1983 - 1986 Spain is
Europe*s largest importer of cannabis and cocaine and fourth largest 
importer of heroin and LSD, However, though Spain is one of the 
larger consumers of drugs it does not consume all that enters. 
Instead, fair amounts entering the country are in transit destined for 
elsewhere in Europe. With about 1.5 million users cannabis is, by 
far, the most widely consumed drug.110 Spain has the largest popula­
tion of cannabis consumers in Europe (See Table 3.4). Most of the 
cannabis consumed is imported; the majority of it in the form of 
hashish. The remaining portion is cultivated within the country.
More than 6.7 m.ts. of plants were seized in the period 1984 -
1987.111 Furthermore, Spain has the second largest population of
cocaine users in Europe after Italy. The majority of cocaine comes 
from Colombia. In contrast, most of the heroin imported originates 
from the Golden Crescent and Lebanon and transits the Middle East and 
eastern Mediterranean before arriving in Spain. LSD is a popular 
psychotropic substance with seizures averaging 25,100 d.u. per year. 
Table 3.15 offers a summary of Spanish drug confiscatures.
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Table 3.15 Spanish Drug Seizures In The Period 1983 - 1987.
Cannabis Cocaine Heroin Morph. /Opium LSD
Year (kgs.) (kgs.) (kgs.) (kgs.) (d.u.)
1983 17,646.520 275.144 109.329 0.128 12,682
1984 34,851.304 277.029 203.087 0.773 17,781
1985 64,248.882 302.544 252.615 5.327 5,647
1986 48,047.876 668.919 407.052 0.0009 67,436
1987 59.603.963 1.135.369 412.699 0 22.128
Sources: UN Docs. E/CN.7/1987/CRP.6 & E/CN.7/1989/CRP.5. .
The demographics behind drug use are not well understood. On 
average 140 people die per year as a result of drug abuse or drug- 
induced events.112 One index used to measure the extent of drug use 
is to correlate new addict cases as a function of population. Based 
on such analysis, it is observed that the Autonomous Communities of 
Pais Vasco and the Balearic Islands possess the highest incidence 
rates while Castilla Y Leon, Castilla-La Mancha and the Canary Islands 
occupy the midrange of the spectrum.113 Vis-a-vis the Balearic 
Islands, it is probable that the high figure reflects in part the con­
sumption of illicit drugs by the transient tourist population.
3.2*6.9 The Netherlands
The Netherlands is one of Europe’s principal importers of canna­
bis, heroin and cocaine. It also sees the largest volumetric seizures 
of amphetamines and ranks second in LSD confiscatures. Of the total 
volume of heroin imported during the period 1983 - 1986 about 73.7% 
originated in Southwest Asia and Lebanon while the Golden Triangle 
provided 23.7%.114 However, recent intelligence information suggests 
a change is occurring with Southeast Asian heroin beginning to gain a 
larger share of the market.115 Dutch authorities list Turkey as their
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single largest source of heroin. The anomaly is that Turkey, 
generally, is not recognized as a source country. The Dutch, however, 
believe that a combination of illicit cultivation, diversion of 
licitly produced opium and the transit of Iranian opiates make Turkey 
a source country.116 The cocaine comes from the usual source 
countries in South America, both directly and via Spain. Cannabis im­
ports Eire split between hashish, which accounts for 65.8%, and 
marijuana, which accounts for 34.1%.117 Between 60 - 70% of the can­
nabis imported annually originates in Pakistan while Lebanon and 
Morocco provide the remainder.118 Nigeria is a tertiary source and 
provides a minor share of the marijuana imported. The majority of am­
phetamine and LSD seized are produced domestically either in clandes­
tine laboratories or diverted from pharmaceutical manufacturers. 
Methadone, psilocybin and amfeperamon are other psychotropic sub­
stances consumed. Table 3.16 provides details on Dutch drug seizures.
Table 3.16 Dutch Drug Seizures In The Period 1984 - 1987.
Tear
Cannabis
(kgs.)
Cocaine
(kgs.)
Aspketaaines
(kgs.)
Heroin
(kgs.)
Morph./Opiui 
(kgs.)
LSD
(d.u.)
Others
(kgs.)
1984 30,278.143 180.013 39.189 143.775 0.556 10,738 0.139
1935 34,902.040 124.897 42.618 364.250 0.039 128,246 6.165
1986 47,855.834 274.117 86.192 541.872 0.803 3,618 5.150
1987 48.502.131 405.947 124.733 517.589 0.028 13,250 0
Sources: CRI, Jaaroversicht 1986 van de Verdovende Hiddelen Centrale (The Hague
1987), d . 11 & UN Doc. B/CN.7/1989/CRP.5.
Though unauthorized use, possession, transport and trade of all 
drugs are prohibited by law, in practice drug use itself is not 
prosecuted. Because the Netherlands is a relatively small country and 
infrastructurally integrated drug consumption is found throughout the
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country. The apparent concentration of drug use in the cities is 
merely a function of population demographics. Amsterdam and Rotterdam
are the premier drug cities. Amsterdam is believed to have ap­
proximately half the hard-drug population in the nation.119 Polydrug 
use is commoni particularly in association with heroin. Cocaine, 
methadone, amphetamines and benzodiazepines axe the jointly consumed 
drugs.120 Because of Amsterdam’s ’international status* which at­
tracts many visitors from abroad and the government’s ambivalence vis- 
a-vis soft drugs, it serves as an attractant for those individuals in­
terested in using drugs. Correspondingly, the annual statistics on 
drug-related deaths show a majority share being foreigners. Lastly, 
it is worth observing that a fair to majority amount of the drugs en­
tering Dutch territory are in transit to other European destinations.
Hence, the Netherlands, more often than not, is a transit state.
3,2*6,10 Italy
Italy is Europe’s other principal importer of heroin and fifth 
major importer of cannabis and cocaine based on seizure data for the 
period 1983 - 1986. Cannabis is the most widely available and con­
sumed drug. Chemical and psychotropic substances are also readily
available with LSD being the notable drug of abuse. Italy ranks first 
in overall seizures of LSD and depressants. The majority of heroin 
originates from Southwest Asia and the Middle East. Based on 1985 
data, 40.5% of all heroin imported came from the Golden Crescent via 
India while another 38.9% came from Turkey and Lebanon.121 The Golden 
Triangle provided 18.2%.122 In terms of origin, cocaine imports are 
split between Colombia, Bolivia and Brazil. Cannabis imports are
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divided between hashish and marijuana with the former accounting for 
83.6% and the latter accounting for 16.4%. The majority of hashish 
imported comes from Morocco and Southwest Asia while much of the 
marijuana imported originates in Ghana, the Ivory Coast and Nigeria. 
Conversely, most of the psychotropic substances found on the illicit 
market are either obtained from illicit laboratories within the 
country or diverted from pharmaceutical supplies. Table 3.17 presents 
a summary on Italian drug seizures.
Table 3.17 Italian Drug Seizures In The Period 1983 - 1987.
Cannabis Cocaine Heroin Horph./Opiui Stuulants LSD Others
Year (kgs.) (kgs.) (kgs.) (kgs.) (kgs.) (d . u .) (kgs.)
1983 5,169.584 223.368 313.585 36.460 71.227 133,640 9.713
1384 6,043.192 73.275 456.472 3.502 0.543 1,630,518 22.043
1985 1,443.061 111.851 276.008 10.467 0.320 20,581 3.545
1986 16,026.658 129.474 333.191 9.262 1.313 530,537 13.361
1987 13,030.950 329.776 323.131 2.370 5.811 N/A 9.402
Sources : UN Docs. B/CN.7/198?/CRP.6 I B/CN.7/1989/CR?.5.
Two interesting trends are to be noted concerning the Italian 
drug scene. The first is the increasing dimension of polydrug use, 
particularly heroin in conjunction with other narcotic or psychotropic 
substances. The second is the change in the type of heroin addict. 
In the past they were considered ’’physically numb and mentally 
ravaged," but now they appear to be a "product of the contemporary 
cultural and social setting devoted to an exasperated consumption, 
able to manage the use of [a] narcotic drug in a regular family and 
working life."123 According to a survey by the health authorities, 
heroin is the most heavily abused drug while cannabis is the most 
widely consumed drug.124 The distinction here being one of severity
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in affect. In terms of the types of offences committed, heroin 
dominates the trafficking category while cannabis accounts for two 
thirds of all possession for personal use offences.125 More than 61% 
of all individuals arrested for drug offences are between 18 - 25 
years in age.126 A more sombre statistic is the fact that there have 
been more than 20,000 drug-related deaths in the decade up till 1987. 
As observed elsewhere, the Italian drug scene follows the familiar 
pattern of concentration in the larger urban areas. The Provinces of 
Lombardia, Lazio and Campania which respectively have the cities of 
Milan, Rome and Naples see the highest level of drug consumption. 
After the U.S.A., Italy is believed to have the second largest heroin 
and cocaine user populations of all the OECD states (See Table 3.4).
3.2,6*11 France
Heroin and cannabis are also the most prevalently abused drugs 
in France. Hashish use is virtually a tradition dating back to the 
19th century.127 The presence of heroin as an illicit commodity dates 
back to the 1930s when the country first became a heroin processing 
centre supplying the ’French Connection’. Today, France has the third 
largest cannabis user population amongst the OECD group after the U.S. 
and Spain and one of the more significant heroin user populations in 
Europe (See Table 3.4). Cocaine appears to be the upcoming trend. 
France was the first European country to experience the intrusion of 
the cheap and highly addictive form of cocaine called ’crack’. In 
1986 more than 3 grams of it was seized in Nice.128 Based on seizure 
statistics for the period 1983 - 1986, France ranks fourth amongst the 
European OECD states in both cocaine and cannabis importation and
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fifth in heroin importation. In the psychotropic category LSD and 
methaqualone appear to be the preferred substances. The majority of 
heroin comes from the Golden Crescent and Lebanon while the Golden 
Triangle provides the remainder. Some of the heroin entering France 
is in transit to Italy and the Netherlands. This scene contrasts with 
the previous decade (early to mid-1970s) when Southeast Asia provided 
at least half, if not most, of the heroin imported. Much of the 
cocaine entering France transits Spain and Portugal first. Morocco, 
Lebanon and Southwest Asia are the principal sources of hashish. 
Table 3.18 sums up French drug confiscatures. Like elsewhere in 
Europe hard drug use is concentrated in the larger urban areas. Paris 
and Marseille are the two most prominent cities experiencing drug 
abuse on a high level. In the 1980s drug-related deaths have averaged 
over 200 per year with roughly 80% of them attributable to heroin.
Table 3.18 French Drug Seizures In The Period 1983 - 1987.
Year
Cannabis
(kgs.)
Cocaine
(kgs.)
Heroin
(kgs.)
Morph./Opiua 
(kgs.)
Stiis.
(kgs.)
LSD
(d.u.)
Others 
(kgs.)
1983 23,488.365 229.426 168.290 2.772 0.582 21,319 0
1984 31,475.882 122.436 208.756 9.781 1.680 28,389 23.325
1985 8,247.814 95.960 277.586 5.077 0 11,088 1.139
1986 13,776.731 246.005 219.967 9.456 1.643 11,258 14.372
1987 12.613.253 754.090 213.374 4.362 7.458 13,766 0.635
Sources: UN Docs. B/CN.7/1987/CRP.6 I B/CN.7/1989/CEP.5.
3.2,6,12 The Federal Republic of Germany
West Germany ranks third amongst the European group of OECD 
states in the confiscature of cocaine, LSD and stimulants based upon 
seizure data for the period 1983 - 1986. Heroin and cannabis
seizures, on the other hand, lag behind those recorded in the other
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European OECD states. Psychotropic substances are the most widely 
abused drugs. Among the more commonly consumed psychotropic sub­
stances are amphetamines, benzodiazepines, other depressants and 
tranquillizers. The Federal Government estimates there are about 
400,000 persons dependent on such substances while West Germany’s Na­
tional Council on Addiction Problems puts the figure at 800,000.129 
Contrastingly, the estimate of the number of outright users of hard 
drugs (ie. cocaine, heroin and LSD) is put at 200,000.130 The extent 
of cannabis consumption is unknown though a minimum figure has been 
proffered. The Golden Crescent, specifically Pakistan and Afghani­
stan, accounts for the majority of heroin found in West Germany while 
the Golden Triangle provides a minor share. The sources of cannabis 
are more diverse with Morocco, Lebanon, Nigeria, Ghana and Colombia 
all being contributors. The latter state is also the prominent source 
for most of the cocaine found within the country. Conversely, most 
psychotropic substances are either synthesized domestically or im­
ported from neighbouring states. Table 3.19 presents a summary of 
West German drug seizures.
Table 3.19 Drug Seizures In West Germany For The Years 1983 - 1987.
Cannabis Cocaine Heroin Morph./Opiui Stiis. LSD Others
Year (kgs.) (kgs.) (kgs.) (kgs.) (kgs.) (d.u.) (kgs.)
1983 4,605.619 107.340 259.957 24.232 23.794 41,848 14.522
1984 5,646.012 171.073 263.801 11.573 14.832 40,951 2.340
1985 11,503.142 164.781 207.993 11.200 20.826 30,536 10.100
1986 2,677.822 186.478 157.156 9.588 88.768 22,237 254.039
1987 3,030.426 263.418 278.337 12.476 80.681 (1.52 kgs.) 382.197
Sources: UN Docs. E/CN.7/1987/CRP.6 & B/CN.7/1989/CRP.5.
West German drug abuse replicates the pattern found in most
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other countries with the large urban areas experiencing the highest 
concentrations of drug use. Berlin and Hamburg, in particular, have 
been associated with drugs since the late 1950s. The modem drug 
scene and culture descends from the drug era of the 1960s. The latter 
era, in turn, owes its manifestation to the prevalency of drug con­
sumption during the occupation period following World War II. Today, 
cocaine use is the growing trend.
3,2,6.13 Bel Mium
Though of relatively small size Belgium experiences a con­
siderable influx of illicit drugs. Based on seizure statistics for 
the period 1983 - 1986 it ranks sixth in cannabis importation and
seventh in both heroin and cocaine imports amongst the European OECD 
states. Comparatively speaking, the other drug categories play an in­
significant role. A fair portion of the drugs entering Belgium are 
destined for neighbouring countries. Hence, it is difficult to dif­
ferentiate with precision the sources of those drugs consumed domesti­
cally from those in trans-shipment for other states. Basically, the 
drug sources described previously for other northern European states 
are also the sources of Belgium’s illicit drugs. A review of litera­
ture on the subject indicates that comprehensive epidemiological 
studies on the extent of drug use in Belgium are lacking or 
unpublished. Cannabis appears to be the most widely consumed drug 
while heroin maintains a stagnant secondary position. Use of the lat­
ter stems largely from the longstanding popularity it possesses among 
the country’s disaffected, unemployed, young and the anti­
establishment subculture. Like elsewhere in Europe, cocaine use is
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the growing trend. Conversely, LSD use is small. In the stimulant 
category amphetamine is the substance most commonly ingested. Drug 
use is concentrated in the larger cities, but because of the in­
frastructural integration of the country drugs are easily distributed 
and readily available throughout Belgium. In the period 1980 - 1985 
the Bureaus of Meer (1,049), Vise (633), Zaventem (376), Putte (156) 
and Mons (158) recorded the highest number of drug confiscatures.131 
Table 3.20 provides a summary of Belgian drug seizures.
Table 3.20 Belgian Drug Seizures In The Period 1983 - 1987.
Cannabis Cocaine Heroin Stimulants LSD Others
Year (kgs.) (kgs.) (kgs.) (kgs.) (d.u.) (kgs.)
1983 13,525.264 24.754 91.290 0.621 2,735 0.559
1984 6,331.460 101.178 134.224 3.768 2,786 0.414
1985 23,000.000* 61.915 91.961 0.320 1,346 0.309
1986 3,791.222 115.884 77.073 2.350 639 1.775
1987 6,570.833 269.714 140.695 9.030 6,467 7.879
* - figure is an approximation due to data divergence.
Sources : UN Docs. E/CN.7/1987/CRP.6 & E/CN.7/1989/CRP.5 as
corroborated/corrected by Belgian Customs statistics.
3*2,6*14 Portugal
The dominant drugs in the Portuguese drug scene are cannabis and 
heroin. Though cocaine seizures are significant and increasing it 
must be noted that most of it is in transit to other European states. 
Portugal ranks sixth in cocaine seizures in Europe for the period 1983 
- 1986. Comprehensive epidemiological data is non-existent. In the 
period referenced above 85.4% of the cannabis consumed was hashish 
while the remainder was marijuana. Most of the hashish consumed comes 
from Morocco, either directly or via Spain, while a minor portion 
comes from Lebanon and Afghanistan. In contrast, the principal for­
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eign sources of marijuana appear to be Angola and Mozambique. 
However, at least half of the annual quantity of marijuana consumed is 
cultivated within the country. In regards to heroin, Pakistan, 
Thailand, Lebanon and India, in that order, are the source countries. 
Nigeria is the most prominent transit state for heroin imported to 
Portugal while France, Denmark, Spain and the Netherlands all play 
secondary roles. Similar to the heroin importation scene, the traf- " 
ficking of cocaine into Portugal likewise exhibits a more diversified 
and complex pattern. Nearly all of it comes from Brazil, Colombia, 
Bolivia and Peru but often transits other South American countries or 
Angola before arriving in Portugal. Other stimulants used include am­
phetamine and methamphetamine while barbiturates and methaqualone con­
stitute the major depressants of abuse. Table 3.21 offers a summary 
on drug confiscatures in Portugal.
Table 3.21 Portuguese Drug Seizures In The Period 1983 - 1987.
Cannabis Cocaine Heroin Others
Year (kgs.) (kgs.) (kgs.) (kgs.)
1983 1,079.685 46.464 5.840 2.554
1984 6,386.602 60.392 18.195 0.021
1985 2,557.669 69.964 3.525 0.057
1986 5,531.910 164.668 18.843 0.647
1987 4.935.085 222.123 29.908 0.042
Sources: CICD/PJ. Principals Drogas Apreendidas Pelos
Organismos De Repressao (Lisboa. 1987) 
Table & UN Doc. E/CN.7/1989/CEP.5.
, Stat.
The small size of Portugal ensures that consumption trends are 
readily diffused throughout the country. On the whole, though, drug 
abuse is not as severe as in other European states. Most drug use 
tends to occur in the larger urban areas. An analysis of patients in
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treatment and rehabilitation centres indicates that drug addiction af­
fects all social strata. Based on 1984 - 1986 data about 65% of the 
heroin addicts admitted for treatment are over 21 years of age.132 
Consequently, drug addiction among the young is not as severe as else­
where in Europe. While heroin accounts for 95% of all addiction cases 
it is anticipated that cocaine is the future drug of concern. Between 
1984 and mid-1987 5,288 individuals were detained or investigated for 
drug offences. Of the total number attainted in 1985 and 1986 56.1% 
were convicted for consumption, 35.8% for trafficking and 8.1% for 
combined offences.133
3*2,6.15 Greece
Comparatively speaking, drug abuse in Greece is a minor social 
problem. A comprehensive survey structured to encompass the entire 
country was conducted in the mid-1980s.134 The survey identified a 
total of 9,684 known cases of drug use and abuse between 1973 - 1983.
Cannabis is the most prevalently consumed drug followed, on a much 
lesser scale, by heroin. A minor amount of polydrug use occurs in­
volving LSD and either hashish or heroin. The use of amphetamines and 
barbiturates is negligible. Where consumed these drugs have usually 
been acquired by theft from pharmaceutical supplies or through the use 
of false prescriptions. Of the total number of survey respondents 
52.42% used cannabis, 30.34% injected heroin and 17.24% combined LSD 
with either of the former two.135 Drug consumption is largely a male 
affair. Men accounted for 91% of all illicit drug intake during the 
ten-year period reviewed.136 Women, on the other hand, frequently 
abuse over-the-counter tranquillizers. It is believed that entrenched
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socio-cultural controls are responsible for preventing women from be­
coming involved in illicit drug use.137 The age bracket for which the 
highest frequency of abuse occurs is between 20 - 39 years of age.13 8 
By far, Greater Athens has the largest proportion of drug users and 
addicts. Thessaloniki, Patra and Larissa are secondary sites. 
Additionally, some of the Greek islands such e l s  Corfu, Crete and 
Rhodes see a higher frequency of drug use than otherwise would be ex­
pected due to the presence of tourists.139 Drug use by the resident 
islanders is negligible, but tourists import drugs to complement their 
recreation, entertainment and relaxation activities. Domestic cul­
tivation provides 70% of the cannabis consumed within Greece by the 
indigenous population. The balance of cannabis consumed is hashish 
obtained from Lebanon, Turkey and South Africa. In contrast, most of 
the heroin consumed is imported. About 50 - 60% of it comes from 
Turkey itself or from the Golden Crescent via Turkey. Minor amounts 
are imported from India and the Golden Triangle while a small percent 
of undetermined origin comes by car from Belgium, Italy and the 
Netherlands. The odd amounts of LSD found in Greece originate in 
Europe. Table 3.22 reviews Greek drug seizures.
Table 3.22 Greek Drug Seizures In The Period 1983 - 1987.
Cannabis Cocaine Heroin Morph. /Opium Others
Year (kgs.) (kgs.) (kgs.) (kgs.) (kgs.)
1983 N/R 0.176 14.929 1.103 Minute
1984 2,088.487 0.189 7.263 5.700 Minute
1985 2,035.417 0.049 9.870 0.090 Minute
1986 N/R 3.000 55.000 0.156 0.703
1987 24.115.025 26.298 73.633 0.759 5.523*
* - data for Athens only. N/R - data not reliable
Sources: UN Docs. E/CN.7/1987/CRP.6 & E/CN.7/1989/CRP.5.
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3*2,6,16 Turkey
Little hard information exists on the extent of drug use and 
abuse in Turkey. Most law enforcement bodies consider Turkey 
primarily a transit state of key importance in the distribution of 
Golden Crescent and Lebanese opiates and hashish because of its inter­
mediate location between select source areas and Europe. Extensive 
refining of opium to either morphine or crude grades of heroin occurs 
within the country in covert laboratories. It is estimated that be­
tween 3 - 4 m.ts. of heroin transit the country yearly.140 Consider­
ing the relatively large size of the country and its population and 
bearing in mind Turkey’s historical involvement with opiates and ad­
jacent location to major drug-producing states, it is remarkable that 
the degree of drug abuse is as insignificant as it appears to be. 
Primary consumption is limited to cannabis and opiates while bar­
biturates - benzodiazepines in particular - and other tranquillizers 
are abused on a minor scale. Between 1982 - 1984 the total number of 
new addicts identified to the Ministry of Health And Social Assistance 
was 1,22c.141 Opiate addicts were the largest category accounting for 
31.1% of the total. Interestingly, the number of new cannabis and 
barbiturate addicts was virtually even with the former accounting for 
24.2% and the latter accounting for 23.9%. Polydrug use accounted for 
the fourth grouping with 20.8%. The majority of opiates, regardless 
of form, enter the country by horseback and muleback across Turkey’s 
rugged 480-km. frontier with Iran.142 Aside from the portion of 
opiates obtained by diversion from licit production and some minor il­
licit cultivation, it is presumed that most of the opiates consumed in 
Turkey are of Iranian origin. Of all the countries analysed so far
130
Turkey is unique in that it sees the highest use of opiates aside from 
heroin. Opium, codeine, morphine-base, dionine and heroin-base are 
all consumed. Most of the cannabis consumed is hashish from either 
the Golden Crescent or Lebanon. Cannabis is grown domestically. In 
the period 1985 - 1987 more than 17.3 million plants were seized.143 
The anomaly here is that Turkey is not recognized as a cannabis 
producer nor a heavy consumer yet the combined quantities of imported 
hashish and domestic cultivation make for a large supply which is not 
fully accounted for in transit trade. Regrettably, this creates the 
nagging suspicion that both cannabis consumption and export must be 
higher than that acknowledged or recognized. Most of the psychotropic 
substances consumed are imported and come from Europe. Table 3.23 
summarizes Turkish drug seizures.
Table 3.23 Turkish Drug Seizures In The Period 1983 - 1987.
Year
Cannabis 
(kgs.)
Heroin 
(kgs,)
Morphine 
(kgs.)
Opium 
(kgs.)
All Others 
(kgs.)
1983 2,358.000 288.000 154.000 20.000 0
1984 2,493.000 265.000 99.500 0 0
1985 6,136.046 102.249 90.985 2.000 0
1986 3,103.777 172.100 58.686 79.427 Minute
1987 3,592.689 1.331.969 350.439 23.857 0.051
Sources: UN Docs. E/CN.7/1987/CRP.6 & E/CN.7/1989/CRP.5
3,2,6,17 The Scandinavian Drug Scene
Compared to nearly all other OECD states drug consumption in the 
Nordic countries is low. Overall, the population of hard drug users 
in all five countries has been stable for the last few years. Can­
nabis in the form of hashish is, by far, the most widely consumed drug 
with amphetamines and heroin being of secondary importance. Cocaine
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use is relatively insignificant though Denmark and Sweden have seized 
small amounts. Because of the manner in which epidemiological studies 
and statistical analyses are done in the Nordic countries, confisca-
ture figures are all that is available for determining the extent of
consumption aside from qualitative analyses.
Denmark is considered the ‘Amsterdam* of the Nordic countries 
because of the ready availability of all drugs, comparatively low 
street prices and geographical position as gateway to Scandinavia. 
Cannabis use is extensive while heroin use is deemed wide-spread and 
both are stable.144 Cocaine use is the growing trend but it has only 
been detected in the big cities to date. Denmark produces a fair
amount of the cannabis it consumes. For 1986 and 1987 combined,
production was estimated to be 5.5 ra.ts.145 Opium plants have also 
been found but their presence should not be construed as definitive 
cultivation. Much of the amphetamine found in Denmark is either il­
licitly manufactured in the country or diverted from domestic phar­
maceutical supplies. Other diverted chemical and psychotropic sub­
stances of abuse are amfepramon, diazepam, ketobemidone and methadone. 
Table 3.24 provides both a summary of Danish drug seizures and com­
parative analysis of drug seizures among the Nordic countries. The 
principal city experiencing drug abuse is Copenhagen while secondary 
sites include Aalborg, Arhus, Frederiksberg and Viborg.146
Sweden has the largest population of hard drug users of all the 
Nordic countries with between 10,000 - 14,000 heavy users; of which 
7,500 - 10,000 are intravenous abusers.147 Compared to a population
of 200 drug abusers in the 1930s there has been a gigantic increase in 
drug abuse.148 The 1960s were deemed the period of explosive growth in
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Table 3.24 Drug Seizures In Scandinavia For The Years 1983 - 1986.
Cannabis Cocaine Heroin Morph./Opiui Stioulants LSD Others
Country (kgs. (kgs.) (kgs.) (kgs.) (kgs.) (d.u.) (kgs.)
DENMARK 3,615.191 50.273 69.225 0.383 11.844 526 17.388
FINLAND 50.927 0.037 1.561 0.048 3.263 120,026 0.403
ICELAND 52.440 0.076 Minute 0 4.632 3,000 0
NORNAY 1,045.704 1.610 17.887 0.320 56.964 2,472 37.984
SWEDEN 3.228.958 47.393 13.877 4.850 350.915 40,652 0.445
Sources: UN Docs. E/CN.7/1987/CRP.6 fc B/CN.7/1988/CEP.8 Iceland figures froi Narkoti-
kasitu&sjonen I Island 1987 (Reykjavik, 1987). p. 12.
Swedish drug use. Hashish and CNS stimulants are the principal drugs 
consumed today. Cannabis is produced domestically, but the extent of 
cultivation is unknown. In the period 1984 - 1987 5,310 cannabis 
plants were confiscated.149 Poppy plants totalling 13.201 kgs. were 
also seized.150 Most of the amphetamine is obtained domestically from 
illicit manufacturing and diversion from licit sources. Like else­
where in Europe drug use is concentrated in the big cities. Stockholm 
has 3,000 - 4,500 hard-core addicts and Malmo-Lund and Gothenburg each 
have between 1,400 - 2,000 addicts.151 However, due to a unique anti- 
drug crusade by the Gothenburg police actual heroin consumption within 
the city is nil.152 Instead, Gothenburg’s resident heroin addicts 
travel to either Malmo-Lund, Stockholm or Denmark to indulge in heroin 
consumption.153 For data on Swedish drug confiscatures refer to Table
3.24 above.
Norway’s total user population is estimated to be around 60,000 
of which 8,000 - 12,000 consume hard drugs regularly.154 Cannabis
cultivation does occur, but it is very limited and must be labelled 
embryonic or experimental. Hashish is the drug most abundantly con­
sumed followed by amphetamines and heroin. Most of the amphetamine is
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obtained by diversion from pharmaceutical supplies or illicitly im­
ported from Sweden and Denmark. The most common chemical and 
psychotropic substances abused are dextropropoxyphene, diazepam, 
flunitrazepam and phentermine. In 1986 nearly 37 kgs. of depressants 
were seized thus creating an unusual fluctuation in the annual 
statistics. Table 3.24 presents the Norwegian seizure data. Oslo has 
the largest proportion of the drug using population.
Finland and Iceland constitute a sublevel of Scandinavian drug 
abuse due to their relatively minor levels of drug consumption vis-a- 
vis the others and similarity in structure and pattern of drug usage. 
Cannabis is the most prevalent drug with stimulants running a distant 
second. Heroin and cocaine are virtually non-existent. Based on re­
corded cases of drug use, Helsinki is, by far, the principal site of 
drug consumption in Finland accounting for nearly 40% of all such 
cases. With Espoo, Lahti, Tullihallitus volvontatso, Turku and Vantaa 
added in more than 71% of all drug cases are accounted for. Table
3.25 provides an analysis of urban use while Table 3.24 portrays Fin­
nish drug seizures. Finland recorded 38 cases involving the diversion 
of chemical and psychotropic substances in 1986 and 1987 combined.155 
Among the substances diverted were triazolam, pentazocine, pethidine, 
phenobarbital, diazepam and lorazepam. Reykjavik accounts for 33% of 
all drug consumption in Iceland. Approximately 20,000 Icelanders be­
tween the ages of 16 - 36 have tried cannabis.156 The hashish con­
sumed is of Lebanese or Moroccan origin and imported via Europe. Be­
tween 100 - 400 kgs. enter Iceland annually.157 Amphetamines along 
with dexamphetamines, methylamphetamines and amfepramon are substances 
of growing consumption.
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Table 3.25 Principal Cities Of Drug Consumption In Finland.
Number Of Cases Per Annum
City 1983 1984 1985 1986 4-Year Sums
Helsinki 488 500 502 403 1,893
Espoo
Lahti
92
52
86
57
112
2
93
86
383
197
Tullihallitus Volvon. 21 58 74 78 231
Turku 63 107 64 116 350
Vantaa 89 97 83 56 325
Rest of Country 284 231 426 429 1.370
ANNUAL TOTALS 1.089 1,136 1.263 1,261 4.749
Sources: Keskusrikospoliisi, Tiedotustoimisto 1983/4/5/6 
(Helsinki. 1984/5/6/7).
Notes And References For Chapter III.
1. Because geography is not a pure science but a study in amalgama­
tion of various natural and social factors, which can be clearly at­
tributed to other branches of science, to explain phenomena there can 
be several definitions of the field. This author holds the view that 
the particular focus of a study or thrust of a research project will 
affect the perceptions one has of the definition of geography. While 
the definition proffered here may be biased or lacking it fulfills the 
requirements demanded in the research and, to that extent, is valid.
2. Cannabis is a rampant plant that is found throughout the world in 
the tropical, subtropical and temperate zones. Under controlled con­
ditions it can grow in climatic environs generally not suited for it 
and which it would not normally propagate to if permitted. Examples 
are the higher latitudes of the temperate zones bordering on the sub­
polar zones. Areas incorporated in the latter zonal range are found
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in Canada, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden and Japan in the northern 
hemisphere and lower Argentina, New Zealand and Tasmania in the 
southern hemisphere. However, in terms of bulk trade the origin 
points can be demarcated relatively well.
3. SFO, Narcotics Control In Turkey (Ankara, January 1986), pp. 4-5
in conjunction with H. Kamm, "Drugs Flow Via Turkey Is Said to Rise,"
International Herald Tribune. July 18, 1986 (Paris), p. 3.
4. As late as 1967 there is specific reference to opium caning out of 
China. See UN Doc. E/NS. 1967/Sum. 8, Case No. 275 on page 14 where 
4.989 kgs. of Yunnan opium were seized in Singapore.
5. RCMP, NDIE 1985/6 (Ottawa, 1986), p. 25.
6. Ibid.
7. Data is derived from the RCMP’s NDIEs covering the years cited.
8. NNICC, NIE 1984 (Washington, D.C., 1985), p. 56.
9. RCMP, NDIE 1985/6 (Ottawa, 1986), p. 25.
10. BINM, INCSR - March 1987 (Washington, D.C.), p. 27 and RCMP, NDIE 
1987/88 (Ottawa, 1988), pp. 26-27.
11. RCMP, NDIE 1985/6 (Ottawa, 1986), p. 71.
12. Ibid, p. 78.
13. The use of the term ’experimental* as used here refers to the 
small-scale operations and activities in cannabis cultivation employ­
ing sophisticated agricultural practices and techniques to promote 
growth and enhance quality and yield of the plant in areas beyond the 
natural propagation range of the plant, or where its yield would be 
otherwise poor. The use of greenhouses, indoor artificial 
environments, hydroponic cultivation and cloning are typical methods. 
On the simple level indoor pot-planting and attention-intensive garden 
plots (in terms of labour, cost and effort) are further examples. 
These types of activities have been employed in Canada, the U.S.A., 
Denmark, Sweden, Finland, New Zealand and the U.K.
14. RCMP, NDIE 1984/5 (Ottawa, 1985), p. 60.
15. UN Doc. E/CN.7/1987/CRP.6, p. 57.
16. RCMP, NDIE 1985/6 (Ottawa, 1986), p. 75.
17. The information presented is mostly derived from Canadian intel­
ligence reports but the latest available issue (RCMP’s NDIE 1987/88) 
failed to cite these two states though earlier annual reports did in-
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elude them among the significant areas of cultivation in Mexico.
18. UN Doc. E/CN.7/1988/CRP.8, p. 62.
19. RCMP, NDIE 1985/6 (Ottawa, 1986), p. 75.
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IV. THE MARINE GEOGRAPHICAL AND TECHNICAL DIMENSIONS.
4.1 The Macroscopic Perspective
Having analysed the global overview it now falls to defining con­
comitant geopolitical factors which in turn determine the respective 
maritime routes of the drug trade. In some instances a drug route, or a 
fair part of it, is simply a straight line between two points. However, 
in many cases the routes follow indirect paths, transiting selected 
ports, islands and countries both incidentally and intentionally. The 
suitability or conduciveness of a given smuggling route is determined by 
the correlation between marine geography, political infrastructure and 
route economics. The latter terms are notional concepts of an operative 
nature in the minds of drug traffickers based on the interrelationship 
of the above factors being such that risks and threat are minimized. An 
applicable synonym for these terms is vulnerability.
Observation of a globe or chart of the world shows a singular pat­
tern of water and land around the planet. The oceans, with 361.7 mil­
lion sq. kms., account for 71% of the total surface area while land, 
with 147.3 million sq. kms., accounts for 29%.1 The land area, however, 
is not one entity but divided into 7 continents, 43 principal islands 
and thousands of small islands, islets, atolls and cays; all of which 
have peculiar shapes, sizes and littoral configurations. Consequently, 
the water area is segregated into 4 oceans and numerous seas, gulfs, 
fjords, bays and straits. The interface between land and sea is called
144
the coastline or littoral zone. Its sum global length is over 350,000 
kms. based on general and straight baseline measurements.2 Additional 
water bodies, some of which figure significantly in this study, 
developed as a result of precipitation, glacial gouging, tectonic isola­
tion and man-related activities. They include lakes, rivers and canals. 
The 33 major lakes of the world add nearly 1.1 million sq. kms. of water 
area to the planet.3
4,1,1 Geopolitical Considerations And Assessment Criteria
Because virtually all land areas in the world have some form of 
political administration or sovereignty superimposed on them the discus­
sion must focus on the role states play in context with their marine 
geographical endowment. Comraensurately, it is germane to include an es­
tablished doctrine that functions as a prescriptive model fostering the 
development of the maritime drug trade and thus inherent to the ensuing 
discussion. Alfred Mahan*s The Influence Of Sea Power Upon History. 
1660-1783 became the foundation both directly and subliminally for sub­
sequent maritime developments following its publication; particularly 
among the colonial powers in respect to their colonies and subsequent 
trade.4 Formulated a century ago, Mahan’s doctrine on sea power and the 
powerful maritime state was based on tenable geographical and political 
factors derived from empirical evidence in which he correlated the ac­
quisition of merchant fleets and expansion of navies in a positive for­
mat to endorse seaborne commerce. Arguably, Mahan was unduly influenced 
by his naval position. Yet, his concepts were equally applicable to the 
private sector and found favour there. Shipping economics has its un­
derlying roots in his doctrine. However, as the 20th century emerged
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Mahan*s doctrine lost some of its validity. This was resolved by John 
Craven who added two modifying principles predicated on Mahaniap 
philosophy thus permitting perpetual applicability of the doctrine so 
long as commerce, freedom, leisure and war involved the maritime 
medium.5 Their principles (and thus the composite doctrine for modem 
times) as quoted by Craven are set forth below:
"1. 'The ability of a nation to utilize the sea effectively depends 
on the topology of the land-sea relationship, with superiority accorded 
to islands, to singly connected domains such as peninsulas, then to mul­
tiple coastlines, and with inferiority accorded to nations having a 
single access or no access to the sea.*
2. ’The configuration of the coast in terms of the capacity for 
port and harbor, access to inland waterways and availability of quays* 
determines the ability of a nation to utilize the sea effectively.
3. *The number of people in the vicinity of the coast having 
knowledge and experience of the technology of the sea* dictates the 
nation's ability to use the sea effectively.
4. 'The character of the people and their government’ must be sup­
portive and promote utilization of the sea and acquisition of knowhow.
5. Technology determines the scale of the significant geologisti- 
cal configurations established for a particular time (i.e., whether an 
island is an island in the Mahanian sense, or an islet, or a continent).
6. The physical character of the sea, which rewards successful 
voyages and punishes through its many perils, is a medium which condi­
tions nations, peoples and economic entities in the development of the 
law and commerce of the sea."6
What Mahan and Craven failed to envisage was the possibility that their 
doctrine may subliminally support and encourage undesirable and negative 
activities such as drug trafficking. The rationale being that smuggling 
is commerce, but illicit and covert in nature. The fact that drugs is 
one of the smuggled commodities has no bearing on it.
The unique geographical positions, configurations and surface mor­
phologies of states determine their participation and involvement in the 
drug trade. While economics is the main influence the prevailing 
political and social regimes in a given state also prescribes its
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suitability for the drug trade. If the political and social climate ap­
pears lax, permissive, corruptible or undefendable then that particular 
state is vulnerable. This is because the risk of interference - the 
primary economic factor - is lower and therefore subject to 
manipulation. Geography can greatly enhance the political and social 
impuissance by providing natural barriers to the centralization and ef­
ficacy of power, consolidation of control and assimilation of values (els 
observed with far-flung archipelagos and lands of rugged topographical 
features). Conversely, it may not be the disadvantageous factor. There 
are situations where, judging by geography alone, a particular island or 
area is ideal for transhipping drugs due to its proximal location to, or 
imposing position in the path of, the trade route. However, because the 
political and social infrastructures are stable, integrated and 
scrupulous it is deemed hostile to drug trafficking and thus unsuitable. 
The risk of intervention is likely and high hence, the economic risks 
and costs are commensurately high. From a geographical standpoint there 
are several examples of drug traffickers using circuitous and lengthy 
routes in order to circumvent the more direct paths due to non-conducive 
social and political climates existing along the latter routes. Because 
of these tactics law enforcement personnel no longer target their inves­
tigations and searches solely on ships coming from traditional source 
ports.7
The effects of geography have created a vast array of trade routes 
with multivarious trans-shipment points. These are not a simple set of 
linear flow patterns, but are a complex matrix of trade routes that form 
networks encompassing the world. To help simplify comprehension of 
these matrices it is useful to define the primary role a state plays in
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the trade, and categorize it accordingly, regardless of whether involve­
ment is voluntary or not. This is accomplished by the analysis of the 
drugs* function and impact when present in the given society of the 
state in question. By looking for the net effect of that presence, 
three categories quickly spring to mind: supply states, demand states 
and transit states. Supply states are ones where the drugs are 
cultivated, harvested, sometimes refined and exported. An essential 
element in defining a maritime supply state is that the vessels carrying 
drugs exit the supply state’s territorial sea and contiguous zone by 
directly entering the contiguous zone and territorial sea of an adjacent 
or opposite state or indirectly entering the aforementioned and distant 
states via the high seas. Demand states are countries where narcotic 
and psychotropic substances are required because of social or cultural 
manifestations of desire, craving, and addiction coupled with wealth 
(the ability to pay). A maritime demand state is defined by the sig­
nificant use of marine transport modes in the importation of drugs. 
Transit states are states which serve as viaducts or staging points for 
the trans-shipment of narcotic and psychotropic substances but which ex­
perience a relatively inconsequential level of domestic consumption.8 
Maritime transit states are denoted by the fact that a fair portion of 
drugs in transit either enter the territorial limits of the state by 
maritime modes of conveyance, only to be re-exported at a later moment 
by those same modes or different modes of transport, or, alternatively, 
they enter by non-maritime modes of transport but are shipped onwards by 
sea. Unfortunately, reality does not permit this degree of
simplification. Some transit states are also major producers or con­
sumers of drugs in their own right. Hence, failing to recognize the
situation in its proper perspective would be negligent. Consequently, 
five categories have been employed: supply states, producer/transit
states, transit states, consumer/transit states and demand states. The 
dual categories are used for denoting those states where ambiguity ex­
ists on the degree of trans-shipment transpiring relative to domestic 
production or consumption occurring therein or where there are suffi­
ciently large activities of the former and either of the latter to war­
rant dual recognition. While the * consumer/transit* denotation is 
easily grasped one may query how the classification of 'producer/ 
transit' is possible. The answer is simply that either two different
drugs are involved or a producer state is used by a neighbouring
producer state to export its drugs. Examples of such states are Colom­
bia and Thailand. Table 4.1 identifies states involved in the maritime 
drug trade and their roles. There are those who may question the cir­
cumstance of a supply state that is also a significant consumer. Ex­
amples are Afghanistan and Pakistan. If a supply state consumes all 
that it produces of a given drug then it has no part in the interna­
tional trade of that drug. In those supply states where consumption is 
high but not equal to production the issue hinges on either the quantity 
exported via the maritime sector or the overall significance of the 
maritime mode, relative to others that are utilized. If the drug con­
signed is different from the one produced, then the state is cross- 
referenced; once under the demand category, provided that the drug 
consumed, or a fair amount of it, comes by sea. Simultaneously, it is 
also under the supply category, provided that the drug produced, or a 
fair portion of it, is exported by sea. It should be borne in mind that 
inevitably there is some consumption in the supply state since historic-
Table 4.1 Classification Of States* Roles In The Maritime Drug Trade.
SUPPLY PRODUCER/TRANSIT TRANSIT CONSUMER/TRANSIT DEMAND
Afghanistan
Belize
Bolivia
Buria
Guatei&la
Jaaaica
Laos
Lebanon
Morocco
Nepal
Nigeria
Peru
S. Africa 
S. Korea
Brazil (C/Co) 
Coloibia (C/Co) 
Ecuador (C/Co) 
India (C/O/H) 
Indonesia (C/O/H) 
Iran (C/O/M/H) 
Mexico (C/Co/H) 
Pakistan (C/O/H) 
Philippines (C/H) 
Taiwan (C/S) 
Thailand (C/O/H) 
Venezuela (C/Co)
Argentina (C/Co) 
Bahaias (C/Co) 
Bangladesh (C/O/H) 
Cayian Is 1. (Ca) 
Costa Sica (C/Co) 
Chile (Co)
Cyprus (C/O/H)
Doi. Rep. (C/Co) 
Haiti (C/Co) 
Honduras (C/Co)
Hong Kong (all) 
Panaia (C/Co) 
Singapore (C/O/M/H) 
Syria (C/O/M/H) 
Trinidad (C/Coj 
Turks A Caicos (C)
Australia (C/H) 
Belgiui (all) 
Deniark (C/Co/H/S) 
Egypt (C/O/H) 
Prance (C/Co/H) 
Greece (C/H)
Italy (C/Co/O/M/H) 
Japan (C/H/S) 
Malaysia (C/O/M/H) 
Netherlands (all) 
Portugal (C/Co/H) 
Sri Lanka (C/O/H) 
Spain (C/Co/H) 
Turkey (C/O/M/H) 
U.S.S.R. (C)
M. Gernany (C/S)
Canada
Finland
Iceland
Ireland
N. Zealand
Norway
Sweden
U.K.
U.S.A.
Note: C = Cannabis Co = Cocaine H : Heroin ,
M = Morphine 0 : Oniun S = Stinulants
Source: This table is based solely on net generalizations of states’ aaritiie roles vis-a- 
vis the drug trade and thus is not to be interpreted as absolute or definitive. The table 
is derived fron a ayriad of sources and is the author’s interpretation and assessnent of 
intelligence reports, statistical data and Qualitative analyses on these states.
al consumption is what precipitated knowledge of the drug and its ef­
fects today.
4.1,2 The Marine Geography Of The OECD States
With various states identified by their role it falls to explain­
ing why from the marine geographical perspective. The coastal member 
states of O.E.C.D. are analysed imprimis. They are split evenly between 
the categories of consumer/transit state and demand state and possess 
more than 30% of the world's coastline. In lieu of the fact that the 
coastal states of O.E.C.D. total 21 out of a total of 123 coastal states 
it would appear that they control a disproportionately large amount of 
the world's land-sea interface.
Australia, Iceland, Ireland, Japan, New Zealand and the United
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Kingdom are outright insular entities in the Mahanian sense. All of 
them are relatively removed from the drug cultivation sites. In tec­
tonic terms, Australia is a one-nation continent of smaller proportion 
than its counterparts. Located in the southern hemisphere, Australia 
and New Zealand are separated by the Tasman Sea and collectively sur­
rounded by the Indian Ocean to the west and south and the southern 
Pacific Ocean to the southeast, east and northeast. Japan, in the 
northern hemisphere, is separated from the Asian continent by the Sea of 
Japan and East China Sea with the vast northwestern Pacific Ocean acting 
as a distance barrier to all points east. Iceland, Ireland and the U.K. 
are situated in the northeastern Atlantic Ocean with the latter being 
just 33.3 kms. away from Europe at its closest point. The principal 
barrier to all points south of Iceland is the North Atlantic Ocean while 
to the east and north it is the Norwegian Sea and to the west-northwest 
it is the Denmark Strait. The British Isles, a geographical reference 
to Ireland and the U.K. collectively, are surrounded to all points west 
by the North Atlantic Ocean, while to the south it is the Celtic Sea and 
English Channel that are the intervening water bodies. To the east and 
northeast it is the North Sea that separates the British Isles from 
Scandinavia. A tunnel linking the U.K. to the European continent has 
yet to be completed.®
Norway and Sweden combined and Italy by itself respectively com­
prise peninsulas in the ideal definition. Spain and Portugal constitute 
the less appropriate Iberian Peninsula while Denmark and Greece are 
anomalies because of their hybrid forms and positions. Norway and 
Sweden comprise a massive peninsula which extends southward from its 
European juncture. It is separated from the lower portion of the con-
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tinent by the Gulf of Bothnia and the Baltic Sea to the east and 
southeast and the Kattegat and Skagerrak directly to the south with the 
Oresund Strait providing its closest approach to the rest of Europe. 
However, this proximity is somewhat negated by the fact that the Danish 
territory in question is itself an island of slightly more distance from 
lower Europe.10 To the west and north of the Scandinavian Peninsula are 
the North and Norwegian Seas. A bridge over Oresund connecting Sweden 
to Denmark has yet to be built.11 Hence, there Eire only two mediums of 
conveyance available: air and sea. Importation overland through the
U.S.S.R. and Finland results in logistical problems and risks that 
render the route unattractive to potential smugglers. Though Italy is 
attached to southern Europe and drugs do enter from the north by terreal 
modes of transport it is more practical to use the atmospheric and 
maritime mediums for importation. The elongated, thin configuration of 
Italy jutting far into the Mediterranean Sea with the Adriatic and Tyr­
rhenian Seas on each side places it astride the trans-Mediterranean 
shipping routes and in proximity to the Near East, Middle East and North 
Africa. Hence, it makes a tempting and vulnerable target for drug smug­
gling by sea, both as an importation and staging point - a fact first 
recognized half a century ago by the Opium Advisory Committee.12 An 
historical analysis of smuggling in the Mediterranean quickly evidences 
this point. Italy is probably the classic example of Mahan’s concept of 
proper geography being fundamental to commerce - though in this case to 
the detriment of the state’s welfare. The Iberian Peninsula is the 
westward extension of the European continent thus, technically, overland 
importation is easily managed. However, in practice significant quan­
tities of drugs do not enter from the northeast over the Franco-Spanish
border in the Pyrenees, but come by sea and air. With the Mediterranean 
Sea to the east and southeast, the Atlantic Ocean intervening to all 
points west and the Bay of Biscay to the north, the seaborne and air­
borne inodes of transport prove easier. The southern extension of Spain 
and northward protrusion of Morocco forms the Strait of Gibralter which 
is the sole gateway between the Atlantic Ocean and Mediterranean Sea. 
The fact that this narrow strait is a vital part of a major trade route - 
makes it strategically important and ensures a high volume of traffic 
rounding the Iberian Peninsula daily.13 The net effect of this 
geographical setting is that drug smuggling by sea is facilitated since 
ports in Spain and Portugal become added stops and the proximity of 
passing vessels to the coast permits clandestine *transfer-to-shore* 
operations. However, more than anything else, it is the proximity of 
Morocco to the south which nurtures the cannabis trade into Spain and 
Portugal. In relation to cocaine, a further incentive is provided be­
cause Spain and Portugal are the ’’Latin connection” to South America, 
having once been the colonial powers there. The commonalities in 
languages, customs and mentalities induces a natural association which 
in regards to drugs nurtures a conduit for trafficking. Lastly, with a 
distance of 5,500 kms., they are the closest European point to South 
America. Consequently, Spain and Portugal have become transit states 
for cocaine. The anomalous positions of Denmark and Greece result from 
both being combinations of peninsulas and archipelagos. The mainland 
portion of Denmark is clearly a peninsula though of lesser proportion to 
those previously discussed. Jutland protrudes directly northward from 
Europe creating the Skagerrak and Kattegat by blocking an expansive, 
open connection between the Baltic and North Seas. The ambiguity is
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caused by the 483 adjacent and surrounding islands which distort the 
overall shape of Danish territory. The net effect is that Denmark does 
not appear to be a peninsula but more a multi-island land bridge between 
lower Europe and the Scandinavian Peninsula. Between all the principal 
islands there are bridges permitting overland transport. The sole fac­
tor that relegates Denmark to being viewed as a peninsula per se is the 
lack of a structural link between any part of its land territory and 
Norway and Sweden. Because of the firm land connection with Europe it 
is not, however, the peninsular form itself which invites maritime 
smuggling. Instead, it is the infrastructural linkage of the ar­
chipelago bringing the overland routes to within a few kilometers of 
Sweden and Norway that sustains Denmark’s role in the maritime drug 
trade. The Greek picture is analogous. Peloponnesus is the protruding 
peninsula and it is the 2,117 surrounding islands which create the ter­
ritorial distortion. The peninsular portion of the Greek mainland juts 
into the Mediterranean Sea with the Ionian and Aegean Seas on each side 
of it. The Cyclades and Sporades island groups distort the peninsular 
form by extending Greek territory to within a few kilometers of the 
western Turkish coastline. The significant difference from the Danish 
situation is the non-existence of the infrastructure required for over­
land transport. The Greek islands are not as close-knit from a physical 
standpoint so as to allow construction of tunnels, bridges and 
causeways. Though overland transport from Turkey is feasible and a 
reality in eastern Greece, technically, it is easier to take advantage 
of its marine geographical form and use the atmospheric and maritime 
mediums for transport. Greece’s proximity to Turkey, the Middle East 
and North Africa and positioning astride the trans-Mediterranean and
Mediterranean-Black Sea shipping routes ensure that it is involved in 
maritime drug trafficking. It is worth noting that any historical 
review of smuggling within the region, or of maritime affairs in 
general, will make mention of high levels of such activity having oc­
curred before. There is practically an historical legacy to be main­
tained regarding smuggling, and drugs make a most suitable, modem 
option.
The eight remaining OECD states all possess significant land bor­
ders adjoining each other and other states allowing direct overland 
transport to play a major role - which it does. However, this does not 
exclude the maritime sector totally. Depending on the drug under review 
and its sources, one will observe that the maritime sector plays a sig­
nificant role. For the U.S. and Canada it is obvious that all Golden 
Crescent and Golden Triangle heroin is dependent upon the air and sea 
mediums for importation. The North American continent is totally 
severed from any other landmass save for South America. The vast ex­
panses of both the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, the inhospitableness of 
the Arctic region, coupled with the Soviet Union’s domination of the 
northern Asian continent ensures that the atmosphere and sea are the 
only mediums to consider. To a certain degree, the same analogy applies 
for the cocaine trade and South American cannabis trade to North 
America. Ignoring for a moment the Panama Canal, the Isthmus of Panama 
is the land link between the continents but, hostility and turmoil in 
Central America preclude a viable trans-continental overland route from 
being established. The only alternatives are the atmospheric and 
maritime modes of transport. To smuggle by sea a drug trafficker will 
have to traverse the Caribbean Sea, Gulf of Mexico and, depending on
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destination, the Atlantic Ocean to reach points in either the gulfcoasts 
of Mexico and the U.S. or eastcoasts of the U.S. and Canada. To reach 
points along the westcoasts of Mexico, the U.S. and Canada a smuggler 
must traverse the eastern Pacific Ocean. In Europe the situation vis-a- 
vis heroin and cannabis is equivocal because the conjugation of Europe 
and Asia provides a natural and direct overland link to sources in Asia 
and the Middle East. But, here politics and transport economics dictate 
the degree to which various modes of conveyance are employed and the 
routes utilized. The division of Europe politically into East and West 
following World War II remains in place today. The Eastern Bloc
countries are communist and totalitarian. They view the West with 
distrust, disdain and deem it decadent. This political barrier - known 
figuratively as the Iron Curtain - extending, cartographically speaking, 
southward from the Soviet-Norwegian border on the Barents Sea down to 
the Albanian-Greek border on the Ionian Sea and then roughly eastwards 
across the Black and Caspian Seas to the Soviet-Iranian-Afghani border 
junction prevents large-scale overland drug smuggling between Europe and 
Asia. The turmoil in Lebanon, Syria’s volatile nature and the Iran-Iraq 
conflict preclude the use of these lands as reliable bypass conduits 
into Europe from the Middle East. It must not be construed that over­
land drug smuggling does not occur via these countries and the Iron Cur­
tain states for it indeed does, but not with reliability or consistency 
and not on the large scales found elsewhere. Iran and Lebanon are, 
afterall, both producers and exporters while Syria, Turkey, Bulgaria and 
the U.S.S.R. have all been seriously involved in drug trafficking.14
To counter the emphasis on the political barrier as the sole basis 
for lack of overland Eurasian traffic it should be observed that there
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exist several purely geographical obstacles to such a trade. Assuming 
for a moment the non-existence of the above states but instead all 
friendly states, the rugged topography, inhospitable deserts, dense
forests and jungles, lack of infrastructure, modem border checkpoints 
and large distances to be encountered between Asian source areas and 
European consumption sites make such enterprises unrealistic. It would 
be economically unfeasible to attempt to transport illicit drugs over­
land as the risks are high and the profit yield low to non-existent.
The regular air services between Europe, Asia and the Middle East and
continual shipping services extending from northern Europe to the 
Mediterranean Sea, through the Suez Canal into the Arabian Sea, Persian 
Gulf, Bay of Bengal, Andaman Sea and eastwards into the South China Sea 
via the Malacca and Singapore Straits provide simpler, rapid and depend­
able methods of transporting drugs to western European states. A
majority of the heroin and cannabis in transit to European destinations 
at some stage will be transported by sea or air. When by sea, the 
Netherlands, France, Belgium, West Germany and the U.K. will be the 
landing sites in addition to Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal. Turkey 
tends to be a transit state where drugs are loaded onto vessels for 
shipment to virtually all points in the Mediterranean and northern 
Europe. The cocaine picture for these same European countries is 
different. All cocaine must come by sea or air from South America. 
However, a given cocaine shipment need only arrive at one European port 
and then can be distributed to neighbouring states via the overland 
mode. Example ports are Rotterdam, Antwerp, Hamburg, Le Havre, 
Marseille, Cadiz, Barcelona, Lisbon, Naples and Piraeus.
Finland, however, is excluded from the above discussion. Under
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Craven’s doctrine, Finland is virtually an "island” in the modem 
Mahanian sense because of both its isolated geographical and political 
positions relative to Western Europe. Finland appears firmly connected 
to, and part of, Europe. Superficially, it seems readily plausible that 
overland transport may play a role. However, in reality, the situation 
is quite the contrary. The longitudinal axis of orientation of 
Finland’s landmass with the Gulf of Bothnia to the west, the Gulf of 
Finland to the south and the Soviet Union as its neighbour for all 
points east means its sole free border connection is with Norway and 
Sweden up north where the Scandinavian Peninsula is attached to Europe. 
It is impractical to import drugs overland from southern points in Nor­
way and Sweden northwards to that border. Nor do drugs cross the 
Soviet-Finnish border. Consequently, the only two ways that drugs may 
enter Finland are by sea and air.
4*1,3 Marine Geographical Factors Of Transit States
Transit states are countries deemed either geographically, politi­
cally or economically expedient for transhipping drugs. The definition 
has already been given and the examples among the OECD states mentioned. 
In order to syllogize the middle tier of what is referred to as a tri- 
tier flow structure the analysis is confined to those transit states 
which serve as marine conduits to the OECD states. Any production and 
consumption occurring in these states is ignored to facilitate identifi­
cation. The most prominent aspect concerning transit states is that 
they permit numerous flow patterns and the adoption of a multi-modal 
transportation structure for a given route. Depending on the complexity 
of the trade matrices involving transit states in a region, it is feasi­
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ble to denote such regions as transit regions. Furthermore, depending 
on the complexity of the flow matrices created by transit states it will 
be observed that specific regions can be denoted as trafficking regions.
4,1,3,1 Opiate Transit States
The opiates adhere to relatively distinct flow lines. Except for 
Mexico’s neighbouring position with the U.S. there are large distances 
between the suppliers and the consumers. The sea is one of only two vi­
able transport mediums. All opiate products transported large distances 
are transhipped at some stage in their journeys and often more than 
once. Golden Triangle products destined for the OECD consumers always 
transit Thailand first; then, usually go on to a second transit state 
before importation to the demand states. Where utilized, the maritime 
sector plays a role from Thailand onwards. The regional geography of 
Southeast Asia combined with the presence of hostile and volatile states 
promotes maritime drug smuggling. Besides Thailand, the principal tran­
sit states are Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Macau, Hong Kong, Taiwan, 
and the Philippines. The extent of China’s involvement is unknown but, 
its domination of East Asia, close proximity to the Golden Triangle and 
extensive coastline make it an attractive transit state. The historical 
context bears this out. Because of the pervasive presence of the 
Chinese culture throughout Southeast Asia, there naturally exists an in­
formal but strong network of socio-economic ideology. Drug trafficking, 
as an enterprise, thrives on such intrinsic and immutable networks. 
Canton has reportedly been used for transhipping opium but hard data is 
non-existent.15 All the transit states cited above border the South 
China Sea making it possible to endorse the notion that regions as a
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whole may be deemed transit areas. Thailand’s position at the head of 
the Gulf of Thailand with a narrow and elongated southerly extension oc­
cupying the upper half of the Malay Peninsula provides easy access to 
the South China Sea and Indian Ocean. Bordering the southern Andaman 
Sea to the southwest puts it astride one of the busiest shipping routes 
in the world. Thailand’s marine transit status stems from all the Bur­
mese and Laotian opiates that are transited through its territory and 
then exported by sea. Though occupying the lower half of the Malay 
Peninsula, Malaysia’s fractured form coupled with the insular nature of 
its neighbours to the south make it more part of the vast Indonesian 
archipelago. The Malay Peninsula is sufficiently long enough so that 
Malaysia does not seem to be part of the Asian continent but an offshore 
island. The peninsula itself functions as a land bridge between 
Southeast Asia and the Indonesian archipelago. It is separated at its 
closest point of approach by only a few kilometers from Indonesia. Be­
cause of the way the Malay Peninsula and Sumatra lie geographically they 
effectively create a 2,000-km. partitioning of the South China Sea and 
Indian Ocean confining the marine link between the two water bodies to 
the Malacca Strait. Being one of the two bordering states along this 
530-n.m. strategic link places Malaysia directly astride the busiest sea 
lane in the region. Singapore is an island state off the southern ex­
tremity of the Malay Peninsula. It sits astride the navigational junc­
tion between the Malacca Strait and the 70-n.m. Singapore Strait leading 
to the South China Sea and all points along the entire coast of eastern 
Asia. Because of its free trade policy, stable economy, developed 
marine services industry and strategic location it has become an impor­
tant roadstead for shipping. Separated by the 1.5-km. wide Johore
Strait from Malaysia and just 14 kms. from the nearest Indonesian is­
lands makes it a natural trans-shipment point. Wherever there is mas­
sive shipping activity it is commensurately easier to engage in 
smuggling. The vast expense of the Indonesian archipelago comprised of 
five main islands and more than 3,000 smaller ones all interspersed by 
seas, bays and straits spread over 1,903,650 sq. kms. provides in­
numerable staging points for transhipping drugs by sea. The lack of a 
competent political infrastructure throughout the archipelago enhances 
its vulnerability to such activity. The archipelagic extent of In­
donesia northeastward to Sarawak (Malaysia's eastern part), Brunei and 
the Philippines, eastward to Papua New Guinea and southeastward to 
Australia creates - in the figurative sense - a territorial bridge to 
these states. Inter-island shipping and island-hopping aircraft can 
readily convey opiates to Indonesian islands that, functionally
speaking, are the doorsteps to the above states. Macau, Hong Kong and
Taiwan are all insular entities off eastern China on the northern 
reaches of the South China Sea. The sailing distance from Singapore to 
Hong Kong is 1,460 n.ms. All three are similar to Singapore; having 
nurtured and developed their economies along congruous lines. Their 
free trade policies, stable but open societies and entrepot activities 
combined with strong financial and capital markets not only cultivate 
shipping, but invite and nurture drug-related activities. To be fair, 
it has been said that much of the trans-shipment activity occurring in 
Macau and Hong Kong is merely the modem continuation and extension of 
historical enterprises. Macau and Hong Kong have always been involved
in smuggling and the drug trade. Lacking the historical roots, Taiwan's
status as a transit state stems in part from its geographical position
and former status as an opium consumer. Taiwan is centrally located 
astride all trade routes leading to Japan and South Korea from Southeast 
Asia and all points west of the Malacca Strait. Much of the shipping 
which calls at Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan carrying opiates are regional 
trading vessels, fishing trawlers and private local craft bringing the 
drugs up from Southeast Asia. The drugs are then transferred either to 
be flown onwards via airborne inodes or concealed in cargo consignments 
to be carried by commercial shipping. The Philippines sure an ar­
chipelago providing the eastern boundary of the South China Sea and bor­
dering the western Pacific Ocean. Comprised of more than 7,000 islands 
and rocks spread over 300,000 sq. kms. of planetary surface area of 
which only 400 are inhabited but lacking internal unity the Philippines 
offer numerous possibilities for transhipping opiates. The midway loca­
tion of the Philippines between Japan and Australia yet detached some­
what from Southeast Asia enhances its suitability. Figure 4.1 portrays 
these opiate transit states.
Basically, there are two broad trade routes which incorporate the 
maritime sector in transporting Golden Crescent opium to the OECD 
states. The first involves a maritime route emanating from southern 
Asia while the second relies on a multi-modal route via the Near East. 
The transit states in the first case are Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and 
Sri Lanka. Pakistani and Afghani opiates are imported overland to India 
and then exported on commercial vessels either eastward to Southeast 
Asia or, more importantly, westward to the Middle East, Europe and 
beyond. The massive protrusion in the form of an inverted triangle of 
the Indian subcontinent into the Indian Ocean bisects the northern part 
into two rather equal seas. To the east is the Bay of Bengal and to the
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Figure 4.1 Opiate Transit States In Southeast Asia.
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west is the Arabian Sea. This peninsular protrusion prohibits rhumb 
line navigational routes and Great Circle routes between the northern 
terminus of the Malacca Strait and the entrances to the Persian Gulf 
(Strait of Hormuz) and the Red Sea (Bab el Mandeb) which leads to the 
Mediterranean Sea via the Suez Canal. Because of India’s ’blocking 
position’, it is only natural that ports appropriately situated along 
its coast will serve as transit points. The historical development of
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India’s principal ports ensured their involvement in commerce today. 
India is an ideal example of a peninsula in the Mahanian sense. Besides 
using the commercial shipping sector, there is a lot of covert exporta­
tion using local craft to nearby regions. Local sailing vessels and old 
coastal traders pick up loads in Bangladesh and India and sail down the 
Indian coast to Sri Lanka or over to the Andaman Islands where the 
opiate cargos are then shipped eastwards. Also, opiate loads are 
carried westward from India across the Arabian Sea to the Arabian Penin­
sula and East Africa. Pakistan serves as a transit state for Afghani 
opiates which are exported to the Middle East. For the long-haul routes 
to Europe commercial carriers are utilized while for short-haul routes 
over to the Arabian Peninsula or the westcoast of India local vessels 
are frequently employed solely for that purpose. The surrounding posi­
tions of Iran, Afghanistan and India combined with its proximity to the 
Persian Gulf and Arabian Peninsula promotes Pakistan as a country 
through which to tranship drugs. The sailing distance between Karachi 
and the Bab el Mandeb Strait is 1,500 n.ras. and all of the route may be 
sailed within coastal waters (for vessels so suited).
The transit states involved in the multi-modal route via the Near 
East are Turkey, Syria, Cyprus, Greece, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. 
Without going into all the geography let it simply be said that these 
states are all more or less between the production sites in the Golden 
Crescent and Lebanon and Europe. Hence, they have become conduits com­
prised of many specific routes which see the intensity of usage varying 
depending on enforcement activities. The modes of conveyance employed 
are a combination of overland, sea and air carriers. The opiates will 
travel overland by motor vehicle and animal to the Syrian and Turkish
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coasts from Iran and Lebanon. The drugs are then transferred to either 
commercial ships, local craft or privately chartered vessels. In the 
case of commercial carriers it is concealed amongst the cargo or the 
crew’s belongings or on the ship itself. When local craft or privately 
chartered vessels are utilized they are specifically engaged in covert 
drug shipments. The commercial carriers generally take the drugs 
directly to ports in Europe where they are offloaded and distributed - 
directly to dealers or shipped further inland by overland transport 
modes. When the two latter categories of marine transport are used the 
opiate shipments may only travel as far as Cyprus, Egypt, Greece, Bul­
garia and Yugoslavia. There, the drugs are transferred to commercial 
ships, aircraft, yachts or other privately chartered vessels for further 
conveyance. Alternatively, the opiate shipments may be transported to 
points offshore along the Iberian Peninsula or the US Eastcoast where 
the illicit cargoes are covertly transferred to waiting yachts and fish­
ing vessels which import the drugs to the country. Then the drugs 
proceed overland as described above to their consumption sites. Instead 
of attempting to discuss all the routes possible and their multi-modal 
structures Table 4.2 summarizes them. The routes are depicted as linear 
flows with the various states and plausible transport modes noted. What 
should be recognized is that the possibilities are only limited by one’s 
or, more appropriately, the drug smuggler’s imagination.
4.1.3,2 Cannabis Transit States
The situation with cannabis is both complex and connoted by 
dynamic flux thus necessitating generalization in description. Cannabis 
differs from the opiates in that it is frequently shipped directly. The
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Table 4.2 Opiate Trade Routes Of The Near East.
Source Transit States Transit States OECD
Country_________( l11 Order)________ (2ld. 3fd I 4td Orders)_____________Consuaer
IRAN — (truck}—  TURKEY................................ (freighter)..................................... ITALY
IRAN — (horse)— TURKEY (vessel) BULGARIA (train/truck)—  N. GERMANY
IRAN — (iule)—  TURKBY........ (freighter).........ITALY.......... (containership)...........U.S.A.
IBAN — (foot)—  TURKBY — (vessel)— CRBBCB — (ferry)—  ITALY - ( t ra in ) -  N. GBRHANY
IRAN — (car)—  TURKBY.(vessel) CYPBUS.................... (containership)...........U.K.
IRAN —  (iule)— TURKBY (car) SYRIA............. (freighter)..............PRANCE
LEBANON — (truck)—  SYRIA (vessel) CYPRUS.(freighter) BELGIUM
LEBANON -—(vessel)--- CYPRUS (containership) U.K. (ferry) IBBLAND
LEBANON — (vessel)—  GREEK VATERS......................(freighter)....................... NETHERLANDS
LEBANON — (freighter/aothership) US WATERS (yacht/fishing boat) U.S.A.
LEBANON --(vessel)--- CYPRUS — (freighter)—  U.K. (containership)..........CANADA
LEBANON — (car)— SYRIA -(fre igh te r)- HOLLAND - (c a r ) -  DENMARK — (ferry)— SWEDEN
Note: These are only a few ezaaples of the aultitude of snuggling routes utilized.
One can siaply interchange or insert other transit and OBCD states not cited 
with those above and the table will s t i l l  be correct.______________________
low  u n it iz e d  va lu e  o f  cannabis re q u ire s  t r a f f ic k e r s  to  tra n s p o r t  la rg e  
amounts in  o rd e r to  cove r r is k ,  expenses and r e a l iz a t io n  o f  p r o f i t .  
Consequently, cannabis is  o f te n  tra n s p o r te d  by sea and in  la rg e  
q u a n t i t ie s .  In  many ins tan ces  a s h ip  o r  ya ch t w i l l  be a c q u ire d  s o le ly  
f o r  th e  purpose o f  sh ip p in g  a la rg e  consignm ent o f  cannabis d i r e c t ly  to  
the  consumer s ta te .  Though 27 c o u n tr ie s  were id e n t i f ie d  e a r l ie r  ( in  
Tab le 3 .2 ) as the  s u p p lie rs  o f  cannabis tra d e d  in te r n a t io n a l ly  o n ly  h a l f  
f ig u re  p ro m in e n tly . Because some o f  them a re  con tiguous  to  each o th e r ,  
they  a long  w ith  s e le c t  ne ighbou ring  s ta te s  can be amalgamated in to  11
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relatively well defined source regions and sites; of which only four en­
velop transit states on a significant level in their trade matrices (see 
Table 4.3). Establishment of the origin points for the flow of cannabis 
facilitates identification of the concomitant transit states. The 
desired subsidiary effect will be clarification of the applicable geog­
raphy behind the various flow patterns. Lamentably, the multiple dis­
tribution of cannabis from any one given source to a number of diverse 
consumption areas precludes this. A given source area usually has two 
or more flow lines radiating from it; only some of which intersect tran­
sit states en route to their destinations. The picture is complicated 
further by the fact that several producers also serve as transit states 
for either neighbouring states' cannabis exports or nearby regional 
outputs. This is particularly true regarding Southeast Asia, Central 
America and the Caribbean basin. For the purposes of lucidity and con-
Table 4.3 Source .Areas And Regions Supporting The Cannabis Trade.
Lesotho
Malawi
South Africa 
Swaziland
SOUTH
AFRICAN
BLOC
CENTRAL
AMERICAN
BLOC
Belize
Colombia
Paraguay
Venezuela
SOUTH
AMERICAN
BLOC
Brazil
INDIAN
BLOC
Afghanistan
SOUTHEAST 
ASIAN BLOC
Indonesia JAMAICA
KENYA
LEBANON
WEST
AFRICAN
BLOC
Ghana
Nigeria
Senegal
MEXICO
MOROCCO
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tinuity in analysis the principal cannabis transit states Eire identified 
in conjunction with the respective source areas for which they serve.
In regards to maritime cannabis smuggling Colombia and Brazil 
dominate the South American Bloc. Venezuela is a secondary supplier 
while Paraguayan cannabis remains on the continent. Colombia accounts 
for the lion’s share of cannabis shipped abroad. The majority of South 
American cannabis exported is consumed in North America with minor 
amounts going to Europe. Because of the isolated position of the South 
American landmass vis-a-vis the consumers, all cannabis must be
transported by air or sea - that is if there is to be any viability to 
the trafficking operation. Colombia’s unique position in the northern 
extremity of the continent where the Panamanian isthmus connects the 
North and South American continents gives the country both a Pacific 
Ocean coastline and an Atlantic Ocean outlet. The intermediate position 
of Central America and the Caribbean basin ensures that virtually all 
South American cannabis shipped indirectly to North America, and select 
European sites, will need to transit these regions. The complex geog­
raphy of the Caribbean basin embracing the eastcoast of Central America 
from Panama to the Yucatan Peninsula, the northern coast of South 
America from Colombia to Venezuela and including the islands of the 
Netherlands, Lesser and Greater Antilles and all the waters within this 
region provides innumerable flow routes and an array of transit states. 
It is simply the incidental but opportune positioning of many of these 
states and territories between the source and destination sites which 
induces drug traffickers to utilize them. The ring-like barrier formed 
by Central America, the Yucatan Peninsula, Cuba, Hispaniola, Puerto Rico 
and the entire Lesser Antilles chain interlaced by channels creates a
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sieve through which the drugs must pass. Figure 4.2 depicts the Carib­
bean sieve.
The additive factor endorsing their use is the trafficker’s need 
to mask a shipment’s origin. When commercial vessels are utilized, and 
the drug is concealed within a legitimate cargo consignment, it is 
highly desirable to create the impression that the cargo is not from 
Colombia but from elsewhere. The notoriety of Colombia as a source 
country means that whenever Colombian cargo is landed in a foreign port 
or ships of any flag having called there arrive in foreign ports, they 
are subject to intense scrutiny. The trans-shipment of concealed drug
Figure 4.2 The Caribbean Basin And Its Sieve-Like Structure.
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consignments via transit states and concomitant falsification of lading 
documents reduces the likelihood of interception. It is a simple fact 
of reality that the desire for a ’free flow* regime in commerce, the 
need for constraint in government expenditures on port security and the 
extant workload on port officials, both in processing licit trade and 
watching for illicit activities, all contribute to a situation that is 
prone to manipulation by smugglers. While understandable and necessary, 
the evolution of the concept of ’target* vessels, consignments and 
source ports, the implementation of profiling criteria to segregate be­
tween *high-risk* and ’low-risk’ trades and resultant apportionment by 
authorities of their intelligence, investigatory and surveillance ef­
forts conversely nurtures vulnerability in such programs. Clever traf­
fickers will exploit the system’s weakness by deception and the use of 
transit states to ensure that their ’cargo* consignment appears to be 
legitimate and originating from a ’low-risk’ port of embarkation or 
origin hence, minimizing the level of scrutiny the consignment may 
otherwise incur. The majority of Colombian cannabis shipped indirectly 
will transit either select South American countries like Ecuador and 
Venezuela, various Central American lands including Panama, Costa Rica, 
Honduras, and Mexico or a number of Caribbean islands including 
Barbados, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Grenada, Haiti, St. Lucia, St. 
Vincent, the Turks and Caicos Islands, but notably the Bahamas. Though 
of a minor level, Colombian cannabis bound for European destinations ad­
ditionally shows a propensity to transit Aruba, Curacao, Guadeloupe and 
Martinique. In naming these states and territories it should not be 
construed that they alone are the only transit states. Others have been 
utilized, but they do not crop up as frequently in seizure and intel­
ligence data. A number of variform drug routes exist but they can be 
categorized into a few general trends. The Central and South American 
states tend to serve as trans-shipment points for cannabis brought in by 
either overland, airborne or seaborne modes but re-exported on conmer- 
cial vessels. For example, a load of cannabis is transported overland 
by truck from Colombia to Guayaquil, Ecuador where it is loaded onboard 
a banana ship, concealed amongst the cargo, and shipped to Los Angeles, - 
California. A second version of this theme involves a load of cannabis 
being concealed in coffee sacks loaded onboard a freighter in Cartagena, 
Colombia bound for Limon, Costa Rica. In Costa Rica the cannabis cargo 
is transferred to another ship bound for New Orleans, but whose last 
port of call was Hamburg, West Germany and the bill of lading is altered 
to show Montevideo, Uruguay as the source port of the cargo. The island 
states and territories tend to be staging points for drugs in transit on 
private vessels or ships acquired exclusively for the purposes of il­
legally transporting cannabis. Trans-shipment via commercial carriers 
is more difficult simply because the islands as a rule do not generate 
sufficient trade to warrant regular long-haul shipping services with the 
cannabis consumer states which can be incorporated into the drug routes. 
Instead, the cannabis is shipped or flown from furtive embarkation 
points in Colombia to desolate landing sites or airstrips in the islands 
where it is then transferred to other vessels or aircraft for the final 
leg of the journey into the U.S.A. Alternatively, the same vessel may 
be used for the entire voyage but it transits one or more island states 
either for refueling purposes or to construct a documentation history of 
traversing the islands thus distancing and masking the vessel's associa­
tion with the source area (the Colombian port). A typical scenario in­
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volves a yacht picking up a load of cannabis on the Colombian coast and 
proceeding to Barbados and then northwards through the Lesser Antilles 
to the Bahamas and finally to the U.S.A. Another version employs a 
fishing trawler going to Colombia and obtaining a cannabis load which it 
carries to the Dominican Republic and then ultimately to a US Gulf coast 
port. Neither the vessel's log nor any other paperwork will reflect the 
fact of the trawler's voyage to Colombia. Of all the trans-shipment 
states and territories noted, the Bahamas has figured most prominently 
based on seizure records. The Bahamas is an archipelago comprised of 
over 700 islands, islets and cays scattered over 100,000 sq. miles of 
ocean of which less than 30 are inhabited. Their proximity to Florida 
combined with the desolation and isolation of many of the islands and 
the lack of governmental supervision and enforcement control create a 
prime geographical area for transhipping drugs. Panama's significant 
involvement as a transit state for Colombian cannabis stems from its ad­
jacency to Colombia and dominance of the Isthmus of Panama. With a 
coast on both sides and therefore accessible from either Colombian 
coastline, a great deal of versatility is granted to the drug traffick­
ers in planning and structuring their trans-shipment routes. The high 
level of shipping traffic in proximity to Colombia as a result of the 
presence of the Panama Canal only provides a further susceptible dimen­
sion to the benefit of the traffickers. The most damning evidence of 
Panama's involvement in drug trafficking is the recent American indict­
ment of Panama's leader of many years, Gen. Manuel Noriega, and other 
officials on drug trafficking.16 For other prominent transit states 
data shows that, while the volumes of smuggling are lower, these states 
are continuously participating in the activity. These include Barbados,
the Cayman Islands, Curacao, the Dominican Republic, Guadeloupe, Haiti, 
Honduras, Martinique and the Turks and Caicos Islands. From the law en­
forcement perspective the Caribbean basin is a 'Mahanian nightmare’ 
while, conversely, it is a 'Mahanian utopia’ for the maritime drug 
smugglers. Figure 4.3 portrays the the maritime trafficking routes and 
transit states of the Caribbean region.
Figure 4.3 Marine Transit States For Cannabis And Cocaine In The 
Caribbean Basin and Central American Region.
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Cannabis smuggling in Southeast Asia also involves a considerable 
degree of complexity analogous to that presented in the preceding 
discussion, but the lesser number of states involved facilitates revela­
tion of their roles. Collectively, Thailand, Indonesia and the Philip­
pines produce over 9,000 m.ts. of cannabis annually. Because of their 
relative proximity or adjacency to each other and the complex geography 
of the region as explained in detail earlier, Indonesia and the Philip­
pines additionally serve as transit states for Thai cannabis. Aside 
from them, Malaysia and Singapore are the principal transit states for 
Thai cannabis moving southward and eastward out of Thailand. 
Simultaneously, on a smaller scale, they are the transit states for In­
donesian cannabis moving northward into points in Southeast Asia and 
southern Asia. The peninsular form of Malaysia and archipelagic nature 
of Indonesia and the Philippines provide innumerable staging points for 
local craft to tranship cannabis. Cannabis originating from the three 
producers which is not exported directly concealed within cargo consign­
ments onboard commercial vessels is carried by local craft to trans­
shipment areas and sites where it is subsequently loaded onto commercial 
carriers. Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan are the other prominent transit 
states for transferring cannabis loads to commercial vessels. The 
politico-economic nature of the first two along with that of Singapore 
make these states excellent trans-shipment points. As observed earlier, 
the bustling activity of their ports, free trade policies, developed 
financial markets and strategic positioning along major trade routes, 
coupled with the manifest entrepot acumen of the respective populations, 
all contribute to the vulnerability and suitability of these states to 
becoming transit states. Generally, cannabis loads transhipped via Hong
Kong, Macau, and Taiwan either originate in Thailand or the Philippines 
and are bound for Japan, South Korea, Canada, the U.S.A., Australia, New 
Zealand and to, a minor extent, Europe. The dominant share of cannabis 
transhipped is Thai because it is readily available and has a desirable 
quality. Domestic consumption in the Philippines and Indonesia is high 
therefore only a minor share is left for export. The poorer quality of 
Filipino and Indonesian cannabis is, undoubtedly, another factor which 
precludes their shares of the export market from increasing. Papua New 
Guinea plays a minor role as a transit state for cannabis shipped down 
through the Indonesian archipelago destined for northeastern Australia. 
Japan seems to have a minor position as a trans-shipment site for can­
nabis destined for ports on the westcoast of North America. The high 
volume of shipping traffic between Japan and North America provides an 
easy and desirable transportation link which the traffickers may tap 
into by routing their illicit cargoes via Japanese ports.
Cannabis smuggling out of the Golden Crescent subscribes to the 
scenario presented earlier in the discussion on opiate transit states. 
However, in discussing cannabis trafficking, Iran is omitted as a source 
country but India and Nepal become important contributors. The prin­
cipal difference between the opiate smuggling scene and that of cannabis 
is the much greater reliance on maritime transport modes in the case of 
the latter. The low unitized value of cannabis relative to the opiates 
and limitations on air cargo and passenger baggage, not to mention 
strict controls at airports, precludes the significant use of non- 
maritime modes of conveyance. Besides being a producer, India serves as 
a transit state for Afghani, Pakistani and Nepalese hashish outbound 
either westward to the Middle East and Europe or eastward to Southeast
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Asia. Sri Lanka is a subservient transit state to all the above states, 
notably India. Usually all non-Indian hashish transits India before 
transiting Sri Lanka. Cannabis shipped eastwards either goes on commer­
cial vessels directly or on local craft which transit the Andaman Is­
lands and northwestern Indonesia. Hashish and ganga headed for Middle 
Eastern destinations also go directly on commercial vessels or on local 
craft traversing the Arabian Sea. For final destinations within the 
Persian Gulf the peripheral sheikhdoms and states of the Arabian Penin­
sula including Oman, Qatar and the U.A.E. along with Bahrain frequently 
serve as transit states. The two latter states in particular are 
entrepot trading centres similar in vein to Singapore, Hong Kong and 
Macau. Local craft, notably dhows of Arabian and Indian design, sailing 
between Indian and Arabian ports and appearing to be engaged in small­
time entrepot commerce are the transport units utilized. A variant of 
the theme involves commercial carriers bringing the cannabis into the 
Arabian ports where it is covertly transferred to local craft for dis­
tribution to other Persian Gulf ports in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, 
Iran and Red Sea ports. The reversed dimension of the variant involves 
local craft importing the cannabis to the Arabian Peninsula where it is 
transferred to commercial vessels destined elsewhere in the Persian Gulf 
or bound for East Africa or Europe. In regards to cannabis shipments to 
Europe, commercial vessels are always utilized except for the variant 
just noted and the focus of the traffickers' efforts is on ingenious 
concealment and deception combined with organized delivery and distribu­
tion schemes in the intended ports of arrival.
The maritime trafficking of Lebanese hashish is identical to the 
scenario given for opiate exportation. Syria, Turkey, Cyprus and Greece
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all play a role as transit states. Local trading craft els well as com­
mercial carriers ELre utilized. Lebanese hstshish is either transported 
overland into Syria and Turkey before being shipped by sea to European 
and African destinations, or is exported directly to all destinations on 
commercial csLrriers and privately chartered ships or shipped to Cyprus 
and a rendez-vous area in the Ionian Sea on local traders and privately 
chartered vessels where it is transhipped to other ships, both coramer- _ 
cial and private, for further transport.
In concluding the discussion on cannabis transit states, it must 
be noted that only the prominent ones have been identified based on 
their significance of utilization for such activity, and their obvious 
intermediary status. Consequently, the small degree of trans-shipment 
occurring in southern and West Africa and between Morocco and Europe is 
omitted. Nor do the incidental port calls in third states by vessels 
carrying cannabis between two given ports constitute transiting points. 
The pervasive aspect of cannabis cultivation and use throughout the 
world in essence means that virtually every state at one time or another 
csm, in the absolute sense, be said to have been a transit state even if 
the amount transhipped was one gram or less. Examples include Canada 
and the U.S.A. which frequently serve are transit states to eetch other. 
There have been several instances of maritime cannabis smuggling between 
the two but where the cannabis originated externally. For example, Thai 
cannabis bound for the U.S. transits Hong Kong imprimis before arriving 
in Vancouver, British Columbia. There, it is transferred either to a 
motor vehicle for overland importation to the U.S. or put onboard a 
fishing vessel or yacht for clandestine cELrriage into the U.S. Further 
examples include the U.K.’s transit role vis-a-vis Ireland, the
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Netherland’s role as a distribution centre for northern Europe, 
Denmark’s trafficking role relative to Norway, Sweden and Finland and, 
in this regard, the secondary transit role of Sweden for the latter. In
all these cases, cannabis enters the primary state by sea from abroad
and other transit states of the first order only to be re-exported or 
distributed in whole or in part to other states by either overland, air 
or sea transport modes. When viewed in this perspective these states 
can be considered maritime transit states. However, because it is 
neither the exclusive nor dominant role of the state and the definitive 
requirement of clear-cut intermediary in the maritime drug trade is not 
met these states are not considered such.
4.1,3.3 Cocaine Transit States
Compared to the other drug categories and their trade routes the 
cocaine transit states are easily defined. Cocaine’s high unitized 
value and relative abundance in the source countries justifies importa­
tion of the drug directly by air either on commercial carriers or 
private aircraft even though the risk factor is high and the amounts 
that may be carried limited. On the whole, the maritime sector does not
play the significant role. Where utilized, there is a propensity to
ship the cocaine directly concealed within cargo consignments. This ap­
pears particularly true for shipments destined for Europe and, to a les­
ser degree, with very large consignments sent to the U.S. With mass 
distribution restricted to North America and Europe the maritime flow 
patterns follow relatively direct paths. Deception, corruption, con­
spiracy and ingenious concealment are the methods employed to minimize 
seizure risk. For cocaine shipments sent indirectly on commercial ves­
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sels the transit states are usually countries near to the supply state. 
They are used in the hope that the attention given by customs officials 
in the destination countries to the vessels and their cargos is minimal 
or cursory. As noted earlier in the cannabis discussion, the drug traf­
fickers are capitalizing on the limitations placed on port control by 
various commercial, economic and political restraints. In these smug­
gling operations the cocaine is transported overland or flown to the 
transit states where it is then concealed amongst legitimate cargo con­
signments or on the vessels themselves. A more complex version of this 
strategy involves transhipping cocaine through disparate transit states 
thus effectively flooding the destination ports with cocaine consign­
ments from diverse ports and diffusing the risk of total interception. 
The premise here is that some of the ships arriving at a given port will 
not be searched thoroughly, or at all, because their prior ports of call 
are not deemed as suspicious as the prior ports of call of certain other 
arriving ships and their bills of lading do not outwardly trigger fur­
ther interest. In developing this strategy the traffickers have taken 
into account the limited resources allocated to most customs agencies 
combined with the short time periods available for customs searches as a 
result of the modern turn-around times of ships today. In busy ports it 
means that ship searches have to be perfunctory and discriminant. The 
traffickers are twisting the hierarchial prioritization programs util­
ized by authorities in determining their rumnages and detailed cargo 
reviews to their advantage. The primary transit states for transhipping 
cocaine consignments onwards with commercial vessels include Brazil, 
Ecuador, Panama, Venezuela and Colombia. The latter is a transit state 
for processed Bolivian and Peruvian coca. All are neighbouring states
of some principal coca producer. Brazil dominates eastern South 
America. It has an extensive coastline, numerous ports, substantial 
merchant fleet and high trade volume. Colombia has coasts both on the 
Pacific and Caribbean sides of the Panamanian isthmus hence, direct 
access to the west-, gulf- and eastcoasts of North America and to 
Europe. Ecuador and Venezuela are both adjacent to Colombia but with 
littoral zones on different oceans and sustain fair volumes of trade as 
a result of their respective oil exports. Panama's strategic position 
on the Isthmus of Panama astride an important trans-ocean canal 
automatically thrusts it into the role of a transit state for all 
cargoes, licit and otherwise. The overall isolation of the South 
American continent and intermediate location of Central America and the 
Caribbean basin which prefaces the maritime drug trade in this part of 
the world has already been documented. Other states which are utilized, 
but on a lesser scale, for cocaine trans-shipments involving commercial 
shipping include Argentina, Chile and Suriname along with certain com­
mercially active island states like Trinidad and those of the Nether­
lands Antilles.
The other component of the maritime cocaine trade embracing tran­
sit states incorporates the use of non-commercial vessels. The extent 
of their utilization is unknown. Virtually all the states and ter­
ritories of the Caribbean basin and Central America can be or are tran­
sit states. The vessels are usually small ( <100 meters), privately- 
owned or chartered and infrequently used for direct shipment to the con­
sumer state. Instead, they Eire often employed for a segment or leg of 
the shipment route involving one or more transit states and transport 
modes. The cocaine is transported either overland, by air or on commer­
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cial ships to a transit state. There it is then transferred to the non­
commercial vessel for direct carriage into the demand state or a sub­
sequent transit state. An example is the air shipment of cocaine to an 
island state in the Caribbean such as the Bahamas or the Dominican 
Republic. There the drug is transferred to a yacht or fishing vessel 
which transports it into Florida. Alternatively, the cocaine is con­
veyed to a second transit state where it is transferred to another ves­
sel and different mode of transport for final carriage into the consumer 
state. An example is the overland transport of cocaine from Colombia to 
Panama where it is loaded onto an old Caribbean trader acquired ex­
clusively for the smuggling operation which takes its illicit cargo to 
an island state in the Lesser or Greater Antilles. There the cocaine is 
transferred to a yacht which takes the drug into the U.S. Based on 
seizure statistics, the use of yachts and private vessels for transport­
ing cocaine to Europe has been minor. However, intelligence data in 
late 1988 and 1989 combined with recent interdiction cases indicate that 
the use of such craft is growing. Overall, European routes involve a 
combination of commercial shipping and private vessels, with the former 
doing the trans-Atlantic portion. For example, cocaine is exported from 
Colombia to Brazil overland where a privately chartered vessel or yacht 
takes delivery on the coast and then transports the drug to Trinidad. 
In Trinidad the cocaine is transhipped, concealed amongst a legitimate 
cargo load, to a freighter bound for Europe. A specific listing of 
transit states in the Caribbean cannot be provided due to the paucity of 
hard data. However, in the mid-Atlantic the Azores have begun to record 
noteworthy cocaine confiscatures from the maritime sector.17 Suffice it 
to say that anything is possible provided that all reasoning is based on
logic. There is virtually nothing to say that what one may conjure up 
in one’s mind has not already been tried or is being utilized, nor 
should other Central American states or Mexico be excluded though not 
specifically mentioned herein. Refer to Figure 4.3 which portrays the 
plausible cocaine transit states of the Caribbean basin and Central 
American region.
4*1,4 Relevant Lakes. Rivers, Canals And Straits
In addition to the oceans, seas and other marine water bodies sub­
sumed under other terms, various non-marine and artificial water bodies 
exist which either have a profound effect on the structuralization of 
the trade routes or contribute significantly in their own right to the 
waterborne transport of drugs. The latter point is achieved through the 
creation of routes based on their incidental, opportune or proximate 
positioning between origin and destination points or transit states 
serving these points.
4,1.4.1 Lacustrine Bodies Of Significance
Vis-a-vis the OECD states the pertinent lakes include the Great 
Lakes in North America and Lake Constance in central Europe. Lake 
Superior, Lake Huron, Lake Erie and Lake Ontario comprise part of the 
U.S.-Canadian border with the boundary line running along a lengthwise 
axis through each lake connectively. Lake Constance sits sandwiched be­
tween West Germany and Switzerland with the international boundary run­
ning latitudinally through it. In both cases, ferries, pleasure craft 
and yachts have been utilized to transport drugs across the interna­
tional frontiers situated within the respective lacustrine bodies. In
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1986 alone a total of 30 drug seizures were effected in the Winsdor and 
Sarnia areas on the Canadian side of the Great Lakes.18 Cannabis, opium 
and heroin have been seized on these lakes though, relatively speaking, 
the quantities have been small. In addition to simply the intervening 
position of these lakes between countries, another basis for their 
utilization in smuggling has been the strong amity between the respec­
tive countries which nurtures relaxed frontier controls combined with * 
the multitude of pleasure craft extant within the lacustrine bodies thus 
complicating surveillance and enforcement measures. The negative 
social, political and diplomatic repercussions resultant from aggressive 
control policies being exercised on these bi-national lakes precludes 
implementation of such measures. In the overall scheme of things trans- 
lacustrine drug trafficking is minute.
4,1,4,2 Riparian Trafficking Sites
In contrast to the above, riparian and transpadane drug traffick­
ing contributes prominently to the international drug trade. Rivers 
connect the hinterlands of countries with the seas and oceans. They 
also permit seaborne commerce to extend into the interiors and isolated 
regions of continents, and in this way, land-locked states gain a con­
nection to the marine medium. Rivers have also become the demarcation 
lines for international boundaries between states hence, inadvertently 
fostering their usage for illicit activities. The utilization of rivers 
as smuggling conduits is old and well-established. In earlier periods 
in areas of rugged topography rivers often served as the sole transport 
medium before the advent of modem transport modes and infrastructural 
developments. Areas exist today where this pxDint is still valid. Be-
183
cause the drugs under study generally originate from regions external to 
the OECD members where large river systems exist and play a key role in 
their export or import those rivers must be included in the review. 
Among those of most significance are the Mekong, Chao Phraya and Ir­
rawaddy Rivers in Southeast Asia; the Ganga River in India; the Shatt al
Arab in Southwest Asia; and the Amazon, Madeira, Maranon, Orinoco,
Paraguay, Parana, Pilcomaya, Putumayo and Ucayali Rivers in South 
America.
The Mekong River extends for 4,180 kms. from its mouth on the 
South China Sea loosely northwestward into central China. It is fully 
navigable by ocean-going ships for 550 kms. upstream. Above that only 
small river craft are operable. Along its middle portion the Mekong 
serves as the border between Thailand and Laos allowing for some 
deviations. Transpadane trafficking of opium between Laos and Thailand 
is rife and well documented dating back to the 1950s.19 The Chao Phraya 
River extends for 230 kms. from its mouth on the Gulf of Thailand 
northward to Nakhon Sawan in central Thailand where it splits into two 
feeder rivers named Ping and Nan respectively. The Nan River continues 
northward for a further 800 kms. into China. Both the Chao Phraya and 
Nan sure navigable but ocean-going ships can only transit upstream (- 42
kms.) to Bangkok. Riparian opium trafficking on the Chao Phraya between
China and Thailsuid is well documented dating back to the 1920s.20 In 
the 1950s and 1960s large amounts continued to be transported southward 
from China.21 In one notable case 7,307.3 kgs. were carried on a 
Chinese sailboat from China to Thailand in 1958.22 Information is now 
scarce but allegedly such traffic does not occur today because China is 
not involved in opium production. However, undoubtedly the reverse
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situation exists considering the role of Thailand and Laos as producers. 
The Irrawaddy bisects Burma rather evenly on a north-south axis extend­
ing for 2,090 kms. from the Andaman Sea up to the Kachin State in north­
ern Burma. Important tributaries include the Chindwin, Sittang and Sal­
ween Rivers. Drug smuggling of opium along these waterways is well 
documented for the past, but in recent years detailed data has been 
sporadic and scant.23 Small amounts were usually being distributed 
domestically while large quantities were being transported to Rangoon or 
other coastal ports for export. The river ferries and barges of the In­
land Water Transport Board frequently carried opium.
The Ganga River extends from Delhi in northern India more or less 
eastwards to the head of the Bay of Bengal. Except for two deep delta 
passages at the mouth, one leading to Calcutta and the other at 
Chittagong, Bangladesh the Ganga is only navigable by small local craft. 
The proximate position of the river to Indian cannabis cultivation sites 
and its relative proximity to Nepal provides traffickers with a flowing 
medium by which to transport drugs downstream to connect with ocean­
going ships. The Shatt al Arab is the lower portion of the Tigris- 
Euphrates River System. It extends southward from Basrah, Iraq to the 
head of the Persian Gulf. Above Basrah, where the two rivers diverge, 
navigation is virtually impossible. Transpadane trafficking of drugs on 
the Shatt al Arab in the past is well documented. The amounts involved 
were generally small and all trafficking was domestic in nature because 
Iraqi sovereignty prevailed on both sides of the river. Minor interna­
tional trafficking occurred when ships or dhows carrying drugs entered 
the Shatt al Arab coming from abroad. Local craft, notably dhows, have 
been apprehended importing drugs to Iraq from other Persian Gulf ports.
185
Based on seizure data, tankers have played a minor role, particularly in 
earlier decades. The situation today is unclear as a result of the 
Iran-Iraq conflict which prevents information being gathered.
The Pilcomaya-Paraguay-Parana River System is situated in the 
lower, central part of the South American continent. The Pilcomaya 
River flows southeastward from central Bolivia to Asuncion, Paraguay 
with the lower 600 kms. serving as the international boundary between 
the latter and Argentina. There it confluences with the Paraguay River 
and turns southward continuing to serve as the international boundary 
for another 250 kms. before entering Argentina and subsequently con- 
fluencing with the Parana River. The Parana continues in the same 
southerly direction for over 1,000 kms. before emptying into the Rio de 
la Plata near Buenos Aires. Though navigable throughout its 4,500-km. 
length, large ships can only sail up the Parana a few hundred kilometers 
to Santa Fe, Argentina. Because of the Pilcomaya and Paraguay Rivers’ 
roles as the common boundary between Paraguay and Argentina, transpadane 
cocaine trafficking on the international level has been documented. 
Considering the notoriety of the Andean region, it would be foolhardy 
not to presume that a moderate level of such trafficking is transpiring 
though difficult to verify. River ferries were the vessels involved in 
those recorded cases. Undoubtedly, small river craft are being used as 
well. Presumably, cannabis is also being trafficked. Though seizures 
involving riparian drug smuggling is lacking there is sufficient reason 
to believe that coca, cocaine and cannabis are being transported 
downstream from Bolivia and Paraguay to the dozen or so seaports on the 
lower reaches of the Parana River. It is an established fact, based on 
intelligence and seizure data, that Buenos Aires is a trans-shipment
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port for cocaine being exported by air and sea. The Orinoco River ex­
tends for 2,060 kms. westward through Venezuela from its delta mouth on 
the Atlantic coast to Colombia. The lower 435 kms. up to Ciudad Bolivar 
(a port) is fully navigable for ocean-going ships while the rest is 
limited to riverine vessels. The opportune positioning of the Orinoco 
provides an excellent conduit for shipping cocaine and cannabis out of 
Colombia and accessing viable trans-shipment ports in Venezuela and 
Trinidad. Though hard data is lacking it is not unreasonable to presume 
that some riparian cocaine trafficking is transpiring and it must vir­
tually be accepted as fact that riparian cannabis trafficking is 
occurring. The basis for the presumptions just made is the prepon­
derance of circumstantial and proximate evidence pertaining to seizures 
effected in Venezuela and nearby Caribbean islands. The origin of much 
of the drugs (usually Colombia), the prior regional ports of call of the 
ships on which drugs were found, the types of vessels apprehended carry­
ing drugs and the origins of various cargoes and their intended destina­
tions are some of the factors which, when correlated with other data, 
elicit the inferences above. The Putumayo River constitutes part of the 
border between Colombia and Peru. It flows southeastward for 1,600 kms. 
from its head in southwestern Colombia to the Leticia Trapezium where it 
confluences with the Ucayali River.24 The Putumayo is mostly navigable, 
but for shallow-draft craft only. Transpadane cocaine trafficking has 
been documented. River ferries have been the vessels involved. The 
Ucayali, Maranon, and Madeira Rivers are all extensions of the Amazon 
River System. The Amazon River itself extends for 6,570 kms. westward 
from its delta mouth on the Atlantic coast of Brazil to southwestern 
Colombia falling only a few hundred kilometers short of actually con­
necting with the Pacific Ocean. The Ucayali and Maranon Rivers, respec­
tively 1,610 and 1,609 kms. in length, are massive feeder rivers flowing 
into the Amazon River from Peru. The Madeira River with a length of 
3,240 kms. is another tributary which flows from central Bolivia into 
Brazil where it confluences with the Amazon River at Itacoatiara, 
Brazil. The lower 1,000 kms. of the Amazon from Belem to Manaus, Brazil 
is fully navigable for all ships provided they maintain a draft of 14 
feet or less. The Amazon is navigable the rest of its length into 
Colombia as well as up the Maranon River to Iquito, Peru by river 
vessels. The Ucayali River is navigable for its entire length by small 
craft. The extensive navigability of the Amazon River and its Peruvian 
tributaries has led to it being designated an international waterway.25 
Peru, Ecuador and Colombia all possess international shipping rights on 
the Amazon River though it is predominantly Brazilian territory. The 
proximity of the upper reaches of the Amazon River and its tributaries 
to the primary coca and cannabis cultivation sites of South America in­
vites illicit utilization. The best indirect evidence of riparian drug 
trafficking on these rivers are the massive quantities of drugs appear­
ing in Brazilian cities and ports to be refined, consumed locally and 
transhipped abroad. While some of it undoubtedly comes overland and by 
air from the interior, the opportune positioning of the Amazon River 
System virtually pre-ordains its utilization in the drug trade. Cor­
roborating evidence to the plausibility of the route is the reverse 
(upriver) trade in precursor chemicals. Intelligence information 
provided by the American CIA and DEA documents the substantive use of 
the Amazon River for illicit shipment of acetone, ether, toluene, MEK 
and acetic anhydride to Colombia.26
4*1*4.3 Ri\rers Of Significance In The OECD States
The principal rivers conducive to riparian or transpadane drug 
trafficking within the OECD states include the Danube, Elbe, Rhine and 
Seine Rivers in Europe and the Mississippi, Rio Grande and St. Lawrence 
Rivers in North America. Originating in the southern part of West Ger­
many the Danube flows 2,850 kms. southeastward through eastern Europe 
before emptying into the Black Sea. Though a vital inland shipping ar- * 
tery the volume of traffic is well below that of other European rivers.
It is linked to the Rhine River by the Rhine-Main-Danube Canal System. 
Hence, it is technically possible to ship a cargo consignment by water­
borne transport from the Black Sea to the North Sea through Europe. 
Navigation is impeded by ice in the winter and seasonal fluctuations in 
water levels. River vessels and barges are the common transport modes. 
The river provides a suitable water conduit for drugs being shipped into 
Europe from Southwest Asian and Near Eastern sources. To date, data on 
drug smuggling on the Danube is scant and thus its occurrence has to be 
considered negligible. The major factor for lack of such illicit traf­
ficking (or lack of knowledge of such activity) are the many Eastern 
Bloc countries through which the Danube flows. Presumably, the an­
ticipated thorough security and control measures exercised by these 
states in regard to international river commerce dissuades Western drug 
traffickers from making use of this route. The question probably hinges 
more on the degree to which individuals and groups within the communist 
states are participating in the drug trade. This point is of particular 
interest in light of the two overland Balkan drug routes which have been 
detected.
The Elbe River extends for 1,159 kms. from its estuarine mouth on
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the North Sea transecting the northeast comer of West Germany and then 
East Germany. The first 100 kms., from its terminus at Cuxhaven up to 
Hamburg, are fully navigable by ocean-going ships while the next 745 
kms. are navigable only by river vessels and barges. Seizure records 
over the years show that drugs concealed within legitimate cargo con­
signments or on the ships themselves have been shipped up the Elbe to 
Hamburg. Most of the drugs onboard ships entering the Elbe are enroute 
from renowned exportation or trans-shipment ports.
The Rhine River extends for 1,320 kms. from its North Sea terminus 
in the Netherlands through West Germany to Switzerland. Considering the 
high degree of riparian commerce on the Rhine and the presence of the 
largest seaport in the world, Europort/Rotterdam, at its terminus, which 
makes an excellent drug trans-shipment link, the river clearly is an op­
portune medium by which to transport drugs inland.27 The Rhine-Main- 
Danube Canal System connecting the Rhine with the Danube provides 
another water route to countries straddling the latter river. Narcotic 
and psychotropic substances either illicitly manufactured or diverted 
from licit supplies in the Netherlands along with those imported by sea 
or air to Rotterdam can easily be distributed to the major German cities 
of Dusseldorf, Koln, Bonn, Mainz, Frankfurt, Mannheim and Stuttgart as 
well as Strasbourg in France and Basel in Switzerland. Evidence of 
riparian drug trafficking on the Rhine to date is exiguous though intel­
ligence analyses suggest this route as very plausible. Cocaine, 
codeine, dilaudide-atropine, dionine and morphine have all been seized 
onboard tugboats engaged in international commerce sailing downriver 
from West Germany to the Netherlands.28 Undoubtedly, a primary factor 
for the few seizures is the lax control mechanism over commerce on the
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river resulting from the amicable relations between the riparian states. 
Though possible, transpadane drug trafficking does not occur primarily 
because of the preponderance of structural links across the river.
The Seine River extends for 761 kms. from its mouth at Le Havre on 
the English Channel into central France. Mostly navigable, except for 
its upper reaches, the river is an important commercial artery for 
France to the extent that a considerable amount of France's foreign 
trade moves on it. Ocean-going ships can sail up the Seine as far as 
Rouen while riverine vessels carry cargoes up to Paris. Though 
infrequent, drug importation does occur as documented by the seizures 
effected at Le Havre and Rouen. In 1984 more than 97 kgs. of marijuana 
were found submerged in the Seine.29 Virtually all the drugs seized 
were concealed in legitimate cargo consignments or on the vessels 
themselves. Considering the importance of the Seine to French commerce 
and the normal trans-shipment roles played by Le Havre and Rouen the 
question arises as to what extent have drugs been transhipped to 
riverine vessels for domestic distribution upriver. It is reasonable to 
presume that the modem and facilitated trains-shipment processes at 
these ports permit cargo consignments bearing concealed drugs to pass, 
somewhat more readily, undetected.
The Mississippi River extends for 3,779 kms. from the Gulf of 
Mexico rather directly northward to Minnesota virtually bisecting the 
U.S.A. The Illinois River physically completes the bisection by con­
necting the upper Mississippi with Lake Michigan. Thus, there is a 
water link between the Great Lakes and the Gulf of Mexico which is com­
mercially viable. Transit time for barge traffic from New Orleans to 
Chicago is 15 days. The many important tributaries of the Mississippi
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provide an extensive inland waterway network throughout the midwestern 
United States. The Arkansas, Missouri, Ohio and Tennessee Rivers all 
confluence with the Mississippi. Possessing the most developed barge 
transport system in the world and having the U.S.’s busiest port, New 
Orleans, at its mouth, the Mississippi provides a most opportune, in­
tegrated and vulnerable network of inland waterways for distributing il­
licit drugs. However, based on intelligence data, riparian drug traf­
ficking appears confined to the private vessels and yachts which sail 
the river system. Additionally, it may be said that such trafficking 
occurs because the mariners themselves engage in drug use while on the 
job. The importation of drugs by sea to New Orleans is well documented 
and therefore access to drugs is easy. The question to be addressed is 
to what extent are drug trans-shipments occurring between the vessels 
importing the drugs and those used for distribution of the illicit cargo 
consignments upriver. Transpadane drug trafficking does not occur be­
cause of the sufficient structural linkages across the river. All drug 
trafficking is domestic in nature because the river is solely within the 
U.S.A.
The utilization of the Rio Grande River in drug trafficking stems 
from its role as the international border between Mexico and the U.S.A. 
Extending for 3,030 kms. from its mouth at Brownsville, Texas on the 
Gulf of Mexico loosely northwestward into New Mexico to its origin in 
the San Juan Mountains in Colorado, the river is virtually unnavigable. 
Its unique position between Mexico, which is a principal producer of 
cannabis and heroin, and the U.S.A. which is a principal consumer of 
these substances, nurtures transpadane drug trafficking which is inter­
national in nature. To be fair, the majority of drugs entering the U.S.
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across the Rio Grande are smuggled in motor vehicles utilizing the offi­
cial crossing and entry points. In terms of proportion, a larger share 
of the total volume of drugs trafficked into the U.S. cross the western 
segment where there is solely a land border. It is the portion of drugs 
physically crossing the Rio Grande via its water medium which are under 
discussion here. Generally too shallow for vessels of consequence, most 
drug trafficking utilizing the river involves swimmers or small boats. 
Wading, which is possible at various times and occurs, is not included 
under the concept of waterborne drug smuggling. In compiling the 
statistics presented later the portion of drugs seized from waders is 
tallied in with other overland transport modes.
Located in eastern Canada, the St. Lawrence River extends for 
3,058 kms. southeastward from the Gulf of St. Lawrence to the St. 
Lawrence Seaway and Great Lakes. It provides direct access for ocean­
going ships to the Canadian ports of Montreal, Quebec, Sorel and Trois- 
Rivieres. As is well documented, cannabis and, to a lesser degree, 
heroin have been imported to Canada via these ports. Most of the 
riparian drug trafficking occurring is international in nature because 
the ships come from foreign ports. Additionally, there is a minor 
degree of transpadane drug trafficking which is international in charac­
ter because of the river's function in areas as the boundary between 
Canada and the U.S. In one instance in 1986 cocaine totalling 0.5 kgs. 
was seized at Prescott, Ontario after having come by boat from the 
American side.30
Other rivers in the OECD states which have been linked to or serve 
as drug trafficking conduits include the Guadalquivir, Thames and Weser 
Rivers in Europe and the Potomac, Tombigbee and Willamette Rivers in
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North America. The Guadalquivir River extends for 560 kms. from San- 
lucar de Barrameda on Spains’s southern Atlantic coast to the Sierra de 
Cazorla Mountains in Jaen Province. Though canalized, ocean-going ships 
can sail the 80 kms. up to Sevilla and riverine vessels ply the river 
onwards to Cordoba. Hard data is scant, but the riparian drug traffick­
ing that has occurred was international in nature and resulted from 
ships docking in Sevilla which came from abroad. Riparian drug traf­
ficking on the Thames River in England is well documented by all the 
seizures made at both London and Tilbury docks over the years. Though 
the Thames extends for 336 kms. inland from its mouth by Southend on Sea 
westward to Gloucestershire, it is only navigable by ocean-going ships 
up to London; the rest of the way up to Lechlade limited to barges. All 
the drug smuggling occurring is international in nature because the 
ships carrying drugs are inbound from foreign ports. However, drug 
smuggling on the Thames is declining because the ports of London and 
Tilbury are being overshadowed by other coastal ports. The W'eser River 
extends for 480 kms. from Munden in West Germany, where it is formed by 
the confluence of the Fulda and Werra Rivers, northward to the North 
Sea. It is navigable by ships up to Kassel though most maritime traffic 
only goes as far as Bremen. Furthermore, the Weser is connected with 
the Elbe and Rhine Rivers by the Midland Canal System. Consequently, 
the Weser provides an additional conduit for distributing drugs by river 
throughout West Germany and further into Europe. Based on records to 
date, riparian drug trafficking is an infrequent event. The little 
smuggling that has occurred has been international in nature because the 
drugs seized were imported on ships coming from abroad docking at 
Bremen. Located on the US Eastcoast and extending only a few kilometers
inland from its mouth on Chesapeake Bay, the Potomac River has been a 
conduit for drugs imported by yachts and private vessels. In one 
notable instance 6,060 kgs. of cannabis were seized from a yacht in 
1974.31 Too small and shallow to be used much by commercial shipping, 
not to mention the presence of major ports nearby, most of the drugs im­
ported are either carried directly from the Caribbean basin or are of­
floaded from motherships lying off the U.S. coast. Stretching for 640 
kms. rather longitudinally through western Alabama, the Tombigbee River 
confluences with the Alabama River to form the Mobile River which flows 
into the Gulf of Mexico. It connects with the Tennessee River via the 
recently completed Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway thus giving the Ten­
nessee Valley region another outlet to the sea besides the Mississippi 
River System. Utilizing a series of locks and dams the Tombigbee is 
navigable but by river vessels and barges only. Drug trafficking is 
rife, but, interestingly enough, is dominated by yachts and pleasure 
craft. The subsequent discussion on the Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway 
elaborates on this. The Willamette River connects the Port of Portland 
in Oregon with the Pacific Ocean. Though intermittent, drug trafficking 
on the Willamette is well documented by the many seizures made on ships 
over the years in Portland. Virtually all the riparian drug trafficking 
occurring is international in nature because the drugs are imported from 
foreign ports.
4.1,4*4 Pertinent Canals And Waterways
The man-made canals and waterways of significance to the maritime 
drug trade are the Suez Canal, Panama Canal, Kiel Canal, St. Lawrence 
Seaway and Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway. The importance of some of them
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has already been indirectly revealed. The vulnerability of the interna­
tional waterways to drug trafficking was first recognized in the 1920s. 
Of the five the Suez Canal sees the greatest throughput of illicit 
drugs. In the period 1985-86 230 kgs. of heroin were seized passing 
through the canal.32 Connecting the Mediterranean Sea with the Red Sea 
the Suez Canal nearly halves the sailing distance between Arabian and 
Indian ports and northern European ports. The Bombay-London route is 
reduced to 6)260 n.ms. via the Suez Canal as opposed to 10,700 n.ms. via 
the Cape of Good Hope while the Kuwait-London route is reduced to 6,500 
n.ms. compared to 11,300 n.ms.33 A long-haul route between the Far East 
and northern Europe is reduced by about 30%. For example, the 
Singapore-Rotterdam route is 8,310 n.ms. via the Suez Canal as opposed 
to 11,820 n.ms. around Africa.34 The strategic link the canal provides 
between the many Asian ports from which drugs are exported and the con­
suming states of Europe ensures its steady usage as a smuggling conduit 
for illicit cargoes. Because the drugs are usually concealed within 
legitimate cargo consignments onboard freighters, containerships and 
other dry-cargo vessels which are always capable of transiting the Suez 
Canal, virtually all drugs shipped to Europe and sometimes North America 
from Asian ports transit the canal. All of the trans-canal drug traf­
ficking is international in nature. Additionally, the canal’s unique 
position transecting the isthmus between Egypt and the Sinai Peninsula 
has led to a high level of cross-canal drug trafficking - analogous to 
transpadane drug trafficking. Though bridges link the two sides of the 
canal, seizure records show a high incidence of cross-canal smuggling; 
this was particularly true in the past. The drugs crossing the canal 
were either carried in water-proof sacks by swimmers or on small boats
and fishing vessels. Today, the Sinai Peninsula is Egyptian territory 
hence, all cross-canal smuggling is domestic in scope. In the past, 
when Israel occupied the Sinai, cross-canal drug trafficking was par­
ticularly rife and international in nature, but smuggling has declined 
since the territory became Egyptian.
Somewhat contrary to the previous situation, the Panama Canal, 
which bisects the Isthmus of Panama, permits the easy shipment of can­
nabis and cocaine to both coasts of North America. Drug trafficking via 
the Panama Canal generally involves vessels coming out of ports on the 
Pacific coast of Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Chile bound for ports in 
the Gulf of Mexico, the east coast of North America and Europe. 
Alternatively, there is some trafficking from ports on the Caribbean 
coast of Colombia, Venezuela and Brazil destined for ports along the 
westcoast of North America. In the former the directional movement of 
flow through the canal is southwest to northeast while in the latter it 
is the transverse (southeast to northwest). The Panama Canal sees a two- 
way traffic in drugs, all of which is international in nature. 
Generally, the cannabis and cocaine are concealed within legitimate 
cargo consignments onboard freighters, containerships and other dry- 
cargo vessels. There is no cross-canal trafficking and trans-canal 
smuggling of drugs by private vessels and yachts is negligible because 
the risk of interception is high.
Drug trafficking via the Kiel Canal is deemed inconsequential. 
Physically separating the Danish mainland from Europe the canal has a 
length of 98.2 kms. and connects the North Sea with the Baltic Sea. The 
canal reduces the voyage distances into the Baltic Sea by 190 - 290 
n.ms. (depending on the vessels* tonnages and their routes otherwise
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around Denmark). However, the amount of drug traffic bound for ports in 
the Baltic and Gulf of Bothnia is relatively minor. The only OECD 
states therein are Sweden and Finland. Poland is a non-OECD state 
which conceivably is a destination for drugs transiting the Kiel Canal. 
Of the 90,000 ships transiting the canal annually, more than 75% of them
are only 1,000 g.r.t. meaning they are, for the most part, short-haul
carriers.35 Consequently, the likelihood of them coming from drug em­
barkation ports is negligible though it cannot be ruled out that they 
are not carrying drugs since their loads may be cargoes transhipped in 
other European ports where scrutiny was minimal (because the cargoes in 
which the drugs are concealed were in transit). Alternatively, coastal 
traders may be coming from the Mediterranean as a result of being en­
gaged in medium-distance haulage and have unknowingly acquired a drug 
consignment which they carry through the Kiel Canal. Regrettably, when 
drug seizures at ports within the Baltic region sure effected no data on 
the precise route is recorded which can be retrieved later to determine 
the significance of drug trafficking via the Kiel Canal.
Comprising five sections inclusive of 17 locks, the St. Lawrence 
Seaway extends for 304 kms. from Montreal to Lake Ontario. Use of the 
seaway is seasonal and it is subject to closure in winter, due to ice 
conditions. Capable of accommodating ocean-going vessels, the seaway 
raises them from sea level to an elevation of 183.5 meters equal to that 
of the Great Lakes. While not a common event, trans-seaway drug traf­
ficking does occur. To the extent that ship>s travel in to the Great
Lakes it may be said that lacustrine drug trafficking involving commer­
cial shipping also transpires. Generally, all drugs smuggled through 
the seaway are concealed within legitimate cargo consignments or in the
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vessels themselves. When trans-seaway trafficking of drugs does occur, 
it is always international in nature because the ships sure coming from 
foreign ports.
As already noted, the Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway connects the 
upper Tombigbee River with the Tennessee River. Considered by critics 
of the waterway to be nothing more than a result of American *pork 
barrel* legislation the 376.6-km. waterway was built to allegedly 
facilitate inland commerce. However, the projected barge traffic has 
yet to develop and that which currently transpires is greatly outweighed 
by that of pleasure craft and yachts; many of which come up the Mobile 
and Tombigbee Rivers from the Gulf of Mexico. Mississippi police are 
convinced that the Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway has instead become an 
important conduit for drug trafficking from the GulfcosLst up into the 
central states of the U.S.36 Yachts in particular are believed to be 
coming directly from international waters into the U.S. and up the 
waterway without restrictions thus verifying its massive potential for 
large-scale drug smuggling.37 To date, a quantitative assessment of the 
problem is lacking.
There are other canals and waterways which undoubtedly have been 
or are sites of maritime drug trafficking. However, little is known of 
the illicit activities occurring therein and they are deemed insig­
nificant to the overall maritime trade in illicit drugs. Examples in­
clude the Rhine-Main-Danube Canal System and Midland Canal System which 
have been cited and the Corinth and Erie Canals which were not 
mentioned. The latter two, respectively located in Greece and New York 
State, play important roles in the commerce of the regions in which they 
are situated.
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4.1,4,5 Pertinent Straits And Passages
The complex configuration of land and sea within the global net­
work of trade routes superimposed thereon creates strategic passages of 
vital significance to waterborne commerce, both licit and illicit. Be­
cause a considerable amount of the maritime drug trade involves the use 
of legitimate commerce, these strategic passages are concomitantly im­
portant to its route structure as well. For example, drug traffickers 
shipping cannabis by sea from either India or Pakistan to any port in 
Europe will generally ensure that their illicit cargo is carried on an 
appropriate ship which transits the Red Sea, the Suez Canal and, if des­
tined for northern Europe, the Strait of Gibralter. In order to enter 
the Red Sea the ship will have to transit the Bab el Mandeb Strait. The 
amount of time required for a voyage around the Cape of Good Hope not to 
mention the lack of dry-cargo commerce circumnavigating Africa dictates 
this. Changing the destination of the above ship to a port in the Per­
sian Gulf means the vessel will instead have to transit the Strait of 
Hormuz. A more vivid example is the shipment of heroin or cannabis from 
ports in the South China Sea to any port in the Indian Ocean, East 
Africa, Middle East or Europe. In order to enter the Indian Ocean any 
vessel must transit either the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, the 
Sunda Strait or the Lombok Strait. The balance of the maritime drug 
trade not carried on comoercial ships but by privately chartered vessels 
also must transit straits and passages in order to transport their il­
licit cargoes to their slated destinations. Because the physical geog­
raphy of land and sea is not subject to change (in the short-term), in 
several cases the same straits and passages used by commercial carriers 
are transited by the private sector as well. However, in many instances
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the utilization of these smaller and private vessels is often predicated 
to an appreciable extent on their better suitability for drug traffick­
ing in a particular region or along a specific route. Consequently, 
these traffickers frequently use different straits and passages and 
carry the lion’s share of drugs moving along a certain maritime conduit. 
Their vessels’ unsuitability for long-haul transport, not to mention 
conspicuousness in far-flung places which would only draw attention, in- - 
duces drug traffickers to instead engage them in short-haul and medium- 
distance trades and take advantage of their appropriateness (read: 
inconspicuousness) to the region. A prime example is the Caribbean 
basin. All the yachts, fishing vessels, coastal traders and pleasure 
boats blend into the backdrop or mosaic of life and activity in the 
region. The geographical structure of the Caribbean basin mandates that 
all vessels coming from Colombia, Venezuela and select Central American 
ports and bound for North America essentially must transit one of four 
passages to enter either the Gulf of Mexico or Atlantic Ocean. The 
Yucatan Channel, Windward Passage, Mona Passage and Anegada Passage are 
the only northward links and thus are of strategic importance to not 
only the drug trade but commerce in general. The eastward and thus 
removed position of the Lesser Antilles from the basic flow direction 
negates somewhat the use of the many passages between those islands. In 
addition to lengthened voyage times, small vessels face the added risks 
of danger posed by the open ocean and difficulty in accessing refuge. 
This same analogy applies to the waters and archipelagos of Southeast 
Asia. Yachts, however, do not figure prominently there. Instead, 
inter-island traders, fishing vessels, junks and other regional craft 
ply the many diverse straits and passages throughout the Indonesian,
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Papua New Guinean and Philippine archipelagos.
The most important straits and passages for shipping and through 
which drugs are smuggled regularly are the Bab el Mandeb, Hormuz, 
Lombok, Makassar, Malacca, Singapore, Sunda and Torres Straits in the 
Indian Ocean region; the Dover, Gibralter and Kattegat-Oresund Straits 
in European waters; and, the aforementioned passages in the Caribbean 
basin. The trafficking of illicit drugs via these straits, channels and 
passages is well evidenced. Much of the data verifying the fact is ob­
tained in the follow-up investigations into seizures effected after the 
actual transit of the drugs through these straits and passages. Thus, 
that which follows is inferred in many cases. Formed by Djibouti and 
North Yemen, the Bab el Mandeb is a 14 n.m.-wide strait linking the Red 
Sea and Indian Ocean (via the Gulf of Aden). Due to the position of 
Perim Island in the strait the wider section (9 n.ms.) called Large 
Strait is used by commercial shipping. About 50 ships a day transit the 
Bab el Mandeb Strait.38 The opening of the Suez Canal linking the 
Mediterranean Sea with the Red Sea assured the importance of the Bab el 
Mandeb Strait to maritime commerce and its utilization for the transit 
of illicit drugs between Asia and Europe. Additionally, local dhows and 
traders traverse the strait carrying drugs to ports in the Red Sea from 
East Africa and the Arabian Peninsula. Bordered by Oman and Iran the 
Strait of Hormuz links the Persian Gulf with the Arabian Sea (via the 
Gulf of Oman). Though 29 n.ms. wide at its narrowest point, the
navigable channel is only 20.7 n.ms. wide.39 The export of oil from
virtually all states in the Persian Gulf combined with a hefty demand 
for imported goods nurtures the strait’s heavy use. Generally, 80 ships
a day transit the strait.40 However, recent events connected with the
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Iran-Iraq conflict, notably the attacks on shipping within the Persian 
Gulf, have reduced that level of traffic. Drug trafficking through the 
Strait of Hormuz goes back to the 1800s while drug transport dates back 
to the period of Arab domination on the seas in the 10' h through 13'h 
centuries. Besides modern shipping, a fair amount of drug trafficking 
involving dhows and other regional trading craft still thrives. The 
Lombok Strait, situated between the Indonesian islands of Bali and 
Lombok, is an alternative link between the Indian Ocean and South China 
Sea (via the Java Sea). Though drug trafficking does transpire the ex­
tent of it is unknown. Utilized predominantly by deep draught vessels 
such as tankers and bulk carriers prohibited from transiting the Straits 
of Malacca and Singapore, the degree of drug trafficking via the strait 
by the commercial sector is relatively minor because these vessels are 
less frequently involved in such activity today. Instead, regional drug 
trafficking by local vessels and craft is more significant. Situated 
between the Indonesian islands of Borneo and Celebes, the Makassar 
Strait is of sole importance for traffic bound for the Lombok and other 
nearby straits from the South China Sea or Pacific Ocean (via the 
Celebes sea) and for local commerce. Consequently, most drug traffick­
ing is regional in character and involves inter-island traders and local 
craft. Positioned between the western Malay Peninsula and Indonesian 
island of Sumatra, the Strait of Malacca extends for 500 n.ms. from the 
Andaman Sea to the Singapore Strait which provides the final link to the 
South China Sea and Pacific Ocean. The Singapore Strait itself extends 
for 75 n.ms. from the eastern terminus of the Malacca Strait ten miles 
due south of Tanjong Merawang, Singapore to the South China Sea. About 
150 ships a day transit the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.41 Both
trans-strait and transfretational (cross-strait) drug trafficking 
occurs, is well documented, and dates back to historical times. The 
concentration of maritime drug smuggling in these straits virtually out­
strips that of any other strait or passage. The trans-strait drug trade 
generally involves commercial carriers or regional traders engaged in 
legitimate commerce. The trans-strait drug trade is a two way trade 
with either drugs being exported from Southeast Asian ports and destined 
for ports west of the Malacca Strait or, conversely, Asian drugs being 
imported to the region from sources in the Golden Crescent, India and 
the Middle East. The transfretational drug trade involves predominantly 
inter-island trading vessels and local craft which are transporting the 
drugs southward from Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore into the In­
donesian archipelago and Australia. Situated in the Indonesian ar­
chipelago between Sumatra and Java, the 12 n.m.-wide Sunda Strait, like 
the Lombok Strait, is another alternative to the Straits of Malacca and 
Singapore. Basically, the trafficking scenario described for the Lombok 
Strait applies to the Sunda Strait as well. However, it is reasonable 
to assume that the degree of local drug trafficking is less because the 
Sunda Strait opens directly into the Indian Ocean somewhat further dis­
tant from Australia and the southern islands of the Indonesian 
archipelago. Formed by the Cape York Peninsula of Queensland, Australia 
and the southwestern comer of Papua New Guinea, the Torres Strait 
serves as the principal maritime thoroughfare by which shipping can sail 
most directly to Australia’s eastcoast ports and New Zealand from vir­
tually all points throughout Asia and the Middle East. Technically 
speaking, the strait itself is 20 n.ms. wide and situated between the 
Australian islands of Banks and Hammond adjacent to the tip of the
peninsula. Drug trafficking involving commercial carriers transiting 
the strait bound for Brisbane, Port Kembla, Sydney and Townsville in 
Australia and Auckland, Lyttelton and Wellington in New Zealand is well 
documented. The cumulative number of seizures made over the past four 
decades in these ports attests to a continual trade though, compara­
tively speaking, lesser quantities are involved. Resulting from the 
proximity of England to France, the Dover Strait connects the English 
Channel with the southern part of the North Sea and ranks as the busiest 
strait in the world (of those used for international navigation). About 
350 ships a day transit the Dover Strait.42 Though 18 n.ms. wide at its 
narrowest point the navigable portion reserved for trans-strait traffic 
is only 10 n.ms. wide. The many seizures of drugs from commercial car­
riers and their cargoes in London, Tilbury, Amsterdam, Rotterdam, 
Antwerp and Hamburg all attest to the role of the Dover Strait in the 
maritime drug trade. Additionally a fair amount of transfretational
drug trafficking occurs due to the extensive ferry services linking 
France and the U.K. In the latter mode the smuggling of drugs is
divided between commercial cargo consignments carried in RO-RO con­
tainers or on lorries and private passengers engaged in entrepot or or­
ganized trafficking activities. The importance of the Strait of Gibral- 
ter has already been cited. Situated between Morocco and Spain, the 
strait provides the link connecting the Atlantic Ocean with the Mediter­
ranean Sea and all points eastward accessible via the Dardanelles and 
Bosporus into the Black Sea or via the Suez Canal into the Indian Ocean. 
About 200 ships transit the Strait of Gibralter daily.43 The transit of 
drugs via the Strait of Gibralter is well documented by all the cargoes 
subsequently seized from ships which exited the Mediterranean carrying
such illicit cargoes from Cyprus, France, India, Iran, Italy, Lebanon, 
Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Syria, and Turkey. As in the Dover Strait, there 
is a substantial level of transfretational drug trafficking via the 
ferries linking Spain and Gibralter with Ceuta and Morocco and by fish­
ing vessels and local craft which carry drug loads from Morocco to iso­
lated coastal sites along Spain’s southern coastline.
Also mentioned earlier, albeit briefly, the Kattegat-Qresund 
Straits constitute the natural maritime link between the Baltic and 
North Seas. Possessing a north-south axis of orientation and situated 
between eastern Denmark and Sweden's southwest coastline, the combined 
straits total 164.4 n.ms. in length. At its narrowest points the Kat­
tegat Strait is about 23 n.ms. wide, but the breadth of the navigation 
channel is restricted to 12 n.ms. The Oresund Strait at its narrowest 
points (Helsingor-Helsingborg) is only 2 n.ms. wide. On average, 142 
ships transit the Kattegat-Oresund Straits daily.44 Though trans-strait 
drug trafficking occurs, relatively speaking, it is minor. The demand 
for drugs by the coastal states in the Baltic region is not high enough 
to warrant frequent importations, particularly when there are other and, 
in some instances, more practical methods of distributing drugs to those 
states. Some of the trans-strait traffic in drugs involves pleasure 
boats and yachts which voyage down into the Baltic Sea from Norway and 
Sweden in the summer and acquire drugs in continental Europe. However, 
as far as is known, the scope of this traffic is small-scale. 
Therefore, the quantities carried northwards through the strait are 
small and the trade, as a whole, is seasonal. Instead, most of the drug 
smuggling of a maritime nature transpiring across the Oresund Strait 
results from the frequent ferry services between Denmark and Sweden. A
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large amount of the drugs taken across the strait are carried by recrea­
tional users, the hard-core addicts, entrepot traffickers and profes­
sional couriers. A well-known case, reflecting a mix of the two latter 
categories, concerns the British Life Guards Officer convicted of 
transporting 50 kgs. of Moroccan cannabis into Sweden by car and ferry 
from Ibiza.45
In essence, there are many passages and straits through which to 
exit the Caribbean Sea, but the four most prominent, from both the licit 
and illicit perspectives, are the Yucatan Channel, Windward Passage, 
Mona Passage and Anegada Passage. Though the latter one is more 
eastward and thus removed from the general trade flow between North 
America and all points in Central and South America that are within the 
Caribbean, all four straits serve as the most direct and efficient way 
for shipping to voyage northward to ports in the U.S. and Canada and, in 
many instances, to Europe as well. While certainly navigable, the many 
passages between the islands of the Lesser Antilles in the eastern 
Caribbean are basically only used by commercial vessels bound for Europe 
and by private vessels engaged in drug smuggling and employing cir­
cuitous and diversionary routes of shipment. Because a fair amount of 
the maritime traffic in drugs to the U.S. and Canada involves conceal­
ment within legitimate cargo consignments onboard commercial vessels, 
these drug shipments resultantly transit one of these four straits. 
Commercial economics dictates that ships engaged in trade use the most 
direct routes, from a navigational standpoint, unless other factors 
preclude it. Additionally, all private vessels engaged in drug smug­
gling to North America must use the same straits unless they desire to 
traverse one of the circuitous routes. Subsequent investigations into
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many of the drug seizures effected in the southern U.S., its adjacent 
waters and in the Caribbean islands attests to this being the case. Ig­
noring the political and ideological discord and accompanying cynicism 
existent in the region as a result of the Marxist nature of Cuba, it is 
noteworthy to observe that Cuba reports a high incidence of drug traf­
ficking via its adjacent straits. Between 1970 - 1986 Cuba seized 250 
m.ts. of marijuana, 1 ton of cocaine, 735,000 qualude pills, 147,000 
dilaudid pills along with 63 vessels and 20 aircraft.46 In geographical 
terms, the Yucatan Channel is the northwestern exit from the Caribbean 
Sea and leads to the Gulf of Mexico. Formed by the Yucatan Peninsula 
and the western tip of Cuba, it is about 111 n.ms. wide. Situated 1,135 
kms. eastward between the eastern tip of Cuba and Cap-a-Foux, Haiti, 
Windward Passage is 45 n.ms. wide and leads to Old Bahama Channel and, 
via channels in the Bahamian archipelago and Turks and Caicos Islands, 
to the Atlantic Ocean. Across Hispaniola to the east, Mona Passage is 
the 33 n.m.-strait between the Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico. It 
leads directly to the Atlantic Ocean and is frequently traversed by
ships bound for ports in the Mid-Atlantic and New England states of the
U.S.A., Canada and northern Europe. The Anegada Passage is 48 n.ms. 
wide and situated between the British Virgin Islands and Anguilla. It 
also leads into the open Atlantic Ocean. Though no figures can be given
for the quantities of drugs trafficked, chiefly cannabis, cocaine and
minor amounts of psychotropic substances, it is neither far-fetched nor 
ludicrous to presume that some of the highest densities of drug smug­
gling in the world occur via these straits.
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4.1*5 The Role Of Commercial Shipping Routes
Inherent in the analysis so far and referred to frequently is the 
role which shipping routes play in the maritime drug trade. It cannot 
be underemphasized that both the character and extensiveness of maritime 
commerce today provides a massive pre-existing network of transportation 
units and routes by which to smuggle drugs. Because conmerce is essen­
tial to the basic welfare of states and their societies, at least in 
economic terms, it must and will occur. As demonstrated, validated and 
reinforced over centuries of occurrence, smuggling in general is a vi­
able method of exporting, transporting and importing commodities which 
are deemed illicit for whatever reasons so declared. Smuggling of il­
licit goods concealed within legitimate cargo consignments is a time- 
tested activity and, in several instances, virtually an industry in its 
own right. Depending on the source, somewhere between 81% - 99% of
world trade by volume and 80% by value moves by sea.47 Concomitantly, 
an extensive trade network envelops the globe composed of singular trade 
routes and regional trade matrices which provide a myriad of readily 
available and easily penetrable conduits by which to smuggle drugs. 
However, the spatial disequilibrium in endowment of resources and com­
modities throughout the world and the divergent but fixed locations of 
suppliers and consumers establishes shipping routes which are not 
egalitarian in usage. Furthermore, the global arrangement of land and 
sea as modified by man dictates the geographic distribution and struc­
ture of the shipping routes. The resulting variations in density of 
shipping traffic and volume commensurately affects the structure of the 
maritime drug trade. Where an expedient and heavily utilized shipping 
route coincides with the flow path of a given drug, it will be exploited
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by drug traffickers. The volumetric ratio of a drug moving via the com­
mercial shipping route will, relative to other transport modes, be 
higher. Conversely, another given shipping route of either lesser 
utilization or involving inappropriate cargoes (not suited for conceal­
ing drugs) or not providing a suitable link to the consumption states 
will generally see a lesser proportion of the drug being shipped on com­
mercial vessels. The underlying proposition to the point presented here 
is that there is a certain constancy to some of the factors which deter­
mine the transport structure of a given drug trade while other factors 
function as variables. Analogous to the scientific experiment or 
trigonometric equation where the magnitude of a variable distorts the 
balance or influence of the other factors, the same applies here though 
the factors involved are not quantitative nor readily measurable. The 
aspect of availability of commercial shipping routes falls into the 
category of a variable. Hence, where it is significant and factored 
into the ’equation’, the magnitude of its role increases the share of 
the overall drug trade conducted via that mode at the expense of select 
other modes. Of course, in reality, no such conscious analysis built 
along these lines occurs. Rather, this is merely a technical explana­
tion of a natural but subliminal phenomenon. The basis for incorporat­
ing an appropriate and busy shipping route into the drug trade is two­
fold. Imprimis, the high volume of traffic on the route provides a con­
stant flow of cargoes and ships within which to transport drugs. 
Secondly, the high volume of traffic to certain destinations invariably 
means that the receiving port or ports are operating at, or near, 
capacity and, as a result, the port officials are frequently hardpressed 
to maintain effective control over all incoming cargo. Therefore, the
possibilities for cursory searches and general laxness in control are 
enhanced and the chances of illicit cargo consignments getting through 
are increased. An incidental facet of a busy sea route is the in­
evitable presence of many other vessels and craft along the route. 
These vessels are either local traders or service-related vessels. Con­
ducting a trafficking operation involving similar vessels becomes at­
tractive because they blend into the scene and their presence would not 
be immediately queried. Elaborate smuggling schemes can be set up in­
volving both the commercial shipping sector and the latter group on the 
shipping route. An example of a heavily travelled route which evidences 
the points just made is the one between northern Europe and ports in the 
Middle East and southern Asia incorporating the Mediterranean Sea and 
Suez Canal.
The reverse dimension involving shipping routes that are not 
heavily used also impacts on the structure of the maritime drug trade. 
For consumption areas situated along or serviced by shipping routes of 
lower traffic density or inappropriate cargos yet better served, in drug 
trafficking terms, by seaborne modes of transport, the smugglers adjust 
for the lacking conduit by implementing and utilizing local craft and 
privately chartered vessels. The private and covert sector of maritime 
drug trafficking compensates and complements the commercial sector and 
consequently either rivals or dominates, in terms of proportion of 
carriage, the maritime component of a given drug route. The regional 
drug trades in Southeast Asian waters and in the Caribbean Basin are 
moderately valid examples. In both cases, there is heavy traffic 
through the regions by commercial shipping, but within the regions it is 
considerably less. This is because many of the states concerned lack
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sufficient trade volumes to sustain higher magnitudes of commercial 
traffic. Therefore, a large segment of the maritime component of the 
drug trade in these regions relies on both local trading and private 
vessels for the carriage of drugs by sea. However, it should not be 
construed that the non-maritime modes of drug transport may not account 
for the majority share of drugs trafficked on that given route. 
Obviously, where a lack of feasible and profitable maritime modes of 
transport exist, the smugglers will resort to other modes of conveyance.
4•2 The Microscopic Perspective
The bases for maritime drug trafficking being such a viable en­
terprise are four fundamental yet, from the pragmatic perspective of law 
enforcement, neglected aspects concerning the maritime medium. The 
physical nature of the sea in general as a medium on which to transport 
commodities is patent and similarly its conduciveness to smuggling ap­
pears obvious and is taken at face value. Regrettably, in real terms 
the extent of diversity and complexity which the sea grants smugglers is 
virtually limitless. It is this point which is not appreciated out of 
ignorance. Secondly, while exoteric to the seafarer, smuggler and cus­
toms officer engaged in rummages but ignored by everybody else is the 
structural intricacy of vessels. Both ships and boats along with the 
cargoes themselves present a unique and most opportune mechanism by 
which to smuggle drugs. Thirdly, the physical morphology of ports and 
all the concomitant infrastructure therein, maritime activity and sur­
rounding urbanization promotes their suitability for illicit activities. 
The very essence of a port and that which makes it such simultaneously 
nurtures smuggling both incidentally, as a natural but ancillary by­
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product of commerce, and intentionally, by traffickers seeking to capi­
talize on vulnerability factors. The problematic dimension posed by 
free trade zones in respect to drugs is subsumed under ports because of 
their physical presence therein. Lastly, the coastal geography of any 
given state*s littoral zone can either pre-empt or complement the drug 
traffic occurring via its ports. The desolation yet physical 
suitability of select coastal areas provide attractive inducements for 
conducting clandestine drug importations or exportations. These four 
elements are of the microscopic level because of their intrinsic, sin­
gular or confined dimensions* They are the core of the maritime drug 
trade and their significance is the crux of the premise for this study. 
It is either the lack of recognition and understanding of these aspects 
or casual and superficial acknowledgement of them by individuals in 
government, in law enforcement and in policy-making which nurtures the 
maritime drug trade. The U.S. has of late woken up to the importance of 
these aspects. Lamentably, in their rush to institute control programs 
they have promulgated policies and actions which are a waste of effort 
and time and are cost-ineffective - when viewed from the results ob­
tained compared to resources input. The "zero-tolerance” policy intro­
duced by the US Customs Service in 1988 and the US Coast Guard’s program 
of port blockades are laudable but ill-conceived examples.48 To 
punctuate the point about their significance, it is worth observing that 
these aspects exemplify, positively or negatively, the real and physical 
components of the Mahanian doctrine as modified by Craven. Notably, the 
2nd, 3rd and 6th principles are exemplified by the physical attributes 
while the point about lack of cognizance or respect of these aspects is 
the perjorative manifestation of the 4th principle. Simply put, without
a susceptible land/sea interface and conducive transport mode there 
would be no maritime drug trafficking. For those states of an insular 
form the argument advanced here is most applicable. Based on parliamen­
tary debate over employing the armed forces to combat drug smuggling it 
appears the U.K. accepts the concept.49
4,2.1 The Maritime Medium
The fluid nature of the sea with a specific density which permits 
vessels with impermeable hulls to ride on the surface prefaces all no­
tions of waterborne commerce. The sea surface serves as a homogeneous 
medium by which a vessel can travel from one given land/sea interface 
point to another such point - allowing for coastal configurations and 
bathymetry. The pervasive extent of the oceans and all their adjunct 
water bodies provides a uniform medium of connectivity throughout the 
world. Discounting the effects of the weather, the moon and geostrophic 
forces, the sea is level and of a constant elevation (called sea level). 
In essence, innumerable routes exist; the only limitations being 
economics and prudent navigation. Consequently, ships have the greatest 
latitude in selecting a course. Though ships and all other vessels, ir­
respective of how small, are relatively slow compared to other modem 
transport modes, they are not affected by land morphology, gradients and 
inclines or atmospheric constraints imposed by technical requirements of 
lift, velocity and pressurization. The combination of slowness in 
speed, being at sea level and being readily intercepted by other vessels 
and craft which either ride the sea or fly through the lower atmosphere 
promotes shipping's role as a smuggling conduit. It is very easy for a 
small boat or fishing vessel to rendez-vous with a ship and transfer a
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drug consignment or for the traffickers to conceal their cargo within 
the sea. The latter is achieved by placing the drugs within water-proof 
containers which are weighted and submerged into the sea to rest on the 
seabed. The location of the submerged drug consignment is established 
by a tethered surface-floating marker and retrieval is simply effected 
by hauling up the line. Aside from other vessels which may be in the 
given area and the horizontal proximity of the coast, the sites of such 
drug trans-shipment points (which effectively is what they Eire) are es­
sentially isolated. There has been no colonization or urbanization of 
the sea and the combined dimensions of depth, weight and quantum of 
water in the water column over the site are certainly isolating factors 
- at least in terms of visibility and open detectibility. In 
comparison, it should be observed that a modem jet travelling at high 
altitude cannot be intercepted for the purposes of transferring or dis­
charging drug cargoes. Simply put, nobody walks on or off an aircraft 
flying at 10,000 - 12,000 meters altitude with a speed of 800 - 900 kms. 
per hour. The same analogy applies for a train moving along at 100 -
200 kms. per hour on a set track. In neither case are the mediums (air 
and rail) receptive to ready diversions or interceptions.
4,2,2 The Nature Of Ships And Boats
In the preceding section inferences were made about the nature of 
a ship and the flexibility of shipping. That which ensues here deals 
mainly with merchant vessels and applies to those which are carrying the 
drugs either unknowingly, or with limited crew participation or, if 
knowingly, as an adjunct activity complementing their normal commerce. 
Ships which are acquired solely for shipping drugs are not encompassed
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by this discussion since presumably their drugs are carried openly in 
the holds and it is not the art of concealment that is being practised. 
Instead, it is the arts of deception and avoidance of detection as a 
whole that are utilized.
From the standpoints of structural design and construction, ships 
are, without doubt, the most intricate transport mode made. They are 
also often the most massive in terms of length, breadth, cubic 
dimension, tonnage and cargo capacity. Comparatively speaking, motor 
vehicles, trains and aircraft are all small with the first two being 
relatively simple while the latter must be labelled as the most complex 
and structurally sound. When vessels are viewed from a distance, as for 
many of us it is how we observe them, they appear to be nothing more 
than a hull and superstructure with variform deck equipment. Inside the 
hull we know there is an engine, fuel tank and, presumably, some cubic 
space set aside for cargo. What is not recognized is the intricacy in 
structure of that vessel under observation and its accompanying 
equipment. In conjunction with its large size these aspects attain 
greater significance since they create innumerable places for concealing 
drugs. The diversity in concealment options is mind-boggling and, from 
the practical point of view of one who must undertake searches of ships, 
impregnable. Basically, drugs can be concealed on a vessel - their 
whereabouts a secret known only to the concealer - and in a hundred 
years they would never be uncovered except by accident or in a 
perscrutation of such an elaborative nature that the vessel is virtually 
being disassembled. Attempting to define every conceivable and viable 
cache for drugs on a ships is senseless. The end result would be noth­
ing more than a voluminous catalogue and is extraneous to the directive
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of this study. Instead, a summary listing some of the more prevalent, 
ingenious and unique places are cited in Table 4.4. All are documented 
cases. It must not be assumed, merely because of the discussion's em­
phasis to within the vessel, that the concealment of drugs is limited to 
onboard or within it. Drugs can be attached to the hull or towed along 
affixed to a chain or line connected to the ship. An example of this 
dates back to 1982 involving a banana ship which called at Cardiff,
Table 4.4 Places And Methods Of Drug Concealment Onboard Ships.
Site And Method of Concealaent._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Data Reference/Source.
- in a tin in propeller shaft tunnel.... . . . . . . . . . . . . . S/NS. 1954/Sun. 4, p. 24.
- in a tin stored in disused ballast tank. . . . . . . . . . . . B/NS. 1354/Sui. 4, p. 24.
- in tins and sacks stashed inside a forced air
draught shaft used for feeding boilers. . . . . . . . . . . . E/NS. 1954/Su b . 4, p. 24.
- inside eapty/non-functioning C02 cylinders. . . . . . . . . . DHD/IH/ 1386/CRP.3, p. 9.
- in 121 packets stashed on cross-aeabers inside the
rudder post tank (access is through a nanhole). . . . . . . B/NS.1954/Sui. 9. p. 14.
■ in sacks hanging on rungs of steel ladder and 
anongst block and tackle stashed inside escape
hatch leading fron engine rooi to deck. . . . . . . . . . . . E/NS. 1957/Sun. 9, p. 7.
- in bags concealed in an opening under a fake valve 
and pipe asseablage which had been constructed for 
concealaent purposes; the entire locale being be­
neath the aetal plate flooring of the engine rooa
(which had to be unscrewed to reveal cache). . . . . . . . . B/NS. 1957/Su b . 9, p. 7.
- inside air vents or pipes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . DND/1H/1986/CBP.3, p. 8.
- in double bottoa (access by aanhole and shaft froa
deck in forepeak). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B/NS. 1954/Su b . 8, p. 24.
- inside paint cans in paint locker. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . DND/IH/1986/CRP.3, p. 8.
- in chain locker. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . personal observation.
- inside or underneath coils of lines in fo'scle.     personal observation.
- in lifeboat (under gunwale). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B/NS. 1953/Sui. 2, p. 3.
- inside pipe joint in a crew toilet. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . DND/IH/ 1986/CRP.3, p. 9.
- on top of wire ducting wherever sufficiently wide. . . . . DND/IB/1986/CEP.3, p. 9.
- in crew neabers’ quarters. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B/NS. 1961 /Sua. 8, p. 6.
- aaong provision stores. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . DND/IH/1986/CBP.3, p. 9.
- inside a sand box. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . DND/IH/1986/CRP.31 p. 9.
Note: UN Doc. DND/IH/1986/CBP.3 (titled Effective Ship Searching And Buaaaging) which 
was prepared by the British Governaent in regard to its colony of Hong Bong
 categorizes 78 diverse places for hiding drugs._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Sources: The UN docuaents as listed and personal experience as a aariner.
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Wales with drugs suspended by chain beneath the vessel.50
An additional aspect of ships and cargo vessels is their ready
capability to transfer drug consignments to other maritime modes of 
conveyance. As cited earlier, ships can voyage freely and be inter­
cepted anywhere by smugglers. This aspect provides diverse pos­
sibilities for organized smuggling involving two or more ships or ves­
sels in a preplanned rendez-vous or sequence of them. It has to be 
borne in mind that the rendez-vous need not require the ship to stop at 
all or the active participation of the entire crew. Instead, it may 
simply involve a motor launch, fishing vessel or yacht briefly coming
alongside a ship at night and the drugs being thrown over to it or, in a
reverse scenario, the drugs being passed to it. Organization on the 
part of the traffickers in their smuggling operation ensures that they 
know which ship to meet, its planned route and expected time of transit 
so as to coordinate the rendez-vous.
4,2,3 The Vulnerability Of Cargoes
Besides the vessels themselves, the other viable method of smug­
gling narcotic and psychotropic substances involves concealing them 
within legitimate cargo consignments. Because shipping accounts for be­
tween 81 - 99% of all commerce, it inherently means that illicit cargoes 
will be carried in maritime trade els well. Marine cargo is considered 
very attractive to drug smugglers for a number of reasons: imprimis, the 
smugglers do not travel with their drug consignments, thus reducing the 
risk of being caught along with their illicit cargoes; secondly, fic­
titious consignees and addresses can be used; thirdly, the extensive 
level of commerce limits search considerations; and fourthly, dockside
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conspiracies become a feasible dimension in landing the drug loads.51 
Furthermore, the variform and diverse cargoes all beg consideration by 
smugglers as caches for concealing drug consignments. Obviously, only 
some cargoes are suitable because either the method of stowage is ap­
propriate or the individual commodities and raw goods being shipped 
present opportune crevices, compartments and hollow spaces in which to 
place drugs. An example of the former are containerized cargoes while 
coffee sacks, machinery and equipment units, which may be either 
containerized, palletized or loose for handling, typify the latter. Ex­
amples of unsuitable cargoes are petroleum products and petrochemicals 
carried in bulk. Though it has been tried, the nature of petroleum 
shipping and cargo handling generally precludes their viability as 
cargoes within which to conceal drugs. Two ancillary factors are that 
many petrochemicals can easily dissolve the liquid-proof containers 
within which drugs may be stored and the fumes of the tank environment 
penetrate virtually anything thus destroying the consumptibility of the 
drugs. The latter situation is analogous to a steak cooked on a bar­
becue grill where too much lighter fluid is used on the charcoals to get 
them glowing such that the meat absorbs lighter fluid taste from the 
fumes released. Many other bulk cargoes such as cement and ores are 
likewise unsuitable even though they are dry cargoes because the cargo 
handling systems (eg. vacuum-suet ion, slurry-conveyors, etc.) do not 
permit or guarantee that the drugs will pass through them unscathed. 
Generally speaking, the cargoes used as caches are dry cargoes carried 
in some unitized form (eg. container, crate, pallet, sack, etc.) and on 
shipping services either of the liner category or steady route charter.
The advent of containerization in the 1960s enhanced the viability
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of smuggling drugs. The basis for its development, namely to facilitate 
the efficiency and expedition in cargo conveyance and flow, and the mass 
explosion in its utilization concomitantly raised the potentiality of 
drugs shipped in containers getting through undetected. Today, their 
limited resources and time allotted for cargo reviews means a majority 
of customs services are unable to undertake the thorough checks of every 
cargo consignment entering the country. The nature of containerization 
involving the stowage of goods, which in many instances can be diverse 
in category, in a confined cubic space with a limited entry means and 
the thousands of containers moving rapidly on the quayside simply does 
not allow for detailed analysis of every container. The additional fac­
tors of some cargoes being perishable or in high demand by the con­
signees necessitates brevity in contemplation of cargo reviews. Lastly, 
the structure of the container itself provides numerous hiding places. 
All of these points have been conceded to by Canada’s Custom and Excise 
service which admits that drug smugglers gain from containerization.52 
Similar conclusions were published in Australia by the Joint Common­
wealth and New South Wales Task Force in their report titled Security Of 
Wharves And Containers.53 Hence, a cargo-search program based on an em­
phasis of target cargoes and random searches frequently will have to 
suffice. The pressure and antagonism which would be incurred from the 
commercial sector as a result of exhaustive and protracted cargo checks 
forces this perspective.
Another dimension of containerization which facilitates drug traf­
ficking is that in free trade zones and trans-shipment ports con­
tainerized cargoes generally are not subject to searches because they 
are in transit. Since they are sealed, the contents are unrevealed
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aside from what the manifest states. This aspect of containerization 
encourages the use of free trade zones and trans-shipment ports (and 
states) in the drug trade. In the cases of palletized and exposed 
cargoes the same holds true but then any drugs shipped would have to be 
concealed within the actual unit or units of cargoes. Because of the 
virtually innumerable types of cargoes and diverse methods of stowage 
and carriage it is beyond the scope of this treatise to list them all. 
Instead Table 4.5 summarizes a select but well documented cross-section 
of cargoes within which drugs have been smuggled.
Table 4.5 Select Examples Of Cargoes Used For Concealing Drugs.
Year Drug 1 Quantity Method of Stowage/Route Data Reference/Source
1950 - Qpiui solution 
[Qty. Unstated]
Within a load of lenons where the naturally-present lenon 
juice had been extracted and opiui solution injected (into 
the U.K.)..... . . . . . . . . UN Doc. B/NS. 1950/Sui. 2, p. 19.
1954 - Opiun
[396.893 kgs.]
Inside biscuit tins labelled as containing graaophone 
records (Egypt to Aden). . . UN Doc. B/NS. 1955/Su b . 3, p. 8.
1954 - Opiua
(523.899 kgs.]
Inside biscuit tins labelled as containing graiophone 
records (Kuwait to Aden)....UN Doc. E/NS. 1955/Sui. 3, p. 9.
1985 - Hethaaphetaaines 
[68 kgs.]
Stuffed in 8 vinylchloride syringes concealed inside wind­
surfing boards (Taiwan to Japan). . . NPA, DPIJ 1986, d . 36.
1985 - Hashish 
[532 kgs.]
Hidden aaong 1, 400 notor lounts Canadian C I S ,  1985 
in 70 cartons of Mercedes Benz Drug Report (Ottawa, 
car parts (India to Canada). . . . . . . . . . 1986), pp. 31-32.
1985 - Hashish 
[590.2 kgs]
Hidden aiongst oranges packed in crates (Cyprus to the
1986 - Hashish 
[337.7 kgs.]
Concealed in 2 guillotine shearing aachines (India to 
Canada).....Canadian C I S ,  1986 Drug Report (1988). p. 39.
1988 - Hashish 
[3.5 l.ts.]
Hidden within 400 sacks of liquorice root (U.S.S.R. to the
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4,2,4 The Character Of Ports
Based on personal observation and experience as a mariner, it ap­
pears that, for the most part, ports represent a unique paradox. On the 
one hand they are, generally speaking, important centers of commerce and 
as such they function as international frontiers for both inbound and 
outbound vessels, cargoes and passengers. To accommodate the port’s 
role there is a concomitant degree of maritime activity, service in­
dustry and physical infrastructure present. Usually, a fair level of 
government-mandated security related to the state’s responsibility for 
border control, customs matters and general safety accompanies the 
port’s operation. However, it is in regard to this latter point that 
the paradox materializes. On the other hand, port security in the form 
of zonal exclusions (to the resident population), efficient security of 
warehouses and stowage areas and sufficient customs officers or other 
law enforcement agents (eg. marine police, national drug agency, etc.) 
is lacking or inadequate in several countries and, in some instances, 
non-existent. In Australia, New Zealand, Portugal and the Scandinavian 
countries anyone can enter the port areas and stand next to a ship 
having arrived from a foreign port - a point ruefully acknowledged by 
the New Zealand Customs Dept. in relation to their ports.54 
Contraposingly, international airports have disproportionately extensive 
and elaborative security systems for what must be considered a highly 
regulated, if not rigid, port infrastructure. Further factors destroy­
ing the capacity for effective port control are the myriad of local ves­
sels and craft present within the port and the localized marine 
geography. Bunker barges and tankers, launches, lighters, pilot boats, 
supply tenders, tugboats and patrol craft are all common vessels with
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bonafide reasons for being present on the waters of the port and coining 
alongside ships either at anchor, dockside or navigating through the 
port. It does not take much imagination to devise smuggling schemes 
predicated on the beneficial presence of these service vessels. Tug­
boats are an example. Large ships, particularly foreign ones, usually 
need or utilize tugboats for docking and undocking. The tugboats came 
alongside positioning or securing themselves against the ship, either 
inside or outside the port area, before the vessel has reached berth and 
awaiting officialdom. There is nothing to prevent a crew member from 
passing a package of drugs to the tugboat. The ship's officers and at­
tendant pilots are preoccupied with navigational matters and fellow crew 
members are either busy, elsewhere, involved or ambivalent thus negating 
the likelihood of such a transaction being seen or reported. This 
scenario, with minor modifications, applies to any of the other 
categories of service vessels. The setting of the port and the physical 
geography of the circumjacent area generally determine its utilization 
in drug smuggling involving private parties. The ubiety of yacht 
harbours, fishing industries, abandoned piers and warehouses and shallow 
bathymetry all grant the trafficking operation diverse avenues for land­
ing drugs in a port. Yachts and fishing vessels can readily cone 
alongside a ship momentarily and procure a drug shipment. 
Alternatively, the drug package may be thrown over the side in a buoyant 
water-proof container and retrieved by a boat which has been hovering 
nearby. Another version involves heaving the drug parcel over the side 
while the ship transits the port and sinking it to the seafloor with a 
small buoy marking its resting place. The drug consignment is sub­
sequently retrieved by boat. A kaleidoscope of slight variations to
these three scenarios exist which, with a little fine tuning, ensure 
successful drug importations. The physical morphology of a port creates 
a land/sea interface of diverse but vulnerable dimensions. The circum- 
jacent littoral zone is variform in nature ranging from sandy beaches to 
garbage-strewn marshes to solid cement and steel docks to decaying 
finger piers and rotted pilings. The juxtapositional onshore zone is of 
a complementary nature ranging from farmland leas to parks to mass urban 
dwellings to storage terminals, refineries, tank farms, bulk cargo 
depots, shipyards, gutted warehouses and crumbling freight-handling 
facilities; all of which may be interspersed and unsystematic in their 
distribution. In relation to an active trafficking operation, these en­
virons benefit the smugglers by providing them with variform poten­
tialities and options for landing drugs which are unobtrusive and 
unguarded.
Many modern ports employ a combination of radar, real-time camera 
monitors and patrol craft to protect their waterways and borders. 
However, as anyone working in a harbour-related industry cam attest to, 
these devices all have shortcomings and limitations to their efficacy. 
Radars, commonly used for vessel traffic control, cannot "see” behind 
hills, massive and tall buildings or ships. There is, so to speak, a 
lee side to objects where radar is blind. Furthermore, most objects 
simply appear as dots or blips on the * scope* hence, there is no way to 
determine the legitimacy of every vessel observed by radar. Under cer­
tain meteorological conditions (eg. hail, rain and snow storms) radar 
temporarily loses the capacity to detect anything. Monitoring cameras 
have limited value because they are in fixed locations and confined to 
the direction or breadth of field (if oscillating) to which the lens
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points. Once again, inclement weather impairs their effectiveness 
(especially fog and mist). Even if perfectly functional, the issue of 
interpretation of a scene on the monitor which is illicit or incongruous 
in nature is dubious. A viewer (in this instance a customs or drug 
agent) could see a bustle or lack of activity in certain areas of the 
port and never see anything out of the ordinary. An innocuous-looking 
speedboat could sneak up alongside a ship on the camera-blind side (the 
side of the ship away from the camera). Even if the transference of a 
suspicious object is observed the question hinges on the response time 
of patrol craft or of catching up with the ’drug* boat before it 
vanishes and disposes of the drug consignment by either passing it to 
another boat, disappearing in amongst old docks and terminals, landing 
the drug shipment or sinking it. Generally, in law, the burden of prov­
ing an offence lies with the state (prosecution) and requires that 
evidence be presented proving the observed "object(s)” were drugs. This 
is very difficult to do if no drugs have been seized. Patrol craft are 
of value, but only if they are continually present. For most states 
where government expenditures are a paramount issue to the population, 
it is difficult to maintain an extravagant patrol program which permits 
a constant vigilance throughout the port. The capital costs incurred, 
along with the perennial expenses of operation, frequently are prohibi­
tive compared to the financial resources allocated for such security 
programs. Hence, something less than adequate is settled for. Though 
pessimistic in nature, all these negatory points reflect reality and 
must be accepted as such.
One further contributing dimension involves the numerous personnel 
serving in an official capacity or possessing authorization for being
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present on the wharves. Contrary to the desired but idealistic notion 
of scrupulosity aspired for in human behaviour and endeavour, an element 
of dishonesty and larceny exists in some individuals. As documented in 
criminal history, nowhere has the manifestation of corruptibility been 
more evident than on the docks. Ports have been the setting for some of 
the most blatant forms of illicit activity running the gamut from sin­
gular crimes to organized but small-time smuggling networks to fully in­
tegrated criminal enterprises. Among the diverse personnel exposed to 
such opportunities are the cargo-handling agents, consignees, customs 
officers, freight forwarders, immigration officers, longshoremen, port 
police, seamen, security guards, ship chandlers, shipping agents and 
truckers. The ready and legitimate access these individuals have to 
ships provides an easy conduit by which drugs can be taken ashore with 
little interference. Several cases abound but one of the better ex­
amples involves an anti-piracy guard.55 Because thievery was a common 
and plaguesome problem for shipping in Singapore in the 1950s, private 
security guards, called anti-piracy squads, were hired to protect ships 
while in port. In this particular case one of the guards was ap­
prehended with 40.123 kgs. of opium onboard his ship. The point to be 
taken here is that the very people entrusted to protect the vessels and 
enforce the law were concurrently engaged in drug trafficking - a situa­
tion that may develop anywhere.
So as not to digress from the subject at hand it has to be recog­
nized that all ports, irrespective of shape, size, location and the 
prevailing political regime, are uniquely different. Any port can be 
conceptualized into a drug smuggler’s "paradise” if one carefully 
analyses the myriad of features and phenomena extant therein. The best,
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albeit indirect, evidence of this point being valid are the large quan­
tities of drugs which are penetrating the ports as documented by the 
magnitudes of states* domestic drug problems. The fact that the ship­
ments got through undetected attests to the ingenuity of the smugglers 
and the vulnerability of the ports.
4,2,5 The Role Of Free Trade Zones
Free trade zones in some form or another have existed for at least 
seven centuries. The ports of the Hanseatic League were proclaimed 
"Free Merchant Cities.”56 Synonyms for the term include export process­
ing zones, foreign trade zones, free ports and free states. Basically, 
all goods and commodities within these exclusion zones are exempt from 
the assessment and imposition of import duties, customs tariffs and 
taxes (of varying forms). Because of the complexities in states* tariff 
structures, with intricate definitions for various goods and variable 
assessment rates which are open to manipulation, free trade zones have 
emerged as a form of extraterritorial refuges for commerce. Generally, 
states which permit the creation of free trade zones do so because of 
the beneficial socio-economic impact such zones have on the area, region 
or state in which located.
Drug trafficking through free trade zones is well documented. 
Free ports like Salonica, Greece and free states like Hong Kong and Sin­
gapore have all recorded drug seizures. Though literature on the sub­
ject is poor, the significance of this aspect has not been lost. In the 
1920s and 1930s the subject of free ports was frequently discussed by 
the Opium Advisory Committee. Hie International Convention Relating To 
Dangerous Drugs of 1925 reflected the signatories concern over the con­
duciveness of free ports to drug smuggling by including a provision 
requiring contracting states to adopt sound control measures therein.57 
The CCC, DND and INTERPOL have all dealt with and discussed this subject 
in their conferences, working groups and published reports. The treaty 
on drug trafficking concluded in 1988 fully recognizes the threat by in­
cluding a specific provision (Art. 18) encompassing free trade zones.58 
The problem from the smuggling perspective is that, while free trade 
zones are heavily controlled on their perimeters, their internal areas 
are left relatively unregulated; the philosophy being that it is not of 
relevance or threat to the domestic security or welfare of the state. 
Hence, within the free trade zones most cargoes are left alone, par­
ticularly if sealed. This is not to say that cargo invoices and 
manifests are not reviewed and that some items are not verified, but in- 
depth scrutiny is rare. The DND’s Air & Sea Group have been strong 
proponents for increased surveillance measures being implemented in free 
trade zones because of the latter’s utilization by traffickers seeking 
to elude detection of their drug shipments.59 Nor should it be con­
strued that free trade zones are drug enclaves within which drugs are 
exempt from confiscation. Illicit goods, sp)ecifically those possessing 
a criminal character, remain prohibited within free trade zones. There 
are two components of a free trade zone which are most vulnerable to 
drug trafficking. The first is its role as a trans-shipment site. The 
other susceptible dimension centers on the conspiratorial possibilities 
for smuggling drugs across the perimeter, either into or out of the host 
state. In the U.S. it is believed to be a very real option. Analogous 
to the potentiality for criminal activities involving port personnel, 
the same scenario exists with free trade zones. Basically, there is
nothing to prohibit the operators of a zone or the employees therein 
from engaging in smuggling activities. Table 4.6 provides a listing of 
OECD states with free trade zones in their seaports.
Table 4.6 Select Seaports In The OECD States With Free Trade Zones.
Canada (Cape Breton Island)
Denmark (Copenhagen)
France (Bayonne, Bordeaux, Dunkerque, La 
Rochelle, Le Havre and Marseille)
Greece (Salonica)
Italy (Trieste)
Netherlands (None, but has bonded warehouses)
Spain (Not on mainland but the Canary Islands 
and Ceuta and Melilla in North Africa.)
Turkey (Adana-Yumurtalik, Antalya, Izmir- 
Nemrut and Mersin.)
U.K. (Cardiff, Liverpool and Southampton)
U.S.A. (Baltimore, Boston, Galveston, Honolulu, Lake Charles, Miami, 
New Orleans, New York, Oakland, Philadelphia, Portland, San 
Francisco, Savannah, and Seattle sure a few examples of many.) 
W. Germany (Bremen and Hamburg)
Australia (None) 
Belgium (None) 
Finland (None) 
Iceland (None) 
Ireland (None) 
Japan (None)
New Zealand (None) 
Norway (None) 
Portugal (None) 
Sweden (None)
4.2,6 The Susceptibility Of Coastal Zones And Waters
Virtually all coastal states with a land/sea interface propor­
tional to their areal expanse commensurately possess stretches of 
coastline which are relatively isolated. The variable coastline with 
select areas seeing a concentration of infrastructure and population and 
other areas lacking or devoid of such urbanization is a by-product of 
geography, nature and human enterprise. Geographical factors respon­
sible for such a land-use pattern include the physiographic configura­
tion of the coast, the onshore morphology and topography and the 
presence of nearshore islands. The location and position of bays, 
coves, inlets, fjords, deltas, estuaries, river mouths, channels, pas­
sages and straits in relation to the degree of shelter they offer or
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their opportune proximity all serve as magnets or disincentives for 
urbanization. The topography and stability of the adjacent land in 
terms of hospitableness and adaptiveness for settlement conjunctly serve 
as determinants for urbanization. The natural factors with a regulatory 
effect include the prevailing climatic, meteorological and oceanographic 
phenomena and the degree to which they are hostile to localized maritime 
activities. The adaptability of a coastal site or its proximity to 
commerce, industry and other economic activities by which society sus­
tains itself is a primordial factor for the development of select coas­
tal areas. Collectively viewed, the composite of isolated, rural and 
urban coastal areas presents a pattern of inequitable coastline frontage 
and usage. Because every state -is uniquely different, any truly com­
prehensive review should look at each state individually. However, in 
relation to drug trafficking, there are certain common attributes either 
applicable to them all or generic in nature which are the emphasis here.
Generally speaking, a drug trafficking operation utilizing a deso­
late coastal area is clandestine in character and predicated on either a 
mothership operation or direct covert importation by fishing vessels and 
yachts. Coastal drug importations involve private boats and chartered 
vessels and not, for the most part, the merchant sector. The most 
recent trend has been for smugglers to "order specially designed 
vessels" which allows "thorn to transport greater quantities of drugs by 
sea with less risk of detection" and enables them "to take maximum ad­
vantage of long and sparsely-populated coastlines or remote and almost 
uninhabited islands."60 This is not to say that commercial carriers may 
not be involved at all, but rather the preponderance of cases indicate 
their role to be secondary. Where the latter are utilized, they are
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usually serving in the mothership capacity. The variable and, in some 
instances, temporal attributes of the remote coastal zone which are 
being capitalized on by drug smugglers include the lack of observers and 
detection devices, the suitable shorelines for landings, the conducive­
ness of meteorological and oceanographic conditions and the daily vacil­
lation in solar illumination. The impact or importance these attributes 
have in determining whether to conduct a smuggling operation can be 
singular, collective or ephemeral in nature. A desolate and unguarded 
coast with a benign or advantageous morphology is an attractive site to 
land drugs from the sea because the likelihood of detection and ap­
prehension is considerably reduced. In the event an ongoing operation 
is detected there is a fair chance the smugglers can either elude or es- 
cape their pursuers because of the remoteness of the coastal area. The 
distance from a large settlement or support base from which reinforce­
ments must travel gives the smugglers time to either complete their 
operation, abort it and flee to sea or rid themselves of the drug 
consignment. Concomitant with the desolate coast is the fact that off­
shore waters may be less frequently traversed and therefore suitable for 
mothership operations. A mothership operation involves two or more 
vessels. The first vessel transports a drug load from wherever it is 
obtained to the waters off the state to which it is destined. There, it 
is transferred to a second vessel (and perhaps others) which assumes the 
task of physically landing the drugs within the state. The coastal 
waters off a desolate coastline permit the transference of a drug ship>- 
ment much closer to shore because of the reduced risk of land-based 
detection and, presumably, marine patrols are less frequent. Coastal 
sites frequently used for direct clandestine importations include the
Algarve in Portugal, the southern coastline of Spain, the westcoast of 
the U.K. and the gulf coast of the U.S.A. Coastal areas noted for off­
shore mothership operations include the eastern seaboard of the U.S. and 
Canada. A more ingenious but variant version of the mothership opera­
tion entails using the seabed and capitalizing on the presence of a 
fishing industry either commercial or recreational in character. In­
stead of the two vessels meeting the mothership sinks their drug cargo 
to the seafloor inside of water-proof containers. A buoy, connected by 
line to the sunken shipment, is deployed to mark the site of its resting 
place. At any time thereafter an innocuous-looking vessel comes out and 
retrieves the drug consignment though outwardly pretending to be hauling 
up 'shellfish traps*. The latest trend has been to deploy transponders 
on the seafloor with the sunken drug shipments thus eliminating the need 
for surface markers.61
When referring to the conduciveness of weather and sea conditions 
and fluctuation in daylight it is their negative elements which are 
deemed desirable. Within the milieu of these three factors are certain 
phenomena which, when they occur, obscure the surroundings of the coas­
tal environs thus making detection and apprehension difficult. Among 
these phenomena are fog, mist, rainstorms, blizzards, night-time and 
select sea conditions. Whenever these conditions arise either in­
dividually or in tandem, they either severely impair or prevent 
visibility. Spotter aircraft, patrol vessels and satellites all become 
functionally useless. Radar, which is the only viable equipment for 
detection during these conditions may also be hampered or unable to 
’see* anything. Even if it is functional it cannot segregate a drug- 
laden vessel from another ’legitimate* vessel. To have patrol craft
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checking every vessel image on the radar scope is an ineffective method 
of patrol. For drug smugglers with an organized operation and * state- 
of-the-art’ navigational equipment, the prevalency and occurrence of 
these natural phenomena is most beneficial. With good navigation and, 
if necessary, coded conversation by radio pre-established geographic 
coordinates for a rendez-vous either at sea or along the. coast sure 
easily found. Though undesirable for effecting the transfer of drug * 
loads at sea or when physically landing such consignments on exposed 
shores, certain sea conditions offer a physical or psychological cloak­
ing to such smuggling operations. Without elaborating upon the tech­
nical aspects which allows the physical condition to be possible, let it 
be said that in certain instances- the structure of a vessel above the 
waterline in relation to the height of select sea states is of such 
position that it presents no satisfactory reflective surface thus 
preventing a proper reflection of incoming radar waves. For this to 
occur, the sea state must consist of swell with a wave length and wave 
height which in relation to the vessel’s hull and superstructure are 
sufficiently large so as to shield the vessel from the radar waves, thus 
creating the illusion that nothing is there. The technical invisibility 
results because the turbulence and distortion of the sea surface 
prevents transmitted radar waves from detecting the vessel (ie. the ves­
sel is below the radar’s "line of sight"). Obviously, there are inter­
mittent moments when a vessel riding through such a sea will ride high 
in the water and thus above its ’shield* so that it is visible to radar. 
However, the irregular but constant ’up and down* motion of the vessel 
creates a fragmented trace. If the timing of the vessel’s ’up’ periods 
coincides with the time period between sweeps by the radar rather
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frequently, then the trace is even more disjointed. Vessels conducive 
to the phenomenon are generally small with low freeboard and few abrupt 
angular surfaces above the deck. The psychological aspect results from 
the collective assumptions in many peoples* minds that nobody in their 
right mind would be out on the sea during certain inclement sea 
conditions. Hence, patrols are curtailed, minimized or stopped and at­
tention to surveillance and detection equipment is reduced. Though con­
ducting a smuggling operation in rough weather is dicey, it is not im­
possible and for those competent in the ways of the sea it is a matter 
of routine. The important dimension of the preceding discussion con­
cerns the degree of relativity entwined in the factors cited. In order 
for many of the points noted to have validity, a proportionality and 
timeliness in their application, manifestation and occurrence is 
required. Though this dimension is a real and essential component of 
smuggling, it involves intangible factors beyond control. Because of 
the many variations possible concerning the actual methods employed to 
land drugs and the advantageous conditions in which to conduct smuggling 
operations, it is futile to describe them all. In essence, there are no 
limitations to drug smuggling involving the desolate coastline except 
the limits of one*s imagination and equipment available. That this 
point is valid is readily evidenced by all the drugs which are present 
within a state and which, in many cases, are known to have entered by 
sea. It should be recognized that the reverse scenario is just as 
plausible with drugs being exported from the coastline. In this case 
aircraft can play a role by bringing the drug loads out to ships and 
dropping it to them - a scenario which has been tried and proven.62
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V. THE MARITIME DRUG TRADE TODAY.
5.1 The Global Overview
The trafficking of drugs by sea in the 1980s has reached a level 
unprecedented in the history of the activity. Moreover, when analysed 
on a volume per annum basis the illicit drug trade of today far exceeds 
the quantities of opium shipped by sea annually during the heyday of the 
latter*s trade. The point being emphasized is that in the later part of 
the 19*h century the opium trade possessed legitimacy albeit contrived 
thus negating the need for smuggling. Commensurately, a voluminous flow 
was to be expected. In contrast, the drug trade today is illicit yet it 
exceeds the levels found in the ’free-flow* period. As Table 5.1 shows, 
the total quantity of drugs seized from the maritime sector in the 
period 1980 - 1986 exceeds 14,300 m.ts. Concomitantly, a survey of the 
coastal OECD states indicates that only between 8 - 12% of the total 
volume of illicit drugs being trafficked are seized inclusive of the 
maritime component of the drug trade.1 To be fair, this statement is 
sweeping in scope and ignores the categorical variations and divergences 
extant in frontier control and law enforcement effectiveness. For 
example, the seizure of cannabis (all forms and types) overall is 
believed to be greater in ratio thus favouring the higher end of the 
percentage range given. A range rather commonly suggested for cannabis 
alone is 10 - 17% overall. Consequently, this figure offsets the lower 
seizure ratios often noted for cocaine, heroin and select psychotropic
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Table 5.1 Maritime Drug Seizures In The World, 1980 - 1986.
Drug Type Quantity (kgs.) Drug Type Quantity (kgs.)
Cannabis....
Cocaine.....
Heroin......
Morphine....
Opium......
.14,338,509.533 Amphetamines.
Diazepam....
Methaqualone. 
Stimulants... 
Others......
TOTAL 14.394.530.164
Source: Crude data comDiled from DND drug summaries and then 
verified/modified according to national statistics.
substances. Additionally, because of enforcement efforts and geography 
some states believe they sustain a higher interdiction rate while other 
states project the figure as lower. A clear example of the former is 
the U.K. which estimates a seizure ratio of 10 - 20% of all drugs bound 
therein with cannabis and heroin topping the high side of the range.2 
Conversely, Finland notes that their success in interdiction is con­
siderably less and holds to a figure of 3 - 5% overall both for itself 
and globally.3 Table 5.2 lists seizure percentages for the various OECD 
states where known or offered. To culminate this particular discussion 
and establish the validity of the opening remarks of this chapter all 
that is required is some informal extrapolation of the facts and 
figures. For the sake of simplicity it is observed that the quantity of 
drugs seized annually from the maritime sector averages just over 2,050 
m.ts. In comparison to the annual volumes of opium shipped in the mid 
to late 1800s, as evidenced in Table 2.1, it is seen that the 1980s 
figure is comparable. However, the modem figure (2,050 m.ts.) must 
then be placed in proper perspective by equating it to the interdiction 
ratio. Resultantly, extrapolation prompts the realization that the ac­
tual quantity of drugs moving today inclusive of the seaborne mode is 
between 8.3 - 12.5 times greater than the volume observed at any given
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Table 5.2 Drug Seizure Ratios Amongst The OECD States.
Australia 5 - 1 0 % Netherlands 10%
Belgium Unknown New Zealand 10%
Canada stated els small Norway 10 - 15%
Denmark N/A Portugal N/A
European Parliament <5% Spain N/A
Finland 3 - 5 % Sweden N/A
France Unknown Turkey N/A
Greece 5 - 9 % U.K. (Overall) 10 - 20%
Iceland 1 - 5% (Cocaine) 10%
Ireland Unknown U.S.A. (Cannabis) 11%
INTERPOL 5 - 15% (Cocaine) 18 - 20%
Italy N/A W. Germany N/A
Japan (Stimulants) 3 - 5 %
Notes: Unknown - means the figure is stated as not known and 
nor is anyone prepared to offer such a figure.
N/A - means that the author was unable to find the 
figure but that a figure may exist.
Source: All percentage figures and ranges obtained in inter­
views and surveys or extracted from national reports.
time currently and between 3 - 1 5  times greater than the volume observed 
in the old opium trade. To be fair, it can be argued that the popula­
tion base into which illicit drugs may permeate is considerably larger,
but that alone does not account for the volumetric increase in drugs 
trafficked, particularly in light of the advanced control mechanisms ex­
tant today.
One of the interesting but not surprising aspects of the maritime
drug trade is that it adheres to some of the same fundamental principles
governing legitimate commerce and shipping economics. Similar to the 
segregation made between bulk and precious commodities one observes a 
congruous distinction made between drug categories. Cannabis is a bulk 
commodity analogous to that of crude oil or grain. It has a low 
unitized value. In order for transportation costs to be recovered and 
profit realized, a comparatively large quantity of it must be shipped at 
one time. This is particularly true when the clandestine modes of con­
242
veyance are to be employed. Conversely, cocaine, heroin and most 
psychotropic substances are precious commodities analogous to that of 
jewellery or stereo equipment. They have high unitized values. 
Therefore, only a relatively small quantity of them need be shipped to 
cover transportation costs and guarantee profit. This distinction be­
tween the drug categories is very important because, to a fair extent, 
it determines the transport modes utilized by drug smugglers in shipping 
their consignments. Moreover, it also dictates the levels of risk the 
traffickers are willing to bear. In the analysis that ensues this 
aspect must be borne in mind because it explains not only the patterns 
observed in the maritime drug trade but also those observed in drug 
trafficking overall.
Of the nearly 14,400 m.ts. of illicit drugs interdicted in the 
maritime sector slightly over 99.6% of the total was cannabis. Out of 
the remaining 0.4% cocaine accounted for the next largest share with 
0.26% followed by methaqualone (0.07%) and then heroin (0.03%). The 
trafficking of morphine by sea continued to decline as did that of 
opium. Contrastingly, the trafficking of psychotropic substances by sea 
grew. In addition to methaqualone, amphetamines and diazepam became 
substances increasingly transported by sea as measured in absolute quan­
tity though their respective percentages remained fractional. In rela­
tion to total seizure figures on the global scale the maritime sector 
accounted for 17.3%. However, when the portion of drugs not found in 
the trafficking stage is discounted the global figure for maritime drug 
seizures by volume jumps to 70%. In general terms, the seizure picture 
of the 1980s is congruous to that depicted for the latter half of the 
1970s. Of the 51 states and territories reporting maritime drug
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seizures in the 1980s the U.S. and the Bahamas continue to maintain 
their respective positions as the top two countries effecting maritime 
drug seizures. Canada, France and the U.K. also sustained their 
prominent positions though there was some reshuffling of their rankings. 
Table 5.3 lists the top 17 states intercepting drugs being trafficked by 
sea; the criterion used for the threshold level above which all states 
and territories are deemed major maritime apprehenders of drugs is 15 
m.ts. for the period given. Unfortunately, the dominant role of can­
nabis in the maritime drug trade distorts the quantitative figures thus 
necessitating a categorical analysis. Resultantly, a clearer picture is 
obtained of the impact and importance of the various substances on 
states involved in the maritime drug trade. A further by-product of
Table 5.3 Principal States Making Maritime Drug Seizures, 1980 - 1986.
State Quantity (kgs.) Percentage Share Cumulative Share
U.S.A. 13,170,729.3 91.5% 91.5%
Bahamas 469,992.1 3.3% 94.8%
Canada 120,956.0 0.8% 95.6%
Thailand 87,097.6 0.6% 96.2%
U.K. 75,217.3 0.5% 96.7%
Egypt 69,848.6 0.5% 97.2%
Netherlands 64,634.0 0.4% 97.6%
Spain 48,332.0 0.3% 97.9%
France 42,404.3 0.3% 98.2%
Belgium 41,800.5 0.3% 98.5%
Cyprus 40,128.9 0.3% 98.8%
Italy 28,578.7 0.2% 99.0%
Greece 22,556.0 0.2% 99.2%
French West Indies 22,330.0 0.2% 99.4%
Pakistan 18,515.5 0.1% 99.5%
Australia 17,686.5 0.1% 99.6%
Turks & Caicos Isl. 15.000.0 0.1% 99.7%
Remaining 34 states
and territories 38.723.0 0.3% 100.0%
Source: Data derived from E/NS. Series for years 19E10 through 1987
and national drug statistics.
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this analysis is that a state’s significance relative to the various 
categories of drugs is defined and, indirectly, its role in the maritime 
drug trade is elicited. Figure 5.1 presents the categorical analysis. 
As is observed, two trends of change have become manifest overall since 
the previous decade. Imprimis, other substances have appeared within 
the maritime drug trade thus increasing the diversity of drugs traf­
ficked by this mode. Secondly, aside from cannabis which adheres to the 
corresponding figure presented for cannabis in the 1970s (see Figure 
2.8) most other drug categories depict alteration ranging from minor to 
major. The pie chart on cocaine trafficking by sea is new. It shows 
the drug to be primarily a North American problem which is fairly ac­
curate of the cocaine trade overall, particularly when viewed in the 
context of the entire decade. Though paucity in data prevented earlier 
presentation of the maritime cocaine trade it can be confidently said 
that the current situation depicted represents a fair change from ear­
lier decades, notably the 1920s through 1940s when the drug was rela­
tively common in the Far East. Unfortunately, because the database ends 
with 1986 and it is only in the latter years (1986, 1987 and 1988) that
cocaine shipments by sea to Europe have dramatically increased, the lat­
ter trend is not quantitatively represented. Undoubtedly, a similar as­
semblage of the data contained herein but inclusive of the later years 
will reflect some change in the percentages and rankings of states af­
fected by the maritime cocaine trade indicative of the expansion of 
cocaine trafficking into Europe. Heroin is the other category worthy of 
specific note due to changes in the trade. As opposed to the pie chart 
presented for the 1970s the current one indicates a shift in the 
maritime trafficking of heroin to the Far East and southern Asia both in
Figure 5.1 Principal States Effecting Maritime Drug Seizures By Drug 
Category.
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percentage and actual quantity. This is not unexpected since the heroin 
scene underwent considerable change in the 1970s. The growth in 
maritime heroin routes now observed reflects the restructuring of the 
production and manufacturing matrix and the efficacy in enforcement ef­
forts by states upon which those routes now impinge. As is seen in the 
pie chart the customary consumer states still appear in the upper rank­
ings though not at the top. Because there is little in the past by 
which the pie charts on the psychotropic substances can be compared the 
only thing that can be said is that they tend to depict those states 
where the respective drugs are a problem or states which commonly serve 
as transit states. In regards to morphine and opium it is interesting 
to observe that the states depicted tend to be those where these drugs 
have been traditionally common. Though speculative, it is reasonable to 
presume that this represents the continuance on the local and regional 
levels of the trade in these substances while heroin is the preferred 
opiate on the global scale.
In volumetric terms, the export of illicit drugs from Colombia, 
Lebanon and the Bahamas occupy a position of unrivalled dominance. The 
outflow of drugs from these three states via the maritime medium has es­
calated dramatically in the 1980s. Cannabis is the principal product 
with Colombia and the Bahamas serving respectively as exporter and mid­
dleman for marijuana while Lebanon exports hashish. Analogous to Figure 
2.9 presented earlier on the maritime trunk routes in operation in the 
1970s Figure 5.2 depicts the parallel picture for the early 1980s. The 
sheer volume of the maritime drug trades of Colombia, Lebanon and the 
Bahamas combined with the constraints placed on graphic portrayal mean 
that only these three states can appear in the diagram. Consequently,
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Figure 5.2 Principal Trunk Routes In The Maritime Drug Trade, 1980-83.
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248
to balance the picture and more fairly depict the true situation Figure 
5.3 is an addendum to Figure 5.2. Figure 5.3 depicts a number of trunk 
routes of lower but still significant orders of magnitude. These routes 
are ones that in terms of volume are below the top three, but which are
relatively important in comparison to the past. To maintain the in­
tegrity of mensuration the scale used is the same as that used in Figure
5.2. As seen in Figure 5.3 export routes emanating from Jamaica,
Mexico, Morocco, West Africa, India and F*akistan are also quite prolific
Figure 5.3 Other Major Trunk Routes In The Maritime Drug Trade, 1980-83.
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and heavily used. However, the dominance of cannabis in the maritime 
drug trade obscures the significance of the other categories of drugs 
along the various routes depicted. To remove this suppression of data 
Figure 5.4 provides a flow analysis of the other drug categories ex­
clusive of cannabis. Hence, the maritime trunk routes of cocaine, 
heroin, morphine and opium are identified. As may be expected, some of 
the principal producing and manufacturing states of the respective drugs 
serve as origin points. The psychotropic substances are excluded from 
this type of analysis because the number of confiscatures effected and 
quantities seized are too sporadic and diverse to form tenable 
conclusions. Based on a combination of intelligence data and extant 
seizure statistics it appears that there is a regular flow, albeit 
small, of amphetamines from the Netherlands to Iceland and the U.K. and 
from Denmark and West Germany to Norway and Sweden collectively. In 
regards to Japan the inflow of amphetamines and methylamphetamines by 
sea from other Far East states has been clearly established. 
Additionally, there appears to be a steady flow of methaqualone across 
the Atlantic Ocean from Europe to North America and from southern Europe 
to Egypt and the Arabian Peninsula as well as from India to the Arabian 
Peninsula and East africa. A similar trend exclusive of the Indian com­
ponent is observed with diazepam. However, in quantitative terms, the 
amounts shipped to the various destinations have been considerably less 
relative to methaqualone. Insufficient data exists to allow definitive 
elaboration on the other substances of the psychotropic category.
In regard to the types of vessels involved in the maritime drug 
trade the fairest maxim that may be offered is to say that virtually 
every conceivable type of craft has been or is being utilized. The dis-
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Figure 5.4 Maritime Trunk Routes For Cocaine, Heroin And Other Opiates.
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cuss ion in the preceding chapter elucidated to a reasonable extent on 
the bases for the transport modes used and methods of concealment and 
deception employed. To recap here, the majority of drug shipments con­
cealed within commercial cargo consignments are generally carried in 
containers. This inherently means that containerships, RO-R0 ships and 
break-bulk freighters modified for partial carriage of containers are 
the vessels commonly used. In the case of mothership operations the 
motherships are frequently old freighters, coastal steamers, offshore 
supply ships, shrimpers, trawlers and other vessels which typically 
range in length from 30 - 100 meters and in tonnage from 100 - 3,000
g.r.t. In many instances they have been bought with the proceeds of 
drug trafficking and registered under a flag-of-convenience. 
Alternatively, they may not show their true flag but a false one simply 
to dissuade suspicion or, in actuality, they may be stateless. In the 
case of the latter predicament it means they have not been properly 
registered. Though the common perception of the maritime industry 
today, particularly in the West, is one of regulations and stringent 
control the reality is far from so. The fact that the Western states do 
maintain relatively strict control over their registered fleets and in­
ternational rule-making organizations like IMO exist does not mean the 
rest of the world follows suit nor that maritime commerce is a regulated 
matter. As was pointedly noted to the author in Greece by the Greek 
Coast Guard ships Eire easily bought and sold and the documentation 
altered.4 Though the shipping industry has experienced a slight im­
provement in recent years, there is still an extensive surplus of ton­
nage extant in the world today. This invariably means there are a num­
ber of desperate owners, lien and mortgage holders and brokers who will
not ask many questions in selling their vessels. Several of the vessels 
put into Lebanon's export trade in illicit drugs were previously idle
tonnage acquired through ship brokerage firms in Piraeus.5 The small
craft which rendez-vous with motherships are generally registered in the 
state to which they are landing the drugs or, in other cases, simply 
lack any registration. This is because the operators have ignored the 
registration requirements of a given state and municipality or their
structural design precludes the need for registration. An example of
the latter are the rubber inflated crafts known as zodiacs which may 
either be carried on the motherships or acquired locally in the state to 
which the drug consignments are destined by the conspirators on the 
receiving end of the trafficking operation. In some marine geographical 
areas ferries are the principal mode of conveyance. Consonant with the 
cultural and technological dichotomy extant in the world the classes of 
ferries used along given transport routes also vary. For example, the 
ferries between continental Europe and Scandinavia and the U.K. are 
sophisticated modern ships of several thousand tons which constitute a 
combination of passenger liner and RO-RO ship. Contrastingly, the 
ferries traversing the Mediterranean Sea between points in North Africa 
and southern Europe are smaller in size and many cannot carry vehicles. 
In the Middle East and Southeast Asia the ferries are, in many cases, 
quite rudimentary in design, accommodation and amenities and the term 
"rust-bucket" is often an applicable definition. On those trafficking 
routes where direct covert importation is the method employed the ves­
sels used are generally small and often either a type of fishing vessel 
or pleasure craft. They vary in technological sophistication and design 
either constituting a "high-tech" powerboat or an old and rusting
trawler or a traditional craft of the region. Among the latter used are 
the dhow, junk and sampan. The dhow is commonly employed in the Arabian 
Sea and Persian Gulf while the latter two craft are frequently used in 
the Gulf of Thailand, South China Sea and adjoining water bodies. The 
use of powerboats has notably emerged in the waters around Florida in 
the U.S. where a specifically designed speedboat called the "Cigarette" 
has evolved. A generic term for elongated, deep-vee racing powerboats 
designed and built in the U.S. the "Cigarette" is being used by drug 
smugglers because of its ability to outrun all other types of vessels.6 
The interesting aspect of this denouement is the resurrection of vessel 
design based on smuggling requirements. Analogous to the evolution of 
the fast clipper ships designed for the opium trade into China in the 
last century the same trend is reoccurring. The best evidence of the 
* smuggler driven’ designing of craft is the latest development in the 
U.S. where the US Customs Service has commissioned the designer of the 
cigarette boat to build a craft for them which can outrun and outperform 
the former. Called "Blue Thunder," these new vessels constitute the 
"state-of-the-art" in maritime counter-smuggling craft.7 However, if 
prior trends are something to go by then it is reasonable to presume 
that the drug smugglers will also acquire the latest craft. 
Alternatively, they may encourage development of something faster and 
better, either directly or indirectly. Because of the diversity in ves­
sels used and techniques of deception employed it is difficult to define 
with any degree of precision the role of various flag states in the 
global drug trade. Further compounding the problem is that several 
states simply do not record the flag of registry of vessels implicated 
in or seized for drug trafficking. However, a reasonable attempt was
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made by the DND in assembling their quarterly summaries on drug seizures 
in the early 1980s to collect information on the flag of registry of 
merchant ships found to be carrying illicit drugs. Based upon that data 
Figure 5.5 provides a fair projection of the degree of involvement of 
various flags of registry. To the extent that it may be accepted Figure
Figure 5.5 Principal Flag States Involved In Drug Trafficking, 1980-83.
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5.5 indicates the continuance of the trends established in the 1970s (as 
seen in Figure 2.10). Both the involvement of a diverse number of 
states and the subdued role of the flags of convenience have been 
sustained. While there have been some losses and gains in the per­
centages of involvement the overall pattern of participation remains 
congruous to that observed in the 1970s. The only major changes have 
been the decline of the British ensign by nearly 40% and the dramatic
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rise of the Pakistani flag nearly eight-fold. Otherwise, the majority 
of other flags depicted represent either a drug producing or consuming 
state, transit state, flag-of-convenience country, major cross-trading 
nation or, in some instances, a combination thereof.
5.2 Maritime Drug Trafficking In The O.E.C.D.
In this section the specific characteristics and dimensions of the 
maritime drug trade relevant to the coastal member states of O.E.C.D. 
are analysed. When examined collectively based on volume the flow pat­
tern for these states is one of net importation. However, within this 
generalized overview anomalies and variations exist. For example, 
Turkey is almost exclusively a maritime exporter of illicit drugs. Den­
mark also appears to be more an exporter from the maritime perspective 
because most drugs enter the country overland or by air, but the portion 
which goes to Norway and Sweden usually goes by sea. In other cases, 
the state in question possess a dual role and appear to be maritime 
transit state. Though the inflow of drugs by sea clearly exceeds out­
flow there is either sufficient volume or constancy in occurrence to the 
export component to warrant labelling the state as a minor maritime ex­
porter or transit state. Among the OECD states exhibiting this trend 
are Australia, Belgium, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Portugal, 
Spain, the U.K. and West Germany. However, because virtually all of 
that which is exported from these states goes on to another OECD state 
there is little alteration to the net importation picture of the OECD 
group collectively. Greece is the aberration in regards to the transit 
role because there is little physical landing of drugs within Greece. 
Instead, the drugs traverse the territorial waters of the country.
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Consequently, while there has been, legally-speaking, territorial intru­
sion by which one can say Greece is a transit state there has not been 
actual terreal incursion. Together, the coastal member states of 
O.E.C.D. accounted for 94.9% of all maritime drug confiscatures in the 
world during the period 1980 - 1986. Table 5.4 provides a comparative 
analysis of individual drug seizures for the period 1982 - 1986. As one 
may deduce, the importation of illicit drugs to OECD states by sea ad­
heres to the global trend with little variation.
Table 5.4 Maritime Drug Seizures Amongst The OECD States, 1982 - 1986.
Country Cannabis Cocaine Heroin Others State Totals
Australia 15,715.5 0 42.0 T 15,757.5
Belgium 40,000.0 66.0 205.0 0 40,271.0
Canada 75,500.8 71.4 34.6 1,254.6 76,861.4
Denmark (m) 37.0 0 0 0 37.0
Finland 2.2 0 T 0.1 2.3
France 36,987.1 47.0 4.1 0 37,038.2
Greece 22,527.0 0 29.0 0 22,556.0
Iceland 19.6 0 0.2 0.5 20.3
Ireland 214.5 0 1.1 T 215.6
Italy 17,837.0 0.1 296.5 25.0 18,158.6
Japan * N/A 0 0 512.7 512.7
Netherlands 64,306.0 59.0 269.0 0 64,634.0
New Zealand 36.7 0 0.6 0.5 37.8
Norway (m) N/A T 0 2.0 2.0
Portugal 10,536.0 0 0 0 10,536.0
Spain 48,129.0 203.0 0 0 48,332.0
Sweden 1,772.0 50.0 0.1 0.1 1,822.2
Turkey 247.4 0 / 0 0 247.4
U.K. 40,000.0 16.1 166.7 11.8 40,194.6
U.S.A. 9,935,926.8 35,501.6 210.2 6.6 9,971,645.2
W. Germany 12.035.0 71.3 41.6 0 12.147.9
OECD Drug
Totals 10.321.829.6 36.085.5 1.300.7 1.813.9 10.361.029.7
Notes: (m) - Minimum figure l - Trace amounts of drugs found
N/A - data not available K - 1986 drug data not included
Source: Bundeskriminalamt, Drug Transports By Sea fDoc. EOll-2]
(Wiesbaden, 1987) p. 7 as verified/modified by national
drug reports of respective OECD states.
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5,2,1 The European Scene
Amongst the 16 European coastal states of O.E.C.D. more than 296.1 
m.ts. of illicit drugs were seized from the maritime sector during the 
period 1982 - 1986. The European group accounted for 2.9% of all
maritime drug seizures by volume within the OECD membership overall for 
that timeframe. Based on seizure cases more than 50% of all drugs bound 
for or moving within Europe when interdicted are being transported via 
the maritime medium. An analysis of the actual methods of carriage show 
that concealment within seafreight accounted for 53% of all maritime 
drug cases in the period 1982 - 1986.® The participation of crew mem­
bers in drug smuggling was the second most prevalent method accounting 
for an additional 21% while yachts were third accounting for 14%.9 Can­
nabis is the drug most extensively trafficked by sea into Europe. Of 
the two principal types of cannabis hashish is more frequently seized in 
Spain with Belgium, France, Greece and the Netherlands being other 
countries often effecting such confiscatures.10 Conversely, nearly 50% 
of all marijuana shipments sire intercepted in the U.K. though the 
largest single seizure (26 m.ts.) was effected in Spain.11 Of the total 
quantity of hashish seized in Europe in the period 1982 - 1986 72% of it 
was smuggled by sea.12 For marijuana the figure is 98% with nearly all 
of it shipped in seafreight.13 Lebanon is the principal source of all 
hashish transported by sea to Europe. During the period noted, it ac­
counted for 64.7% of the total amount.14 Morocco and Pakistan con­
tributed a fair portion of the balance. Contrastingly, 61% of the 
marijuana imported to Europe by sea came from Colombia with Nigeria, 
Ghana and Jamaica providing most of the remainder.15 The transport pic­
ture for heroin is considerably different with the amounts confiscated
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from the seaborne modes being relatively small compared to the amounts 
seized from the airborne and overland components. Italy, the 
Netherlands, Belgium and the U.K. are the principal countries effecting 
maritime seizures of heroin in significant quantities. Together, these 
four states accounted for 92.5% of all the heroin intercepted in the 
course of being imported by sea into Europe during the aforesaid period. 
Based on quantity seized; the larger heroin shipments originated from * 
Afghanistan, Thailand and Pakistan; the latter figuring prominently in 
the number of interdictions by accounting for 66% of all such 
incidents.16 Most of the heroin shipments were concealed in freight. 
However, in terms of number of seizures, it is observed that 63% of all 
confiscatures involved crew members, particularly on ships arriving from 
Pakistan.17 Cocaine, like heroin, is generally concealed within freight 
consignments with minor amounts carried by crew members. Clandestine 
cocaine importation by sea is on the rise as evidenced by the landings 
effected in southwestern England and rise of the Azores as a mid- 
Atlantic transit point.18 The majority of it originates from Colombia. 
Based on quantities interdicted during the period 1982 -1986 Spain was 
the principal destination in Europe for maritime cocaine traffickers.
It accounted for 39.6% of all maritime cocaine confiscatures in Europe.
On a lower but still significant level West Germany, Belgium and the 
Netherlands also figured prominently as European destinations for 
cocaine smuggled by sea. Collectively, they accounted for an additional 
38.3% of all maritime cocaine seizures in the above cited period. Be­
cause maritime drug seizures involving substances other than those just 
discussed are relatively minor, analysis of their confiscature is sub­
sumed within the applicable country sections which now follow.
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Moreover, because the format of analysis used so far diminishes detail, 
disallows the variations between states from being fully defined and 
would become confusingly complex if continued the objective is better 
served by shifting to an individual analysis of each coastal OECD state.
5,2,1.1 The Netherlands .
In the period 1982 - 1986 the Netherlands seized the largest quan­
tity of illicit drugs from the maritime sector of all the European 
states. Considering the role of the country as a transit state within 
Europe because of geographical factors and the prevailing socio­
political climate this predicament is not unexpected. More than 64.6 
m.ts. of drugs were confiscated which, in relation to the European 
grouping of coastal OECD states as a whole, accounted for 21.8% of the 
entire amount seized from the maritime sector. In comparison to the 
non-European OECD states the Netherlands ranked third overall in 
maritime seizures behind the North American contingent. In relation to 
the total amount of drugs seized within the Netherlands (159 m.ts.), the 
quantity confiscated from the maritime sector accounted by weight for 
40.6% of the total. Cannabis was the predominant drug seized accounting 
by weight for 99.5% of all maritime drug confiscatures. Heroin followed 
with 0.4% and cocaine was third with 0.1%. Based on intelligence data 
for the years 1985 - 1988 cannabis importation by sea is split between 
hashish which accounts for about 70% of all cannabis seizures and 
marijuana which accounts for the remaining 30%.19 Pakistan is the 
source of 63% of the cannabis imported by sea while Lebanon and Morocco 
jointly account for another 40% and Nigeria is the source of the remain­
ing 3%. Approximately 95% of all Pakistani hashish imported to the
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Netherlands is smuggled by sea with about half of it shipped in con­
tainers and the other half transported clandestinely on vessels specifi­
cally acquired for drug trafficking. In conjunction with the Pakistani 
export trade in hashish it has been observed that Pakistani crew members 
on ships arriving from Pakistan are frequently involved. In these cases 
they are usually part of an elaborate trafficking organization and serv­
ing as transport agents. In regards to Lebanese hashish imported to the 
Netherlands the same percentages apply with 95% of that entering the 
country arriving by sea; half in containers and half shipped 
clandestinely. In addition to direct importation by sea from Pakistan 
and Lebanon a third hybrid route exists incorporating a combination of 
maritime and terreal transport modes. In this latter system drugs com­
ing from Pakistan and Lebanon are transported by sea north through the 
Adriatic Sea to ports along the Italian-Yugoslav border area (Trieste, 
Koper, Ravinj and Rijeka).20 From there they are transported overland 
through Europe into the Netherlands. For the portion of drugs shipped 
clandestinely, it has been observed that frequently the vessels 
involved, which are coming from the Mediterranean Sea and North Africa, 
set course out into the Atlantic Ocean and travel around the British 
Isles entering the North Sea from the northwest, thus avoiding the 
English Channel. Once in the North Sea they proceed southward to the 
Dutch coastal provinces of Friesland and Noord Holland where the drug 
cargoes are covertly landed. The vessels utilized are generally old 
coastal traders and small freighters which can be fairly labelled as 
"rust-buckets."21 In some instances the scenario just described 
transpires, but in variant form involving two vessels. The first vessel 
exports the drug load from the source area (ie. Lebanon, Pakistan, etc.)
to a predetermined rendez-vous point in the Mediterranean Sea where it 
is met by a second vessel which takes on the drug cargo and assumes the 
task of transporting it to the Netherlands.22 Lastly, in regards to 
cannabis, yachts do play a contributory role in the import side of the 
Dutch drug trade, but on a minor level.23
In regard to heroin and cocaine little factual information exists 
on which to base definitive statements. Lumped together, maritime 
heroin seizures amount to the second highest figure amongst the coastal 
OECD group for the five-year period referenced earlier. In general, the 
tendency is for these drugs to enter the Netherlands by air or overland 
from neighbouring countries - a point well documented by the number of 
seizures effected in relation to these modes. However, of late there 
has been a noticeable change with a rise in incidences of large but 
single consignments of these drugs concealed within freight being landed 
in the Netherlands. In one case in 1986 heroin totalling 220 kgs. was 
found in Rotterdam concealed in raisins after being offloaded from a 
Soviet ship.24 Subsequent investigation revealed that the heroin had 
originated in Afghanistan and travelled by road from Kabul through the 
U.S.S.R. to Riga where it was loaded onto the ship for carriage to 
Rotterdam. Because of such cases statistics on the modes of transport 
involved using volume as the measuring unit will indicate the maritime 
sector to be significant though it may not be in terms of occurrence. 
For example, the above cited seizure projects the role of the maritime 
sector in relation to heroin importation for the period 1982 - 1986 to 
be at least 81.8% based on weight. Yet, when compared to the number of 
seizures and other modes of transport utilized, the maritime role 
expressed in percent is considerably less. Based on seizure data there
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are no other drugs of significance being imported to the Netherlands by 
sea. However, because of the country’s role as a transit state there is 
a fairly constant albeit low-level export trade by sea in illicit drugs. 
The principal drugs involved are cannabis and stimulants, notably 
amphetamines. Unfortunately, the picture on amphetamines is somewhat 
vague. Considerable production within the country combined with high 
demand externally induces an outflow of amphetamines - though in quan­
titative terms the amounts are relatively minute. Resultantly, the 
maritime sector has gained a role in exporting this substance, par­
ticularly to those countries separated from the Netherlands by water 
like the U.K., Norway and Sweden. The ferries linking the Netherlands 
with nearby states have become important transport modes for drugs. To 
a lesser degree, yachts also play a role. For countries further afield 
like Iceland and Ireland commercial carriers and fishing vessels are 
utilized to export amphetamine from the Netherlands. The same scenario 
applies for cannabis exports, but with a little variation. Relative to 
maritime amphetamine exports the quantities of cannabis exported range 
between larger and massive. The size of the shipment and how it is 
transported usually depends on the nature of the trafficking operation 
involved. Smaller amounts often go by ferry carried in motor vehicles 
or within personal baggage. Medium to large consignments are concealed 
in containers conveyed either on lorries using ferries to make the 
crossings or on regional containerships, freighters and RO-R0 ships. 
Though little is known of the maritime export of cocaine and heroin it 
is occurring. Seizures in the U.K. where the drugs came from the 
Netherlands validate the reality of the activity.
In summary, the Netherlands is both a major maritime importer and
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minor exporter of illicit drugs. Its open borders with Belgium and West 
Germany and proximity to other European drug consumers enhances the dual 
role of the Netherlands. Furthermore, the important role of Rotterdam 
to world commerce and shipping assures an ample stream of vessels and 
diversity in routes by which illicit drugs may be imported to and ex­
ported from the Netherlands.
5,2,1, 2 Spain
Comprehensive data on the maritime drug trade of Spain is lacking. 
This is the result of few statistics being kept until recently within 
Spain on the subject. Consequently, many of the points made here are 
qualitative assessments based on intelligence data, the findings of in­
vestigations and cases. Overall, Spain ranks second amongst the 
European OECD membership in maritime drug seizures. In the period 1982 
- 1986 over 48.3 m.ts. of illicit drugs were confiscated from the
maritime sector. In percentage terms, Spain accounted for 16.3% of the 
total quantity of drugs seized from the maritime sector amongst the 
European grouping of coastal OECD states. In comparison to the OECD 
membership as a whole Spain ranks fourth in maritime drug confiscatures 
for the period noted. In relation to the total amount of drugs confis­
cated (189.4 m.ts.) within Spain for the period referenced, the maritime 
sector accounts by weight for 25.5%. However, when the portion of drugs 
seized domestically which are deemed not to have been in the trafficking 
stage are discounted the figure rises dramatically to nearer 80%. Can­
nabis is the principal drug interdicted in the maritime sector account­
ing by weight for 99.7% of all maritime drug confiscatures. Compared to 
Europe as a whole Spain records the highest number of cannabis seizures.
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Cocaine is the only other drug seized in noteworthy quantities from the 
maritime sector accounting for the remaining 0.3%. Hashish is the
dominant form of cannabis imported by sea with most of it coming from 
Morocco and Lebanon. Much of the hashish originating from Morocco is
transported directly on merchant ships concealed within freight and 
clandestinely on fishing vessels and yachts.25 The use of yachts is 
particularly acute. When indirect routes are used the transit areas of 
prominence are Ceuta and the Balearic Islands. The importation of 
Lebanese hashish tends to be restricted more to the direct modes involv­
ing seafreight and clandestine landings on the Mediterranean coast based 
on mothership operations. The majority of marijuana seized is often of 
Colombian origin and shipped on commercial carriers concealed within 
cargo. The importation of cocaine by sea is more ominous. Though, of 
late, large seizures of cocaine are being effected in other European 
states the rise of the maritime cocaine trade to Europe first manifest 
itself in Spain. A trend analysis of quantities seized annually for the 
1980s depicts a linear profile of steady growth. During the period 1982 
- 1986 Spain seized the largest amount of cocaine from the maritime sec­
tor of all the European OECD states. Spanish cocaine seizures accounted 
for 43.9% of the total quantity of cocaine confiscated from the maritime 
sector by the European group as a whole. Nearly all of the cocaine im­
ported by sea comes from Colombia. Usually, it is either in the form of 
cocaine HC1 or in the forms of coca base and paste and concealed in 
cargo carried on commercial carriers.26 Consequently, most of the 
cocaine enters Spain through a major seaport. A result of improvements 
in data gathering and statistical compilation in the mid-1980s is the 
availability of data on the types of vessels involved in Spanish drug
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importations. Table 5.5 depicts the involvement of various classes of 
vessels during the years 1984 - 1986 based on frequency of utilization 
as established in seizure investigations.
Table 5.5 Vessel Involvement In Spanish Drug Importations, 1984 - 1986.
Class of Vessel Percentage of Use
Yachts/Pleasure craft ...
Launches (Motor) ......
Motorboats ............
Merchant Ships .........
Fishing Vessels .......
Other Craft ............
Source: Data specifically prepared for author by
Secretaria General Tecnica of the Ministerio Del
Interior (Madrid, 18 May 1987).
5,2,1*3 Belgiurn
Belgium is another state wherein full data on the modes of 
transport utilized in drug trafficking is not kept. Relative to the 
other European OECD states Belgium ranks third in maritime drug 
seizures. For the period 1982 - 1986 more than 40.2 m.ts. of illicit 
drugs were intercepted in the maritime sector. In percentage terms Bel­
gium accounted for 13.6% of the total quantity of drugs seized from the 
maritime sector by the European grouping of coastal OECD states. Rela­
tive to the OECD group as a whole Belgium ranked fifth overall. In 
relation to the total amount of drugs confiscated within Belgian ter­
ritory (55.2 m.ts.) during the above cited period, the maritime sector 
accounted by weight for 73%. However, when the portion of drugs seized 
domestically which is deemed not to have been in the trafficking stage 
is discounted, the figure then rises to 81.2%. The basis for the high
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volume of drug trafficking into Belgium is because the country, like the 
Netherlands, functions as a transit state. Cannabis is the principal 
drug confiscated from the maritime sector accounting by weight for 99.3% 
of all maritime drug seizures. Heroin is second accounting for 0.5% and 
cocaine is third with 0.2%. Though quantitative data is lacking hashish 
appears to be the predominant type of cannabis imported by sea. Based 
on 1985 data only, hashish accounted for 97.1% of all maritime cannabis 
importations.27 Lebanon is the principal source of hashish imported by 
sea to Belgium while India is a secondary source. Cyprus often serves 
as a trans-shipment site for Lebanese hashish shipments en route to 
Belgium. Marijuana accounts for the remaining 2.9% of all maritime can­
nabis importations based on the same 1985 data.28 Zaire is the prin­
cipal source of marijuana imported by sea to Belgium. While Zaire is 
not known as a major exporter of illicit drugs, the fact that Belgium 
was the colonial overlord and still maintains a special trade relation­
ship with its former colony nurtures the utilization of the shipping 
link for drug trafficking. This aspect is significant for two reasons. 
Imprimis, the generally close relationship between mother country and 
colony in the post-colonial period explains the bases behind certain or­
ganizational and structural elements of the maritime drug trade - in 
other words, why. Secondly, it is a trafficking pattern that is 
repeated elsewhere though involving different states. Little is truly 
known regarding the maritime importation of heroin and cocaine to Bel­
gium aside from the fact it occurs. These drugs Eire generally imported 
by motor vehicle via overland routes and by air. In the period 1982 -
1986 Belgium ranked third in Europe and fourth overall amongst the OECD 
group in effecting maritime heroin seizures. Statistically, Thailand
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appears to be an important origin point for heroin brought by ship into
Belgium though the validity of this finding in actuality is unknown.
The cocaine interdicted in the maritime sector usually arrives on mer­
chant ships coming from South America.
Containers are the preferred method of concealment. Antwerp is 
the site of nearly all maritime seizures effected in Belgium. . Moreover, 
Antwerp appears to be the main importation point in Europe for cannabis 
shipped by sea from Lebanon while the Netherlands serves as the main 
distribution centre.29 Consequently, much of that entering Belgium by 
sea is destined for the Netherlands and transported to there by overland 
modes of conveyance. Zeebrugge, Oostende and Gand effect minute 
maritime seizures of drugs. Turning to the maritime export dimension of 
Belgian drug trafficking little is known about it aside from the fact 
that it occurs. Compared to the maritime import dimension, it is small.
Similar to the Netherlands, it is observed that the ferries linking Bel­
gium with the U.K. and regional commercial carriers play a role. Can­
nabis is the drug commonly exported, but quantities of cocaine, heroin 
and amphetamine are also frequently shipped abroad.
5,2.1.4 The United Kingdom
The U.K. ranks fourth in maritime drug seizures among the European 
OECD states and sixth overall in the OECD group based on data for the 
period 1982 - 1986. During that period over 40.1 m.ts. of illicit drugs 
were intercepted in the maritime sector. In percentage terms the U.K. 
accounted for 13.6% of the total quantity of drugs seized from the 
maritime sector amongst the European group of coastal OECD states. In 
relation to the total amount of drugs seized in the U.K. (24.8 m.ts.) in
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1986 alone, the maritime sector accounted by weight for 69.3%.30 
However, when the portion of seized drugs not taken at the frontier is
discounted that figure rises to 75.2%. Cannabis is the principal drug 
confiscated from the maritime sector accounting by weight for 99.5% of 
all maritime drug seizures. Heroin is second with 0.4%, cocaine ranks 
third with 0.04% and amphetamines are last at 0.02%. Hashish is the 
more common of the two types of cannabis seized. Based on 1986 data 
only hashish accounted for 50.1% by volume of all maritime cannabis 
confiscatures.31 Much of the hashish imported by sea comes from 
Lebanon, Morocco and the Golden Crescent either directly or via transit
states. Marijuana, on the other hand, shows a wider diversity in
maritime routes of importation with Nigeria and Ghana serving as
prominent origin points along with Colombia and Jamaica. The comment 
made earlier in the Belgian section concerning the positive correlation 
between post-colonial relationships and organizational structure apropos 
select trafficking routes applies here as well. Aside from Colombia, 
the other states are all former British colonies with which the U.K. 
maintains special trade relationships. Much of the heroin seized in the 
maritime sector comes from Pakistan while Colombia is the origin point 
for most of the cocaine. Smaller amounts of these two drugs along with 
amphetamine also enter the U.K. by ferry and RO-RO ship from Belgium, 
France and the Netherlands.
A breakdown of 1986 data on the volume of illicit drugs inter­
dicted in the maritime sector reveals that 83.9% of all drugs were dis­
guised as freight or concealed within it while the remaining 16.1% was 
simply carried on the vessel within whatever stowage space was decided 
upon.32 Further analysis reveals that cannabis is the dominant drug
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conveyed via both shipment methods with virtually equal percentages, 
thus indicating there is little emphasis placed on how a particular 
category of drug is to be trafficked by sea once the transportation mode 
has been selected. Figure 5.6 presents a pie chart analysis of the 
maritime methods of shipment. The one notable difference between the 
two maritime methods of shipment centers on the quantities of marijuana 
and hashish transported. The majority of cannabis shipped either con­
cealed in or disguised as cargo is marijuana though the ratio is barely 
60:40. Contrastingly, the preponderance of cannabis transported undis­
guised onboard vessels is hashish by a margin of 11 to 1. Considering
Figure 5.6 Analyses Of British Drug Importations By Method of Shipment.
DRUGS IMPORTED 
in SEAF R E I G H T
DRUGS IMPORTED 
on VESSEL ALONE
AMPHETAMINE 
& HEROIN
COCAINE & AMPHETAMINE 
M A R I J U A N A  —
H ASH ISH
M A R I J U A N A
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T = 14,428.135 Kgs. T = 2,777.455 Kgs.
Drug S e izures S t a t i s t i cs 1986 (London, 1987).
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that most of the cannabis (89.1% by weight) conveyed via the latter 
method of shipment is carried on small craft like fishing vessels and 
yachts, this is not surprising. Because these vessels are small and 
limited in range and durability it is only to be expected that when 
utilized they will voyage to the nearer sources of cannabis. Relative 
to the U.K. this means the hashish production areas like Morocco and 
Lebanon and, to a lesser degree, cannabis transit states like Cyprus, * 
Portugal, Spain, Belgium and the Netherlands. Where the drugs are dis­
guised as legitimate freight or concealed within other cargo onboard a 
commercial carrier they generally land at a major British port. Dover, 
Felixstowe, Liverpool and Southampton are often the sites of seizures of 
drugs hidden in freight. Where the drugs are imported clandestinely, 
the landing sites usually involve isolated coastal areas and quiet 
rivers in western England and Wales. Secondary sites used for clandes­
tine importations include the coastal areas and small rivers found in 
southern England abutting the English Channel and North Sea. Vis-a-vis 
the latter, it is usually pleasure craft caning from the European con­
tinent or which have met a mothership offshore that are landing the 
drugs. Coastal areas and rivers which have actually seen such landings 
include Aberbach Beach near Fishguard in Dyfed, Wales, Beachy Head in 
Sussex, the Kent coast and the River Crouch in Essex.
5.2.1.5 France
France ranks fifth in maritime drug seizures among the European 
OECD states and seventh overall in the OECD group based on data for the 
period 1982 - 1986. More than 37 m.ts. of illicit drugs were confis­
cated from the maritime sector during that period. In percentage terms
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France accounted for 12.5% of the total quantity of drugs confiscated 
from the maritime sector amongst the European group of coastal OECD 
countries. In relation to the total amount of drugs seized within 
France (104.7 m.ts.) in the above cited period, the maritime sector ac­
counted by weight for 35.4%. When the portion of seized drugs not in­
tercepted crossing the frontier is deducted the figure rises to 40.2%. 
Cannabis was the principal drug confiscated from the maritime sector, ac­
counting by weight for 99.86% of all maritime drug seizures. Cocaine 
ranked a distant second with 0.13% and the quantities of heroin seized 
added up to a fraction of a percent. Based on quantity seized hashish 
accounted for over 87.4% of all cannabis intercepted in the maritime 
sector; of which 99.8% of it was in the form of resin while the other 
0.2% was liquid hashish.33 Most of the hashish imported by sea comes 
from Lebanon and Morocco with Nepal being the origin for a minority 
share transhipped via India. The remaining 12.6% of all cannabis con­
fiscated from the maritime sector is marijuana. Colombia is the prin­
cipal country of origin while Nigeria is a secondary source. Table 5.6 
lists the sources of cannabis imported to France via the maritime medium 
and their shares of contribution. Vis-a-vis maritime cocaine imports,
Table 5.6 Sources Of Cannabis Smuggled By Sea To France, 1981 - 1986.
Country Percent Share
Lebanon....
Morocco ....
Colombia ....
Nepal ......
Nigeria ....
Source: La Douane Francaise, Saisies De Stunefiants
Achemines Par La Voie Maritime De 1981 A 1987 (Au 31
Aout) (Paris, 1987), Tables for years 1981 - 1987.
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Colombia is the principal source country while India, Lebanon and Syria 
serve as the origin points for heroin confiscated from the maritime 
sector.
Of Frances’s three littoral zones, by far, the heaviest incidence 
and volume of maritime drug importation occurs along its Mediterranean 
coastline. Referred to as the Littoral Mediterraneen by the French Cus­
toms service this coastal zone accounts by weight for 80.7% of all 
maritime drug interceptions.34 Within the Littoral Mediterraneen the 
coastal area with the highest incidence of maritime drug smuggling is 
the area around Nice and Cote-d’Azur, called Les Alpes-Maritimes. The 
basis for the high level of drug trafficking is the high volume of yacht 
traffic in the area. Within a coastal zone of 100 kms. in length there 
are more than 20 ports and local vessel registries show about 15,000 
vessels registered therein.35 Further contributing to the maritime drug 
trade in Les Alpes-Mari times is the constant presence but fluctuating 
population of foreign vessels calling therein such that a dynamic state 
of flux exists which overwhelms attempts of complete regulation.36 
Yachts, fishing vessels and coastal traders are the principal transport 
modes used in smuggling. In registering their vessels drug traffickers 
commonly employ flags of convenience.37 In regards to the involvement 
of commercial carriers Marseille is the major seaport where such ships 
are often found to be carrying drug consignments onboard.38 Called the 
Littoral Atlantique, the western coastline of France abutting the Bay of 
Biscay records the second highest volume of maritime drug trafficking 
accounting by weight for 15.7% of all maritime drug seizures.39 The 
French coastline abutting the English Channel and North Sea, called Lit­
toral Manche/Mer du Nord, effects the remaining 3.6% of maritime drug
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seizures. In both the Littoral Atlantique and Littoral Manche/Mer du 
Nord some of the interdictions involve vessels not bound for France, but 
which are transiting the territorial sea en route to northern Europe, 
notably the Netherlands.40
In terms of transport modes employed and methods of shipment 
utilized, it appears that most of the drugs imported by sea, the 
majority of which is cannabis, are imported on small and old vessels 
which land the consignments clandestinely. There are three reasons for 
this: imprimis, small vessels can approach the coast of France more
easily and hide among the many legitimate vessels present in a given 
area and port; secondly, small vessels are preferred by the traffickers 
because they can carry large drug consignments with relatively few 
people involved (small crew) thus reducing the risk of betrayal and 
detection; and thirdly, old vessels which in some cases sure nothing more 
that "rust-buckets" are cheaper to acquire thus making the loss of the 
vessel through confiscature less significant.41 Frequently, to actually 
land the drug loads on the shore inflatable rubber crafts and zodiacs 
are utilized.
France is also a minor exporter of drugs by sea. Though quantita­
tive data is scarce it is known that most of the drugs exported by sea 
go to the U.K. As in the case of Belgium and the Netherlands the cross­
channel ferries and regional RO-RO ships play a prominent role. Can­
nabis is the primary drug exported, but quantities of cocaine and heroin 
are also shipped via these modes. Occasionally, amphetamines and minute 
quantities of various psychotropic substances are also transported this 
way.
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5.2,1,6 Greece
Greece is another state where quantitative data is somewhat lack­
ing thus necessitating a more descriptive analysis. Relative to the 
other European OECD states Greece ranks sixth in maritime drug seizures 
and eighth overall in the OECD group based on data for the period 1982 - 
1986. Over 22.5 m.ts. of illicit drugs were intercepted in the maritime 
sector during that period. Expressed in percentage terms, Greece ac­
counted for 7.6% of the total quantity of drugs confiscated from the 
maritime sector amongst the European group of coastal OECD states. In 
relation to the total quantity of drugs seized within Greek territory 
(23.2 m.ts.) in 1987 alone, the maritime sector accounted by weight for 
97.9%.42 Cannabis, solely in the form of Lebanese hashish, is the prin­
cipal drug interdicted in the maritime sector. It accounted by weight 
for 99.9% of all maritime drug seizures in the period referenced above. 
Heroin accounted for the remaining 0.1%. When intercepted, the hashish 
seized was in the process of being exported from Lebanon, either 
directly or indirectly via Syrian and Turkish ports, to points in West­
ern Europe and North America. At this juncture, technical clarification 
is required of Greece’s role. Greece is a transit state, but in a 
unique way contrary to the ordinary definition of the term. The 
geographical character of the Greek archipelago combined with the 
country’s territorial proximity to Lebanon, Syria and Turkey ensures 
that maritime drug smugglers traverse Greek waters. Consequently, when 
drug-laden vessels are interdicted, the seizures technically occur off­
shore in the territorial sea. Therefore, Greece is not a transit state 
in the true physical sense because rarely do the drug consignments ac­
tually land on Greek soil and then be transhipped. It must be pointed
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out that in relation to heroin this scenario does not fully apply.
Most of the vessels involved are old freighters and coastal 
traders usually 20 years old or older acquired in Piraeus from idle ton­
nage for the express purpose of drug trafficking.43 Many of then justly 
fall into the category of "rust-bucket." Because of lax regulation on 
all levels ships are easily bought and sold in Piraeus and the documen­
tation changed without problem. Generally, the vessels are registered 
under a flag-of-convenience. Among the flags of registry often utilized 
are those of Honduras, Panama, Sri Lanka and St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines.44 Typically, the size of the drug shipment is large and 
there is no real attempt to conceal the load. Usually, it is stowed 
either in containers or in some other contained form within the holds of 
the vessels. There are no manifests except where the drug consignments 
are concealed within other legitimate cargoes. Then the manifests show 
the legitimate cargoes as the sole contents of the vessels* loads. To 
minimize the chances of interception, the drug-laden vessels either 
traverse shipping lanes less used or create their own routes through 
desolate (unpatrolled) water areas. Additionally, the vessels* ap­
pearances are made to look sufficiently innocuous and typical such that 
no interest is generated in their presence by distant observers. Many 
of these vessels serve as motherships. Hence, they either carry their 
drug cargoes to the coastal waters off the state to which the drugs are 
destined or transport the drug shipments only so far into the Mediter­
ranean Sea where they rendez-vous with other vessels which then convey 
the drug loads the rest of the way. One maritime area frequently used 
for the latter form of trans-shipment is the southern half of the Ionian 
Sea between Sicily and Peloponessius.45 Typically, the motherships
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leave Lebanon and sail westwards giving a wide berth to Crete by going 
close to Libya and then turning north-northwest into the Ionian Sea. 
Upon arrival at pre-determined coordinates fishing vessels, yachts and 
other types of pleasure craft rendez-vous with the motherships to obtain 
their drug consignments.46 Though the Canadians described the Greek ar­
chipelago as a "trafficker’s paradise and an obstacle to enforcement 
when trying to detect vessel traffic" in their 1983 drug report47 the 
reality of the trafficking situation in the Greek islands does not sub­
stantiate this contention. While the geographical assessment upon which 
they founded their proposition is indeed valid, the actual level of ac­
tivity transpiring, both then and now, does not corroborate the maxim 
that maritime drug trafficking is rife in the Greek islands. There is 
small and rather constant importation of hashish and heroin by local 
ferries to several of the islands from Turkey.48 Additionally, yachts 
and other pleasure craft engaged in inter-island touring shuttle minute 
quantities of drugs around. However, virtually all of this low-level 
drug trafficking is driven by the tourist demand for such substances. 
Islands notably found to be involved include Corfu, Crete and Rhodes.
Besides it transit role, Greece is also a minor exporter of il­
licit drugs by sea. The Greco-Italian ferry link across the Strait of 
Otranto provides a regular conduit by which drugs may be sent to Italy 
and onward into Europe. Though little is known regarding its utiliza­
tion by drug traffickers it is presumed that most of the quantities 
transported this way are either hidden in personal luggage or concealed 
within freight carried on lorries. The following section on Italy 
elaborates further on the Greco-Italian maritime conduit in relation to 
heroin smuggling.
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5. 2,1•7 Italy
Italy’s unique geographical position ensures that the maritime 
sector plays a significant role in satisfying the country’s internal 
demand for illicit drugs. However, more important is the fact that 
Italy serves e l s  a direct link for seaborne shipments coming from the 
Middle East and bound for other points in western Europe and North 
America. Its "cosLstline is dotted with numerous ports and fishing vil­
lages which create obstacles" for the Italian authorities in their 
"attempts to effectively register and control the flow of local and for­
eign vessels."49 The position of Sardinia and Sicily relative to select 
source areas for drugs and astride the trans-Mediterranean drug route 
emanating from Lebanon further attracts drug trafficking enterprises. 
The historical dimension concerning the involvement of Italian criminal 
groups in nefarious activities serves only to enhance the country’s vul­
nerability to drug-related operations. Based on data for the period 
1982 - 1986, Italy ranks seventh in maritime drug seizures among the 
European OECD states and ninth overall in the OECD group. More than
18.1 m.ts. of illicit drugs were confiscated from the mELritime sector 
during that period. In percentage terms, Italy accounted for 6.1% of 
the total quantity of drugs seized from the maritime sector amongst the 
European group of coastal OECD states. In relation to the total quan­
tity of drugs seized within Italian territory (1.8 m.ts.) in 1985 alone, 
the mEiritime sector accounted by weight for 21.6%. However, when the 
portion of seized drugs not intercepted in the process of crossing the 
frontier are discounted the figure rises to 43.1% and for hashish alone 
the figure rises to 70.6%.50 As just indicated, cannabis is the prin­
cipal drug imported by sea to Italy. In the period cited it accounted
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by weight for 98.2% of all maritime drug confiscatures. Because of poor 
records only 1985 data was available at the time this thesis was 
prepared on which to base the following quantitative assessment. 
However, the findings described are deemed applicable for the mid-1980s 
as a whole based on qualitative intelligence data. Hashish accounted by 
weight for 99.8% of all maritime cannabis seizures in 1985 with the 
remaining 0.2% being marijuana.51 The majority of hashish imported by 
sea and bound for the Italian market comes from Morocco, either directly 
or via Tunisia. Lebanon and Syria serve as secondary origin points for 
hashish destined for Italy while India is a tertiary source area. 
However, because of Italy’s geographical position, large quantities of 
Lebanese hashish are interdicted within the country which in actuality 
are destined elsewhere. For example, 3,180 kgs. of hashish were seized 
in December 1984 while en route from Lebanon to Montreal, Canada via 
Italy.52 On cursory examination the maritime seizure figures for heroin 
imply that the maritime sector plays a rather insignificant role. 
However, the reality surrounding the heroin trade indicates otherwise. 
Imprimis, expressed as a percentage of the entire quantity of drugs 
seized from the maritime sector in the five-year period referenced 
heroin accounted by weight for 1.6%. In ratio terms, this figure is the 
highest among all 21 of the coastal OECD states. Secondly, in real 
terms the amount of heroin confiscated from the maritime sector is again 
the highest amongst the entire OECD group with 296.5 kgs. taken in the 
aforementioned period. Thirdly, qualitative information derived from 
intelligence operations and investigations conducted by the authorities 
corroborates this proposition. Much of the heroin imported by sea to 
Italy comes from Lebanon, Iran and Turkey, either directly or
indirectly. Where indirect, Cyprus, Greece, Syria and, vis-a-vis 
Iranian heroin, Turkey are the transit states. An investigation into 
heroin trafficking involving diplomatic personnel in 1986 uncovered a 
smuggling operation wherein Syrian diplomats were utilizing their 
diplomatic privileges to carry heroin to Italy by ferry from Greece.53 
Over the span of half a year in late 1985 and early 1986 a few hundred 
kilograms of heroin were imported via this smuggling operation.54 
Though this particular heroin enterprise met its demise one may confi­
dently presume that several others existed and that the void was quickly 
filled. As far as the other categories of drugs like cocaine, morphine 
and opium are concerned the small amounts seized in the mid-1980s from 
the maritime sector suggests that they are imported by non-marine modes 
of transport. The former maritime morphine and opium trades of the 
1930s through early 1970s appear to have died though 25 kgs. of morphine 
were confiscated from the maritime sector in 1983. An analysis of mor­
phine and opium seizures overall in Italy (See Table 3.17) indicates 
that their use has waned considerably.
5.2.1,8 The Federal Republic of Germany
West Germany ranks eighth in maritime drug seizures among the
European OECD states and tenth overall in the OECD group. For the
period 1982 - 1986 over 12.1 m.ts. of illicit drugs were seized in the
maritime sector. In percentage terms, West Germany accounted for 4.1% 
of the total quantity of drugs confiscated from the maritime sector 
amongst the European coastal states of O.E.C.D. during the period 
referenced. In relation to the total quantity of drugs seized within 
the country (29.5 m.ts.) during the period noted, the maritime sector
280
accounted by weight for 41.1%. No correction figure is available for 
the portion of drugs shipped by sea and intercepted crossing the 
frontier. Cannabis is the principal drug imported by sea with Lebanon 
and Morocco being the primary source countries. For the five-year 
period referenced it accounted by weight for 99.1% of all maritime drug 
seizures. Because the pertinent records and statistics are not being 
kept no categorical analysis regarding the ratio of the types of can­
nabis imported by sea nor their origins can be offered. It must, 
however, be recognized that a fair portion of the drugs interdicted 
crossing the land border were at some stage previously transported by 
sea into Europe. Hence, the maritime sector plays a more important role 
than the percentage figure above (41.1%) indicates. Cocaine ranks a 
distant second in maritime drug seizures by weight with a 0.6% share and 
heroin is third with a 0.3% share. Typically, the cocaine imported by 
sea comes from Colombia, either directly or via a transit state. Most 
of the heroin imported by sea comes from Pakistan. The principal method 
of shipment involves concealing the drug consignments within freight or 
disguising them as freight which is packed within containers. 
Consequently, containerships and break-bulk freighters modified for par­
tial container carriage are the vessels frequently involved. Because 
commercial shipping is the primary method utilized by the smugglers it 
commensurately means that major seaports in the country are the landing 
sites. Based on seizure incidences Hamburg and Bremen appear to be the 
principal ports of entry for illicit drugs imported by sea. The degree 
of riverine drug trafficking on the Elbe and Weser Rivers above these 
two ports is not known.
In addition to the import trade in drugs by sea there also exists
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a minor export trade in drugs by sea. Like Belgium and the Netherlands, 
West Germany sees a frequent outflow of narcotic and psychotropic sub­
stances by sea to other regional states but predominantly the Scan­
dinavian countries. The amounts involved range between infinitesimal to 
small and are usually carried on ferries linking West Germany with 
Finland, Norway and Sweden. Among the ports involved are Kiel, Puttgar- 
den and Travemunde. In addition to the narcotic drugs commonly 
transported by sea minute but noteworthy amounts of amphetamines and LSD 
are exported by ferry. Generally, all drugs are concealed within per­
sonal luggage or within motor vehicles. In the summer season pleasure 
craft become involved in the export of drugs to Scandinavia. Usually, 
the drugs are intended for personal consumption by the crafts* operators 
while vacationing. Regional shipping also plays a minor role in export­
ing drugs from West Germany, but little is known about it.
5,2,1.9 Portugal
Portugal functions more as a maritime transit state for drugs des­
tined elsewhere in Europe. The country ranks ninth in maritime drug 
seizures among the European OECD states and eleventh overall in the OECD 
group. More than 10.5 m.ts. of illicit drugs were seized from the 
maritime sector in the period 1982 - 1986. In percentage terms, Por­
tugal accounted for 3.6% of the total quantity of drugs intercepted in 
the maritime sector amongst the European coastal states of O.E.C.D. In 
relation to the total quantity of drugs seized within the country (17.1 
m.ts.) exclusive of the Azores and Madeira for the period specified, the 
maritime sector accounted by weight for 61.5%. If the portion of confis­
cated drugs deemed not to have been in the trafficking stage or crossing
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the frontier is discounted the figure rises between 3-8%. Lack of 
data prohibits a more precise figure being offered. Cannabis accounted 
for the entire quantity of drugs imported by sea to Portugal in the 
timeframe referenced. Nearly all of it was in the form of hashish. As 
far as is known cocaine and heroin are imported by air and overland from 
Spain. However, the Portuguese territory of the Azores appears to be an 
emerging transit point for illicit drug consignments shipped on yachts 
from South America to Europe.55 Morocco is the principal supplier of 
the hashish smuggled into Portugal by sea while Lebanon serves as a 
secondary source. Pakistan and India serve as tertiary origin points 
for Afghani hashish which is transhipped through them before being 
shipped by sea to Portugal. The majority of cannabis imported by sea is 
conveyed on motherships which offload their drug cargoes to fast speed­
boats on the high seas. These craft in turn transport the drug loads to 
desolate coastal sites along the Algarve coast.56 This method of con­
veyance accounts by volume for 65% +/-5% of the maritime cannabis trade 
into Portugal.57 The individuals involved are nearly always part of an 
organized smuggling group, either of independent status or part of a 
vast overlying network supported by criminal enterprise. The balance 
(35% +/-5%) of the maritime cannabis trade into Portugal is structured 
around clandestine importations by fishing vessels and yachts which land 
their drug cargoes covertly at night along the Algarve coast either on 
beaches, in secluded coves or in the ports of small coastal communities. 
Fisherman, in particular, will import hashish hidden under their fish 
loads.58 The size of the drug consignments landed along the Algarve 
varies in size from a few hundred kilograms to multi-ton shipments. An 
example of the latter is the June 1987 seizure of 4 tons of Afghani
hashish by the Policia Judiciaria.59 In addition to the Algarve coast, 
the western coast of Portugal extending from Sagres to Vigo is 
frequently utilized for clandestine drug importations. Contrary to the 
situation in the Algarve the shipment size in these landings usually 
ranges between 50 - 100 kgs. per load.60 Furthermore, the method of im­
portation is generally based on fishing vessels making direct voyages 
from Morocco to Portugal and covertly landing their drug loads 
themselves. Mothership operations along this part of Portugal’s coast
are rare. A result of this predilection on the part of the smugglers
towards clandestine importations means the role of commercial carriers 
in Portugal’s drug trade appears to be less. In terms of destination, 
most of the cannabis entering Portugal and transhipped onwards is bound 
for central and northern Europe. The extent to which the maritime sec­
tor plays a role in the export of drugs from Portugal is unknown aside 
from the fact that it occurs. Presumably, the maritime export of drugs 
is more diversified with both commercial carriers and the clandestine 
vessel operators engaged in such activity.
5.2.1.10 Turkey
The quantity of drugs reported confiscated from the maritime sec­
tor by the Turkish authorities for the period 1982 - 1986 is not indica­
tive of the actual maritime trade in illicit drugs. However, when put 
in proper perspective the figure, though low, is not that surprising. 
In contrast to the other OECD states Turkey is solely a maritime ex­
porter of drugs. The majority of drugs exported are produced either in 
Iran or Lebanon. On a minor level illicit production and manufacturing 
occurs within the country itself. Therefore, Turkey is predominantly a
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transit state and the flow of drugs is outwards. This situation poses 
an inverse problem in drug control for the relevant law enforcement 
agencies concerned. The dilemma is not one of protecting the maritime 
frontier from the territorial intrusion of undesirable products and 
influences, but one of preventing these elements from escaping. Because 
the various agencies responsible for frontier security are geared 
towards importation control and have their hands full with a number of 
other tasks under their purview unrelated to drugs it is natural for 
there to be a diminished success rate in interdicting drugs exported by 
sea. To be fair on this point, it must be observed that this predica­
ment is not unique to Turkey but applies to all states. However, having 
made these comments it should not be construed that this in any way ex­
cuses the Turkish authorities from their poor performance in drug 
interdiction. Their efforts may be described as ranging between dedi­
cated but ineffective at best to outright lacklustre in negative terms. 
One additional aspect hampering the entire law enforcement effort is the 
collective notion yet extant in Turkey not to be concerned about illicit 
activities and injurious substances which domestically have a benign to 
positive economic effect on portions of the indigenous population but 
which pose serious social problems elsewhere. Unfortunately, this type 
of socio-cultural malaise is an inherent characteristic of human be­
haviour which manifests itself whenever given the opportunity. An his­
torical analysis of Turkey’s attitude towards opiates over the past one 
hundred years attests to the validity of this observation.
Because of poor data and uncertainty in the figures presented by 
the authorities little in the way of a quantitative analysis can be of­
fered regarding Turkey’s maritime drug trade. According to the data ob­
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tained for the years 1982 - 1986 only 247.4 kgs. of cannabis were con­
fiscated from the maritime sector. With 1981 data added the figure 
rises to 946.6 m.ts. However, intelligence operations and case inves­
tigations done by other countries support the premise that there is a 
fairly high volume of illicit drugs being exported by sea from Turkey. 
In volumetric terms, cannabis in the form of hashish accounts for the 
majority share. Heroin, in various refined grades ranging from crude to 
pure, accounts for much of the remaining volume of drugs exported. Mor­
phine and opium are still exported by sea but the quantities involved 
are small compared to the historical scene. Probably, most of the mor­
phine is refined into heroin upon arrival at those states to which it is 
destined if it has not already been converted in a transit state. The 
shipment method varies with some of the drug consignments sent on com­
mercial carriers either concealed in or disguised as freight, or within 
special compartments. Other loads are shipped clandestinely on vessels 
specifically acquired for such purpose. In regards to the latter method 
it is believed that the entire southern coastline from Iskenderun 
westwards to Kocek is utilized for clandestine exportations.61 Regional 
trading craft and fishing boats are the vessels commonly used. Unique 
to this form of shipment has been the concealment of opium consignments 
within inner tubes of automobile tires.62 This method is popular be­
cause it grants the smugglers a way to avoid apprehension and keep their 
drug loads. Basically, if a vessel smuggling drugs believes it is going 
to be intercepted the drug-laden tubes are heaved overboard. However, 
because the drugs are within the impermeable tubes, which are both 
buoyant and waterproof, the tubes can be retrieved without damage to 
their contents. On a lower level this same scenario applies to the
western seacoast extending from Kocek northwards to Gelibolu. Factual 
information on the destination of Turkey's maritime drug exports is 
scant. Based on drug seizures effected abroad it is known that 
Bulgaria, Cyprus, Egypt, Greece, Italy, Lebanon, the Netherlands, 
Romania and Syria have been and, for the most part, still are the 
recipients of drugs exported by sea from Turkey. Some of the aforemen­
tioned states are, of course, transit states and thus the drug loads are 
present therein for only a short time.
5,2.1,11 Ireland
The small consumption base in Ireland means the quantities of 
drugs transported by the various modes of conveyance are also relatively 
small compared to the majority of other OECD states. However, the in­
sular character of the country ensures that the maritime sector plays a 
significant role in the importation of drugs into Ireland. Between 1982 
- 1986 maritime drug seizures totalled 215.6 kgs. In relation to the 
total quantity of drugs seized within the country (865.0 kgs.) during 
this period, the maritime sector accounted by weight for 24.9%. 
Unfortunately, data is not available by which to deduct the portion of 
drugs not in the trafficking stage and thus calculate a revised figure. 
However, a better idea of the role of the maritime sector in Ireland's 
drug trade is derived by reviewing the period 1980 - 1986. Data for
this time period reveals that maritime drug confiscatures accounted by 
weight for 75.9% of all Irish drug seizures; of which cannabis accounted 
by weight for 99.95% of this figure. Heroin and amphetamines accounted 
for the remaining fraction of a percent. Hashish is the principal type 
of cannabis imported by sea. It accounted by weight for 75.5% of the
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total quantity of cannabis interdicted in the period 1980 - 1986 with 
most of it originating from Lebanon and Morocco. Marijuana constituted 
the minor share. Most of it came from West Africa. The minute amounts 
of heroin and amphetamine imported by sea come from the U.K. Based on 
quantity of drugs interdicted, containerships, RO-RO ships and break- 
bulk freighters modified for container carriage appear to be the inodes 
of transport commonly utilized. However, this conclusion is the result 
of statistical distortion and, thus, is of dubious value. The distor­
tion stems from the fact that only a few drug seizures have been ef­
fected from such vessels and their cargoes but the quantities involved 
were very large. A similar analysis based on the number of conf isca­
tures shows that ferries are the mode of maritime transport most 
frequently used for drug trafficking. The amounts involved range be­
tween minute and small and the drugs are usually concealed either within 
passenger luggage, in motor vehicles or on the person. Clandestine im­
portations by sea do not appear to be a popular mode of maritime drug 
trafficking. The basis for this is because either the market cannot ab­
sorb large shipments on a regular basis or the other marine modes of im­
portation suffice. An analysis of the Irish seaports through which 
drugs enter the country, based on seizure statistics for the period 1980 
- 1986, reveals that Dublin is the principal port of entry. Waterford 
is a secondary port of entry while Rosslare and Dunlaoire both play a 
minor role. Lebanon is the principal departure point for drug shipments 
sent in bulk by sea to Ireland while Britain’s ports dominate in terms 
of ntanber of shipments to Ireland. Figure 5.7 presents pie charts on 
the role of various states in exporting illicit drugs to Ireland by sea 
and the role of Ireland’s seaports as landing sites for illicit drugs.
Figure 5.7 States Of Embarkation And Ports Of Discharge For Drugs 
Imported To The Republic Of Ireland.
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5.2,2 The Scandinavian States
Vis-a-vis other coastal OECD states the trafficking of illicit 
drugs by sea into the Scandinavian countries is quantitatively minor. 
However, for four of the states the maritime sector is important because 
it is only one of two modes of importation feasible. Denmark is the ex­
ception because it is connected to central Europe. The high level of 
dependence and involvement on maritime commerce by the Scandinavian 
states ensures the availability of seaborne conduits by which drugs may 
readily be conveyed to these states. Collectively, the five Scan­
dinavian states confiscated nearly 1.9 m.ts. of illicit drugs from the 
maritime sector in the period 1982 - 1986. However, this figure is
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somewhat misleading in that 96.7% of that amount was confiscated solely 
by Sweden. Furthermore, irrespective of the moderate to high degree of 
homogeneity extant throughout the Scandinavian countries regarding the 
social bases for their drug scenes one finds no such homogeneity pervad­
ing their respective trafficking dimensions. The physical and technical 
aspects of the maritime trafficking trends observed in the respective 
states are variform in character. Consequently, a review of the 
maritime component of Scandinavia’s drug trade is best managed by in­
dividual analysis of each state.
5,2,2,1 Sweden
Sweden is the premier country in Scandinavia effecting maritime 
drug seizures. It stands out prominently as a result of the relatively 
high volume of maritime drug importations. More than 1.8 m.ts. of il­
licit drugs were seized from the maritime sector in the period 1982 - 
1986. In comparison to the other coastal states comprising the European 
fold of O.E.C.D. Sweden ranks tenth in maritime drug seizures based on 
quantity confiscated. In relation to the total quantity of drugs seized 
within Swedish territory (3.7 m.ts.) in the period cited, the maritime 
sector accounts for 47.7%. Though no correction to the figure can be 
attempted because of lack of data, it is fair to assume that the revised 
figure would stand at between 60 - 80%. Further support for this 
premise is elicited from a review of cocaine seizures for the period 
referenced. Though the amount of cocaine confiscated in Sweden is small 
all of it was imported by sea. Cannabis is the principal drug inter­
cepted in the maritime sector accounting by weight for 97.2% of the to­
tal quantity of drugs seized. The majority of maritime cannabis confis-
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catures involve hashish of Lebanese and Moroccan origin either concealed 
in freight or conveyed via a combination of sea and land modes of 
transportation. A route exemplary of the latter method is the export of 
hashish from Morocco to Spain by sea where it is then transported over­
land to Denmark and imported to Sweden by ferry* Cocaine is the only 
other drug seized in significant quantity from the maritime sector. By 
weight it accounted for 2.7% of all maritime drug seizures effected be­
tween 1982 - 1986. Heroin and amphetamines accounted for the remaining 
0.1% of drugs imported by sea. Ferries linking Sweden with Denmark and 
West Germany constitute the predominant class of vessel utilized for 
maritime drug importations based on number of seizures. Consequently, 
the ferry ports of Goteborg, Helsingborg, Malmo and Trelleborg are the 
ports of entry for drugs imported by ferry. The departure points for 
these drug importations are Frederikshavn, Helsingor and Copenhagen in 
Denmark and Travemunde in West Germany. The extent to which merchant 
shipping aside from ferries is involved is unknown. It is presumed that 
the ports noted above along with Stockholm are the principal landing 
sites for illicit drug consignments imported on commercial carriers. 
Vessels engaged in regional trade arriving from Belgium and the Nether­
lands along with ships coming from countries known for drug production 
or for serving as transit states are deemed likely transport modes. 
Yachts are another class of vessel utilized for drug importations. 
However, in terms of quantity of drugs imported, their role is believed 
to be small and confined to the summer season. Generally, the minute 
amounts of drugs imported on these vessels are acquired in Denmark, the 
Netherlands and West Germany and are intended for either personal use by 
the vessels* operators back home or limited circulation amongst friends
and relatives. The final aspect to be noted concerning Sweden’s in­
volvement in drug trafficking focuses on its role as a transit state. 
Though quantitatively indefinable, a certain percentage of drugs enter­
ing Sweden by sea are shipped onwards to both Norway and Finland. Vis- 
a-vis Norway the drugs are first imported by ferry to a Swedish port, 
notably Malmo, and then transported overland into Norway.63 In the case 
of Finland the method of importation to Sweden remains the same, but the 
drugs are instead transported overland to Stockholm where they are then 
re-exported by ferry to either Helsinki or Turku.64
5.2,2,2 Norway
According to the police in Norway "no official Norwegian statis­
tics are maintained regarding the transport modes” employed in drug 
trafficking.65 However, it is unofficially estimated that about 90% of 
all illicit drug importations are effected by sea, either directly or 
via Sweden from continental Europe.66 Actual seizure figures for the 
period 1982 - 1986 show that a mere 2 kgs. of illicit drugs were ap­
prehended in the maritime sector. This maritime confiscature figure is 
the lowest of all the coastal states in O.E.C.D. Of that total, am­
phetamines accounted by weight for 99.5%. Minute amounts of cocaine and 
LSD accounted for the balance. Because these figures fail to accurately 
depict the maritime trafficking situation in Norway some additional 
remarks of a qualitative nature are required. The principal drug im­
ported by sea is hashish transhipped through continental Europe. 
Amphetamines, heroin and LSD are additional drugs imported by sea, but 
on much lower orders of magnitude. In volumetric terms, the transporta­
tion of hashish by sea far outweighs the others. However, considering
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the high potency factor of the other categories of drugs it must be said 
that the quantities imported are sufficiently high in dosage terms, 
though minute in weight, so as to warrant attention. The ferry routes 
linking southeastern Norway with Denmark and West Germany are the 
maritime conduits of significance. The "ferry line between Kiel and 
Oslo is a very important smuggling route" as are the ferry routes link­
ing Hirtshals, Denmark with both Kristiansand and Oslo respectively.67 
Another significant route for direct importation is that linking 
Frederikshavn, Denmark with Larvik.68 Complementing these direct drug 
routes are the ferry connections between Sweden and continental Europe; 
of which the most important, from the Norwegian perspective, is the 
Copenhagen-Malmo link.69 Little is known about the role of cargo ships 
in the importation of drugs to Norway. It is presumed that container 
traffic is a vulnerable mode which is being utilized, but to what extent 
can only be speculated upon. This same dilemma of little knowledge ap­
plies to the clandestine mode of drug importation involving vessels 
specifically acquired for such purpose. Considering Norway’s unique 
coastal geography the country is extremely vulnerable to such activity. 
It is accepted as fact that drugs are being smuggled into Norway by 
various classes of small vessels, but the scope of the activity cannot 
be stated or estimated.70 Presumably, fishing boats and pleasure craft 
are the transport units involved. Yachts, in particular, are believed 
to play a role during the summer season; the basis for such activity and 
volumes smuggled being congruous to the Swedish situation. However, it 
must be said that this mode of drug smuggling can readily become more 
sinister, or may already have become so but has not been discovered yet.
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5 .2.2. 3 Finland
Maritime drug seizures in Finland are very small. It is fair to
say that the maritime sector plays only a minor role in the country’s
drug trade. For the period 1982 - 1986 maritime drug confiscatures 
totalled slightly over 2.3 kgs. of which cannabis accounted for 2.2 kgs. 
and the remaining 0.1 kgs. was split between amphetamines, heroin, LSD 
and methadone. In relation to the total quantity of drugs seized within 
Finnish territory (27.6 kgs.) in the years 1985 and 1986 the maritime 
sector accounted by weight for 14.6%. When the portion of confiscated 
drugs not seized at the frontier are discounted the figure rises to 
35.5%. Aircraft are the predominant transport mode by which drugs are 
smuggled into Finland accounting by weight for 47.7% after revision. 
Because the role of the maritime sector varies between the drug
categories Figure 5.8 provides a categorical analysis for the years 1985
and 1986. Ferries and passenger ships are the predominant mode of mari-
Figure 5.8 Finnish Maritime Drug Seizures By Drug Category, 1985-86.
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time transport accounting by weight for 96% of all maritime drug 
confiscatures.71 Cargo ships account for the remaining 4%.72 Because 
ferries are the principal mode of transport Helsinki and Turku are the 
primary ports of entry for drugs imported by sea. The ferry routes 
linking Stockholm, Sweden with both Helsinki and Turku respectively 
along with the route between Traveraunde, West Germany and Helsinki con­
stitute the principal routes of importation. In addition to these - 
direct routes there is the indirect route involving a combination of sea 
and terreal transportation modes. On this route the drugs sure first ex­
ported by ferry from Denmark to Sweden and then transported overland to 
Stockholm where they are re-exported on the Stockholm-Finland ferry 
routes. As noted in the section on Norway, the Copenhagen-Malmo ferry 
link is considered the major conduit for drugs between Denmark and 
Sweden and therefore is the primary one by which drugs destined for Fin­
land via Sweden first commence their journey from continental Europe. 
Lastly, complementing the above maritime modes of importation are yachts 
and pleasure craft. The perennial palingenesis of a recreational boat­
ing industry in the Baltic Sea during the summer season on an expansive 
scale provides a multitude of individual units of transport feasible for 
drug trafficking. Naturally, some of them are used to smuggle minute 
quantities of drugs from Sweden and West Germany into Finland. The 
character of this activity is identical to that observed in Norway and 
Sweden involving pleasure craft.
5.2,2.4 Denmark
Of the five Scandinavian countries Denmark maintains the least 
amount of information regarding the maritime drug trade. According to
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the quantitative data available, Denmark seized 37 kgs. of drugs during 
the period 1982 - 1986; all of it in the form of cannabis. In relation 
to total drug confiscatures within Danish territory (4.7 m.ts.) ex­
clusive of the Faeroes and Greenland the maritime figure when expressed 
as a percentage of the total is only a fraction of a percent. However, 
this figure is meaningless in light of the fact that there is no data 
maintained on the role of the maritime sector. Realistically, it is not 
an unreasonable proposition to presume that the maritime sector plays a 
minor role in the importation of drugs to Denmark. The country's land 
border with West Germany provides an easy overland frontier across which 
drugs may be imported. Control mechanisms are lax and the transporta­
tion infrastructure linking the two states is excellent. Furthermore, 
the proximity of Denmark to Belgium, the Netherlands and West Germany - 
states all known for drug consumption, distribution and production - 
lends credence to the theory that drugs travel predominantly overland to 
reach Denmark. Instead, it is the country's role as a transit state 
which ensures a vital role for the maritime sector in drug trafficking. 
Denmark's territorial proximity to Norway and Sweden makes the country 
an excellent conduit through which to send drugs to the latter states. 
While Denmark is not physically connected to Norway and Sweden, ferries 
and other vessels sustain a constant and practical link between them. 
Consequently, these maritime links have all become important modes of 
conveyance for drugs transhipped through Denmark to Finland, Norway and 
Sweden. The viability and extensiveness of their utilization has been 
well documented in earlier sections reviewing the latter three states. 
Hashish is the principal drug exported by sea followed by amphetamines, 
cocaine, heroin, LSD and other substances of abuse. Copenhagen is the
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major port in Denmark exporting drugs while Frederikshavn, Helsingor and 
Hirtshals all have secondary roles. Undoubtedly, cargo vessels trading 
regionally, particularly those engaged in pan-Scandic commerce, also 
play a role. The role of yachts has already been mentioned in earlier 
sections covering Finland, Norway and Sweden. To recap, during the sum­
mer months yachts voyage from Norway and Sweden to Denmark and while 
visiting the latter state acquire minute amounts of drugs to take back
with them. To be fair, it must be observed that, undoubtedly, Danish
yachts also play a role and transport minute quantities to Norway and 
Sweden. Little is truly known on how rife this activity is. From the 
law enforcement perspective the most worrisome aspect of the activity is 
the potentiality which exists for . a much more sinister form of drug 
trade to develop based on the benign to beneficial existence of the 
recreational boating industry.
5.2.2.5 Iceland
In relative terms one "almost cannot say that there is a real drug 
market in Iceland."73 Consequently, one may expect the quantity of il­
licit drugs required to meet domestic demand to be low. Ironically, 
Iceland confiscates a larger quantity of drugs from the maritime sector 
than both Finland and Norway combined. Put in proper perspective, 
however, this is not surprising. Iceland’s insular character and iso­
lated position in the North Atlantic mandates that the maritime sector
play an important role in commerce, both licit and illicit. Between 
1982 - 1986 maritime drug seizures totalled 20.3 kgs. In relation to 
the total quantity of drugs seized in Iceland (65.2 kgs.) for the period 
cited, the maritime sector accounted by weight for 31.2%. However, when
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the portion of confiscated drugs (45%) not intercepted while entering 
the country is deducted the revised figure rises to 56.6%. Cannabis, in 
the form of hashish, of Lebanese and Moroccan origin is the principal 
drug imported by sea. It accounted by weight for 96.5% of the total 
quantity of drugs interdicted in the maritime sector in the period 
noted. Amphetamines produced in Europe, notably the Netherlands, ranked 
second with a 2.5% share of the total quantity and heroin was third with 
a 1.0% share. The interesting aspect of these percentage figures is the 
ratio relationship between cannabis and the hard drugs. Though Iceland 
is a small country and many would not expect drug consumption to be a 
sophisticated matter with use oriented towards the hard drugs this trend 
is exactly what the maritime seizure figures support. Compared to 
nearly all the other OECD states analysed so far Iceland shows a higher 
proportion of hard drugs being imported by sea relative to cannabis than 
found elsewhere. This is all the more interesting when one considers 
the transport cost versus distance phenomenon which requires that drugs 
with low unitized value be shipped in greater quantity to generate 
profit while drugs of high unitized value be conveyed rapidly to des­
tination to realize profit. However, placed in proper perspective the 
anomaly is not significant. The transport restrictions imposed by 
Iceland’s distance from drug sources combined with the lack of a 
volumetrically-demanding market within means that the quantities of 
drugs imported will be shipped via any and all modes available without 
significant regard for scales of economy associated with organized traf­
ficking operations and structured routes. Most maritime drug imports to 
Iceland come on commercial carriers and, to a lesser degree, fishing 
vessels which have sailed to various European ports and acquired the
drugs while there. Copenhagen, Amsterdam and Rotterdam are the prin­
cipal ports abroad where drugs are obtained for import to Iceland.74 
Generally, the method of stowage and concealment of the drugs is similar 
to the modus operand! used for alcohol smuggling into Iceland.75 
Alternatively, concealment is within legitimate cargo consignments. 
Ports in Iceland where illicit drugs are landed include Hafnarf jordhur, 
Keflavik, Reykjavik and Straumsvik.
5,2.3 The North American Scene
Together, Canada and the United States constitute the largest 
trading bloc for illicit drugs in the world. As such it is only to be 
expected that the maritime sector plays an important role in the impor­
tation of drugs to North America. Moreover, the geographic insularity 
of the continent from select drug production areas mandates its 
utilization. In the period 1982 - 1986 these two states collectively 
interdicted more than 10,000 m.ts. of illicit drugs in the act of being 
smuggled into them. The neighbouring position of Canada and the U.S.A. 
vis-a-vis each other combined with the high degree of commonality in 
culture and social behaviour ensures that they experience, for the most 
part, the same trends in drug trafficking. Moreover, it means that they 
will serve as transit states for each other though the scope of these 
roles is unclear. For example, the Canadians believe that 50% of all 
cocaine entering their country transits the U.S. first.76 Figuratively 
speaking, the flow of drugs by sea into North America is a spectre of 
the old * China opium trade*, both in magnitude and affect, but which in 
reality is now a drug problem that constitutes an American drug evil.
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5.2.3.1 Canada
Of the two North American OECD members Canada effects the minor 
share of maritime drug confiscatures. In the period 1982 - 1986 Canada 
seized close to 76.9 m.ts. of illicit drugs from the maritime sector. 
In percentage terms, Canada accounted for only 0.74% of the total quan­
tity of drugs confiscated in the maritime sector amongst all the coastal 
OECD states under review in this treatise. Because this figure appears 
minute and trivializes the threat drugs pose to the country, it must be 
pointed out that if the U.S.'s seizure figures are removed from the 
group sura Canada’s seizure share rises to 19.7%. Overall, Canada ranks 
second in maritime drug seizures by weight. In relation to the total 
quantity of drugs confiscated within Canadian territory (112.6 m.ts.) 
for the period referenced, the maritime sector accounted for 68.3%. In 
contrast, the air sector accounted for 22.3% and the overland modes of 
conveyance accounted for the remaining 9.4%. Cannabis was the principal 
drug interdicted in the maritime sector accounting by weight for 98.2% 
of all maritime drug seizures during the period cited. A collection of 
psychotropic substances ranked a distant second with a 1.1% share while 
cocaine was third with 0.1% followed by heroin with the remaining 0.1%. 
However, it must be noted that the large percentage figure for the 
psychotropic substance category is more a statistical aberration induced 
by a massive seizure of methaqualone (1,138 kgs.) and large seizure of 
diazepam (100 kgs.) in 1982. Though an event in the early 1980s, 
notably 1981, maritime seizures of such substances since 1982 have 
ceased to occur.77 Therefore, from a qualitative perspective, it is 
better to consider cocaine as the second drug most frequently inter­
cepted in the maritime sector. A similar analysis to that above on
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maritime drug confiscatures but based on number of seizures in the years 
1984 - 1987 shows that cannabis accounts for 87% of all maritime seiz­
ures while cocaine accounts for 13%. Instead of describing the role of 
the maritime sector in relation to all the various categories of drugs 
imported to Canada Figure 5.9 presents a series of pie charts evaluating 
the roles of the various transportation sectors by drug category. Of 
the total quantity of cannabis trafficked by sea in the years 1982 -
1986 marijuana accounted by weight for the majority share but just 
barely with a 51.8% share while hashish accounted for 48.1%. Liquid 
cannabis in the form of hashish oil accounted for the remaining 0.1%.
Figure 5.9 Modes Of Drug Importation To Canada, 1982 - 1986.
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Marine cargo is deemed the most attractive method for smuggling 
illicit drugs into Canada and is used frequently. Most drug importa­
tions using this method involve cannabis coming from India, Jamaica, 
Lebanon and Pakistan; much of it routed and transhipped through major 
seaports in either Asia, Europe or the U.S. In many cases, the purpose 
of the indirect routing of drug-laden freight is to distance it from its 
true origin point by having the last port of call be one not known for 
drugs. Among the foreign ports used as trans-shipment sites are Hong 
Kong and Kao-hsiung in Asia; Newark and Seattle in the U.S.; and 
Antwerp, Felixstowe and Hamburg in Europe.78 In the period 1985 - 1987 
seventeen drug seizures were effected and more than 27 m.ts. of illicit 
drugs were found hidden in marine freight imported to Canada. In addi­
tion to the use of legitimate cargo for smuggling drugs there has been a 
moderate increase in the trafficking of drugs by ships’ crews. In that 
same period 40 drug seizures involving crew members were effected from 
cargo ships, fishing vessels and cruiseships. The majority of these 
seizures involved small quantities of drugs weighing between one to a 
few tens of kilograms. In contrast, the majority of clandestine impor­
tations by sea involve motherships carrying multi-ton consignments of 
cannabis. Generally, the vessels employed are old coastal freighters 
and yachts. Most of the activity occurs along the eastern seaboard of 
Canada, particularly off the southeastern coast of Nova Scotia and 
Newfoundland, while on the Canadian Westcoast the principal maritime 
area for clandestine importations is the western coast of Vancouver 
Island. Cannabis is the principal drug imported this way with the bulk 
of it being marijuana exported from Colombia followed, on a secondary 
level, by hashish from Lebanon and Morocco. Other routes traversed, but
on a lesser scale and involving more the use of fishing vessels and
yachts, include those used for the importation of marijuana from Jamaica
to the Canadian Eastcoast and from Thailand to British Columbia. 
Additionally, it is believed though not corroborated by actual interdic­
tions that drugs are being imported to British Columbia from Colombia's 
Pacific coast and Mexico's Westcoast both directly and via the U.S.'s 
northwestern coastal states of Oregon and Washington.
Based on weight, most maritime drug confiscatures involve drugs 
either concealed in or disguised as freight and those intercepted from
clandestine smuggling operations. However, in terms of number of
seizures the majority of drug confiscatures are effected from in­
dividuals and their baggage while entering Canada by ferry and, to a 
much lesser degree, by pleasure craft, cruiseships and canoes. Pas­
sengers on the ferries linking the U.S. and Canada along both the east 
and west coasts of North America and on the Great Lakes accounted for 
86% of all maritime drug seizures effected from individuals travelling 
by ship during the years 1985 - 1987.79 The majority of these seizures 
involved small drug amounts intended for personal use. An analysis of 
Canadian ports serving as landing sites for drugs based on quantity 
seized shows that Montreal accounts for the largest share with 85.9% 
followed by St. John's with 11.9% and Vancouver with 2.2%. 
Contrastingly, if the same sort of analysis is done based on number of 
seizures then Yarmouth leads with a 55.9% share followed by Victoria 
with 26.3% and Vancouver with 4.8%. Montreal is the primary port of 
destination for drugs concealed in cargo or, if not the final 
destination, the entry point for drugs being transhipped through the 
port bound elsewhere in Canada. Montreal’s prominent role as a maritime
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entry point for illicit drugs is believed to be because organized traf­
ficking groups in Canada are based there. On the other hand, Yarmouth 
dominates in terms of number of seizures because it is the Canadian ter­
minus of the Gulf of Maine ferry link with Portland, Maine in the U.S.
5,2,3,2 The United States of America
The United States intercepts the largest quantity of illicit drugs 
in the process of being imported by sea per annum over all other 
countries in the world. During the period 1982 - 1986 more than 9,971.6 
m.ts. of illicit drugs were interdicted in the maritime sector. 
Expressed in percentage terms, the U.S. accounted for 96.2% of the total 
quantity of drugs confiscated from the maritime sector by all the coas­
tal OECD states combined. In relation to the total amount of drugs in­
tercepted within U.S. territory®0 (12,423.8 m.ts.) for the period cited, 
the maritime sector accounted for 80.3% (the figure already corrected). 
Cannabis was the principal drug confiscated from the maritime sector ac­
counting by weight for 99.6% of the total quantity of drugs seized 
therein. Of the total amount of cannabis seized in the maritime sector 
for the period given 99.3% of it was marijuana while hashish accounted 
for the remaining 0.7%. Hashish oil was also seized but the quantity, 
when expressed in percent, is minuscule totalling a mere 0.003% of the 
cannabis total. Albeit distantly, cocaine ranked second in maritime 
drug confiscatures accounting for 0.35% of the total quantity of drugs 
interdicted in the maritime sector. However, it must be observed that 
though the percent share appears as a fraction of a percent, in ac­
tuality the amount of cocaine seized from the seaborne modes of. con­
veyance amounted to over 35.5 m.ts. in the period referenced. Vis-a-vis
304
the total amount of cocaine seized in the maritime sector by the coastal 
OECD states as a group the U.S. accounted by weight for 98.4% of all 
maritime cocaine confiscatures. Heroin ranked third in maritime drug 
confiscatures for the period given with a minuscule fraction of a per­
cent share followed by opium and, lastly, various psychotropic sub­
stances; the latter two categories accounting for infinitesimal shares. 
Instead of discussing the role of the maritime transport sector in drug 
importation Figure 5.10 offers a series of pie charts graphically 
portraying the roles of the various transport sectors by drug category.
Figure 5.10 Modes Of Drug Importation To The U.S.A., 1982 - 1986.
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The bulk share of illicit drugs imported by sea are shipped clan­
destinely and privately, either directly on vessels specifically ac­
quired for such purpose or via mothership operations. Among the sub­
305
stances commonly imported by one of these methods are marijuana of 
Colombian, Jamaican and Thai origin along with hashish of Lebanese and 
Pakistani origin. A third method of covert importation by sea utilized 
involves both the atmospheric and maritime sectors but with the method 
and site of actual trans-shipment subject to variation. In the first 
scenario the drug consignments are flown from Colombia to desolate is­
lands in the Caribbean, notably in the Bahamas, where the aircraft land 
and transfer the drugs to small vessels which then convey the illicit 
cargoes to the U.S. In the second trans-shipment scenario the aircraft 
do not land but simply drop their drug loads to waiting vessels, either 
in Bahamian or U.S. coastal waters, which retrieve the drugs and 
transport them to the U.S. The latter method has been frequently util­
ized for the importation of Jamaican cannabis. The basis for the 
prominence of the clandestine methods of importation is because of the 
dominance of marijuana, in volumetric terms, in the US drug market. As 
commented upon in the beginning of this chapter, the low unitized value 
of marijuana necessitates that it be shipped in bulk in order to justify 
the large capital investment in transportation units and maximize 
profit. Lastly, it must be noted that clandestine drug importation is 
not restricted to the Eastcoast and Gulfcoast of the country nor to can­
nabis only. Large amounts of cocaine are now being imported this way 
and clandestine drug importation by sea is transpiring along the Pacific 
coast of North America. However, less is known about these activities. 
It is believed that the scale of activity on the Pacific side is less 
and, predominantly, involves cannabis originating from Colombia, Mexico 
and, on a lower level, Thailand.
Marine cargo is the other important method by which illicit drugs
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are imported by sea to the U.S. However, the weight of the average 
shipment is less than that observed with the clandestine methods. Two 
factors are responsible.for this trend. Imprimis, constraints are im­
posed on the amount of drug which may be concealed in a unit of cargo by 
the cubic dimensions of the hiding places. Secondly, select hard drugs 
are shipped in cargo but because of their potency factors the quantity 
shipped at one time need not be large. Cannabis, both in the form of - 
hashish and marijuana, accounts by weight for the majority share of il­
licit drugs imported this way. Cocaine and heroin account for the minor 
share. In particular, Golden Triangle heroin is imported this way, both 
directly to the ports of Los Angeles, New York and San Francisco and in­
directly to the aforementioned ports via transit states such as Hong 
Kong, Japan, Taiwan and, vis-a-vis Burmese and Laotian heroin, 
Thailand.91 Generally, the purpose for transhipping the heroin-laden 
cargo is to either obscure the actual source of the cargo or repack the 
drugs in other cargo which it is hoped will receive less attention by US 
customs inspectors upon entry. Cargo documentation may be altered as 
well. In contrast, the majority of Southwest Asian heroin comes by air 
while most Mexican heroin enters the U.S. via overland modes of 
transportation. In regards to cocaine it must be stated that conceal­
ment within or as cargo has been the principal method of effecting 
maritime importation throughout the 1980s. However, of late, a change 
has been noted in the maritime patterns of cocaine trafficking. It now 
appears "that there has been a shift from the * traditional * bulk 
marijuana shipments seen in the past” in the covert trade "to the 
smaller, more easily concealed, but far more valuable, cargo of cocaine" 
(ie. cocaine is increasingly being imported by clandestine methods of
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shipment).82 Evidence corroborating this maxim as fact are the large 
seizures of cocaine effected in Jamaican, Haitian and Honduran waters 
from non-commercial vessels.83
The classes of vessels employed in smuggling drugs into the U.S. 
are diverse ranging from small pleasure craft to giant tankers. 
However, based on the methods of importation commonly utilized, some 
general observations can be made regarding the vessel classes involved. 
Essentially, the types of vessels utilized can be differentiated into 
three vessel groupings based on method of use. The first are the common 
carriers (eg. containerships, break-bulk freighters, passenger liners 
and tank ships). They are involved either because the cargoes carried 
and routes served make them attractive modes of conveyance or because 
their crews are engaged in trafficking both on an individual basis and 
as part of some larger conspiracy devised by a trafficking organization. 
Containerships are the most common vessel class simply because they are 
the principal mode of dry cargo shipping engaged in U.S. foreign trade. 
Consequently, a substantial portion of the illicit drugs imported, 
either concealed within or disguised els freight, ELrrive on container­
ships. Subsumed under the broEid category of private vessels, the second 
grouping encompEtsses the small coastal freighters and large fishing ves­
sels functioning as motherships. Generally, these vessels are old and 
have been structurally modified so els to carry lELrge drug shipments. 
Usually, a criminal organization is involved and the entire crew is 
pELrty to the trafficking conspiracy. The vessels which rendez-vous with 
the motherships vary, but typically include sailboats, sport fishing 
boats, cabin cruisers and cigELrette boats.84 Also subsumed under the 
category of private vessels, the third grouping comprises vessels rang-
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ing in size from 40-foot sailing boats to 70-foot shrimpers which carry 
multi-ton drug consignments and are used for direct drug importations of 
a clandestine nature. These vessels are sufficiently sturdy to sail on 
the ocean yet possess an appearance innocuous enough not to attract the
same degree of attention as certain other types of vessels will when in
given coastal areas. Measured in quantitative terms, it is observed 
that the private vessels dominate in involvement; both in the numbers 
involved and the quantities of drugs imported by sea. Considering that
marijuana is the principal drug imported this is not surprising. The
greatest change in the maritime importation of drugs to the U.S. in the 
1980s has been the proliferation in use of small vessels. Smugglers 
today are using high performance pleasure craft and fishing boats with 
state-of-the-art equipment.8 5
Although the database is incomplete enough data has been collected 
by the USCG to permit a fair analysis of the role of various flags of 
registry in the clandestine importation of drugs to the U.S.86 Table 
5.7 offers a statistical analysis of the role of vessel nationality in
relation to U.S. marijuana interdictions in the maritime sector. Be­
cause the source of the data is the USCG it has to be noted that the 
statistics reflect drug confiscatures effected mostly from non­
commercial shipping which was engaged in covert importation. Therefore, 
Table 5.7 is a complete representation of the role of vessel nationality 
in the U.S. *s clandestine drug trade.
The part of the U.S. most often the site for clandestine drug im­
portations by sea is the coastal zone in the southeast extending from
Key West, Florida northward to the border between South and North 
Carolina. Based on USCG seizure statistics for 1986, 81.8% by weight of
309
Table 5.7 U.S. Marijuana Seizures By Vessel Nationality For 1985-86.
Vessel Nationality Number Percent Share Quantity Seized Percent Share
(flag of registry) of Cases (by cases) (Kgs.) (by quantity)
Bahamas 5 1.4% 23,010.8 1.3%
Barbados 1 0.3% 22,697.8 1.3%
Brit. Virgin Isl. 1 0.3% 3,919.0 0.2%
Canada 2 0.6% 589.7 0.03%
Cayman Isl. 5 1.4% 17,429.8 1.0%
Colombia 9 2.5% 124,035.0 7.2%
France 2 0.6% 10,670.8 0.6%
Guatemala 1 0.3% 17,111.8 1.0%
Haiti 5 1.4% 14,787.1 0.9%
Honduras 9 2.5% 57,529.6 3.4%
Jamaica 1 0.3% 2,041.2 0.1%
Mexico 5 1.4% 41,449.3 2.4%
Panama 14 3.9% 182,607.9 10.7%
U.K. 4 1.1% 31,104.2 1.8%
U.S.A. 258 71.5% 652,596.8 38.1%
Venezuela 1 0.3% 16,510.8 1.0%
stateless 38 10.5% 494,984.6 28.9%
Source: USCG, General Law Enforcement Digest Of Interdiction Statistics
________ of 16 January 1987 (Washington, D.C., 1987). p. 10.___________
all maritime drug interceptions are effected therein.87 When the same 
analysis is done based on the number of seizures the figure is nearly 
identical at 83.9%.88 Table 5.8 reviews USCG drug seizures for all of 
the maritime regions enveloping the U.S. The principal ports of entry 
for drugs imported in marine cargo and by crew members sure New York, 
Baltimore and Savannah on the EsLStcoast, New Orleans on the Gulfcoast 
sind Los Angeles, San Francisco and Seattle on the Westcoast.
Lastly, it must be acknowledged that though the U.S. is 
predominantly a maritime importer of illicit drugs it is also a minor 
exporter of drugs by sea. Virtually all the drugs exported by sea go to 
Canada, mostly by ferry, fishing vessel smd plesLsure craft. As the 
Canadian section already covered this topic, nothing further is said 
here in relation to this trade.
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Table 5.8 USCG Seizure Statistics By Maritime Region For 1986.
Site/Region
Number of 
Seizures
Quantity Seized 
(Kgs.)
Percent Share 
Based on Qty.
NEW ENGLAND (Maine south 
to Delaware/Virginia 
coastal boundary)
3 27,519.5 3.6%
MID-ATLANTIC (Virginia 
south to North Carolina/ 
South Carolina boundary)
2 635.5 0.08%
SOUTHEAST U.S./CARIBBEAN 
(South Carolina south to 
Key West. Florida)
266 631,175.6 81.8%
GULF of MEXICO (Panama 
City, Florida west to 
Texas/Mexico boundary)
13 32,230.0 4.2%
CENTRAL/GREAT LAKES 
(Encompasses the Great 
Lakes and adjoining 
waterways within U.S.)
5 137.5 0.02%
PACIFIC DISTRICTS 
(Embraces entire U.S. 
Westcoast and Alaskan 
Hawaiian coastal waters)
25 20,892.8 2.7%
ATLANTIC OCEAN (Area 
outside USCG districts) 3 59,257.4 7.7%
PACIFIC OCEAN (Area 
outside USCG districts) 0 0
Totals for United States 317 771.842.3 100.0%
Source: USCG. General Law Enforcement Digest Of Interdiction
Statistics of 16 January 1987 (Washington, D.C., 1987), p. 9.
In closing out the review of the U.S.'s maritime drug scene it has 
to be said that the trafficking industry - if one may be permitted to 
call it that - is both sophisticated and versatile and capable of im­
mediate response to threats to its survival. The drug trafficking scene 
in the U.S. is basically one of tense balance created by two opposing 
forces which are constantly trying to outdo the other. When one gains a 
little headway over the other the latter amends its operation so as to 
regain the equilibrium. The validity of this theorem is readily 
evidenced in the various dynamic developments observed in the U.S.'s
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maritime drug trade over the last ten years. Several examples may be 
cited of both the traffickers* adaptability and ingenuity in responding 
to US enforcement initiatives. One example is the restructuring and 
rerouting of sailing routes. In the early 1980s maritime drug smugglers 
normally sailed through the Yucatan and Windward Passages to reach the 
U.S. However, as American enforcement initiatives clamped down on the 
use of these channels by creating a gauntlet of interception craft the
traffickers countered by either acquiring vessels with large fuel
capacities and extended ranges or outfitting their own with extra tanks 
so as to enable them to transit the many passages extant in the Lesser 
Antilles." Another example is the increased sophistication and com­
plexity in concealment techniques. In the 1970s and early 1980s many
drug traffickers simply conveyed their drug loads without any real at­
tempt at concealment. However, as law enforcement efforts were stepped 
up and these shipments began to be frequently seized, ingenuity in con­
cealment and deception evolved to new levels. Vessels are now either 
built or reconstructed with false compartments which are both hard to 
detect and difficult to access. A third example is the rise in the 
utilization of * air-drops*. This method eliminates the need for terreal 
trans-shipment sites, which aircraft otherwise require to offload drugs, 
and consequently reduces all risks associated with such operation. 
Aircraft on the ground are vulnerable and the support base is easily 
targeted once discovered. With the * air-drop* method the actual trans­
shipment sites may vary and be altered on short notice if not 
instantaneously. A fourth example is the emergence of counter­
intelligence systems by the drug trafficking groups for use against the 
U.S.’s law enforcement agencies. The acquisition of informants and
placement of spies within the pertinent enforcement agencies to keep 
watch over the latters* activities and operations are examples of their 
counter-intelligence efforts.90 However, the most ominous development
has been the traffickers* acquisition of reconnaissance aircraft to con­
duct counter-surveillance operations against the interdiction and sur­
veillance units operated by the U.S. authorities.91 A fifth example is 
the implementation by the traffickers of the convoy system of smuggling. 
Under this system numerous drug-laden vessels approach the U.S. coast 
simultaneously thus overwhelming the interdiction forces available.92 
In this form of smuggling assault, which may be labelled a drug * blitz­
krieg*, the traffickers accept a loss ratio of one out of three or
four.93 The profits realized on the drug loads which get through cover 
the lost vessels and drug cargoes - in essence the 25 - 33% loss ratio 
is part of the course of doing business. A sixth example is the
traffickers* use of false distress calls to lure or divert patrol ves­
sels away from their stations. While the patrol craft are responding to 
the false signals the drug smugglers* vessels slip through the area that 
the patrol craft normally patrolled. A final example, which emphasizes 
the integration of maritime drug routes from source to destination, is 
the traffickers* acquisition of coastal property in the New England 
region. As the traffickers shifted their smuggling activities northward 
away from the southeast in the 1980s they purchased and leased coastal 
property which was both secluded and had adequate docking facilities for 
their vessels to berth at.94 This granted them legitimate facades be­
hind which they could land drugs covertly without raising much interest 
in their activities.
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5,2,4 The Situation Amongst The Pacific OECD Members
Compared to the maritime drug scenes observed amongst the OECD 
states in both Europe and North America it has to be said that the level 
of maritime drug trafficking amongst the Pacific OECD states is of a 
considerably lower order of magnitude. Together, Australia, Japan and 
New Zealand confiscated more than 16.2 m.ts. of illicit drugs in the 
period 1982 - 1986. In regard to the latter two states a unique trend 
is the high proportion of drugs other than cannabis seized in relation 
to the total amounts of drugs confiscated from their respective maritime 
sectors. Though the Japanese situation cannot be fully evaluated due to 
data problems it is observed that methamphetamines account for a sig­
nificant portion of the drugs imported by sea. In New Zealand’s case 
heroin, opium and LSD account for 2.9% of the total quantity of drugs 
interdicted in the maritime sector. While this percentage seems small 
and the actual quantities involved were small, it must be borne in mind 
that relative to the cannabis/non-cannabis ratios seen in most other 
OECD countries the figure is substantial. In addition to Japan and New 
Zealand, only Finland, Iceland and Norway possess statistical similarity 
with the non-cannabis component comprising higher percentage shares of 
the total quantities seized in their respective maritime sectors.
5,2,4,1 Australia
Of the three coastal OECD states in the Pacific region, Australia 
confiscates the largest share of illicit drugs imported via the maritime 
medium. In the period 1982 - 1986 more than 15.7 m.ts. of illicit drugs 
were intercepted in the maritime sector. In percentage terms, Australia 
accounted for about 96% of the total quantity of drugs confiscated from
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the maritime sector amongst the three Pacific OECD states. Overall, 
Australia ranks tenth in maritime drug seizures by weight for the 
aforementioned period amongst the entire OECD group. In relation to the 
total quantity of drugs seized within Australian territory (22.5 m.ts.) 
including Tasmania, but excluding the many islands under protectorate 
status, for the period referenced above the maritime sector accounted 
for 70.1%. When the portion of seized drugs not intercepted while 
crossing the frontier is deducted the revised figure stands at 81.7%. 
Cannabis is the principal drug interdicted in the maritime sector ac­
counting by weight for 99.73% of all maritime drug confiscatures. Be­
cause of the way seizure records are collected and maintained no defini­
tive differentiation between the roles hashish and marijuana play can be 
proffered. Heroin ranks a distant second with a 0.26% share while 
cocaine, opium and amphetamines collectively account for the remaining 
0.01%. Instead of describing the role of the maritime sector’vis-a-vis 
the various categories of drugs imported Figure 5.11 presents a series 
of pie charts portraying the roles of the various transportation sectors 
in Australian drug importations.
The concealment of drugs within marine cargo is the predominant 
method of maritime drug importation to Australia. Between 1982 - 1986
seafreight was the location of 73.3% of the total quantity of drugs in­
tercepted entering Australia by sea. Clandestine importation provided 
an additional 26.3% while the use of the ship itself as a cache for 
drugs accounted for a further 0.3%. Passengers arriving by sea and un­
accompanied baggage accounted for fractional shares of the remaining
0.1%. A substantial portion of the drug seizures effected from marine 
cargo involve containerized cargoes.95 Conversely, most of the drugs
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Figure 5.11 Modes Of Drug Importation To Australia, 1983 - 1986.
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found onboard ships usually are discovered either in the crews’ quarters 
or stashed amongst the vessels’ bulkheads or in false compartments.96 
Because most drugs entering Australia by sea arrive in cargo the prin­
cipal entry points are the seaports. As Table 5.9 shows, Sydney in New 
South Wales, Melbourne in Victoria, Darwin in the Northern Territory and 
Carnarvon in Western Australia are the prominent ports of entry for il­
licit drugs. Though Shark Bay is listed in Table 5.9 it must be noted 
that the quantity confiscated (1.9 m.ts.) involved a clandestine impor­
tation attempt by private vessel. Because large stretches of the 
coastline along northern and western Australia extending from Gove 
westward to Cape Cuvier are sparsely populated and uninhabited, the AFP 
believes that clandestine drug importations are more prevalent than 
seizure records indicate.97 Generally, these drug importations either
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Table 5.9 Major Ports And Sites Of Entry For Illicit Drugs In 
Australia, 1982 - 1986.
Port/Site of Entry Quantity (Kgs.) Percent Share
Sydney 6,267.557 39.8%
Melbourne 2,524.397 16.0%
Shark Bay 1,919.000 12.2%
Darwin 980.043 6.2%
Carnarvon 885.008 5.6%
Other ports (24) 11.454 0.1% .
Clandestine landings
along the coasts of
Northern Territory & 3,170.000 20.1%
Western Australia
Total 15,757.460 100.0%
Source: Table compiled by author from data contained in the
seizure database maintained by the ACS for the years
1982 - 1986 and in the AFP’s annual reoorts.
involve yachts engaged in direct landings or mothership operations. 
Cannabis is the principal drug landed via this method. However, as 
documented by the Royal Commission of Inquiry into Drug Trafficking, 
heroin is also imported by yacht.98 Though the database is incomplete 
it, nevertheless, is possible to present a fair listing of those 
countries which serve as the departure points for drugs bound for 
Australia by sea. As Table 5.10 shows, based on those cases where such 
data was collected, over 60% of the total quantity of drugs imported by 
sea departed from Lebanon and Pakistan.99 The prominence of these two 
countries indicates that hashish is the principal type of cannabis im­
ported by sea though no quantitative data is available to corroborate 
this assertion.
In addition to the import trade in illicit drugs there also exists 
a minor export trade in drugs by sea. Australia serves as a transit 
state for drug shipments originating from elsewhere and destined for New 
Zealand. Furthermore, it is an exporter in its own right. This is be­
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cause Australia produces drugs domestically and a minute share of that 
production is exported to New Zealand. The trans-Tasman shipping link 
between the two states is the conduit employed to effect export. More 
will be said on this aspect in the following section on New Zealand.
Table 5.10 Origin Points Of Australian Drug Imports By Sea, 1982-86.
Departure Point Percent Share Based on Weight
Lebanon 35.9%
Pakistan 24.4%
Singapore 17.1%
India 8.2%
Philippines 6.7%
Thailand 6.1%
Italy 0.8%
Hong Kong 0.6%
U.S.A. 0.2%
Other states (14) 0.01%
Total 100.0%
Source: Data compiled by author from seizure statistics 
statistics collected and kept by both the ACS 
and AFP for the years 1982 - 1986.
5.2*4,2 New Zealand
In terms of magnitude, the maritime drug trade of New Zealand is 
comparable to that observed in most of the Scandinavian states except 
for Sweden. In the period 1982 - 1986 New Zealand seized 37.8 kgs. of 
illicit drugs from the maritime sector. In relation to the total quan­
tity of drugs seized in New Zealand (2,015.0 kgs.) for that period the 
maritime sector accounted for 1.8%. Cannabis was the principal drug in­
terdicted in the maritime sector accounting by weight for 97% of all 
maritime drug confiscatures. Though figures are not available it is 
known that hashish accounted for most of the cannabis intercepted. 
Heroin ranked a distant second with a 1.6% share while opium accounted 
for 1.3%. Minute amounts of cocaine and LSD were also confiscated from
318
the maritime sector and they accounted for the remaining 0.1%. Aside 
from cannabis, nearly all other drugs enter New Zealand by air. Most of 
the hashish imported by sea is transported by containerships and RD-RO 
ships engaged in trans-Tasman trade with Australia and by the variety of 
ships engaged in inter-regional commerce with Southeast Asia and India. 
Overall though, containerships appear to be the principal carriers 
involved. Vis-a-vis LSD the trans-Tasman route is considered the prime 
conduit for its importation by sea. It is believed that seamen serving 
on ships engaged in this trade effect the import of LSD as a result of 
either their membership in or affiliation with New Zealand drug 
gangs.100 In context with the trans-Tasman trafficking scene it must be 
noted that Australia is usually serving as the trans-shipment point for 
the drug consignments as their origin is elsewhere. Concurrently, 
Australia also functions outrightly e l s  a minor drug exporter because 
seme of the heroin and LSD exported to New Zealand are refined and 
manufactured there. In terms of method of shipment, it is found that in 
about 95% of the cases crew members are responsible while in the re­
mainder of cases the drugs are concealed within freight. As Table 5.11
Table 5.11 Principal Ports Of Entry For Drugs To New Zealand, 1984-86.
Port of Seizure Percent Share Based on Weight
New Plymouth 43.7%
Auckland 43.1%
Wellington 3.8%
Tauranga 3.2%
Christchurch 3.1%
InvercELrgill 2.5%
All Others 0.6%
Total 100.0%
Source: Data derived from statistical database on drug seizures 
maintained by NZ Customs Dept, for years 1984 - 1986.
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shows, the principal ports of entry for illicit drugs to New Zealand, 
based on weight, are New Plymouth and Auckland.
5. 2.4, 3 Javan
In contrast to all the other coastal OECD states Japan is unique 
in that stimulants, primarily methamphetamine, are one of the two prin­
cipal substances imported by sea; the other being cannabis. The quan­
tities of other drugs seized from the seaborne modes of conveyance are 
minute and insignificant. Unfortunately, Japan is another country where 
the quantitative information on the role of the various transport sec­
tors is poor. The data required for determining the portion of cannabis 
transported by sea is not compiled thus preventing quantitative assess­
ment of the proportional relationship of cannabis and the stimulants 
vis-a-vis each other and in relation to all other drugs imported by sea. 
However, sufficient information is gathered regarding stimulant seizures 
such that some inferences may be drawn based on a comparison of maritime 
stimulant seizures to national cannabis seizures. From this comparison, 
it is possible to calculate the range within which the percentage share 
that maritime stimulant seizures possess in relation to total maritime 
seizures of all drugs must fall. Without elaborating on the mathematics 
involved, the result obtained is that stimulant seizures accounted for 
somewhere between 34.5 - 51.4% of the total quantity of drugs inter­
dicted in the maritime sector during the period 1981 - 1985.
Because Japan is a fragmented insular entity all imported drugs 
must come by air or sea. Information obtained from intelligence ac­
tivities and police investigations indicates that the maritime sector 
plays the more significant role. Close to 74% (629 kgs.) of the total
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quantity of stimulants seized in Japan during the period 1981 - 1985
were either confiscated from the maritime sector directly or apprehended 
later within the country but ascertained to have been imported by 
sea.101 Though complete data is lacking, in a majority of cases the 
source of the stimulants imported is established.102 As noted in Chap­
ter 3, the bulk of stimulants seized in the period 1980 - 1985 came from 
South Korea. However, the overall trend depicted obscures the fact that 
for the middle years of the decade (1984/85) Taiwan was, by far, the 
most prominent source of stimulants imported by sea. It provided by 
weight 76.6% of all stimulants seized in Japan during 1984 and 1985 
while South Korea provided 13.4%. The majority of stimulants imported 
by sea are either transported on commercial carriers or shipped clandes­
tinely on fishing vessels. In general, it is thought that the entire 
western coastline of Japan functions as one elongated perimeter across 
which illicit stimulants enter the country from the sea. Japan’s 
proximity to shipping centres like South Korea and Taiwan combined with 
the constant flux in marine personnel and high level of trade ensures 
the utilization of its western coast for drug importation.103 The por­
tion of stimulants imported by sea on commercial carriers are generally 
carried by crew members or concealed within cargo. Most of the portion 
of stimulants shipped clandestinely into Japan by sea are landed either 
at small local ports or on offshore islands or along isolated beaches. 
The use of small local ports as landing sites has increased during the 
1980s for two reasons. Imprimis, the enhanced vigilance maintained by 
customs officials at the major ports in recent years has magnified the 
risk of detection of drug consignments shipped on comnercial carriers. 
Secondly, the local ports tend to be areas of the country where the
presence of the local constabulary and other regulatory agencies is 
relatively light.104 Typically, the clandestine importation of 
stimulants by sea involves South Korean fishing vessels which have been 
chartered by drug trafficking groups for such activity. In other cases 
where the drug consignments are landed at local ports it is the crews on 
local trading vessels which are responsible. Figure 5.12 presents a pie 
chart depicting the roles of the various modes of transport and methods 
of concealment used in maritime stimulant smuggling to Japan. Usually, 
the flags of registry of the vessels involved are those of South Korea 
and Taiwan.
Figure 5.12 Maritime Modes Of Drug Transport And Concealment In Japan.
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Detailed information on the importation of cannabis to Japan is 
sparse. As was established earlier, it is theorized that cannabis ac-
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counts for somewhere between 48.6 - 65.5% of the total quantity of il­
licit drugs imported by sea. When translated into actual quantity it 
means that somewhere between 1.2 - 1.8 m.ts. of cannabis may have been 
imported by sea during the years 1981 - 1985. Though the sum of na­
tional cannabis confiscatures for this period (1.19 m.ts.) does not com­
pletely validate the range offered it comes extremely close to the lower 
parameter such that it can neither be discounted. Further support for 
the range is derived from the fact that drug seizures represent only a 
fraction of what is actually trafficked. Hence, it may instead be said 
that the range represents a likely volume of maritime cannabis smuggling 
overall during the period referenced. Because Japan produces a fair
amount of cannabis and the air sector plays a more significant role in 
cannabis importation than is observed elsewhere, it is not unreasonable 
to presume that maritime seizures of cannabis may only account by weight 
for between 25 - 50% of national cannabis confiscatures for any chosen 
timeframe. What is definite is that the principal type of cannabis im­
ported to Japan is marijuana. Unfortunately, no data is available on 
the departure points and sources for cannabis imported by sea to Japan. 
It is believed that the Philippines, Thailand and India are the
prominent sources for the cannabis so imported. Instead of discussing 
the roles of various Japanese seaports as points of entry for illicit 
drugs Table 5.12 summarizes their involvement.
The final point to be noted concerning Japan is its role as a 
transit state. Both Canada and the U.S. believe that Japan functions as 
a trans-shipment point for drugs emanating from Southeast Asia, in par­
ticular heroin but also marijuana. Japan’s high level of trade with
both Southeast Asia and North America means that it is in an excellent
323
Table 5.12 Japanese Seaports Effecting Drug Seizures, 1980 - 1984.
Seaport 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 Total % Share
Funabashi 0 0 0 1 0 1 2.3%
Hakata 0 1 6 0 0 7 16.3%
Kagoshima 1 0 0 0 0 1 2.3%
Kaizuka 1 0 0 0 0 1 2.3%
Kobe 3 2 0 0 1 6 14.0%
Mizushima 1 0 0 0 0 1 2.3%
Nagoya 0 1 0 0 0 1 2.3%
Osaka 0 2 2 1 1 6 14.0%
Shimonoseki 1 6 0 1 0 8 18.6%
Tokyo 0 0 1 1 0 2 4.7%
Toyohashi 0 0 0 1 0 1 2.3%
Tsushima 0 0 0 1 1 2 4.7%
Uno 0 2 0 0 0 2 4.6%
Yokohama 1 0 0 1 2 4 9.3%
Other ports (7) 0 0 0 0 0 0 -
TOTALS 8 14 9 7 5 43 100.0%
Source: NPA, Drug Problems In Japan 1985 - Statistical Data
(Tokyo, 1985), p. 3. (Table revised by author.)
position to serve as a transit link through which drugs may be exported 
from the source areas and refining centres to North American consumers. 
The high level of commerce means there is a constant flow of maritime 
traffic on which to transport drugs. Furthermore, the routing of drug 
consignments through Japan permits the traffickers to either mask or 
obscure the true origin of their drug-laden cargoes before arrival at 
the destination ports. This is accomplished in one of two ways. 
Imprimis, passively, by simply having their drug shipments transit Japan 
the smugglers hope that the customs inspectors in North America will 
give less attention to the drug-laden ships and cargoes arriving from 
there.105 This is because Japan is not seen as a prominent drug 
country. Secondly, actively, by deception involving either alterations 
to bills of lading or shifting of the drug consignments from one con­
cealment site to another while temporarily present in Japan. The reason 
is the same as that just given previously. Legitimate cargoes of
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Japanese origin commonly receive less attention than cargo consignments 
which show their origin to be other countries in Southeast Asia.
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VI. THE ROLE OF ORGANIZED CRIME.
6.1 Synoptic Overview
A principal facet of the maritime drug trade alluded to in the 
preceding pages but never elaborated upon is the organizational 
component. Commonly, the phrases "organized crime" and "criminal 
conspiracy" are used to define those illicit activities which involve a 
number of individuals operating in tandem and within a management struc­
ture of hierarchial character. Unfortunately, the use of these phrases 
simplifies the reality of the character and role of organization in the 
drug trade. A review of the organized criminal element within drug 
trafficking reveals that while some of the general assumptions and 
preconceptions we may have of the activity derived from film, litera­
ture, media reports and police investigations are indeed valid there 
also exists a deeper dimension that is neither well-recognized or 
appreciated. Yes, it is true that groups like the Mafia, Triads and
Yakuza are involved in drug trafficking. However, in many instances 
there is more to it with the structure of a given drug trade being very 
complex and transcending simple ethnocentric activities. Frequently, 
the basis for a drug trade and its concomitant degree of organization 
and structure is historical in origin and rooted in either socio­
cultural phenomena or ethnic migrations. In this chapter some of the 
various aspects behind the organized criminal element are examined as 
they affect the maritime drug trade of today.
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6,2 Bases For The Organizational Component
Overall, it has to be said that at least 99% of the total volume 
of drugs transported by sea are trafficked by individuals and groups 
party to or working with an organized criminal network. Though there 
are numerous incidences and cases of individuals transporting drugs via 
the maritime medium wholly on their own - that is without support of or 
affiliation with any group - the quantities involved range between 
minute and small. Nearly all such independent trafficking activity in­
volves passengers on either cruiseships, ferries and passengers liners, 
or crew members on ships of all types or the owners and operators of 
pleasure craft and yachts. There are occasional instances where very 
small groups comprised of two or three individuals transport large quan­
tities of cannabis by fishing vessel, junk, sampan and dhow independent 
of any organized trafficking group, but such incidences are relatively 
few in occurrence and, as commented upon later, it becomes questionable 
as to just how independent these traffickers truly are. Generally, in 
all the above cases the individuals have purchased the drugs outright 
and are serving as their own transport agents. Upon arrival at their 
destinations they either sell the drug consignments to drug dealers or 
distribute the drugs themselves. However, as stated earlier, the volume 
of drugs transported by sea without the benefit of nexus with and sup­
port of an organized criminal enterprise is negligible. The reasons are 
simple and straightforward. Imprimis, virtually all vessels aside from 
some of the smaller pleasure craft and regionally-constructed vessels 
are expensive units of transport. While there is a great dichotomy 
throughout the world regarding the standard of living it remains an es­
tablished p h e n o m e n o n  that water-borne units of transport are relatively
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expensive propositions absorbing a monetary input far above the average 
man’s annual income regardless of where one may be in the world. 
Consequently, the funds required for acquisition of larger vessels are 
either derived from the collective contributions of a group or sub­
sidized by large criminal networks. Secondly, the shipment of large 
quantities of drugs requires large capital outlays for such consign­
ments. Individuals, for the most part, lack such financial resources. 
Even if one has the required funds for acquisition one still needs a 
suitable vessel which further defies the limited capital available. 
Alternatively, if the drugs are shipped within legitimate cargo consign­
ments one then needs additional funds to procure the legitimate goods 
utilized as caches and to arrange the embarkation and subsequent recep­
tion of the drug-laden cargoes. Thirdly, most vessels of any substan­
tive size which are to be sailed a considerable distance require a crew 
in order to be- safely (read: successfully) operated. Therefore, a traf­
ficker must either organize an operation involving commercial carriers 
to effect exportation on hire others to assist in the operation of his 
own vessel so acquired for the task. Regardless of the method selected 
the smuggling operation is no longer an ’unorganized* activity. 
Fourthly, no-one can hope to smuggle significant quantities of drugs by 
sea in a vacuum - that is without the various drug producers (not the 
drug producing states but the groups behind cultivation, manufacturing 
and refining of drugs within source countries) of a given drug trade 
having acquiesced to such activity. One must simply recall the 
geographical dimensions pertaining to drugs and their distribution. It 
is virtually impossible for a given drug trade to be operated by an in­
dividual or small but independent group without, at minimum, the in-
direct assistance of others involved in or behind the overall drug 
trade. If one does set up their own trafficking operation they will 
need contacts on both ends who are willing to co-operate and deal with 
them. This means there is an organizational component to the operation. 
Consequently, individual smuggling operations invariably become part of 
extant flow systems and in effect comprise segments in organized 
criminal networks. Lastly, it must be recognized that the vast majority 
of drug trafficking by sea either clandestinely or in freight requires 
the conspiratorial participation of individuals ashore at both the 
departure and landing points to ensure safe transit and trans-shipment 
of the drug loads. This again calls for an organizational dimension to 
the trade since assistance in the physical sense is needed to effect the 
exportation and importation of drug consignments. Because of the in­
tegral role organized crime plays in the maritime drug trade an analysis 
of the character of and degree of scale extant in the organizational 
structure is essential.
6.3 The Organizational Structure Of The Maritime Drug Trade 
The degree of organization varies ranging from small-time smug­
gling operations, which may be either casual, frequent or constant in 
occurrence, through a spectrum of increasingly sophisticated and complex 
trafficking enterprises. The character of the organizational structure 
involved ranges from wholly mono-ethnic on the one extreme to a criminal 
entity of bi- or tri-ethnic composition in the middle to a criminal net­
work on the other extreme which is devoid of any clear-cut ethnic and 
racial composition and instead functions as a streamlined machine. To 
clarify the latter category, one may envision it simply as a network
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comprised of individuals of any and all races and ethnicities working 
together harmoniously for the sole purpose of ensuring the safe transit 
of drugs from origin to destination. Vis-a-vis both the character and 
degree of organizational structure apparent one finds that the type of 
drug involved and its origin does determine where along the spectrum the 
level of organization ranks. Because there is much diversity it is im­
possible to discuss all the variations extant. Instead, a fair amount 
of generalization is called for complemented where relevant by other 
formats of elucidation on the topic. In terms of associating the above 
spectral parameters with the actual maritime drug trade it is useful to 
employ a graphic device in presentation. Without explaining the mathe­
matics involved it is possible to portray the relationship between the 
organizational structure and maritime drug trade in quantitative terms. 
Imprimis, the two spectrums of organizational structure are assimilated 
to be axes mounted on a coordinate plane so that an X-Y axial graph 
portraying a functional inter-relationship between character and scale 
of organization involved is created. To avoid problems in the projec­
tion presented herein no quantitative values are assigned to the axes. 
However, it has to be recognized that numeric values must exist in order 
for plotting positions to be derived. Secondly, in depicting the role 
of organization in the maritime drug trade one predicates the relation­
ship on the functional inter-relationship of character and scale of or­
ganization els ascertained in maritime cases and incidences. The find­
ings of follow-up investigations into maritime drug seizures serve as 
the bases by which the character and scale of organization in respective 
cases are established since they are the only grounds on which one may 
profess definitive knowledge of the maritime drug trade and its con­
comitant organizational structure. Though left ill-defined here the 
numeric values assigned to both the character and scale of organization 
yield the coordinate points from which the graph is plotted. The result 
is that one finds an overall trend emerging with the majority of mari­
time drug trafficking involving a fair level of organization linked 
predominantly with groups possessing definite ethnic ties. Figure 6.1 
provides the graphic presentation of this analysis. It must be under­
stood that this scattergram containing a partial linear regression is
Figure 6.1 The Role Of Organization In The Maritime Drug Trade.
Individuals Saal1-Scale Moderate Level High Level of Fully Integrated 
(Acting alone) Group Snuggling of Structure Sophistication Crininai Enterprise
i \ i i J i i i i i i i J i u i i J i i i i J i i i i i i i n i n i n i i i i n i i J i i i i u i L i i i i i i i J i J L i iL i i in j m i i i m i i m
SCALE
Mono-Ethnic Bi- i Tri-Bthnic Multi-Ethnic/Racial Ethnicity Irrelevant
t EiiLm inm wm uiwwum iLiinniiiiiiiiiiriiiniiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii iuiurim j i ih
CHARACTER
Y (Character)
336
only intended to be illustrative of the situation as it truly appears to 
be and not a precise scientific model.
Of the three main categories of drugs shipped by sea the traffick­
ing of cocaine and heroin involves high levels of organization while for 
cannabis it is variable, both in character and scale, and ranges the 
gamut of both spectrums. This dichotomy between drug categories results 
from a number of factors which need to be examined individually as they 
apply to a category. However, it is worth observing that more than any­
thing else it is the high potency factor of both cocaine and heroin 
resulting from the refining process combined with high levels of addic­
tive demand for them which attracts the high level of organized crime to 
these trades. The interdependent relationship of these two factors 
leads to these substances possessing high unitized values which in turn 
means they generate greater profits for those engaged in drug smuggling.
6,3.1 Organization In The Cocaine Trade
Of the three principally traded drugs cocaine possesses the 
greatest vertical organizational structure. Moreover, in terms of 
production, wholesale distribution and international trafficking it dis­
plays the most controlled flow matrix extant in the drug trade overall. 
As elaborated upon in a detailed article on the subject in The Wall 
Street Journal in 1986 the cocaine trade "has moved away from its 
entrepreneurial origins" more than a decade ago when it was nothing more 
than "a haphazard cottage" activity and become an "industry" that is 
"relatively stable and dominated by a few well-entrenched giants."1 It 
is South America’s "’only successful multinational industry’."2 A prime 
factor for this predicament is the fact that cocaine is a refined sub­
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stance which essentially has only one origin point - the Andean region 
of South America. This means the cocaine market can be easily manipu­
lated and controlled provided one of the two following provisos exist: 
imprimis, the various groups and individuals in control of the source 
area exercise a strategy of production and marketing based on an oligar­
chic structure such that there exists an overall monopolistic character 
to the trade or, secondly, that the majority of such activity is in the 
hands of one group or individual whom can therefore establish the market 
and thus dictate the level of activity and structuralization of the 
trade. In reality it appears that both situations are manifest, but 
that the latter arrangement is the overall market regulator. Several 
cartels exist when one examines Bolivia, Colombia and Peru collectively. 
However, it is generally believed and stated as fact by the US DEA that 
the Medellin Cartel of Colombia controls 80% of the overseas cocaine 
market.3 Resultantly, this group is deemed the "world’s largest cocaine 
ring."4 With such a market structure flexibility and volatility in both 
competition and pricing is significantly reduced. Another factor rein­
forcing the need for a high level of organization in the cocaine trade 
is the refining stage. Because cocaine refining requires precursor 
chemicals for the synthesis process which are generally unavailable lo­
cally and becoming increasingly controlled it inherently means a con­
certed effort at acquisition is needed. Basically, only organized 
groups with the concomitant financial bases and capacities for inducing 
conspiracy can effect the refining process. A third factor of impor­
tance is that in exporting cocaine out of South America the methods of 
shipment and modes of transport employed along with the routes utilized 
often include intermediate stops in other Central and South American
countries where conditions across the spectrum from culture to politics 
are congruous to those extant in the source areas and refining centres. 
This latter dimension permits the introduction and rapid manifestation 
of an organized criminal enterprise to these outside areas with relative 
ease. Once entrenched it becomes more difficult for law enforcement 
agencies to break up the organizational structure. Lastly, as mentioned 
earlier, the cost of producing cocaine combined with the exorbitant cost 
of transport resulting from the high risk factor elicited by the threat 
of interception essentially means there must be an organized conspiracy 
behind the trafficking component of the trade if one is to be assured of 
a steady and viable presence in the marketplace. It is germane to ob­
serve that the committed efforts of the opponents of the cocaine in­
dustry - that is the law enforcement agencies of the affected states - 
promote the need for organizational structure in the cocaine trade if 
the latter is to survive and flourish. Success in this industry is only 
attained through coordination and conspiracy in subterfuge which means 
that organized crime is a necessary aspect of operation. Vis-a-vis the 
maritime sector these factors have determined that the portion of 
cocaine shipped by sea is conveyed under the auspices of an organized 
trafficking group. Consequently, as revealed in the preceding chapter, 
the vast majority of cocaine exported by sea is concealed within or dis­
guised as legitimate cargo and involves either a crew or dockside 
conspiracy, or it is shipped clandestinely along a structured flow route 
involving a segment of the overlord cartel. Alternatively, it may be 
representatives of the distribution organization in the consumption 
areas which assume the task of importation via the latter method of 
smuggling.
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6,3,2 Organization In The Heroin Trade
The heroin trade, like the cocaine trade, is a heavily controlled 
enterprise operating as a developed industry albeit an illegal one. The 
difference is that there is more than one source area and competition is 
commensurately more developed. With heroin there sire four general 
source areas - the Golden Crescent, the Golden Triangle, Lebanon and 
Mexico - each of which in itself comprises a trading bloc composed of 
several trafficking groups which are in competition both within their 
respective areas and internationally. The two factors which to varying 
degrees negate the competition for market shares on the international 
level are geography and history. The proximity of source areas to 
select consumer bases and the entrenchment of traditional patterns of 
drug trafficking Eire fixed factors which simply by virtue of their exis- 
tance means they have sin effective role. Examples of the geographical 
dimension are the importance of Mexican heroin solely to the US drug 
market and the prevalency of Pakistani heroin in northern Europe while 
Lebanese and Iranian heroin are more common in southern Europe. An ex­
ample of the historical basis is the pervasive presence of Golden Tri­
angle heroin throughout Southeast Asia and abroad as a result of the 
opium period and subsequent dispersion of ethnic Chinese throughout the 
world. This means that any review of the heroin trade and its con­
comitant organizational structure should be segregated by source region 
with analysis focusing on the pattern of heroin outflow from one chosen 
area at a time. On the compartmentalized level one then finds that a 
rather vertical organizational structure exists with cartels in control 
of the production, wholesale marketing and international trafficking of 
heroin. These regional cartels generally manage to co-exist with each
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other so long as the remain tempered in their greed. However, this does 
not mean the situation is likewise at the retail end of the trade. In 
the marketplace these regional cartels often are in conflict as a result 
of competition between each other and with the marketing arras of cartels 
operating from other source blocs. It must be observed that this con­
flict may not necessarily take place between the cartels directly, but 
indirectly via their trafficking intermediaries, distributorships and 
marketing affiliates in the consumer countries. This tense competition 
mandates the existence and entrenchment of a well-developed organization 
if a particular cartel is to fend off threats to its flow routes and as­
sure itself of a viable presence in a given retail market. The net 
result of all this is that the global heroin trade is a more balanced 
affair which, to a reasonable degree, keeps itself in order. On the one 
hand, there is a certain degree of price stability within a given 
cartel-dominated sector of the marketplace. Conversely, on the other 
hand, one observes some degree of price differential or volatility be­
tween diverse sectors of the marketplace due to different cartels and 
source regions serving the various sectors. Furthermore, alternate sup­
pliers are readily available to take up the slack where necessary. The 
net outcome is that no particular source region can alone determine the 
world trafficking scene.
Aside from the above difference most of the other points noted 
concerning the cocaine trade apply here as well. The primary factor 
nurturing the entrenchment of organized crime within the heroin trade is 
the high unitized value of the drug. A result of the cost of refining,
the intrinsic potency factor and the established consumer base created 
through addiction is the high profit the drug yields on relatively small
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bulk. As with cocaine the refining process requires precursor chemicals 
to act as catalytic agents in purifying the heroin. These chemicals are 
not easy to obtain freely without the benefit of conspiracy in 
acquisition. Furthermore, the refining process requires laboratories, 
which need protection, and a fair degree of logistical support. This 
means an organization is needed if such activity is to be successfully 
sustained. Another important factor supporting the need for organiza­
tion in the heroin trade is the routing of the flow paths through tran­
sit states. In order to assure the safe flow of the finished product 
(heroin) and refinement of crude opiates (opium and morphine) trustwor­
thy individuals and groups are needed in the transit states and refine­
ment centres to assume responsibility for the heroin’s presence therein 
and oversee transit of the drug. This requires co-operation and coor­
dination between the factions involved along a given route thus assuring 
that there is an organized enterprise behind the trade. Lastly, vis-a- 
vis the maritime sector the same trends in shipment observed with 
cocaine exist for heroin but with a notable difference. Marine cargo is 
the predominant mode by which heroin is shipped by sea intercontinen- 
tally and inter-regionally. This means that shore-based conspiracies 
constitute a significant element in any organization’s involvement in 
the smuggling of heroin by sea. Clandestine trafficking using private 
vessels, on the other hand, tends to be confined to the maritime regions 
either adjacent to the source areas and exporting ports or within the 
source regions. Resultantly, most of the heroin shipped by sea to 
northern Europe, Canada and the U.S.A. from source areas other than 
Mexico travel in containerized cargoes and involve shore-based 
conspiracies. Conversely, for the countries and transit states border­
ing a sea within or in proximity to a source area local trading craft 
and private vessels play an important role. In this case the operators 
of the vessels are themselves party to the organization either directly 
or through co-operative association. This form of organizational traf­
ficking is particularly prevalent in the South China Sea, Arabian Sea 
and eastern Mediterranean. On these seas the maritime heroin traffick­
ers are part of a network either engaged in regional distribution of the 
drug or serving as the initial agents of transport in the long-haul 
trafficking routes by carrying the heroin to trans-shipment sites. 
Ships’ crews of commercial carriers are a third noted method of heroin 
smuggling by sea. In this instance the crew member is either a member 
of the overlord organization or has been coerced or lured into the role 
of heroin smuggler by the organization. Though need of a dockside con­
spiracy for landing the drug is negated there is still need for a land- 
based conspiracy since the heroin shipment needs to be received and dis­
tributed - something a sailor off a ship in port for a few hours cannot 
do.
6.3*3 Orsanization In The Cannabis Trade
The character and degree of organizational structure extant in the 
maritime cannabis trade can only be minimally described herein. The 
analysis given will be fleeting in context and only elaborate to the ex­
tent necessary to identify the principal differences in organizational 
structure between the cannabis trade and that of the previously dis­
cussed substances. Because cannabis is the drug most widely shipped by 
sea, in theory the degree of organization operative in the trade should 
be the organizational structure most utilized in the maritime drug trade
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overall. Unfortunately, the diversity extant in the cannabis trade 
negates the theorem of one clear-cut organizational structure pre­
dominating over the others. One of the principal factors distinguishing 
the organizational structure behind cannabis trafficking from the other 
drug trades is the multitude of source areas • Instead of there being 
one principal area of origin as with cocaine or a handful as with heroin 
there are a number of such pinnacles. Emanating from these many points 
are a number of flow routes leading to a number of different consumption 
sites. In terms of bulk flow the number of origin points is eight. For 
each of the eight sources one finds different organizational structures 
in operation. Complicating the matter is the fact that more than one 
method of maritime cannabis smuggling exists in a given trade with each 
mode possessing a separate and different organizational component behind 
it. When conceptualized as a schematic the organizational dimension 
looks like a complex matrix or web of flow routes originating from eight 
separate points. Although there is an array of options by which a can­
nabis trafficking operation may be organized ranging the gamut from 
fully integrated on the one extreme to nearly unstructured on the other 
extreme the bulk of cannabis shipped by sea falls into one of two 
categories. Imprimis, there is the integrated organization which is 
responsible for the bulk production, wholesale marketing and interna­
tional trafficking of the drug. It oversees the shipment of the drug by 
sea either directly or through affiliate groups. The cannabis shipments 
are generally large on the order of 300 kgs. to multi-ton consignments 
and are shipped either concealed within or disguised as freight on com-
i
mercial carriers or transported clandestinely on private vessels 
specifically acquired for that task. The degree of organizational par­
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ticipation is high and virtually always involves shore-based con­
spiracies both in the ports of departure and arrival of commercial ship­
ping and in the cases of clandestine importations utilizing motherships. 
Mothership operations in particular are highly organized since the en­
tire crew is involved and the rendez-vous arrangements (with the landing 
craft) need to be synchronized. The covert trafficking of Colombian 
marijuana to the U.S.A. and Lebanese hashish to both Europe and North 
America exemplify this trafficking arrangement. The second principal 
method of cannabis smuggling by sea also involves organization, but on a 
simpler scale and usually without the participation of the overlord or­
ganizations in the respective production areas. The latter do, however, 
tacitly assist in that they provide the cannabis loads. In this situa­
tion the maritime traffickers are either independents which, in essence, 
are freelancing in the drug trade or they are intermediary groups and 
organizations functioning solely as transportation agents or they are 
part of the distribution organizations in the destination states which 
have undertaken the responsibility of transporting the drug themselves. 
The actual transport of the drug is generally effected via the clandes­
tine mode of trafficking using private vessels.
It is important that it be understood that the cannabis trade is 
often fractionated with separate groups and organizations handling dif­
ferent aspects of the trade. Contrary to the hard drugs where all 
aspects of the trade from cultivation to retail marketing are often in 
the hands of a singular criminal organization, the diverse competition 
in the cannabis market not to mention low profit margin fosters dis­
enfranchisement of the trade and permits the involvement of many or­
ganizations and groups of unequal structure and status. To clarify fur­
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ther on the second method and its concomitant organizational structure 
it is best to visualize a given flow route as a line segmented into 
parts - each of which is regulated by a separate organization. These 
line segments, however, are connected because the various groups in­
volved co-operate with each other.
In addition to the factors noted above it must be remembered that 
cannabis is a drug which upon conclusion of cultivation is in marketable 
form. Except for the production of hashish oil and hashish resin can­
nabis does not require processing or refinement. This eliminates the 
need for an elaborate organizational component for such activity. The 
upshot of this aspect is that the drug can directly enter the traffick­
ing stage and marketplace via any group organized to undertake such 
activity. The overlord organization in the cultivation area can, if 
they so desire, reduce their exposure to the risks associated with their 
enterprise by concentrating on the facet of the cannabis trade most vi­
tal - production. Instead, the distribution groups in the OECD states, 
smuggling organizations specializing in drug transportation and free­
lance operators assume the risks. Because payment is usually demanded 
upon delivery of the cannabis to some designated point of exportation 
where the pick-up is made the overlord organization realizes their 
profit on the drug safely. Furthermore, because cannabis is a rela­
tively inexpensive drug which grows rampantly where given the oppor­
tunity and is deemed a relatively innocuous substance by several states 
there is a concomitant degree of less rigorous law enforcement initia­
tive against the trade, particularly in countries where the state’s 
financial resources are limited. This means the level of organization 
required can be more informal in many areas with a portion of the actual
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trafficking of cannabis in the hands of anyone desiring to participate 
in the activity. For the overlord organizations this can prove benefi­
cial since the structure of the trafficking stage may involve many inde­
pendent smuggling enterprises which collectively overwhelm the law en­
forcement agencies responsible for combatting the drug trade based on 
systematized counter-trafficking offensives.
Lastly, the diverse and variform structure of the trade results in 
a concomitant diversity in the ethnic composition of the groups in­
volved. Usually, there will not be a mono-ethnic organization oversee­
ing the flow of cannabis from site of origin to consumer marketplace. 
The multi-ethnic composition of the groups found along a given route 
generally disallows the formation of cohesive organizational structures 
of the kind seen in. the cocaine and heroin trades. This aspect stems 
from an observed sociological phenomenon centering on the subliminal 
distrust and disdain extant between select ethnic groups when brought in 
contact with each other over sensitive and nefarious matters (eg. Colom­
bian and Cuban drug groups). In the cocaine and heroin trades this is 
avoided by the fact that there is usually one ethnic group in charge of 
a route from origin to consumption site.
6,3,4 Organization In The Trade Of Other Illicit Substances
Without elaborating on all the variform aspects of organization 
present in the trades of other narcotic drugs and psychotropic sub­
stances let it simply be accepted that in the majority of cases involv­
ing some bulk these drugs are conveyed along organized conduits. Where 
the shipments are large the degree of organization behind them is com- 
mensurately better developed. The bulk shipments of diazepam and
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methaqualone from Europe to North America and the Middle East are ex­
emplary of this els are the larger shipments of opium and morphine be­
tween points in the Far East. Generally, concealment within or dis- 
guisement as cargo is the method most often employed for effecting the 
bulk shipment of psychotropic substances. Conversely, the many in­
stances of maritime trafficking involving minute to small amounts of 
these substances are often unorganized and involve individuals acting on 
their own. Ferries and other passenger craft are the vessels frequently 
utilized. The trafficking of amphetamines by sea into Scandinavia is 
typical of this dimension of the trade. For the most part there is no
formal overlord organization manipulating the trade in a given substance
of this category. Relatively-speaking, the quantities smuggled by sea
are small and the sources diverse. On the one hand competition is
abundant, but on the other hand it is weak because the various sources 
of these drugs tend to have fixed markets that do not overlap - at least 
not significantly to warrant the strong entrenchment of rigid distribu­
tion networks in those marketplaces. Even though some of the substances 
may have high unitized values, their limited circulation resulting from 
the small quantities involved and stiff competition from cocaine and 
heroin negates the development of complex organizational structures in 
the maritime component of their respective trades. Commonly, the actual 
production and distribution of some of the psychotropic substances is 
handled by groups which are on the fringes of mainstream society. Thus, 
the drugs become confined in circulation to consumers whan either adhere 
to the fringe groups or are willing to indulge in some of the latter*s 
activities inclusive of drug ingestion. Lastly, it is germane to ob­
serve that many of the psychotropic substances in illicit circulation
are manufactured in several of the OECD states without the need for ex­
ternal assistance and materials. Consequently, the need for transport­
ing these substances by sea is diminished since the many markets are 
self-providing. Furthermore, because several OECD states share common 
land borders the overland modes of conveyance are generally employed for 
trafficking the drugs where such activity is demanded.
6.4 The Ethnographic And Anthropological Factors
Several of the criminal organizations behind the current drug 
trafficking networks owe their existence to either traditions in 
criminal behaviour, historical patterns of migration and dispersion of 
given ethnic groups, colonialism or territorial occupations of given 
areas in the past as a result of war. All of the principal globally- 
integrated criminal organizations extant today had their origins in the 
family and communal associations nurtured at the local level.5 The cul­
tural and familial ethics extant allowed the primitive groups to enforce 
a code of conduct and secrecy essential to countering threats from law 
enforcement initiatives.6 The character and behaviour of a fair portion 
of the populace of Sicily is a clear example of the modem continuation 
of the cultural and communal manifestation of such a code. The basis 
for the movement of a portion of a population of a given ethnicity from 
their indigenous locale to new areas, regions and sites far removed may 
have been forced or unforced. This aspect is relatively unimportant. 
What is important is that the actual migration formed socio-cultural 
networks spanning not only regions but the globe thus bridging the 
physical geographical schisms extant between the origin area and 
transposed members of the given ethnic group. Because some of these
349
ethnic groups either originated from areas historically noted for drug 
consumption or possessed an inbred acumen for enterprise and entrepot 
activity regardless of its legitimacy and social and physical decadence, 
the linkages established became conduits by which drugs could be 
transported to the new areas. The maritime sector became significant 
because at one time it was the sole method of economic long-distance 
transportation. As has been discussed in Chapter IV the maritime sector 
retains its prominent role in transportation though perhaps not in the 
case of passenger carriage. Furthermore, the physical geography of the 
world is virtually unchanged from that of previous millenniums. 
Consequently, the incorporation of the maritime sector in drug traffick­
ing based upon ethnocentric migrations was inevitable. The best ex­
amples of this are the extensive involvement of ethnic Chinese groups in 
the drug trade throughout the world and the well known activities of the 
Italian crime syndicates. Regrettably, the accounts of ethnic-driven 
criminal organization which many of us have obtained from fictional 
literature, film, media reports and prejudicial investigations by law 
enforcement bodies are often distortions of the true picture of the 
situation. Because of space constraints only a few of the many ethnic 
groups involved in the drug trade .are examined and then only cursorily. 
They have been singled out because of their extensive involvement in the 
international drug trade inclusive of the maritime component and the 
degree to which they exemplify, in whole or in part, the various his­
torical and sociological foundations behind ethnically-oriented 
trafficking. Naturally, if one were to consider every cultivation and 
production site, transit locale and consumer marketplace extant one 
would find a congruous number of ethnic groups involved. In addition to
those elucidated upon herein other prominent ethnic groups engaged in 
drug trafficking include Indians, Iranians, Lebanese, Moroccans, 
Nigerians and Sri Lankans either in the primary stage or in a subser­
vient role to another ethnic group. As already stated, to a large ex­
tent the category of drug trafficked in a given trade determines the 
ethnic composition of the smugglers and their organizations. The impact 
a given drug has on ethnic groups into which it intrudes while travers- - 
ing its flow routes from origin site to marketplace, regardless of 
whether ephemeral, incidental, or purposeful, combined with the innate 
aggressiveness, receptiveness or vulnerability of select groups towards 
illicit economic venture results in the creation of an attractant force 
by which some members of these ethnic groups are readily drawn into drug 
trafficking.
6,4,1 The Role Of The Ethnic Chinese
Today, much of the heroin exported from the Golden Triangle is 
refined, trafficked skid distributed globally by ethnic Chinese drug 
rings. Though it is often stated that the Triads are the element within 
the ethnic Chinese group responsible for such activity there sure those 
who question the extent of Triad involvement; among these are the US 
DEA.7 The current involvement of ethnic Chinese in the heroin trade has 
its roots in the historical experiences which both China and the ex­
patriate Chinese communities in other areas of Southeast Asia had with 
opium. The other crucial fsLctor which comes into play is the strong 
acumen the Chinese possess for commercial and entrepot activities. 
Additionally, the effects of colonialism both in the colonial era and 
post-colonial period need to be considered. The early migration and
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dispersion of the Chinese community throughout Southeast Asia had as­
sured that the opium experience was not confined to China alone but 
received throughout the former region. When the Chinese moved further 
afield notably southward to Australia and then eastward to Canada, the 
U.S.A. and eventually Mexico they carried with them their affinity for 
both opium and enterprise. Because the transposed groups encountered a 
considerable amount of discrimination and poor living conditions they 
resorted to insular social behaviour and relied on the methods and prac­
tices of association and recreation prevalent in their homelands. This 
is how opium use spread to these countries and why trans-Pacific trade 
in the drug developed to the large extent that it did in the late 19* h 
and early 20th centuries. Subsequently and inevitably, the indigenous 
and extant populations in Australia, Canada and the U.S.A. were intro­
duced to the use of opium with some part of them taking up consumption 
of it. Though the Chinese are involved in the European heroin scene 
today the basis for it is somewhat different from that just described 
for North America and it developed more slowly. One reason for the dif­
ference is the simple fact that there was always strong competition in 
the supply of opium from other sources. Another factor was the tendency 
of the European colonial powers to suppress the influx of people and 
their practices from the Asian colonies into the motherlands. 
Naturally, some people did manage to emigrate to the motherlands as im­
migration policies loosened up or through illegal means and establish 
themselves in the main urban areas, particularly in the early part of 
the 20th century. Hence, the bases for the early presence of Chinese 
communities in both Amsterdam and Paris. The links these groups kept 
with the Far East became conduits for drugs. The synthesis of heroin
only served to enhance the viability of drug trafficking as an economic 
activity once the drug became a controlled substance. An entirely new 
dimension in illicit enterprise for the Chinese criminal groups to 
engage in had been created that merely required some triggering event to 
realize its large-scale potential. Over time up till 1960 this activity 
experienced fluctuations both in level and scope. Overall, it has to be 
said that the trend was one of growth, consolidation in the trafficking 
structure and hierarchy and further entrenchment. The continued migra­
tion of ethnic Chinese to both Europe and North America in the latter 
half of this century enhanced this process. However, it was not until 
the liberalization of social values in the 1960s and 1970s and American 
presence in Vietnam combined with the cessation of Turkish opium produc­
tion and collapse of the French Connection that Chinese involvement in 
modern drug trafficking escalated to a new height. Today, the par­
ticipating Chinese groups control between 30 - 40% of the world heroin 
market since they handle the trafficking of virtually all opiate 
products originating from the Golden Triangle. A point of clarification 
required here is that production of Golden Triangle opium and either 
partial or limited refinement of it is mainly in the hands of the Bur­
mese and Thai producers. However, ethnic Chinese groups effect the 
trafficking, distribution, wholesale marketing and, to a limited extent, 
retail marketing of the heroin. Currently, it is believed that "Chinese 
organized-crime groups" are still in a phase of emergence and in time 
may become the dominant force in the "heroin trade in Europe and North 
and South America."8 Exemplifying this threat is the Chinese takeover 
of the multi-billion dollar heroin market in New York as a result of the 
decline of the Italian-based Mafia.9 Additionally, they control 60% of
the Canadian market and 75% of the Australian market while Amsterdam is 
their most important transit and distribution point in Europe. Though 
unquantifiable large amounts of the heroin exported from the Golden Tri­
angle goes by sea, particularly to North America.
6,4,2 The Role Of The Pakistanis
The Pakistanis constitute another ethnic group involved heavily in 
drug trafficking inclusive of the maritime component. Their direct in­
volvement in the maritime transport of heroin from Pakistan directly 
into Europe was documented in the preceding chapter. However, the basis 
for their participation is different. There is no analogous historical 
context by which to explain their involvement as can be done for the 
Chinese. Instead, Pakistani involvement stems from their desire not to 
be mere poppy cultivators and crude heroin refiners whom are relegated 
to dealing with a variety of external drug trafficking groups and thus 
denied the maximum profit possible on their drug. The grounds for their 
forays into the trafficking component is to control all facets of their 
heroin trade starting with production at home and ending with the 
marketing of their product abroad. Prolific production of heroin in the 
Afghani/Pakistani border region is relatively recent resulting from 
changes accruing to the heroin market in the 1970s when Turkish opium 
production ceased temporarily. At first Pakistani involvement was con­
fined to cultivation and production as other ethnic groups, either 
Indian, Iranian or European, handled the trafficking, distribution and 
wholesale marketing of the heroin produced in the Golden Crescent. But, 
a result of Pakistani emigration to Europe in the 1970s and early 1980s 
was the establishment of expatriate Pakistani communities abroad. This
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meant there were then entrenched ethnic communities overseas in the 
marketplaces with established links to Pakistan which could be exploited 
to serve as conduits on which to establish and operate a full-scale 
trafficking operation. Consequently, the Pakistanis initiated a traf­
ficking enterprise where they control not only cultivation and refine­
ment but also the international trafficking of their illicit commodity, 
its distribution and wholesale marketing. In effect, they have estab­
lished an illicit multinational enterprise in Europe which in some ways 
exemplifies a form of reverse colonialism over the European states. 
Their dominant position in the heroin markets of central and northern 
Europe attests to this predicament being the case. Furthermore, the 
Pakistanis have set their sights on North America and are slowly gaining 
prominence in the latter*s heroin market.
6*4,3 The Bole Of The Colombians
A rather analogous background to that described above for Pakis­
tani participation in the drug trade is behind the high level of Colom­
bian involvement in the drug trade. However, in this case two different 
drugs are involved: cocaine and cannabis. Today, the Colombian under­
world retains a pre-eminent position in the drug trade through a com­
bination of sophistication in operation and ruthlessness in competition. 
The importation of these drugs on a large scale into North America and, 
more recently, into Europe is a relatively new phenomenon dating back, 
in the case of the U.S.A., to the 1970s. It has to be said though that 
the integration of the Colombians in the two drug trades has varied 
somewhat with the cocaine trade seeing a greater level of integration. 
When Colombian participation first commenced their trade in both sub­
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stances was fragmented, particularly that of cocaine. North American 
criminal organizations along with other Latin ethnic groups, notably the 
Cubans, handled the international trafficking, distribution and market­
ing of the drugs. However, as the cocaine trade rapidly grew and proved 
highly profitable and members of the Colombian drug rings managed to 
either emigrate to or infiltrate the U.S. and establish themselves the 
desire to control all aspects of that trade not only evolved but became 
feasible. By the mid-1980s sufficient linkages were in place and the 
Colombian drug cartels had the capital available to effect their take­
over. Moreover, they had one other factor weighing in their favour - 
they had a captive market since there is basically only one source 
region in the world for the drug. The consolidation of the production 
and export of cocaine from South America by the Medellin Cartel in con­
junction with other Colombian groups such that they regulated the market 
granted them the power to take control of the trade. All that was 
required was the resolve to effect the takeover. To date this goal has 
not been fully accomplished in the sense that other ethnic groups con­
tinue to actively participate in various aspects of cocaine trafficking, 
distribution and marketing. However, on the other hand, it has to be 
conceded that they operate in conjunction with the Colombians because 
the latter controls output and on this basis it may be said the Colom­
bians control the trafficking of cocaine. Other ethnic groups notably 
involved include the Jamaicans and Panamanians. Because saturation has 
been reached in the North American market the Colombians have turned 
towards Europe as the next marketplace to develop.10 At present they 
are still working on establishing their own linkages therein. Hence, 
other ethnic groups are often involved as intermediaries in the
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trafficking, distribution and marketing of cocaine. The Colombian can­
nabis trade is regulated by the Colombians and involvement by them is 
fairly well developed on all levels down to distribution in the U.S.A. 
However, the scope of their integration is not absolute as in the 
cocaine trade. They continue to rely on other ethnic groups for the 
trafficking, distribution and marketing of their cannabis and they do 
not control the US cannabis market.
6,4.4 The Role Of Joint Javanese-Korean Groups
Vis-a-vis the amphetamine trade the Japanese Yakuza operating 
jointly with South Korean criminal organizations account for much of the 
amphetamine imported into Japan. Before continuing it must be stated 
that the term ’Yakuza’ is being used in a generic manner to collectively 
embrace all the various criminal organizations, groups, sub-groups and 
factions thereof found in Japan and of Japanese ethnicity. In 
actuality, there are an array of Japanese names for these groups based 
not only on the individuality of the respective groups but also their 
heirarchial ranking within the whole criminal infrastructure of Japan. 
Another generic term which may be used is ’Boryokudan’ which translated 
means ’’gangsters."11 In 1985 61.6% of all individuals apprehended for 
stimulant drug offences in Japan were members of organized crime 
groups.12 The amphetamine trade into Japan exemplifies the close in­
volvement possible between two or three ethnic groups for the purpose of 
mutual economic gain based on a fixed market. The South Koreans produce 
the drug and either transport it across the Sea of Japan where the 
Yakuza assumes responsibility for distribution and marketing or let 
their Japanese counterparts conduct the trafficking component as well.
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On the surface the basis for such ethnic co-operation is mystifying 
aside from the presumption of common greed. Historically, stimulant use 
in Japan has been minor aside from a short period of prolific abuse fol­
lowing World War II. Furthermore, as a cultural group the South Koreans 
are said to possess something akin to inbred disdain for the Japanese as 
a result of Japan1s former imperialistic ventures in the earlier part of 
this century. On the other hand, it is reasonable to presume that the 
years of Japanese occupation of South Korea permitted the assimilation 
of like-minded attitudes on the part of the Koreans in regard to 
economic activities and this manifest itself rather powerfully amongst 
the South Korean criminal underworld. Resultantly, in criminal en­
terprise the Japanese and South Korean groups involved see eye to eye 
and will co-operate where mutually conducive to earning revenue. 
Another factor for the structured but integrated criminal hierarchies 
now extant stems from the traditional socio-political regime once common 
in both states1 histories which subtlely continues to permeate their 
societies today. Presumably, this nurtures a mutual but subliminal 
respect among these two groups for each other in regard to the other’s 
home territory which in turn means they co-operate on enterprises incor­
porating the other’s domain though they compete strongly elsewhere. 
Their co-operation today in drug trafficking is merely a modem manifes­
tation of their respective traditions in illicit activity.
6.4.5 The Role Of Italian-Based Criminal Syndicates
In discussing the topic of organized crime the role of the Mafia 
must be mentioned if only in recognition of their once omnipotent and 
widespread network. As noted in regard to the term ’Yakuza* the term
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’Mafia* is a generic term embracing the many criminal groups and syndi­
cates along with all the sub-groups and factions thereof which are com­
posed of ethnic Italians and those of Italian descent regardless of 
location (eg. Canada, Italy or U.S.A.).13 The origin of the Mafia is 
complex. It basically stemmed from the communal but feudal nature of 
life in southern Italy in prior centuries and was introduced to North 
America by Italian immigrants in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. 
The Mafia both in Europe and North America first engaged in interna­
tional drug trafficking on a large scale in the 1930s. After having in­
itiated the trans-Atlantic heroin trade and establishing their invin­
cible dominance in drug trafficking they sustained the activity for four 
decades until the mid-1970s. The involvement of the Mafia in drug traf­
ficking continued the history of the Italian criminal groups in illicit 
enterprises and merely reflected a contemporary adjustment in activity. 
The repeal of Prohibition in the U.S.A. created a vacuum in illicit 
revenue generation which the Mafia quickly had to fill. The loss of one 
of their primary activities (alcohol smuggling) by which they had built 
their massive empire and extensive network necessitated rapid solution 
in order to sustain the organization in its powerful and elaborate form. 
Heroin, refined primarily from opium of Turkish origin but also from 
Iran, was the answer. The Mafia, therefore, quickly established ties
with the Turkish and Iranian opium producers and constructed an
elaborate heroin trafficking network extending from the Middle East via 
Italy and France to the U.S.A. and Canada. Opium in either crude form
or as morphine was shipped from the source areas to refining centres in
Italy and France where it was converted into heroin. Much of it was 
then shipped onwards to North America while a lesser amount went into
the European heroin market but notably Italy.14 At all points along the 
trafficking routes the Mafia had its members overseeing the transit of 
the drug shipments. However, it must be noted that they did not p h y s i c ­
ally control opium production in the source countries. Instead, they 
acquired the crude product and assumed all responsibility for it 
thereafter. Today, the Mafia as a whole is still a strong organization 
to be reckoned with, but it has been diminished in stature, suffered 
significant losses in portions of its network and seen encroachments 
upon its territory. Though still well entrenched in Italy it appears to 
be enduring further reductions in its powerbase and network in North 
America as a result of ruthless competition, dedicated law enforcement 
efforts and generational division in the ranks.15 The decline in the 
Mafia’s strength is perhaps best summed up in the statement that the 
world’s illicit drug market has undergone considerable change. Where 
there were once few players who could usurp control over a large part of 
the drug trade there are now many. Another way of looking at it is that 
the Mafia was an early player in the global drug trade because it had 
the infrastructure required for operating a drug trafficking network of 
such dimension in place early on. Conversely, many of the other ethnic 
groups now involved either lacked the historical bases of traditional 
existence, in situ infrastructure and cohesive identity required for 
such large-scale activity at an earlier period in time or had yet to 
evolve or succumb to a position where a sufficient number of vulnerable 
individuals in a given group were drawn or forced into drug trafficking 
and subsequently coalesced into an ethnically-based organization.
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VII. THE INTERNATIONAL LAW AGAINST THE MARITIME DRUG TRADE.
7.1 Overview Of The Legal Problem
On the surface the controversy over law enforcement on the sea ap­
pears to be easily explained. It is universally recognized that all 
littoral states possess a maritime area adjacent to their coasts and 
surrounding their islands within which they may exercise either complete 
sovereignty or selected sovereign rights depending on the zone in 
question. In legal terms it means that municipal law extends to the 
maritime medium but only out to the seaward parameters of these ter­
ritorial zones. All parts of the sea beyond this mensurated limit com­
prise high seas and are not subject to the jurisdiction of any state 
save in regard to those activities of universal anathema and vis-a-vis 
flag state responsibility as codified in the Law of the Sea. This is 
where the problem arises. The crux of the matter concerning drug con­
trol on the sea lies enmeshed in the issue of how is maritime drug traf­
ficking to be fought on the part of the sea beyond the territorial and 
thus jurisdictional limits of all states. If one may digress, 
momentarily, into philosophical thought it has to be recognized that of 
the three mediums - air, land and sea - by which transportation is ef­
fected the maritime medium is a unique natural realm which because of 
its historical utilization and resultantly entrenched perceptions 
several states yet retain over it it is the medium which is the most 
problematic in juridical terms. In the historical context the irony is
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that the global community has had much time to debate the issue and 
resolve it. Yet, today, the Law of the Sea remains a rather anachronous 
doctrine and is bogged down in a quagmire regarding progressive changes 
on all levels. In resuming the analysis of the legal problem the corol­
lary problem needs to be introduced. Debate exists over where the ter­
ritorial limit actually ends and the high seas begins. While the limit 
is p h y s i c a l l y  determined by linear measurement in practice, today, the 
actual limit is variable in cartographic position. This is because 
states disagree on the juridical interpretation of two of the zonal
bands which establish the seaward boundary of the maritime area within
which municipal law may apply either in whole or in part. The variposi- 
tional limits currently extant because of varying state practice exacer­
bates the problem of drug control on the sea by granting drug smugglers 
a greater areal domain within which to roam with reduced fear of 
apprehension. Consequently, consensus amongst states in regards to the 
general question of drug enforcement on the high seas is prevented. 
Though it has not been stated till now but nevertheless pervades the 
discussion is the theme of lack of coherent law regarding the sea. In 
reality, this is the root of the problem. If the law was clear, estab­
lished and well-founded then the question of how to combat the maritime 
drug trade is no longer a legal one. Instead, it is one of ensuring 
that the law enforcement measures implemented are effectively carried 
out in a manner mutually acceptable to all states and which preserves 
the integrity of jurisprudence both domestically and internationally. 
Realistically, the issue becomes one of co-operation and co-ordination 
on the operational level once the international law is in place. As it
stands now several states are constrained in their execution of effec-
tive anti-drug measures on the sea and therefore do little while other 
states resort to actions which, from the standpoint of international law* 
and juridical principle, are dubious in nature, provocative in effect 
and illegal. What follows herein is a review of the international law 
and practice specifically oriented towards suppressing drug trafficking 
on the portion of sea construed to be beyond the territorial jurisdic­
tion of littoral states. Because of recent developments in this field 
the proposed doctrines of recently concluded conventions relevant to the 
topic are included, where appropriate, in the analysis. As the emphasis 
of this treatise is on the law or lack thereof pertaining to the problem 
area there will be no discussion of specific national laws applicable 
for combatting drug trafficking within the maritime zones defined as 
subject to municipal jurisdiction. All states have incorporated in
their municipal legislation either statutes, decrees or combinations 
thereof which expressly and thus legally extend their jurisdictions to 
their respective maritime zones in regard to criminal activities in­
clusive of drug trafficking. There is no ambiguity on this point per 
se. Rather, the controversy centers on their differing viewpoints 
regarding where their respective municipal jurisdictions end and the 
high seas begins.
Finally, before continuing it must be understood that in present­
ing the legal analysis which ensues herein the author presumes that the 
reader is sufficiently familiar with not only the bases behind interna­
tional law, but also the systems which make it functional and the 
mechanisms by which it is enforced. As a passing caveat, it should be 
recognized that, as Harris observes, "treaties are, formally, a source 
of obligation rather than a source of law."1
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7.2 Conventions And Treaties Of Relevance
7,2*1 Historical Synopsis
Several international treaties relating to drug control have been 
ratified since the inception of the 1912 International Opium Conven­
tion*2 Appendix II lists the international ones. However, not one of 
them specifically mentioned or indirectly incorporated the high seas 
within their texts nor promulgated legislation which could be construed 
as applicable on the waters beyond the territorial limits of states; 
that is until the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic In 
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. 1988 (hereinafter called the 
1988 Anti-Trafficking Convention) was concluded and opened for 
ratification.3 In retrospect, virtually all the major conventions pre­
viously drafted and adopted have constituted pieces in the jigsaw con­
struction of an international anti-drug doctrine for the contemporary 
period. With the progression of time through the 20* h century social 
change became more volatile and brisk in occurrence. Concomitantly, il­
licit drug use gained in prevalency and manifest itself within a number 
of diverse societies. The global community responded with successive 
codifications of anti-drug legislation and measures designed not only to 
address the pertinent topic which gave rise to them, but also to broaden 
the overall doctrine. A simple review of the titles of various conven­
tions prior to the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs. 1961 (herein­
after called the 1961 Single Convention) validates the point.4 When 
drafted the 1961 Single Convention was designed to serve a dual purpose. 
Imprimis, it consolidated the objectives and scopes of nearly all of the 
previous treaties under one ’package’ convention hence the basis for it 
being called the 'Single Convention’. Art. 44 of the 1961 Single Con­
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vention effected the termination of most of the earlier treaties cited 
therein for the contracting signatories. Secondly, apropos to that 
period in time (the late 1950s/early 1960s) it promulgated a new, com­
prehensive anti-drug doctrine which garnered a broader base of appeal 
throughout the global community and thus better represented interna­
tional consensus on the topic. The 1961 Single Convention has retained 
its viability up till today though in order to remain so it required 
amendment and needed to be complemented by the Convention On 
Psychotropic Substances 1971 (hereinafter called the 1971 Psychotropics 
Convention)5 and the 1988 Anti-Trafficking Convention. These subsequent 
developments further attest to the hypothesis proffered earlier concern­
ing the piecemeal assemblage of the current international anti-drug 
doctrine. It is germane to observe that the one pre-1961 treaty not 
terminated, at least not completely, is the Convention of 1936 for the 
Suppression of the Illicit Traffic In Dangerous Drugs (hereinafter 
called the 1936 Suppression of Trafficking Convention).6 For whatever 
reasons the 1961 Single Convention specifically targeted Art. 9 of the 
1936 Suppression of Trafficking Convention as the only part of the lat­
ter treaty to be terminated by its entry into force (see Art. 44, para.
2.). This raises an interesting point. Hie 1936 Suppression of Traf­
ficking Convention is still in force between the 37 contracting states 
which ratified it.7 Therefore, the question is why was it not subsumed 
in its entirety within the 1961 Single Convention. The answer is that 
it is a unique treaty which stands out from the rest. The 1936 Suppres­
sion of Trafficking Convention attempts to deal with what must be deemed 
the most important dimension of the entire drug problem - the traffick­
ing of drugs. Unfortunately, the structure and text of the articles
were considered either too vague or too onerous for many states to ad­
here to much less incorporate in domestic legislation. Overall, the
convention was seen at the time as one that was unrealistic and unaccep­
table to the prevailing law doctrines extant in most states then.8 
However, there is another perspective to be considered. Because 
hindsight always grants us an insight to things which were earlier 
ambiguous, confusing and irrational it is only now that the 1936 Sup­
pression of Trafficking Convention can be appreciated in a more 
favourable light. In retrospect, it may be said that the convention was 
ahead of its time in that what it attempted to promulgate, albeit 
poorly, was a valid idea which has now been incorporated within the 1988
Anti-Trafficking Convention. In comparing the two conventions one can­
not *help noticing a degree of congruity both in the objectives and texts 
of the provisions. Consequently, the problem with the 1936 Suppression 
of Trafficking Convention may have been that it projected something the 
world was not yet ready for. Support for this point comes from Chat­
ter jee when he observes that perhaps the basis for the 1936 Convention’s 
unpalatability was that it "made too enthusiastic an attempt to bring 
the drug traffickers to task.”9
Because the treaties prior to the 1961 Single Convention have all 
been terminated in relation to the signatories of the latter save for 
parts of the 1936 Suppression of Trafficking Convention the analysis of 
convention law is limited to the modem international treaties. As a 
side note, for states not party to the 1961 Single Convention but party 
to any of the earlier agreements those conventions remain in force for 
them except where provisions of one supersede a previous one. 
Specifically, the emphasis here is on those which, directly and
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indirectly, have applicability on the portion of the sea beyond the ter­
ritorial and jurisdictional domains of states. Resultantly, the 1961 
Single Convention as amended by the 1972 Protocol, the 1971 Psycho- 
tropics Convention as revised in 1982, the Law of the Sea and the 1988 
Anti-Trafficking Convention are all analysed. Additionally, the Inter­
national Convention On Mutual Administrative Assistance For The 
Prevention, Investigation And Repression Of Customs Offences. 1977 
(hereinafter called the Mutual Assistance Convention) is examined.10 
What should become apparent is that the international law repressing the 
trade in illicit drugs by sea is ambiguous and weak - some may say, non­
existent. In order to be equitable in presentation it has to be ob­
served that there are those who will argue that such void reflects the 
viability of other extant components of the composite anti-drug doctrine 
- namely those relying on the internal control mechanisms extant within 
all states. Furthermore, the adherents of the latter viewpoint will 
argue that the prevailing global attitude towards drug trafficking on 
the high seas as measured by the current status of the Law of the Sea in 
general reflects the maximum extent to which states are willing to open­
ly forego the concept of the high seas els an area subject to no juris­
diction. Naturally, hypocrisy is inherent in the latter point in that 
creeping jurisdiction and the proposed enterprise for sea-bed mining are 
demonstrative of the opposite.
7,2,2 The 1961 Single Convention On Narcotic Drugs
The 1961 Single Convention entered into force on 13 December 1964 
and remains the cornerstone of international legislation concerning drug 
control in the world today. Chatterjee provides an excellent review of
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the treaty including its foundations, purpose and objectives, content 
and the degree to which it represents successful codification of a vi­
able anti-drug doctrine suitable for the modem period.11 However, in 
regard to drug trafficking on the waters beyond national control it of­
fers little. Only two provisions specifically mandate that states com­
bat illicit drug trafficking but neither refers to the high seas area. 
Art. 28, para. 3 requires states to adopt measures preventing the misuse 
and illicit traffic in cannabis leaf. Art. 35 requires that states en­
deavour to repress the illicit drug trade and co-operate with each other 
in doing so. Art. 36 requires that all contracting states adopt penal 
provisions for any drug activity contravening the law and which there­
fore is illicit. However, this article simultaneously recognizes the 
sole competency of each state in regard to drug offences occurring 
within its territory (see paras. 3 and 4) though it supports extradition 
where such is warranted and feasible. Confirmation of the non­
applicability of these anti-trafficking provisions to areas beyond the 
territorial limits of states is found in Arts. 4 and 42 which establish 
the territorial applicability of the convention’s provisions once 
adopted by contracting states. As will be observed later, there is 
emerging a new but distorted construance of the term ’territorial 
limits*. Furthermore, the 1961 Single Convention in no way modifies the 
Law of the Sea in regard to flag state jurisdiction. The bases for why 
no such provisions were included or even contemplated can only be specu­
lated upon. Part of the answer lies in the fact that while the 1961 
Single Convention is an international convention the purpose of all its 
provisions is to foster the adoption, implementation and enforcement of 
anti-drug measures by the ratifying states in respect to their legal and
penal codes as the latter apply throughout their respective territorial 
jurisdictions. In other words, the convention promotes consensus on the 
need for drug control on the global level by promulgating articles 
demanding harmonization and standardization in the national anti-drug 
laws of the world’s states. However, it relies on the states to fulfill 
their treaty obligations. Moreover, the 1961 Single Convention itself 
is more an instrument which establishes the basis by which drugs are to
be produced and transported to meet licit requirements as opposed to
strictly focusing on the illicit dimension. It is this distinction fea­
ture of the convention which effectively gives rise to the few articles 
dealing with the illicit trafficking component. The specific answer as 
to why areas not subject to national jurisdiction were excluded 
presumably lies in the fact that the status of the Law of the Sea 
prevailing at the time precluded conscious consideration. The 1958 Law 
of the Sea conventions had been concluded only two years prior and the 
lack of clear-cut agreement on many issues of the Law of the Sea un­
doubtedly made the drafters of the 1961 Single Convention wary of
codifying a drug doctrine which embraced a controversial issue extant 
elsewhere in the international arena. Furthermore, there was a sound 
rational and theoretical basis for not incorporating the sea within the 
scope of the convention. Had the convention, and the past tense is used 
because hindsight proves the contrary, succeeded in its purpose of get­
ting every state to not only upgrade and standardize their municipal law 
codes regarding drugs but also implement and enforce with equal effec­
tiveness their anti-drug measures, the need for international laws and 
measures applicable to the extraterritorial areas would be unnecessary. 
The theorem being advanced is that if all states actively and effee-
tively tackled the illicit drug trade occurring in their respective ter­
ritories on equal footing both in the legal sense and on the operational 
level then, in effect, a viable international framework suppressing the 
trade would have existed. It, however, would be the result of common 
national doctrines which collectively established a global doctrine in­
stead of the reverse being attempted. The fact that the high seas exist 
as a ’no man’s land* beyond their territories would not matter since the - 
interdiction gauntlets created in each state’s territory which the drug 
traffickers would have to run either in departure from or entry into any 
state should be overwhelming. In reality, the 1961 Single Convention 
has not fully attained its objective as envisioned, thus the need for 
the 1988 Anti-Trafficking Convention. Several states have yet not 
ratified the 1961 Single Convention or its amended version.12 Moreover, 
many of those which have have not effectively implemented the provisions 
of the convention within their jurisdictions - particularly in regard to 
the operational dimension. Several of the states in the latter 
predicament, for a variety of reasons, cannot effectively suppress drug 
trafficking in their territories. One has merely to look at the drug 
scene today to document this point. These aspects have precluded the 
1961 Single Convention from being the complete anti-drug doctrine both 
in spirit and substance. This is not to say that it is a failure for it 
is not, but vis-a-vis drug trafficking on the sea it falls short. The 
reason, in summary, is that the convention was drafted in a different 
era when perspectives were somewhat different regarding how to best 
suppress the illicit drug trade on the international level and the ig­
norance of the drafters was supplanted by idealism and optimism for the 
future.
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7.2.3 The Convention On Psychotropic Substances 19 71
The 1971 Psychotropics Convention entered into force on 16 August 
1976. In many ways it is a copy of the 1961 Single Convention in terms 
of purpose, objective, format and structure of the provisions contained 
therein. What makes it a distinct doctrine is the fact that it is not 
an amendment or revision of the latter convention, but embraces an en­
tirely different category of drugs. In other words, it complements the 
1961 Single Convention by bringing under control an array of drugs not 
regulated by that convention. The text of the Preamble to the 1971 
Psychotropics Convention clearly identifies its thrust and aim. The 
basis for the convention being drafted was the proliferation in usage 
and abuse of many psychotropic substances in the 1960s during the period 
of social upheaval and youth rebellion. The lack of viable constraints 
both on the national and international levels combined with the rampant 
permeation of psychotropic drugs in society during that era necessitated 
the codification of some form of globally-initiated controls. The 
problem with the 1971 Psychotropics Convention being similar to the 1961
Single Convention is that it commensurately ignores the waters beyond
the territorial limits of states. It appears that the points and
theorems advanced earlier in the discussion on the problems with the
1961 Single Convention, and the bases for the latter*s provisions not 
extending to the high seas, apply here as well. Because of their 
presentation earlier those points and theorems are not repeated here. 
However, it must be observed that the Law of the Sea had started to un­
dergo change following Pardo’s advancement of the res communis 
doctrine.13 Unfortunately, several states still were not prepared to 
concede their polarized viewpoints regarding many aspects of the
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maritime realm including the status of the high seas. Consequently, the 
question of incorporating the waters beyond national jurisdiction within 
the purview of the 1971 Psychotropics Convention never arose. As the 
trafficking of psychotropic substances by sea compared to that of select
narcotic drugs was, at the time, small and remains so today, there was
never the same impetus present to begin with on the subject.
The pertinent provisions of the 1971 Psychotropics Convention 
specifically promulgating an anti-trafficking doctrine include Arts. 7, 
12, 21 and 22. Art. 7, subpara, (f) requires the contracting states to
prohibit both the export and import of all psychotropic substances
listed in Schedule I (of the four attached Schedules) except where such 
activity is being conducted by authorized personnel and agencies. Art. 
12, para. 3, subpara, (d) requires all contracting states to detain all 
consignments of psychotropic substances listed in Schedules I and II 
either entering or leaving their territories which are not accompanied 
by appropriate documentation. Art. 21 of the 1971 Psychotropics Conven­
tion is the counterpart to Art. 35 of the 1961 Single Convention. Ex­
cept for minor elaboration in points the two articles read the same. 
Art. 21 requires the contracting states to endeavour to repress the il­
licit trafficking of psychotropic substances and to co-operate with each 
other in doing so. Art. 22 contains the penal provisions and like Art. 
21 is a copy of an article in the 1961 Single Convention - in this case, 
Art. 36 of the latter convention. However, Art. 22 has been phrased and 
structured somewhat differently in regard to some of its provisions. 
Furthermore, Art. 22 is more expansive in that para. 3 contains an 
express provision for the seizure and confiscature of psychotropic sub­
stances along with the catalytic agents and other substances used in the
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commission of a drug offence and the equipment involved. One area where 
the two conventions differ somewhat is in the provisions regarding the 
territorial applicability of the provisions. The 1971 Psychotropics 
Convention lacks an explicit provision on the territorial extent to 
which contracting states may project and effect their respective 
counter-trafficking measures such as found in Art. 4, subpara, (a) of 
the 1961 Single Convention. It does, however, contain a provision in 
the form of Art. 27, which is a carbon copy of Art. 42 of the 1961 
Single Convention, regarding external territories for which contracting 
states bear responsibility for in international affairs. However, while 
a specific provision is missing one finds sufficient delimitation of the 
extent of states’ control measures in the wording of other provisions: 
Art. 3, para. 3; Art. 12, para. 3; Art. 13, para. 4; and, Art. 16, para. 
1. All of these provisions imply de facto that states sire confined to 
exercising their initiatives within the confines of their territorial 
limits. Lastly, like in Art. 32 of the 1961 Single Convention the 1971 
Psychotropics Convention has the same provision. Art. 14 requires that 
all contracting states adopt safeguards to prevent the misuse and diver­
sion of psychotropic substances comprising part of medical supplies kept 
onboard ships of their nationalities. To the extent that the provision 
applies to activity transpiring wholly within the confines of a given 
vessel it may be said that this article tacitly endorses the right of 
flag states to exercise jurisdiction on the high seas over illicit drug 
activity provided any actions on their part are confined to their 
respective flag vessels.
In summary, the 1971 Psychotropics Convention lacks any reference 
to the waters beyond the territorial limits of both contracting and non­
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contracting states. Consequently, it is functionally useless as a basis 
on which to combat drug trafficking on the high seats. The only consola­
tion is that the trafficking of psychotropic substances by sea is rela­
tively small and thus not as pressing an issue vis-a-vis some of the 
narcotic drugs.
7,2,4 The Law Of The Sea
7,2,4.1 Overview Of The Law
The prevailing Law of the Sea is the branch of international law 
most relevant for determining the extent to which states may exercise 
jurisdiction, both individually and collectively, on the sea. It estab­
lishes the juridical status of the various maritime zones conceived un­
der its aegis and, conmensurately, the degrees to which states may 
project their sovereignty or sovereign rights therein. Vis-a-vis 
maritime drug trafficking the law of the Sea establishes the extent to 
which states can exercise their jurisdiction on the sea in interdicting 
drug smugglers. Unfortunately, after having said this, it has to be ob­
served that part of the body of international ocean law is mired in 
controversy. Therefore, in order to understand the current Law of the 
Sea as it provides for the establishment of control measures over drug 
trafficking on the sea the current status of the law along with some of 
its controversial aspects need to be explained.
The extant Law of the Sea appears to be composed of three distinct 
facets: custom and practice; the Geneva Conventions on the Territorial
Sea and the Contiguous Zone,14 on the High Seas,15 on the Continental 
Shelf,16 and on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the 
High Seas;17 and, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982.18 Cus­
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tom and practice are the longstanding components of international law 
which treaties and conventions often purport to codify in their scrip­
tural form. The four Geneva Conventions of 1958 represent the first at­
tempt at codification of the customary law of the sea in convention 
form. However, as noted by some publicists like Harris these treaties 
did not fully live up to that billing and instead contained provisions 
which constituted "progressive development."19 They are all still in 
force at present and seem likely to remain so into the foreseeable 
future.20 The Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Con­
tiguous Zone entered into force on 10 September 1964 and has 46 con­
tracting states. The Geneva Convention on the High Seas (hereinafter 
called the High Seas Convention) entered into force on 20 September 1962 
and has 57 contracting states. The Geneva Convention on the Continental 
Shelf entered into force on 11 June 1964 and has 54 contracting states. 
The Geneva Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living 
Resources of the High Seas entered into force on 20 March 1966 and has 
30 contracting states. For simplicity in future reference to their 
provisions these four conventions will, in most instances, be referred 
to collectively as UNCLOS I. The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 
1982 (hereinafter called UNCLOS III) is not in force though it has 159 
signatories and 40 ratifications.21 Moreover, the prospects of UNCLOS 
III entering into force in the near future range between slim and 
unknown. This raises an interesting query concerning the latter 
convention. When opened for ratification in December 1982 after ten ar­
duous years of drafting and negotiation UNCLOS III was supposed to rep­
resent the *state-of-the-art* in convention law governing the sea and 
lauded sis such. Yet, six years later on it hsis not entered into force
having been ratified by only two thirds of the number of states required 
to effect entry into force. In the last few years publicists in their 
writings have alluded to and directly spoken of another Law of the Sea 
convention being needed. Bimie,22 Booth23 and Menefee24 are but a few 
examples of such advocates. The bases for the lack of acceptance by 
many states of UNCLOS III hinges on two general points. Imprimis, for 
several developed states the entire sea-bed * package* found in Part XI - 
is unacceptable. Secondly, the convention as a whole represents a con­
siderable departure from the codification of customary law, longstanding 
practices and general principles of law. Incorporated in the provisions 
are progressive developments either promulgated by international law 
commissions and legal bodies or derived from the political and economic 
whims of states. The attitudes and responses states have adopted 
towards the Law of the Sea appears to be based on the degrees to which 
they individually and collectively consider it to embrace bonafide cus­
tom and practice, general principles of law and acceptable progressive 
developments as contained in both the 1958 and 1982 conventions on the 
Law of the Sea.
As it stands now, technically, the Law of the Sea consists of two 
components of international law: convention law and custom. Contract­
ing states of the various conventions comprising UNCLOS I are bound by 
the legal terms and obligations contained therein. States which are not 
party to these conventions rely on the entire body of customary law per­
taining to the sea. However, there is a third category. Several 
states, either when signing UNCLOS I or subsequently, maintain that 
these conventions did not, at the time of their inception, go far enough 
in scope and therefore claim to adhere to an additional body of ocean
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law beyond that expounded upon in the conventions. Complicating the 
matter are the many changes of a progressive nature occurring in the 
last 25 years which have dramatically altered states* perspectives con­
cerning the sea. Much of it was embraced within the provisions of UN­
CLOS III. The problem is that UNCLOS III is not a governing convention,
yet many of the altered and new doctrines have manifest themselves to
the point that they now constitute custom and practice anyway. Thus,
from the standpoint of drug trafficking it is useful to use UNCLOS III
as the legal reference. Moreover, there are moral and quasi-legal bases 
for referencing UNCLOS III as the applicable Law of the Sea. The con­
vention has been signed by 159 states - in other words, by 96% of the 
world’s sovereign members. While signation is not ratification it does 
indicate states* acceptance of the spirit of the convention in terms of
both its purpose and objectives and respect for a fair amount of the
content therein. Otherwise, why would states participate in the draft­
ing process at all much less sign it. The quasi-legal basis for grant­
ing credence to UNCLOS III is derived from Art. 18 of the Vienna Conven­
tion on the Law of Treaties 1969 (hereinafter called the 1969 Treaties 
Convention).25 This article stipulates that contracting parties having 
affixed their signatures to a treaty must '’refrain from acts which would 
defeat the object and purpose of a treaty when: (a) it has signed the
treaty until it shall have made its intention clear not to become a
party to the treaty...” Apropos to UNCLOS III it requires signatories 
of the latter convention which are also contracting parties of the 1969 
Treaties Convention to abide by it until such time that they have
decided to ratify or reject it. Quantitatively, this applies to half
the number of states having signed UNCLOS III. Because of all these
bases UNCLOS III is used in the ensuing analysis as the legal reference. 
Where there is considerable variance between practice and the law the 
divergences are noted.
Lastly, to entertain a realistic dimension to the analysis and 
demonstrate the complexities which could arise in the future one need 
only to envisage a scenario where UNCLOS III has entered into force, but 
the number of contracting parties is the minimum number required for 
entry into force.26 Should this scenario come to pass a "complicated 
set of treaty relations will result" with the 1958 Geneva Conventions 
continuing in force for the states party to them and not parties to UN­
CLOS III.27 The 1958 Geneva Conventions will also remain the governing 
instruments for states party to both the 1958 and 1982 Conventions in 
their relations with states party to the former only.28 UNCLOS III re­
places UNCLOS I completely for those states party to both in dealing 
with each other.29 Art. 311 of UNCLOS III establishes these points. In 
addition to the above treaty relationships there will exist a set of 
treaty-customary law relationships further complicating the scene. 
States not party to either UNCLOS I or UNCLOS III will be governed en­
tirely by customary law as they see it. The dilemma posed here hinges 
on the harmony and compatibility of the latter law with that codified in 
the conventions. Furthermore, there will undoubtedly be states which in 
continuing to adhere to UNCLOS I will refute the notion that UNCLOS III 
represents adequate or complete codification of the Law of the Sea, yet 
will have to contend with seme of its progressive elements since they 
are deemed custom and UNCLOS I lacks the substance to embrace them. 
Presumably, these states will adhere to a Law of the Sea which repre­
sents a fusion of UNCLOS I with select aspects of the contemporary cus­
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toms and practices pertaining to the sea. The net dilenma brought to 
mind by these intricacies and controversy concerning the Law of the Sea 
is how can one reliably determine the anti-trafficking doctrine extant 
on the sea today. Fortuitously, the answer is that most of the relevant 
Law of the Sea is unambiguous and well-established by longstanding cus­
tom and practice though perhaps lacking. The most problematic aspect of 
the Law of the Sea centers on the emergence of the exclusive economic 
zone codified in UNCLOS III but also now accepted in practice.
UNCLOS III envisages nine different, geographically defined zones 
and areas; each possessing distinct legal status. Six of these were 
either codified or introduced in UNCLOS I while the other three were 
promulgated for the first time in UNCLOS III. The nine zones and areas 
are: internal waters; the territorial sea; the contiguous zone; the ex­
clusive economic zone (EEZ); the continental shelf zone (CSZ); high 
seas; archipelagic waters; archipelagic sea-lanes; and, straits used for 
international navigation. Under the new oceanic regime states sure 
granted varying degrees of sovereignty or sovereign rights in the 
respective zones and areas. The extent of sovereignty or sovereign
rights the state possesses directly determines the extent of jurisdic­
tion the state has over maritime drug smugglers. Consequently, estab­
lishing the juridical characters of the respective zones and areas in 
regard to drug trafficking is paramount. Of all the zones and areas it 
is the contiguous zone and EEZ which pose contention because their legal 
statuses are imprecise. Because some of the zones and areas are of 
analogous or identical juridical character so far as the jurisdiction a 
state possesses therein is concerned analyses of them is simplified by 
amalgamating them together. Before presenting the analysis one last
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dimension needs elaboration. In regard to drug trafficking per se the 
Law of the Sea may, to some, not appear to be very helpful in repressing 
such activity. It does not directly contribute any type of doctrine, 
either in treaty form or custom, suppressing the activity. Considering 
that drug smuggling by sea 1ms existed for around 200 years this 
predicament is somewhat anomalous. UNCLOS III contains only two provi­
sions out of 445 articles (convention and annexes) specifically refer­
ring to the suppression of drug trafficking. Art. 27 is redundant in 
that it only scripturally embodies a specific right on the part of 
states which is firmly established elsewhere in Part II (Arts. 2, 19 and 
21) though not in such words. Art. 108 is relatively useless as any 
learned member of the legal profession can tell you. It is nothing more 
than a propaganda article endorsing co-operation on the subject. Where 
the Law of the Sea is invaluable is in extending the municipal jurisdic­
tion of states out on to the sea so that states can suppress the 
maritime drug trade in their littoral waters. Furthermore, the Law of 
the Sea recognizes the right of states to exercise complete control and 
jurisdiction over their flag vessels and stateless vessels on all parts 
of the sea beyond their respective jurisdictional and territorial 
limits. It is these aspects of the Law of the Sea that are of relevance 
here and expounded upon further. To facilitate comprehension of the 
juxtapositional and conterminous relationship of the zones and areas 
Figure 7.1 depicts them.
7.2.4,2 Archipelagic Waters. Internal Waters And The Territorial Sea
In archipelagic waters, internal waters and the territorial sea 
all states possess complete sovereignty therein. Art. 2 of UNCLOS III
381
Figure 7.1 The Maritime Zones And Areas Codified In UNCLOS III.
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expresses this maxim. Resultantly, only the littoral state has juris­
diction in such zones and areas which it has proclaimed as extant ad­
jacent to its coast• Of the three zones and areas, internal waters and 
archipelagic waters possess identical juridical characters. Art. 8 in 
Part II infers the sovereignty of littoral states over their internal 
waters while Art. 49 in Part IV clearly establishes the complete 
sovereignty of archipelagic states over their archipelagic waters. This 
means that coastal states have sole jurisdiction in their internal 
waters and archipelagic states have sole jurisdiction in their ar­
chipelagic waters over any and all matters. The territorial sea pos­
sesses a slightly different character in that other states are granted 
the right of innocent passage (Arts. 17 - 26). Also, criminal ac-
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tivities and actions resulting in civil liability committed and confined 
to wholly onboard and within a foreign flag vessel remain in the juris­
diction of the flag state and not the coastal state. However, in regard 
to drug trafficking within the territorial seas of states UNCLOS III ex­
plicitly acknowledges the sole jurisdiction of the coststal state to com­
bat such activity. Art. 27, para. 1, subpara, (d) establishes this 
right of the coastal state in its territorial sea to exercise jurisdic- - 
tion by stating "if such measures are necessary for the suppression of 
illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances." Under 
Arts. 3 and 7 the breadth of the territorial sea may vary in width, but 
the maximum allowed is 12 n.ms. as mensurated from the baselines from 
which it is drawn. Currently, 105 states claim the full 12-mile limit 
while another 17 states claim less. However, there are also 20 states 
claiming more than 12 n.ms. for their territorial seas in contravention 
of the convention and accepted practice. Table 7.1 lists the various 
claims and respective number of adherents.
Table 7.1 Territorial Sea Claims As Of 30 June 1988.
TS claim No. of claimants TS claim No. of Claimants
3 n.ms.
4 n.ms. 
6 n.ms.
6/12 n.ms. 
12 n.ms.
(combination)
11 20 n • ms • i
2 30 n « ms • 2
3 35 n.ms. 1
1 50 n . ms • 2
105 200 n. ms • 14
Total Number of States Claiming Territorial Seas = 142_____________
Note: Though this table includes the U.S. in the grouping of
states claiming 3 n.ms. it must be noted that the U.S.
_______has since extended its territorial sea claim to 12 n.ms.____
Source: UN Office for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Law Of
The Sea Bulletin. No. 11, July 1988 (New York), pp. 46-49.
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Additionally, it must be clarified that the seaward limit of the 
territorial sea, regardless of its stated breadth, does not necessarily 
represent the true distance of that limit from shore. For states with 
relatively smooth and linear coastal configurations the seaward limits 
of their respective territorial seas will, allowing for slight 
variations, comprise imaginary lines paralleling their coasts positioned 
at uniform distances off the coast equivalent to the numeric value of 
the declared breadths. However, in regard to states with unique and 
peculiar coastal and insular configurations the outer limits of their 
territorial seas may be of considerably greater distances from shore. 
In particular, this is true for archipelagic states and states with 
ragged coastal configurations resulting from deep embayments, fjords, 
river mouths, deltas and numerous offshore islands. It occurs because 
the baselines from which the territorial sea is measured are themselves 
offshore in some cases thus coramensurately displacing the outer limit of 
the territorial sea further offshore. For am archipelagic state the 
seaward limit of the territorial sea may be far out to sea by a factor 
several times greater than the breadth actually claimed. UNCLOS III 
fully permits such deviations and variations in the establishment of the 
territorial sea so long as the baselines are drawn in accordance with 
its provisions.
Finally, relative to this analysis it must be observed that much 
of what has been said based on UNCLOS III also appears to apply in cus­
tom and practice. Internal waters and the territorial sea doctrines are 
old established concepts and the provisions of UNCLOS III are, for the 
most part, not incompatible with those contained in UNCLOS I. Ar­
chipelagic waters, on the other hand, is a new doctrine open to debate
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not so much because the concept is outrightly unacceptable, but rather 
because of the way some archipelagic states wish to draw their baselines 
which defies logical and rational comprehension.30 Consequently, in 
practice one is left to presume that non-archipelagic states will only 
respect the claims of archipelagic states to their respective ar­
chipelagic waters and adjacent zones to the extent they see the latters* 
claims as cartographically valid.
7,2,4,3 The Contiguous Zone
Though an entrenched concept in the Law of the Sea the formaliza­
tion of the contiguous zone regime is rooted in the historical and often 
arbitrary projections of municipal authority by states on the sea beyond 
their territorial limits as they unilaterally deemed necessary. As 
defined in the pertinent provisions of UNCLOS III the contiguous zone is 
a zone adjacent to the territorial sea within which states may exercise 
jurisdiction solely in regard to customs, fiscal, immigration, sanitary 
and archaeological matters (Arts. 33, para. 1 and 303). In simplified 
terms, the contiguous zone is a sort of a buffer zone or transition zone 
within which states may exercise select protective and punitive measures 
oriented towards preserving their territorial integrity. The actual 
breadth of a state's contiguous zone depends on the territorial sea 
claim of the state. Art. 33, para. 2 stipulates that the outer limit of 
the contiguous zone may extend up to a maximum of 24 n.ms. seaward from 
the same baselines used to measure the territorial sea. However, the 
true breadth of the zone itself is determined by subtracting the width 
of the territorial sea from the declared outer limit of the contiguous 
zone. The conterminous relationship of the territorial sea and con­
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tiguous zone allows this method of assessment. Resultantly, for states 
claiming 12-mile territorial seas and 24-mile limits to their contiguous 
zones the true breadth of the latter zone is 12 miles. Except for the 
archaeological component and the new seaward limit the UNCLOS III provi­
sions are congruous to those contained in UNCLOS I. Moreover, custom 
and practice today attest to the viability of the regime. On the sur­
face it appears that the Law of the Sea is concise and that in regard to 
drug trafficking states do have jurisdiction over such activity in their 
contiguous zones. The specific use of the term ’’customs” in para. 1, 
subpara, (a) in context with the entire phrasing of Art. 33 clearly in­
dicates such. The fact that in nearly all states the respective customs 
agencies usually constitute a primary component of a state's counter- 
trafficking initiative and are legally empowered to both prevent the 
entry of illicit drugs and confiscate them where discovered confirms 
this premise.
Unfortunately, in practice states seem to be divided in their in­
terpretation or acceptance of the contiguous zone, both in general and 
vis-a-vis the suppression of drug trafficking. As shown in Table 7.2 
only 30 states claim contiguous zones. Considering the propensity of 
most states to usurp more territory wherever possible, given the chance, 
this lack of contiguous zone claims is anomalous. It implies that while 
many states will normally promote 'creeping jurisdiction* they do not 
accept the contiguous zone regime els a viable doctrine by which to do 
so. Part of the basis for this split stems from differences in inter­
pretation of the wording in para. 1 of Art. 33. Controversy surrounds
the use of the phrase "to prevent infringement within its territory
or territorial sea.” The argument advanced is that the verb "prevent”
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Table 7.2 Contiguous Zone Claims As of 30 June 1988.
The figures given below cure the true breadths of the respective 
contiguous zones after subtraction of the territorial sea claims 
of the respective states listed. _____________________________
Antigua & Barbuda 12 n«ms « Malta 12 n. ms.
Bangladesh 6 ti . ms . Morocco 12 n. ms.
Burma 12 n.ms. Pakistan 12 n. ms.
Chile 12 n .ms. Saudi Arabia 6 n.ms.
Dominica 12 n • ms. Senegal 12 n.ms.
Dominican Rep. 24 n.ms.< *> South Yemen 12 n. ms.
Egypt 6 n • ms. Sri Lanka 12 n. ms.
Finland 2 n • ms. St. Kitts & Nevis 12 n.ms.
France 12 n . ms. St. Lucia 12 n.ms.
Gabon 12 n«ms • St. Vincent &
Gambia 6 n • ms. The Grenadines 12 n. ms.
Ghana 12 n.ms. Sudan 6 n.ms.
India 12 n.ms. U.S.A. 9 n.ms.< b>
Kampuchea 12 n • ms. Vanuatu 12 n.ms.
Madagascar 12 n. ms. Venezuela 3 n. ms.
Vietnam 12 n. ms.
(a) - The Dominican Republic claims no territorial sea but the full
breadth of the contiguous zone.
(b) - Since increased to 12 n.ms._________________________________
Source: UN Office for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Law Of
The Sea Bulletin, No. 11, July 1988 (New York), p. 50.
followed by "infringement'’ does not sanction active interdiction 
efforts, but endorses surveillance operations and ’dissuasion-from- 
entry’ tactics. In other words, there is a difference between offensive 
and defensive measures. The second part of the argument focuses on the 
area of emphasis. Hie thrust of the article is on preventing the 
penetration of the territorial sea and violation of national laws ap­
plicable therein. The phrasing used implies that a violation of the 
various laws referred to (customs, fiscal, immigration and sanitary 
laws) does not technically occur until the intruder physically enters 
the territorial sea while carrying a substance defined as illicit. 
Subpara, (b) of Art. 33, para. 1 reinforces this interpretation by ac­
knowledging the right of a state to apprehend transgressors of the laws
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specified in subpara, (a) for having committed such offences while in 
the territorial sea or on terreal territory but which have fled to the 
waters comprising the contiguous zone. The question which proponents of 
the argument will retort with is how can one legally equate preventive 
measures applied on an area beyond the territorial limit of a state in 
relation to anticipated and not actual offences with the absolute juris­
diction states possess within their territorial limits in regard to any 
offence and crime. Based on the relatively small number of the world's 
states claiming contiguous zones it would appear that for most states 
the answer is you cannot. As a last comment on the argument it should 
be noted that it is not new but was first advanced prior to UNCLOS I. 
Gerald Fitzmaurice, the U.K.'s representative on the ILC drafting UNCLOS 
I, strongly voiced the argument in the conferences leading up to the 
four conventions.31
In light of what has been said the question naturally arises: what 
is the current status of drug interdiction measures implemented by a 
coastal state in respect to its contiguous zone? With one exception the 
answer is that any and all counter-trafficking measures adopted by the 
coastal state are valid so long as they are confined to within the con­
tiguous zone. The 30 states currently claiming contiguous zones have 
the full right to effect drug control actions therein. All other states 
not claiming a contiguous zone have identical and congruous rights 
should they assert a claim to such zone in the future. Furthermore, the 
latter group must respect the contiguous zone claims of all states which 
claim such zones and, concomitantly, their right to exercise jurisdic­
tion over drug trafficking activities transpiring therein. The one ex­
ception alluded to earlier concerns the use of force. While force is a
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necessary element in combatting the illicit drug trade, presumably, 
there are limitations to its usage based on certain fundamental prin­
ciples of law and morality. As opposed to the territorial sea wherein 
the littoral state can employ draconian and violent measures of response 
it is reasonable to presume that "preventive measures" implemented in 
the contiguous zone must necessarily be of a less severe nature. In ap­
plied terms, this means that suspect vessels found in the contiguous - 
zone and ascertained not to have already been in the territorial sea of 
the pertinent coastal state cannot be summarily destroyed by an 
authorized government vessel of that coastal state for failing to stop 
and be boarded. Contrastingly, in the territorial sea a coastal state 
may lawfully employ deadly force in a pre-emptive manner though public 
and international outcry may abhor such a response. The foundation for 
this presumption is that within a state's territory municipal legisla­
tion empowers law enforcement agencies to employ such tactics when the 
actions of the offenders allow no other recourse (in order for the 
police agencies to serve their function). Naturally, in circumstances 
where a suspect vessel fires upon a government vessel or aircraft while 
within the contiguous zone the latter are then automatically granted the 
right to reply with equivalent force and use it till such time that the 
offensive vessel has been rendered harmless.
7.2,4.4 The Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)
The EEZ defined in Bart V of UNCLOS III is a new concept which 
definitively exemplifies progressive codification in the Law of the Sea. 
While it is true that recognition of the concept dates back four decades 
and was implied in UNCLOS I, it was not until the 1970s that it rapidly
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gained acceptance among a wide spectrum of states. However, not all 
states accept the entire definition of the EEZ found in UNCLOS III and 
instead call their equivalent zones Exclusive Fishing Zones because it 
more aptly reflects the economic activity they regulate therein. Ac­
cording to Art. 57 the EEZ may be up to 200 n.ms. in breadth and is
measured from the same baselines used for measuring that state's ter­
ritorial sea and contiguous zone claims. Currently, 93 states claim 
either an EEZ or EFZ; of which 89 claim the full 200 miles.32 In 
reality though the actual width of the EEZ is less as a result of its 
conterminous relationship with the territorial sea. Because states 
possess jurisdiction in regards to drug trafficking both in their ter­
ritorial seas and contiguous zones, where the latter are claimed, the 
actual portion of the EEZ under consideration here is that which is 
beyond the outer limits of these two zones. Consequently, to determine 
the net breadth of a state’s EEZ relevant to this discussion one must 
subtract the sum of the territorial sea breadth and contiguous zone
breadth, where the latter exists, from the EEZ or EFZ claimed - as the
case may be. Wherever there is solely a territorial sea or contiguous 
zone claimed one simply subtracts that breadth from the EEZ breadth. 
Table 7.3 presents the result of these computations. The actual rights 
and obligations coastal states have in their respective EEZs are estab­
lished in Art. 56. In synopsis, the coastal state is given the 
sovereign right to exploit, explore, conserve and manage the natural 
resources, both living and non-living, therein and derive all benefit 
from other economic activities they can develop in the zone predicated 
on the use of technology in relation with natural phenomena, forces and 
resources (eg. produce energy from wind, currents, water, etc.).
Table 7.3 Net Breadths Of The EEZs And EFZs Subject To Inquiry.
The mileage figures to the left are the net breadths of the EEZs and 
EFZs after subtracting the respective territorial sea and contiguous 
zone claims. The number to the right in the column is the number of 
states having EEZs/EFZs of that net breadth._______________________
1 n.m. 1 182 n • ms • 2
6 n.ms. 2 185 n • ms • 1
32 n. ms. 1 188 n * ms • 56
170 n. ms. 2 (■> 196 n.ms. 1
176 n.ms. 21 197 n • ms • 4
180 n . ms. 1 (■> 200 n.ms. 1
(a) - net breadth results from territorial sea claim contrary to
UNCLOS III provisions.
(b) - net breadth is full breadth of EEZ allowed because state
claims no territorial sea or contiguous zone.
Note: States claiming 200-mile territorial seas are not included
_______ in the above presentation.__________________________________
Source: Extrapolated from data contained in UN Office for Ocean
Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Law Of The Sea Bulletin. 
_________No. 11. July 1988 (New York), pp. 46-53.___________________
Conversely, Art. 58 establishes the rights other states possess in a 
state’s EEZ. This is where controversy arises though in regard to the 
drug trafficking issue it may not matter much for now. The core of the 
debate centers not so much on its purpose but rather its juridical 
status overall. Poor syntax and phrasing of the relevant provisions 
combined with structural segregation of the various doctrines and 
regimes espoused in UNCLOS III have given rise to serious argument over 
the scope of the EEZ regime and lent impetus to several states adopting 
a broader than intended interpretation of their rights and jurisdiction 
in their EEZs. As noted earlier, 13 states outrightly maintain that 
they have 200-mile territorial seas.33 Additionally, other states sub­
scribe to the concept of the coastal state possessing national jurisdic­
tion in the EEZ though they do not claim their EEZs to constitute ter­
ritorial seas.34 The root of the controversy stems from the intrinsic 
desire on the part of many states to extend their sovereignty and juris­
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diction whenever and wherever possible in order to fulfill an innate in­
security complex. It is not the author*s intent to give a discourse on 
the controversy, but in order to establish the juridical status of the 
EEZ as it affects states* ability to combat drug trafficking on the sea 
sane elaboration is required. Contrary to the view of some states that 
the waters of the EEZ comprise high seas it appears that in fact the EEZ 
is a zone sui generis. Sufficient evidence of this fact is found in 
both the official declarations of states regarding the oceanic regime 
and the literary works and forum discussions of publicists. Among 
states advocating this position are Cape Verde, Chile and Uruguay.35 
The Chilean interpretation of the the EEZ is demonstrative of these 
states’ views. Chile states that "the exclusive economic zone has a sui 
generis legal character distinct from that of the territorial sea and 
the high seas" and "is a zone under national jurisdiction..."38 It goes 
on to say that UNCLOS III "defines it [the EEZ] as a maritime space un­
der the jurisdiction of the coastal state, bound to the latters’ ter­
ritorial sovereignty and actual territory, on terms similar to those 
governing other maritime spaces, namely the territorial sea..."37 Among 
publicists categorizing the EEZ a zone "sui generis" are Barrie,38 
Booth,39 Churchill and Lowe,40 Hollick41 and Rembe.42 The truest answer 
to a question on the juridical status of the EEZ is that it is yet un­
decided and that resolution may come from elsewhere. O ’Connell holds 
this view when he states that the EEZ’s "actual status is likely to come 
to depend less upon the textual exegesis than on the outcome of the free 
play of political forces over a span of time."43 This is unfortunate 
for those states most concerned and afflicted by the maritime drug trade 
because an answer would be helpful now. To bridge the gap the formula­
tion of a temporary but * working’ answer which states can refer to until 
such time as the juridical issue is definitively settled or a political 
consensus attained is paramount. To achieve this the pertinent articles 
of UNCLOS III need to be re-evaluated and balanced by the learned views 
of publicists.
As already noted the crux of the debate centers on the extent of 
sovereignty or sovereign rights states possess therein. Part of the 
conflict in viewpoints stems from an incongruity in the relevant provi­
sions induced by poor phrasing and the compartmentalization of the 
various oceanic regimes into separate Parts. The structure of the con­
vention implies that each Part is a separate entity. Art. 86 of Part 
VII dealing with the high seas indicates that the FEZ must be of dif­
ferent juridical status by categorically excluding the application of 
the high seas regime to within the EEZ. Contrastingly, Art. 58 of Part 
V specifically states that the high seas freedoms listed in Art. 87 and 
other internationally lawful uses (not cited in the article’s 
provisions) do exist within the EEZs of all states. Here is where the 
contradiction arises though it is not readily obvious. A careful read­
ing of of Art. 58 reveals that only the "freedoms" listed in Art. 87 and 
"other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to these freedoms" 
are permitted. Drug trafficking is not one of the freedoms listed in 
Art. 87. At this juncture a curious question is posed: is drug traf­
ficking on the high seas unlawful? This question is of relevance in 
relation to the phrase "other internationally lawful uses..." While 
most of us would think the answer is yes it has to be said that nowhere 
in convention law pertaining to the high seas has it been established 
that drug trafficking on the high seas is unlawful. Irrespective of the
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latter point the outcome of this analysis reinforces the idea that the 
EEZ is not a residual high seas area. Art. 55 validates the point.' 
Thus, the question arises: is the EE7. a maritime zone within which the
littoral state may exercise jurisdiction in regard to drug trafficking 
activities on the basis that it possesses some form of limited 
sovereignty or national jurisdiction therein granted to it by either 
UNCLOS III or custom? Outwardly, the answer is no! Art. 56, para. 1, 
subparas, (a) and (b) seem to concisely and explicitly define the degree 
of sovereign rights - not sovereignty - the coastal state has with 
respect to its EEZ. Nowhere in the article (Art. 56) do the provisions 
grant the state jurisdiction in regard to drug trafficking specifically 
or criminal activities in general. Resultantly, it appears that the 
coastal state may not adopt or implement drug control measures in the 
EEZ nor attempt to enforce its drug laws therein. However, as Young 
observes, the EEZ legitimizes the monopolistic ubiety of the civil power 
of the coastal state and extends the area over which the legitimization 
of national control may be exercised.44 Considering the name of the 
zone, the nature of politics and state behaviour it should be realized 
that in practice there is little activity at sea which cannot be 
embraced within the term "economic.” Drug trafficking is an economic 
venture albeit criminal. Hence, in the future it is conceivable that 
the right of the coastal state to regulate economic activities within 
the EEZ will broaden to encompass all illicit economic activities.
7.2.4.5 The High Seas
As defined in Art. 86 of UNCLOS III and corroborated, for the most 
part, by state practice the high seas consists of all parts of the sea
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not comprising internal waters, archipelagic waters, the territorial sea 
and the EEZ. Art. 1 of the High Seas Convention is nearly identical but 
omits the EEZ. The contiguous zone is not included in Art. 86 as an 
area of exclusion. Considering the conterminous relationship of the 
latter zone with the EEZ this presents something of an incongruity and 
is further evidence of the syntactical and structural problems extant 
within the convention. However, in relation to drug trafficking this * 
point is academic since the right of states to combat drug trafficking 
in the contiguous zone seems secure and in this context it must be 
defined as not comprising part of the high seas. Under the extant Law 
of the Sea no state may purport to subject any part of the high seas to 
its sovereignty and all states enjoy equally a number of "freedoms of 
the high seas" pertaining to navigation, overflight, scientific 
research, the laying of submarine cables and pipelines and the construc­
tion of artificial islands and installations (Art. 2 of the High Seas 
Convention and Arts. 87 and 89 of UNCLOS III). In spatial terms, the 
high seats constitute the maritime area beyond the outer limit of the EEZ 
or, where none is claimed, the territorial sea. The fact that a state 
claims no EEZ but claims a contiguous zone technically has no bearing on 
the matter since in juridical terms the latter zone remains part of the 
high seas with the littoral state granted only limited regulatory powers 
therein. It is solely in the applied sense in relation to drug traf­
ficking and other select offences that the contiguous zone becomes a 
zone divorced from the high seas.
The high seas regime codified in both UNCLOS I and UNCLOS III are 
relatively identical and provide states with only limited means of sup­
pressing the drug trade. Though UNCLOS III differs from UNCLOS I in
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that it contains a specific article pertaining to drug trafficking on 
the high seas there are no express provisions in either directly grant­
ing all states universal jurisdiction over maritime drug traffickers in 
that regime. Art. 108 of Part VII in UNCLOS III is a functionally use­
less article which effectively serves no other purpose than to pay *lip 
service* to counter-trafficking measures for the high seas and recognize 
flag state jurisdiction. Art. 108 is reproduced below:
"Article 108 Illicit traffic in narcotic drugs or psychotropic 
substances
1. All States shall co-operate in the suppression of illicit traffic 
in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances engaged in by ships on 
the high seas contrary to international conventions.
2. Any State which has reasonable grounds for believing that a ship 
flying its flag is engaged in illicit traffic in narcotic drugs or 
psychotropic substances may request the co-operation of other States
to suppress such traffic."
There are three major flaws in the article. Imprimis, para. 1 requires 
all states to "co-operate in the suppression of illicit traffic" but 
does not define what the means of co-operation are to be. The article 
therefore has no * teeth*. As is well evidenced in other areas of inter­
national law and relations the term "co-operation" has diverse meaning 
ranging the gamut from bilateral exchanges of information to multi­
lateral military operations but generally involves passive intelligence 
co-ordination. In simple terms, the article does not definitively sanc­
tion the use of counter-trafficking offensives on the part of all states 
to suppress the illicit drug trade on the high seas. Another flaw with
para. 1 is that it refers to "illicit traffic engaged in by ships on
the high seas contrary to international conventions." None of the other 
applicable drug conventions contain provisions pertaining to or ap­
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plicable on the high seas. Therefore, one is left to ponder as to what 
international conventions are being contravened when drugs are moving on 
the high seas. The third problem concerns para. 2 wherein the absolute 
right of the flag state to exercise jurisdiction on the high seas is 
reaffirmed. This paragraph is redundant since the extant Law of the 
Flag theory is established elsewhere in the provisions of both UNCLOS I 
and UNCLOS III and in custom and practice (Art. 6 of the High Seas Con­
vention and Arts. 92 and 94 of UNCLOS III). The fact that Art. 108 
promotes the idea of flag states asking the assistance of other states 
in dealing with one of its vessels does not alter the realities of 
circumstance. Flag states alone possess jurisdiction over their vessels 
and, in general, no state may project its jurisdiction over foreign flag 
vessels in regard to drug trafficking on the high seas except if 
authorized by the flag state. This latter aspect naturally swings the 
analysis around to the line of query concerning the limited bases by 
which states may exercise their jurisdiction on the high seas in rela­
tion to drug trafficking therein. At this juncture some juridical 
philosophy on the subject is required to facilitate comprehension of the 
bases by which states can protuberate their jurisdiction on the high 
seas. International law recognizes a number of exceptions to the 
’’freedom of the high seas” doctrine when the interests of a given state 
supersede the interests of the international community.45 These excep­
tions are rooted in the concept that a certain legal order must be 
preserved to prevent anarchy on the high seas. Of the six exceptions 
pertaining to criminal behaviour - the nationality, objective- 
territorial, protective, passive personality, territoriality and univer­
sality principles - only the first three have validity in regard to drug
smuggling on the high seas. To demonstrate the viability of the 
nationality, objective-territorial and protective principles the juridi­
cal bases in the Law of the Sea through which they may be applied, in­
ferred or interpolated need to be examined. There are four bases by 
which states can legitimately exercise jurisdiction over drug traffick­
ing activities on the high seas. The first involves the Law of the Flag 
theory referenced above. The Law of the Flag theory is a corollary 
principle of the nationality principle and is based on the concept that 
a vessel constitutes a territorial extension of the state in which it is 
registered. Consequently, all flag states retain exclusive jurisdiction 
over their respective flag vessels on the high seas (Art. 6, para. 1 of 
the High Seas Convention and Art. 92, para. 1 of UNCLOS III). In prac­
tice it means a flag state may board, search, seize its vessels, arrest 
those onboard and prosecute them, regardless of citizenship, for of­
fences committed on the high seas as the flag state sees fit or 
necessary* The flag state is fully within its rights to enforce its na­
tional laws along with treaty conferred obligations on its flag vessels 
while they are on the high seas. An additional dimension of this situa­
tion is that flag states are fully entitled to defer or delegate their 
authority over their vessels to another state should they so desire or 
if requested to do so. But, in order for other states to have such 
responsibility the flag state must have acquiesced or consented to such 
deferral or delegation. Art. 108, para. 2 recognizes this aspect of the 
Law of the Flag theory and encourages such interstate co-operation al­
beit it in a lacklustre format. As will be observed later, Art. 17 of 
the 1988 Anti-Trafficking Convention also promotes this form of inter­
state co-operation, but in a more effective manner. Art. 110, para. 1,
\subpara, (e) along with paras. 2, 4 and 5 affirms the right of flag
states to board and search their own vessels on the high seas though no 
provisions specifically granting seizure, arrest and prosecution powers 
are included. However, it is construed that flag states have this 
authority under the auspices of Art. 92, para. 1 in tandem with the cus­
tomary Law of the Flag theory.
The second basis applies for all states and is founded on their 
universal right to board, search and seize ships which are stateless. 
In practice, vessels engaged in drug trafficking are sometimes un­
registered thus possessing no legitimate link with any state. The U.S. 
reports that about 10% of the vessels it seizes on drug trafficking 
grounds are stateless.46 Art. 110, para. 1, subpara, (d) along with 
paras. 2, 4 and 5 establishes the right of all states to board and
search vessels having no nationality (not registered in any country). 
Unfortunately, similar to that noted earlier there are no provisions in 
either UNCLOS I or UNCLOS III specifically stating what states finding 
such vessels are to do with them. However, in practice there appear to 
be two options by which states may justifiably seize stateless vessels 
and arrest and prosecute those onboard for drug trafficking. The first 
involves the application of the objective-territorial or protective 
principles. The objective-territorial principle grants states jurisdic­
tion over criminal activities committed extraterritorially but which 
produce a detrimental effect within their respective territorial limits. 
Therefore, stateless vessels carrying drugs destined for a given state 
can be apprehended outside that state’s territorial sea and contiguous 
zone limits on the basis of the negative threat the drug consignment 
poses to the state. The rationale being that once the drugs enter the
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state they would have had a detrimental impact on the population. The 
problem is that the objective-territorial principle in theory requires a 
more definitive ’cause and effect’ nexus between the act committed ex- 
traterritorially and the detrimental effect induced within the state’s 
territory. Drugs on the high seas are innocuous substances which in no 
way have a detrimental effect on the state. In practice though this
latter aspect has not deterred municipal courts from convicting drug 
traffickers found on the high seas onboard stateless vessels, notably in 
the U.S.47 The protective principle grants states jurisdiction ex- 
traterritorially if the activity occurring outside their territories 
pose potential threats to national security. Historically, prosecution 
under the protective principle in a state’s court was restricted to ex­
traterritorial acts related to espionage, currency forgery and plots to 
overthrow the government. However, a liberal interpretation of what 
constitutes a threat to national security easily allows extraterritorial 
drug trafficking to be embraced within the scope of the term thus grant­
ing states jurisdiction over drug traffickers seized on the high seas. 
US courts have indicated support for convictions on these grounds 
(protective principle).48 The second option requires a liberal inter­
pretation by the courts of the character of stateless vessels. Instead 
of focusing solely on the presence of illicit drugs onboard the state­
less vessel the basis for conviction stems in part from the offence of 
being stateless which the Law of the Sea implies is intolerable. 
Neither UNCLOS I or UNCLOS III specify the negative impact or threat, if 
such exists, posed to the global community by the presence of stateless 
vessels on the high seas. However, the court of a state may find that a 
state is sanctioned to seize stateless vessels and arrest and prosecute
those onboard on any of the following grounds: (1) a stateless vessel
has no internationally recognized right to navigate freely on the high 
seas; (2) a stateless vessel constitutes a potential hazard to naviga­
tion and its presence destabilizes the tranquil character of the high 
seas; or, (3) that the assertion of state jurisdiction over stateless 
vessels is lawful because it does not interfere with the affairs of any 
other state.49 The fact that the stateless vessel was carrying illicit * 
drugs is an additive factor for justifying the state's assertion of 
jurisdiction over stateless vessels since it can be claimed that drugs 
are certainly a destabilizing influence in the world. The lack of 
elucidation on the character of statelessness in both the 1958 and 1982 
conventions is merely further evidence of the shortcomings extant in the 
codified Law of the Sea. Art. 110 should have contained an additional 
paragraph elaborating on the arrest and seizure rights of all states 
discovering stateless vessels or, alternatively, an additional article 
relating to the entire aspect of statelessness should have been inserted 
in the codified Law of the Sea and the rights of all states explicitly 
clarified therein. As it stands now, the right of all states to seize
stateless vessels stems from both customary law and general principles 
of international law.
The third basis also applies for all states and is a variant of 
the above doctrine concerning stateless vessels. In this case though 
the grounds for boarding, searching and seizing vessels on the high seas 
results from the selective use of two or more flags by a vessel for the 
purposes of convenience. Art. 92, para. 2 (Art. 6, para. 2 of the High 
Seas Convention) categorically states that any vessel sailing under more 
than one flag is to be assimilated to be a vessel without nationality.
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This means that all the points made above concerning the basis for 
boarding, searching and seizing stateless vessels and the relevant ar­
ticles and principles cited are equally applicable here.
The fourth basis involves the doctrine of ’hot pursuit*; a concept 
firmly entrenched in customary law and both UNCLOS I and UNCLOS III. 
All the various elements of this doctrine are not recanted here aside 
from those necessary for demonstrating its applicability. Under the 
*hot pursuit* doctrine a littoral state may actively pursue a foreign 
flag vessel which it believes committed an offence contravening its na­
tional laws while present in its internal waters, archipelagic waters 
and the territorial sea out onto the high seas and there seize the of­
fending vessel and arrest and prosecute those onboard (Art. 23 of the 
High Seas Convention and Art. Ill of UNCLOS III). This doctrine also 
applies to offences committed within the contiguous zone, EEZ and CSZ, 
but only to the extent that the offence contravenes the limited laws and 
regulations coastal states have been given the right to adopt and en­
force therein. Art. Ill explicitly establishes the *hot pursuit* 
doctrine. Drug trafficking is one of the offences for which states may 
undertake hot pursuit of an offending vessel, seize it and arrest those 
onboard on the high seas. The validity of this interpretation is sub­
stantively reinforced by para. 4 of Art. Ill which seems to be specifi­
cally oriented towards drug trafficking because of the provision per­
taining to mothership operations. Of course, the reference to mother­
ships in para. 4 also embraces certain other types of marine activity, 
notably those related to fishing since it is non-specific. This,
however, does not alter the fact that it has clear application to drug 
trafficking operations. An interesting aspect of the *hot pursuit*
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doctrine contained in UNCLOS III is that it grants states the right to 
maintain hot pursuit of a vessel into the EEZs and contiguous zones of 
other states but not the territorial seas. Para. 3 of Art. Ill ex­
plicitly specifies that the "right of hot pursuit ceases as soon as the 
[suspect] ship pursued enters the territorial sea of its own State or of 
a third State."
Aside from the above bases there are no other grounds on which 
states can legally seize vessels engaged in drug trafficking on the high 
seas and arrest and prosecute those onboard. A vast majority of the 
world’s states concur on this point. Perhaps because it is a principal 
destination point for illicit drug shipments the U.S. has promulgated 
Federal legislation purporting to extend its jurisdiction to the high 
seas in regard to foreign vessels with foreign crews based on the 
objective-territorial and protective principles. US courts have upheld 
convictions related to drug seizures effected on the waters beyond the 
U.S.’s contiguous zone.50 Furthermore, the American courts have hinted 
at the applicability of the universality principle though no court has 
actually accepted it sis a valid basis for conviction.51 Unfortunately, 
while there is sympathy for the U.S.’s drug problem and its concomitant 
initiatives at combating the trafficking component many states will, if 
pressed on the issue, say that they do not concur with some of the laws 
enacted, or portions thereof, and programs implemented by the U.S. to 
suppress the drug trade. The reasons for their nonconcurrence are that 
they do not accept the U.S.’s projection of jurisdiction in areas nor­
mally deemed beyond the territorial limits of the U.S. and which con­
travene international law. One particular example is the U.S.’s 
reliance on the ’Ker-Frisbie* doctrine for trying select cases.52 Under
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this doctrine the manner in which individuals, regardless of 
nationality, are brought within the court's physical custody in no way
invalidates the court's right to try them.53 US courts have upheld
their right to try defendants apprehended on the high seas for drug of­
fences even though the U.S. may have had no right to arrest them and in
doing so violated international law.54
7,2,4,6 Archipelagic Sea-Lanes, International Straits And 
The Continental Shelf Zone (CSZ)
Though archipelagic sea-lanes, international straits and the CSZ 
are recognized as separate marine geographical entities possessing dis­
tinct juridical characters their existence is of little consequence to 
the promulgation of a maritime anti-trafficking doctrine. The reason is 
that whatever juridical characters they respectively derive from UNCLOS 
III in no way alters the legal status of the waters comprising the 
respective zones and areas. Incorporated in the relevant articles 
codifying each regime is a specific provision which explicitly provides 
that the legal status of the waters within these respective zones and 
areas is determined by the prevailing legal regimes of the surface 
waters. In other words, the legal status of the waters in these three 
zones and areas will either correspond to the respective claims of lit­
toral states for territorial seas, contiguous zones and EEZs, and for 
archipelagic waters in the case of archipelagic states, or be governed 
by the high seas regime. In regards to archipelagic sea-lanes Art. 49, 
para. 4 in UNCLOS III explicitly states that the "regime of archipelagic 
sea lanes passage established in this Part shall not in other respects 
affect the status of the archipelagic waters, including the sea
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lanes...” Relative to drug trafficking this means that the archipelagic 
state has full jurisdiction over such activity since para. 1 of Art. 49 
establishes the sovereignty of the archipelagic state therein. In 
regards to international straits Art. 34, para. 1 explicitly states that 
the "regime of passage through straits used for international navigation
established in this Part shall not in other respects affect the legal
status of the waters forming such straits or the exercise by the State
bordering the straits of their sovereignty or jurisdiction over such
waters..." This means that the extent to which states bordering a 
strait may exercise jurisdiction over drug trafficking on the waters of 
the strait will depend on their territorial sea and contiguous zone 
claims. As an applied example, two littoral states, both of which claim 
12-mile territorial seas, bordering an international strait of less than 
24 n.ms. in breadth throughout its length have complete jurisdiction 
over drug trafficking therein up to the boundary between the two ter­
ritorial seas (usually a median line). Where the strait is wider than 
24 n.ms. the extent to which strait states may exercise jurisdiction 
over drug trafficking in the strait depends on not only whether they 
claim contiguous zones but the breadth of those claims in relation to 
the physical width of the strait. If the width of the strait exceeds 
the sum of the respective claims of the strait states to territorial 
seas and contiguous zones there then exists a corridor of water in the 
center of the strait which, normally, is beyond the jurisdictional con­
trol of the strait states except in regard to any extant FEZ regimes. 
EEZ claims, though, are irrelevant since states at present cannot exer­
cise jurisdiction over drug trafficking therein. However, under other 
provisions of the international straits doctrine it appears that strait
states do have jurisdiction over drug traffickers on the waters of a 
strait beyond their territorial limits. The basis for this jurisdic­
tional extension steins from the need for promoting safe navigation in 
the strait and countering threats to it. Art. 42, para. 1, subpara, (d) 
stipulates that strait states can adopt laws and regulations in relation 
to transit in respect to the "loading or unloading of any
commodity in contravention" of their customs laws. This is a
unique provision in that it allows strait states to have de facto con­
tiguous zones throughout their halves of an international strait ir­
respective of its breadth. In effect, it means the high seas doctrine 
which may otherwise exist in an international strait is partially 
suspended. In the case of international straits which are bordered by 
the same state on both sides it means that that state may exercise 
jurisdiction throughout the strait in regard to drug trafficking regard­
less of the strait’s breadth. Where more than two states border an in­
ternational strait which is wider than their territorial limits one will 
have to work out the cartographic limits to jurisdiction based on a 
median line or an equity principle. Alternatively, these three (or 
more) strait states can mutually decide on an open interdiction policy 
applicable for all of them in the portion of the strait beyond their 
respective territorial limits. In regard to the CSZ Art. 78, para. 1 
explicitly states that the "rights of the coastal state over the con­
tinental shelf do not affect the legal status of the superadjacent 
waters..." In applied terms, this means that a coastal state claiming a 
CSZ may only exercise jurisdiction over drug trafficking up to the outer 
limits of its territorial sea, and contiguous zone if one is claimed. 
In the rest of the CSZ, regardless of breadth, beyond these limits the
coastal state cannot exercise jurisdiction over drug traffickers except 
as provided for under the high seas doctrine. The fact that the CSZ of 
a given state may, for the most part, be conterminous with its EEZ has 
no bearing on the matter because littoral states currently lack juris­
diction over drug trafficking in the latter zone (aside from that 
provided for under the high seas regime).
In summary, neither the archipelagic sea-lane, international 
strait or CSZ doctrines create any problematic dimension in combating 
the maritime drug trade. Conversely, neither do they complement the ex­
tant Law of the Sea in terms of enhancing suppression of the trafficking 
of drugs by sea except as provided for under one provision of the inter­
national straits regime. In essence, the doctrines enveloping these 
three zones and areas are benign in relation to the drug trafficking 
issue.
7,2,5 The 1988 Convention Against Illicit Traffic In 
Narcotic Drugs And Psychotropic Substances
At the time this treatise was being prepared the 1988 Anti- 
Trafficking Convention had just been opened for signation.55 As of 7 
April 1989 the convention had 62 signatures but no ratifications. As to 
when it may actually enter into force is unknown, but realistically it 
stands an excellent chance because the number or ratifications and ac­
cessions required for entry into force is only 20 (Art. 29). Whether 
the convention will be widely accepted - that is accepted by more than 
100 states - is another issue. Some of the articles in the convention 
contain provisions requiring elaborate legal obligations which several 
states’ legal systems may be unable to fulfill or comply with. The 1988
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Anti-Trafficking Convention has particular relevance to the topic of 
this treatise because it expands on the manner in which states may 
suppress drug trafficking on the high seas, in free trade zones and in 
free ports. It does not, however, recognize an open right on the part 
of all states to search and seize foreign flag vessels nor a right to 
arrest and prosecute those onboard. Having said this, it has to be 
noted that a somewhat contradictory or, perhaps one should say, am­
biguous provision exists within the convention which appears to suggest 
that states can exercise their jurisdiction extraterritorially on the 
basis of the objective-territorial principle. More is said on this 
dimension later.
The basic purpose of the provisions pertaining to the maritime 
drug trade is to encourage bilateral co-operation based on flag state 
assent to foreign interception. Arts. 4 and 17 are the relevant 
articles. Out of necessity they are inextricably interdependent on each 
other. Just as its title implies Art. 4 defines the jurisdictional
parameters to state projection of authority. Art. 17 promotes bilateral
co-operation and advances the consent concept based on the Law of the 
Flag theory. However, it has to be said that the wording is weak and, 
in practical terms, no change to the status quo of the Law of the Sea 
has been effected. Art. 4 in para. 1, subpara, (a), item (ii) mandates 
that contracting states implement measures to ensure their jurisdiction 
over their respective flag vessels in relation to the drug offences 
enumerated upon in Art. 3, para. 1. Vis-a-vis shipping the ap­
plicability of the Law of the Flag theory is reaffirmed. Furthermore,
in subpara, (b), item (ii) contracting states are requested to "take 
such measures as may be necessary to establish" their jurisdiction over
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foreign flag vessels on which drug offences have been committed pursuant 
to the scope of authorization given by the flag state. Lastly, in para. 
2, subpara, (a), item (i) it is mandated that contracting states take 
measures to ensure their jurisdiction over those individuals committing 
drug offences onboard their respective flag vessels. Art. 17 provides 
the mechanism by which contracting states are to co-operate in fighting 
the trafficking of drugs by sea. In para. 1 the validity of the Law of 
the Sea is recognized and endorsed via the stipulation that all efforts 
at suppression conform with it. The bases by which contracting states 
may interdict drug-laden vessels on extraterritorial areas of the sea 
are established in paras. 2 - 8 .  However, in all of the provisions 
found therein the sovereign sanctity of the flag state is firmly 
preserved. Para. 2 recognizes the right of the flag state to ask other 
states to intercept and seize its vessels on the basis of their involve­
ment in drug trafficking. Provided the state to which such request is 
made is a contracting party of the convention the latter must render the 
assistance requested within the limits of its ability and resources. 
This provision is an extension of the legal mutual assistance doctrine 
and in particular appears to make Art. 7, para. 2, subpara, (c) clearly 
applicable in regard to the maritime component of the drug trade. Para. 
2 also appears to recognize that states can seize stateless vessels en­
gaged in drug trafficking though the wording is not concise. Paras. 3 
and 4 promote the concept of flag state acquiescence to search and 
seizure of their vessels and arrest and prosecution of the traffickers 
by other states. Para. 3 stipulates that a contracting state encounter­
ing a foreign vessel which it suspects of drug trafficking has the right 
to notify the flag state, request confirmation of the vessel's registry
and request permission to intercept it. Para. 3 does not require that 
the flag state concede such permission and in the absence of any other 
provision to the contrary it has to be accepted that if the response is 
negative the requesting state can do nothing more. Para. 4 attempts to 
define the extent to which a flag state may authorize a requesting state 
to exercise jurisdiction over the former’s vessel. While subparas, (a) 
and (b) clearly -specify that boarding and searching of suspect vessels 
are bonafide actions to be allowed subpara, (c) purposefully fails to 
clarify what subsequent actions are to be taken if drugs are found. 
Instead, in subpara, (c) it is stipulated that the flag state may 
authorize the requesting state to take "appropriate action." This is 
amphibolic wording. By its ambiguity it means that arrest, prosecution 
and penalization are permitted courses of action. Realistically, these 
subsequent courses of action could just as easily have been stated in 
concise terms in the same manner as done for the "board" and "search" 
authorizations. Because of the way the paragraph (para. 4 as a whole) 
is phrased the specific inclusion of these courses of action would not 
have imposed any further obligations on the flag states than otherwise 
exist in the article. This raises the subject of the overall weakness 
of Art. 17. The use of the verb "request" and phrases "may authorize" 
and "may so notify" mean that the response of a flag state to requests 
from other states is wholly discretionary. If the flag state chooses 
not to comply with requests from other states there is little the latter 
can do. The only thing that is required of a flag state is that it 
respond quickly, whether positively or negatively, to requests for in­
terception of its flag vessels by other states. Para. 7 establishes 
this point. This paragraph also requires all contracting states to have
a designated governmental agency or entity authorized to accept the 
requests of other states. To further comment on the prior point, it is 
presumed that a flag state must respond to a request though the 
paragraph per se does not require a reply to be given. The fact that 
this seems to be the case does not mean that if a flag state fails to 
respond it has then tacitly consented to the requesting state*s demand 
for interception. The U.S. has interpreted lack of response on the part 
of a flag state to mean consent, but under the convention no such con- 
struance would be justified.56 The validity of this point is attested 
to in Art. 2, paras. 2 and 3 which require states to respect the 
sovereignty of other states and refrain from projecting their jurisdic­
tion in others* territories. Para. 9 has significance because it en­
courages states to formulate agreements and treaties which embrace the 
scope of Art. 17, but which streamline the procedural aspects of co­
operative arrangements so as to promote effectiveness and efficiency in 
the practical application of the 'assent* concept. The ideal dimension 
to be included in such treaties is the incorporation of an open right of 
interdiction. In such agreements all the contracting states (of the 
agreement) will have consented to the interception of their respective 
flag vessels by any of the other contracting members at any time, 
anywhere and without the need for advance approval from the flag state. 
Additionally, the types of measures which the interdicting state may 
take in follow-up to the seizure inclusive of arrest, prosecution and 
penalization would be included. Already, agreements of this kind exist 
though not with the degree of scope envisaged here. One example is the 
U.S.-U.K. agreement wherein the U.K. consents to the boarding of private 
vessels flying the British flag and flags of Grand Cayman and Turks and
Caicos by US authorities within specified areas of the Caribbean Sea, 
Gulf of Mexico, western Atlantic Ocean and within 150 miles of the 
U.S.’s entire eastern seaboard.57 Other such agreements have been con­
cluded by the U.S. with the Bahamas58 and Haiti.59 The last two 
paragraphs (paras. 10 and 11) of Art. 17 sire straightforward technical
provisions; the contents of which are more or less taken right from the 
Law of the Sea.
In addition to dealing with the extraterritorial parts of the sea 
the 1988 Anti-Trafficking Convention recognizes the trafficking problems 
associated with free trade zones and free ports, notably those compris­
ing parts of seaports. Art. 18, para. 2, subpara, (a) requires con­
tracting states to endeavour to monitor the flow of goods and persons in 
free trade zones and free ports and to empower their respective policing 
agencies to search not only the commercial shipping entering and depart­
ing these zones and ports, but also the pleasure craft and fishing ves­
sels found within the areas. Subpara, (c) requires contracting states 
to endeavour to establish and maintain surveillance in the harbours and 
wharf areas of these zones and ports.
Lastly, the apparent endorsement of the objective-territorial 
principle as a basis by which contracting states can unilaterally assert 
their jurisdiction extraterritorially needs to be reconciled. Art. 4, 
para. 1, subpara, (b), item (iii) reads in such a manner as to indicate 
that this is indeed the case. Paraphrased and simplified, the provision 
stipulates that a contracting state may implement measures establishing 
its jurisdiction over select drug offences committed beyond its ter­
ritorial limits but which are intended to provoke commission of a 
broader group of drug offences within the state’s territory, or which
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would have done so if apprehension had not been effected. This is 
clearly the application of the objective-territorial principle but with 
the direct ’cause and effect* link omitted. Because Art. 4 cross- 
references parts of its provisions with provisions contained in Art. 3 
one has to refer to the pertinent provision in the latter to ascertain 
the select drug offences embraced by the provisions in Art. 4. . In this 
case the applicable cross-reference involves Art. 3, para. 1, subpara,
(c), item (iv). This provision stipulates that contracting states shall 
establish as criminal offences acts involving "participation in, as­
sociation or conspiracy to commit, attempts to commit and aiding, 
abetting, facilitating and counselling the commission of any of the of­
fences established" as drug offences according to the convention. 
Effectively, Art. 4, para. 1, subpara, (b), item (iii) merely ensures 
that these offences retain their criminal character when committed ex- 
traterritorially and conjunctly extends the right of the contracting 
states to exercise their jurisdiction over them extraterritorially. 
However, this provision incorporating the objective-territorial prin­
ciple does not sanction contracting states to unilaterally project their 
jurisdiction extraterritorially in regard to foreign flag vessels. The 
reason is that no specific scope to the application of jurisdiction ex­
traterritorially is offered and in the absence of such clarification it 
must be presumed that it is not the intent of the convention to con­
travene existing international law. In other words, it is unlikely that 
Art. 4, para. 1, subpara, (b), item (iii) is intended to be applied vis- 
a-vis such offences committed onboard foreign flag vessels. Instead, it 
is more than likely that the phrase "outside its territory" refers to a 
state’s own flag vessels and to stateless vessels which are situated
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beyond the territorial limit of the state. In summary, this provision 
does not reflect codification of the objective-territorial principle per 
se but rather a modification in meaning thus permitting limited applica­
tion of it.
7,2,6 The Mutual Assistance Convention (1977)
Concluded on 9 June 1977 the Mutual Assistance Convention cur­
rently has 22 contracting states.®0 In overview it has to be said that 
the emphasis of the convention is on the suppression of a variety of 
customs offences unrelated to illicit drugs. Moreover, the convention 
is a procedural device for mandating co-operation between the customs 
administrations of contracting states in relation to an array of of­
fences of which drugs are but one facet. The pertinent provisions 
focusing on drug trafficking are contained in Annex X. The unique 
dimension of the Mutual Assistance Convention is that contracting states 
need not accept Annex X if they so desire.61 Contracting states can be 
selective in the annexes they choose to adhere to. However, once they 
have acceded to Annex X then, under Art. 10 of the Body of the
Convention, it forms sin integral part of the convention and is binding 
upon them. As opposed to the treaties examined previously the Mutual 
Assistance Convention contains several provisions of an operational 
character regarding the illicit drug trade, both in general and vis-a-
vis the maritime component specifically. These provisions are opera­
tional in nature because they prescribe actions which the customs
agencies may undertake to expose the drug trade inclusive of intel­
ligence gathering and investigatory work. Of the 21 articles comprising 
Annex X Arts. 3, 4, 8, 10, 13, and 15 - 21 are the key provisions relat­
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ing to mutual assistance on drug trafficking. Art. 3 requires the cus­
toms agency of a contracting state to relay information and intelligence 
data it has obtained on trafficking activity to the customs agencies of 
other contracting states which may be affected by the activity they have 
have uncovered. Under para, (b) of this article data on vessels engaged 
in or suspected of involvement in drug trafficking is to be forwarded. 
Art. 4 requires the customs agencies of the contracting states to assist 
each other in surveillance operations by tracking all phases of a drug 
trafficking operation transpiring within their respective territorial 
limits but which affect other contracting states. Para, (d) of Art. 4 
specifically includes ships as one of the transport modes to which sur­
veillance is to be extended to. Art. 8 promotes the concept of joint 
investigatory operations involving the customs agencies of two different 
contracting states physically operating within the territorial limits of 
one or the other state. In essence, this article fosters the extrater­
ritorial operation of a given customs agency of a contracting state 
provided it is confined to within the territorial limits of another con­
tracting state and based upon the request of the latter. Arts. 10 and 
13 in conjunction with Arts. 15 - 21 require contracting states to main­
tain databases on individuals engaged in drug trafficking, the methods 
of smuggling utilized and, specifically, the modes of maritime transport 
employed and to furnish all their data to a central Council which dis­
seminates the data to the other contracting states. Overall, it has to 
be said that the provisions of the Mutual Assistance Convention comple­
ment the provisions of other international anti-drug conventions by 
providing a tangible framework for the establishment of a global drug 
intelligence network. The convention does not provide for the applica­
tion of any counter-trafficking measures on the waters beyond the ter­
ritorial limits of states. However, in a tacit way it effectually advo­
cates the installation of a worldwide intelligence system to monitor the 
movement of all vessels traversing the high seas via the recording of 
their entry and exit from the contracting states* territories (eg. 
ports, harbours, rivers, bays, yacht basins, etc.). Art. 4 sanctions 
states to conduct surveillance operations within their respective ter­
ritorial seas and contiguous zones. Furthermore, there is no provision 
within the Law of the Sea stipulating that states cannot conduct sur­
veillance operations on the waters beyond their territorial limits.
7.3 Other Measures Of Law Enforcement On The Sea
All that has been said in the preceding text of this chapter has 
been concerned with law - specifically, international law and how it af­
fects and regulates the states acceding to it. However, the chapter 
would be incomplete without the mention of a couple of additional but 
different aspects of drug control on the sea. The first concerns the 
unilateral assertion of state jurisdiction beyond the territorial limits 
of the state. The other involves interdiction beyond the territorial 
limits of the state but which is recorded as effected within the ter­
ritorial limits of the state. As one may anticipate both are rather 
dubious though the latter must be labelled as outrightly illegitimate. 
Currently, for each case there seems to be only one state practising 
these forms of law enforcement. Therefore, the review of these two 
aspects of drug control on the sea is presented within the context of 
how the respective states involved employ them.
To combat the high level of maritime drug trafficking experienced
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by the United States legislation has been enacted extending its customs 
waters beyond the set limit of its contiguous zone.62 The basis for 
doing so is to allow the law enforcement agencies concerned to legally 
(both from the standpoint of international law and the US judiciary) be 
able to interdict motherships, which commonly hover beyond the 24-mile 
limit of the contiguous zone, and intercept drug-laden vessels well 
before they reach US coastal waters, notably those transiting the Carib­
bean Sea and Gulf of Mexico. However, in effecting some seizures and 
the subsequent prosecutions the U.S. transcended elemental presumptions 
of jurisprudence rooted in international law. The problem has been that 
some of the interdictions effected did not fully meet the legal criteria 
stipulated in either customary international law or convention law, yet 
in some cases the US courts allowed conviction. Part of the problem 
stems from the nature and structure of US law which allows variability 
in application. Consequently, in judicial proceedings the interpreta­
tion of the law applied by the courts has fluctuated and been 
inconsistent. Examples of cases where conviction resulted from unsound 
interpretation are United States v. Howard-Arias6 3 and United States v. 
May-May.64 In the former the court found that seizure in violation of 
international law was acceptable in order to carry out national policy. 
Because the U.S. has decreed drugs a national security problem this 
response of the court appears to sanction the use of the protective 
principle.65 In the latter case the US court found that protection of 
the flag state over one of its vessels is only guaranteed if that state 
is a signatory of the Law of the Sea conventions because the high seas 
freedoms contained therein are only accorded to signatory states, not 
non-signatory states. This finding stretches credibility in that the
U.S. is essentially saying there is no customary Law of the Sea extant 
governing the world community as a whole. It is because of trends like 
these that the counter-trafficking measures accorded to states under in­
ternational law are subject to controversy and prone to alteration on a 
level one must label optimistically as progressive but negatively as 
dangerous. Though at this time the U.S. is alone in promoting the above 
positions it appears that the extant, formalized regime of the Law of 
the Sea as it regulates drug trafficking is being gradually eroded. The 
threat posed by maritime drug trafficking has ensured the interjection 
and acceptance of the objective-territorial and protective principles. 
However, more importantly, the incorporation of these principles, par­
ticularly as done by the U.S., nurtures the emergence of the univer­
sality principle as a basis by which to tackle the maritime drug trade. 
On a subliminal level the concept of universal abhorence for the drug 
trade is already an entrenched concept within the global community. No 
legitimate state will publicly adopt a contrary stance. It is only in 
application that states diverge in viewpoints. The fact that the U.S. 
is a 'superpower' and one of the key players in world affairs advances 
the development of the above perspectives somewhat quicker than they 
otherwise would evolve if advanced by other states.
The second aspect of drug control on the sea to be commented upon 
concerns the furtive projection of state jurisdiction beyond the ter­
ritorial waters of the state to apprehend drug traffickers. Because of 
the illegitimacy of this action the state employing such measures will 
remain anonymous. In the way of identity all that will be said is that 
it is an Asian coastal state which claims solely a 12-mile territorial 
sea. To combat drug trafficking on the sea this state seizes vessels of
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regional registries which its patrol craft encounter on the high seas in 
proximity to their territorial sea but records the geographical coor­
dinates of the seizures as within its territorial sea limit. For 
example, if a drug-laden vessel is found 14 n.ms. off the baseline (2 
n.ms. beyond the outer limit of their territorial sea) in the arrest 
report it is recorded as having been seized 11.8 n.ms. from the baseline 
(0.2 n.ms. inside the outer limit of the territorial sea). All the ves­
sels interdicted in this manner are indigenous craft and those onboard 
are generally illiterate. The reason this state can get away with this 
form of interception stems in part from the ignorance of the drug smug­
glers and partly from the fact that other states aware of it quietly 
condone the practice. Simply put, as long as those seized are guilty 
(as evidenced by the drugs found) who cares where they were arrested. 
To clarify the point about the ignorance of the traffickers it must be 
observed that many of them are indigenous people of the region which, 
while possessing intimate knowledge of the region's waters and inbred 
’feel’ for navigation, lack the state-of-the-art navigational equipment 
for determining precisely their position in cartographic terms and are 
oblivious to politically decreed delimitations of maritime boundaries. 
In other words, many of these indigenous smugglers simply do not know 
where they are in relation to the territorial sea limit when apprehended 
and can do little to refute the falsified claims of the prosecution. 
Obviously, the illegitimacy of this state's actions only arises in 
regard to foreign vessels because there is no attempt by the state to 
contact the countries of registry or origin of the trafficking vessels. 
By not doing so this state rejects the Law of the Flag theory and has 
unilaterally extended its jurisdiction onto the high seas in contraven­
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tion of the Law of the Sea. Realistically, the likely long-term affect 
of this practice will be reinforcement of the universality principle as 
a basis by which to interdict maritime drug smugglers. Moreover, if 
condemned for their behaviour the state in question may invoke the 
protective principle as the basis for its actions and cite the U.S.'s 
behaviour as justification for their response. The one dilemma that 
arises would be how to justify the invocation of the protective prin­
ciple. Virtually all extraterritorial seizures involve drug shipments 
not destined for the state but ones which had been exported from it.
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VIII. Conclusions And Recommendations.
8.1 Treatise Theme Revisited
In the preceding chapters the maritime trade in illicit drugs was 
examined comprehensively with emphasis given to both the complexities 
involved and the inadequacies of the human response. In simple terms, 
the status quo of the trade has been defined. At this stage two ques­
tions become apparent: 1) what can be done to better suppress the traf­
ficking of illicit drugs by sea; and 2) how is this achieved? Consider­
ing that the 14,400 m.ts. of illicit substances seized between 1980 -
1986 from the maritime sector represents, on the one hand, only a frac­
tion of what was actually transported by sea, but, on the other hand, 
70% of all drugs confiscated globally while being trafficked in the 
aforesaid period the direction to which improvements in drug control 
need to be targeted seems clear. If real inroads can be made in sup­
pressing the maritime component of the global drug trade there then will 
be a commensurate and measurable decrease in the overall supply of drugs 
extant in the marketplace. Because several of the coastal member states 
of O.E.C.D. either rank among the world’s major drug consumers or serve 
as principal importation sites for illicit drugs shipped by sea the onus 
is on them to develop and adopt effective counter-measures to the 
maritime drug trade, not only as it imputes on the state but also on the 
regional and international levels as well. Moreover, these states must 
realize that they are, for the most part, privileged in that they alone
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possess both the capability and resources required, on all levels, to 
effectively tackle the problem with possibility for real success. 
Though under duress in some cases, the character and strength of their 
respective societal infrastructures combined with sound economic bases 
affords them that advantage. Realistically, the issue is more one of 
resolve on their part. As evidenced by the lacklustre results of many 
anti-drug initiatives in several OECD states the question of resolve is 
more important than society recognizes. Because resolve is an intrinsic 
concept which out of necessity must be contracted from the prevailing 
legal, political and social regimes extant in a given society and state 
one must determine the status of attitudes, cultural mores and socio­
political conditions therein and then formulate a viable response (read: 
resolve) based either on the status quo or through modification. It is 
only through such behaviour that sound and viable counter-trafficking 
offensives can be mounted by the state.
8.2 Solutions And Strategies For A More Effective Campaign 
In implementing more effective counter-trafficking measures 
against the maritime drug trade there are two areas to consider. The 
first is the legal framework itself in terms of the written law and the 
second is the operational side. On the legislative side two jurisdic­
tional regimes need to be considered: the territorial area and the in­
ternational area. Though statutory problems exist within the respective 
law codes of some states it has to be said, in all fairness, that domes­
tic legislation is not the cause for the lack of success in combatting 
drug trafficking. In regard to the international area this is less true 
because of the paucity in conventions and treaties in force specifically
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aimed at drug trafficking therein. Both the 1961 Single Convention as 
amended by the 1972 Protocol and 1971 Psychotropics Convention put the 
onus on states to adopt, implement and maintain counter-trafficking 
measures. They ignore the area beyond the territorial limits of states. 
The few other treaties in force which some people allude to as exemplary 
of the applicability of an anti-trafficking doctrine on the interna­
tional level are, to varying degrees, limited, weak or problematic and 
none deal with the high seas. The 1988 Anti-Trafficking Convention is a 
direct effort to fill the void. It attempts to overcome some of the 
problematic aspects of administrative, judicial and legal differences 
between states by establishing a communal consensus on counter- 
trafficking measures. More importantly, it mandates active co-operation 
and participation as opposed to merely requesting it thus streamlining 
legal procedures and strengthening the applicability of the anti­
trafficking doctrine globally. However, it also does not sanction an 
open right to seize vessels on the high seas. UNCLOS III is only mar­
ginally helpful in that it grants all states the right to apprehend drug 
traffickers up to 24 n.ms. seaward from the baselines. Furthermore, it 
lends impetus to the fight against drug trafficking on the high seas by 
requiring states to co-operate with each other on the issue. Though 
Art. 108 is relatively useless as written it could be rewritten so as to 
assimilate drug trafficking to be an offence similar in character to 
those of piracy jure gentium, pirate broadcasting and slave trading un­
der Arts. 99 - 104 and 109, paras. 1 - 3  and grant the concomitant right 
to all states to search suspect vessels and, where justified, seize them 
along with their crews and cargoes in accordance with Arts. 105, 109,
para. 4 and 110. This would constitute invocation of the universality
principle. Naturally, there are some serious obstacles to be overcome 
in order to make this suggestion a reality, but it is not unfeasible* 
However, because neither of the latter two conventions are in force 
other alternatives must be explored for dealing with the high seas 
issue. One possibility is for states to collectively draft a specific
multilateral treaty regarding the high seas and drug trafficking 
thereon. Regrettably, the process would take time and entry into force 
is not assured. In all likelihood the number of ratifying states would 
be few. A second alternative is for bilateral agreements to be con­
cluded granting the mutual right of high seas seizures of the 
signatories’ vessels by any of the contracting parties. This option of­
fers potential but it remains questionable as to how many states would 
be willing to conclude such agreements. Moreover, it is doubtful that 
many of those flag states whose vessels tend to be frequently involved 
would sign. The agreements the U.S. has concluded with the Bahamas, 
Haiti and the U.K. only partially exemplify the concept proposed here 
because they are not mutual. They are steps in the right direction and 
if states are willing to effect such agreements then the idea should not 
be hindered. Though of different emphasis and thrust the section on 
juridical co-operation in the Treaty Of Co-operation Between Denmark. 
Finland. Iceland. Norway and Sweden as amended incorporates elements of 
the concept envisaged above.1 The third option is for states to respec­
tively promulgate national statutes which extend their jurisdiction to 
extraterritorial areas under strict conditions. In real terms this is a 
variant of the second option. It, however, offers the best short-term 
solution. The latter concept is based on the fact that states can con­
sent to the seizure of their respective vessels by other states under
the extant Law of the Flag theory. Consequently, other states are not 
prevented from enacting legislation which extends their jurisdictions to 
foreign vessels on the high seas based upon prior consent or acquiesence 
of the flag states. This concept is similar to that promoted in Art. 17 
of the 1988 Anti-Trafficking Convention except that in this case the 
author is advancing a statutory basis for the idea in domestic law. Nor 
is the author requiring the formalized structures for and systems of 
consent stipulated in Art. 17. The U.S. first effected this development 
with the passage of the Marijuana on the High Seas Act of 19802 followed 
by the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Prosecution Improvements Act of 
1986.3 As change in the near future is unlikely regarding the various 
physical components and status quo position of select socio-political 
factors one must look to pragmatic solutions which can function with the 
prevailing conditions. Hence, the improvements need to be in policy and 
in the operational sector accompanied, where necessary, by legal reform. 
They are itemized below:
1) A primary priority should be the establishment domestically of 
a highly effective intelligence system and concomitant telecommunica­
tions network. Effective intelligence gathering is crucial to maintain­
ing a successful interdiction program. By now the reader will be aware 
that much of the information contained in this treatise is derived from 
drug intelligence activities and operations. Many law enforcement of­
ficers and field operatives in the OECD states declare that if it were 
not for intelligence information passed on to them from other agencies 
they would not even have the small level of success they have now.4 The 
majority of drug seizures effected today have resulted from intelligence 
information. Examples of domestic intelligence organizations and sys-
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terns developed to combat the illicit drug trade include New Zealand’s 
National Drug Intelligence Bureau, the U.K.’s National Drug Intelligence 
Unit and the U.S.’s El Paso Intelligence Center. Because the latter 
country is so large a suborder of intelligence centres have evolved on 
the regional level to deal with particular problem areas. The Blue 
Lightning Operations Center in Miami, Florida is the case example which, 
perhaps more than anything else, epitomizes the modern, highly sophisti­
cated intelligence unit.5 Its command centre functions as a coordina­
tion base for all the various law enforcement agencies involved and in­
corporates the latest technology, equipment and methods of detection and 
interception thus representing the state-of-the-art in counter- 
trafficking measures.
2) In conjunction with the above development a prioritization 
policy should be implemented establishing where the thrust of the anti- 
trafficking program is to be targeted. Searching and seizing every ves­
sel where the quantity of drug to be found may be negligible is a mis­
guided program. Though the "Zero-tolerance” policy adopted in the U.S. 
was a laudable concept, it is not a practical policy.6 Simply put, it 
is a waste of money and time to search, seize, process, prosecute and 
penalize or incarcerate insignificant miscreants and make farce of an 
overburdened legal system - the very system the state relies on for 
serving as a deterrent and establishing public order.
3) A corollary of the above and one that is controversial in na­
ture is that in general every state should reformulate their national 
anti-drug policies such that the objective is not one of ridding society 
of drugs, but one of containment. In’other words, the policy should be 
one of confining drug use to that certain element in society or percent­
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age of population which insists on imbibing such substances - and, in 
this context, need drugs. As horrid as such a plan may sound it prof­
fers a more realistic approach to tackling the drug problem on all 
levels inclusive of the trafficking component. There is also precedence 
for the idea when one considers the alcohol and prostitution issues and 
looks at the responses of states to these addictions and vices over the 
past 100 years. Those who advocate and fantasize of a drug-free society 
- and unfortunately there are many - are dreamers. The worse dimension 
of this predicament is that several of these individuals are in posi­
tions of power or tend to be heard more only because they make the ef­
fort to espouse their viewpoints where opportune thus distorting the 
degree of true public antipathy. Narcotic drugs and psychotropic sub­
stances are a part of life and have been since the commencement of 
mankind’s existence on the planet. In the modem age drugs constitute 
an addiction or vice just as alcohol, gambling and prostitution do. 
There will always be a portion of society which indulges in such be­
haviour just as others indulge in the other vices. On this level of 
rationale it should be conceded that drug use and abuse cannot be eradi­
cated but only contained.7 Therefore, all efforts at drug control 
should be targeted at the level of drug use and abuse above and beyond 
this primal level of consumption. By focusing education and law en­
forcement efforts on the broader group of individuals comprising a given 
society’s and state’s population one stands a better chance of subduing 
the epidemic levels of drug use and abuse. In applied terms, this means 
that enforcement efforts should be directed against the hard drugs and 
the trafficking networks, and the relevant penal provisions enhanced.8 
This is not to say that drugs with lower potency factors should be
legalized or decriminalized, but rather that in the operational sphere 
the counter-trafficking initiatives of law enforcement agencies should 
not be targeting the soft drugs specifically nor the drug users. 
Currently, many states have ineffective anti-drug policies though on 
paper they appear feasible. Moreover, to make their seizure statistics 
look impressive, justify enforcement expenditures and vindicate to them­
selves their alleged commitments to drug control several states ap­
prehend minor drug miscreants because the latter are easily targeted and 
found. The problem with such a philosophy is that the distribution and 
trafficking organizations supplying the markets are left intact. The 
emphasis should be on striking at the upper hierarchy behind the drug 
trade where disruption will elicit dramatic effects downstream in the 
marketplace. The use of "controlled delivery" is helpful in this case.9 
And where success in interdiction has been attained severe penal 
measures need to be applied including the use of capital punishment such 
as employed in Iran, Malaysia, Singapore, Sri Lanka and, most recently, 
endorsed in Egypt and the U.S.10
Of course, in advocating such a position the question arises as to 
how does a state or society determine the acceptable parameters of drug 
use and the threshold level above which all the state's resources are 
brought to bear. In pure empirical and scientific terms, no precise 
method of deciding this issue exists. Instead, a certain degree of ar­
bitrariness and supposition based on presumption and perception of the 
true drug situation in a given society will have to suffice. One rather 
arbitrary way is by settling on a select percentage of the whole 
population. Alternatively, a census of the drug using population can be 
fixed based on a summary of drug arrests, hospital emergencies and ad-
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diets in treatment centres. Another method could involve a figure ex­
trapolated from police estimates of consumption for given areas based on 
the quantities of drugs interdicted and their purity.11 A fourth basis 
could involve the amalgamation of the above methods into some form of 
equation where each is a variable and the result a quantitative figure. 
The actual method adopted for determining the parameters of acceptable 
drug use will vary from state to state befitting their respective drug 
cultures and scenes. Increasingly, of late, it appears that more people 
are beginning to subscribe to the general viewpoint described here, 
either in whole or in part, though perhaps not the specifics, or have 
advanced more liberal doctrines.12
4) In fighting the maritime drug trade there is no excuse for not 
using naval forces to help apprehend drug traffickers. The peacetime 
navy needs to practice and maintain their operational state of 
readiness. Their participation in drug patrols and counter-offensives 
would certainly provide beneficial training and, at the same time, 
complement the extant interdiction forces. In those states which bar 
the military's involvement in civilian affairs on constitutional or 
legal grounds an amendment should be introduced permitting the military 
to assist civilian law enforcement agencies. The needs for frontier 
security are consonant with the needs for national security and it is 
foolish not to make use of the personnel and equipment already 
available. The U.S. recognized this concept and amended the Posse Com- 
mitatus Act13 with Public Law 97-8614 thereby allowing military par­
ticipation in the anti-trafficking campaign. The subsequent Defence 
Drug Interdiction Act of 1986 further enhanced the military's role in 
counter-trafficking offensives.15 The U.K. has followed suit, but not
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on as expansive a scale.16
5) Specialized international programs for monitoring regional 
ocean areas should be established. Envisioned as a collaborative effort 
by the states of a region, the program utilizes a combination of 
intelligence, surveillance and technical innovation to track all 
maritime traffic in the region, with particular emphasis on the small 
craft and vessels which are not commercial carriers. Though several 
obstacles, namely administrative and technological, would need to be 
overcome the direct benefit would be concrete cognizance of vessel move­
ments in the region. In turn, this would permit faster recognition of 
suspicious movements, facilitated identification of suspect craft and 
rapid, perhaps instantaneous, background data and file checks. Examples 
of such initiatives are Project Cook17 and the Pompidou Group*s MAR-Info 
Program.18 In the Project Cook proposal the Pacific Ocean is divided 
into three regions and the focus is primarily on the movement of drugs 
out of Southeast Asia. The U.S., Australia and New Zealand will respec­
tively serve as the intelligence collation centres while the other 
states within the respective regions all monitor the maritime traffic 
found in their sectors and rapidly forward the data to their regional 
centre. Though abandoning the drafting of its own anti-trafficking 
treaty for Europe, the emphasis of which was on the maritime sector, the 
Pompidou Group has embarked on developing a program of coordination and 
harmonization in port controls and maritime surveillance amongst its 
member states.19 Further developments along these lines would be most 
prudent and beneficial.
6) Another alternative for countries lacking their own resources 
for combatting the maritime drug trade is to allow an outside state
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which has the resources to operate either on their behalf or jointly 
with local personnel in their waters. On a limited basis such opera­
tions are already transpiring in the Caribbean region between various 
island states and the U.S.20 Problematic legal constraints on both 
parties’ side would, of course, have to be overcome. The U.S.’s amend­
ment of the Mansfield Amendment21 by enactment of Sec. 605 of the Inter­
national Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985 is demonstra- * 
tive of the law changes required to permit such intraterritorial 
counter-trafficking offensives. It permits US law enforcement personnel 
to be present in other states' waters, when so invited, and assist local 
forces, but under rigid guidelines. Support on the international level 
for this concept is found in the 1977 Mutual Assistance Convention. 
Art. 8 of Annex X advances the idea in relation to customs investiga­
tions of drug activities.
7) Domestically, the responsible law enforcement agencies should 
develop bilateral co-operation relationships with all the ship-owning 
companies and vessel operators based or operating within their domains 
which engage in foreign trade. This idea is not novel yet it appears to 
be greatly under-utilized. The type of relationship initiated can vary, 
but at minimum it should involve a commitment whereby the vessel 
operators undertake to implement more secure methods of cargo convey­
ance, maintain effective security onboard their vessels when abroad and 
provide enhanced documentation procedures. The complete adoption of 
these ideas would measurably assist drug enforcement agencies in sup­
pressing the maritime drug trade in two ways. Imprimis, it would become 
harder for traffickers to find vulnerable cargoes and ships much less 
access such cargoes and vessels. Secondly, identification of suspect
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loads and vessels would be facilitated via the incorporation of an 
automated manifest system in documentation processing. The latter al­
lows copies of documentation to be provided to the customs services 
either in advance of vessel arrival or instantaneously upon arrival thus 
permitting rapid evaluation of the risk factor presented by a vessel and 
its cargo. The US Customs Service has seen the benefit in such 
relationships and embarked on a program of implementing agreements of 
this kind wherever feasible. Currently, several shipping companies have 
signed such agreements with the USCS.22
However, by the same token, law enforcement agencies must better 
appreciate the difficulties pervading commerce and the often sinister 
precincts in which vessel operators function in. Shipping companies 
have little control over many of the cargoes they carry in the sense 
that the methods of carriage preclude searches and whatever illicit ac­
tivities transpire on the wharves in ports is beyond their control. 
Furthermore, scales of economy apply to vessel operations which means 
there is little time, manpower and capital available for vessel rummages 
by the crew and installation of elaborate security systems. This 
notably applies to several of the vessel operators in OECD states which 
are fighting to remain in business in the face of cut-throat competition 
from foreign operators with lower operating costs. Additionally, a 
philosophical debate is entwined in this issue concerning where the role 
of policeman falls. Vessel operators maintain, and rightfully so, that 
they are not policeman and nor should they be expected to act as such 
beyond exercising a certain nominal level of security over their 
operations. On the other hand, law enforcement agencies are quick to 
maintain that they alone are the entities duly equipped, trained and
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authorized to exercise police powers and that no other individual or en­
tity is so sanctioned. Yet, in regards to drug trafficking law enforce­
ment agencies are increasingly placing the burden of controlling such 
activity on the carriers. In other words, they appear to be delegating 
some of their responsibilities to the carriers and concomitantly but un­
duly penalizing them when cases of smuggling are uncovered. Such be­
haviour has been practised in the U.K. and U.S. wherein the customs 
services either attempted to or successfully persecuted the carrier for 
drug trafficking. Examples of transportation companies so affected in­
clude Air Canada,23 Grancolombiana Lines24 and Sea-Land.25 It must not 
be construed that non-prosecution of those carriers which purposefully 
engage in drug trafficking or exercise total negligence in regard to 
security is being advocated for it is not. It is maintained, however, 
that carriers which unknowingly convey illicit substances because the 
drug loads are concealed within the cargo or planted on the vessel or 
transported by a small number of the crew should not be liable for such 
carriage. Penalizing the carrier serves no useful purpose aside from 
antagonizing the commercial sector and exposing the frustrated senti­
ments of drug enforcement agencies.
8) Where viable, sound and of proven benefit the latest 
developments, innovations and inventions in technology should be applied 
in the anti-drug campaign. Moreover, the law enforcement community in 
tandem with the governmental sector should encourage such a trend via 
whatever mechanisms at their disposal. Vis-a-vis the maritime drug trade 
this means the invention of new detection and surveillance equipment, 
construction and design of more potent interception vehicles and im­
provement in data processing and evaluation systems. As observed in
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earlier chapters such developments are being nurtured in some states, 
but, unfortunately, the trend has yet to attain widespread 
dissemination. Among recent inventions oriented towards combatting 
maritime drug trafficking and worthy of mention herein are the *Blue 
Thunder* boat, the Coastal Security System, the CONDOR Contraband Detec­
tor System and the airship surveillance platform. The first was 
elaborated upon in Chapter V but the other three systems and vehicles 
are briefly described here. CSS utilizes a series of radar installa­
tions positioned along the coastline which via their sophisticated 
hardware jointly monitor offshore marine traffic on a more effective and 
detailed level than presently available.26 CONDOR CDS involves mass 
spectrometry utilizing highly sensitive equipment which may be located 
either in fixed locations or onboard mobile land-based units.27 The ad­
vantage of this system is that it offers rapid but effective cargo in­
spection and is particularly well-suited for checking containerized 
cargoes and personal luggage en bloc - items which generally need to be 
reviewed quickly. The airship surveillance platform involves zeppelin- 
like craft which provide sturdy, economical and effective offshore ob­
servation posts. An array of these units positioned strategically off­
shore provides excellent surveillance bases, allows advanced detection 
of suspicious movements and enhanced tracking capabilities over suspect 
vessels. All of these devices, systems and vehicles have demonstrated 
merits. However, regarding implementation it has to be said that a 
given state should only select those actually necessary for enhancing or 
complementing their extant counter-trafficking measures. As a straight 
rule the introduction of new interdiction systems by a state must not be 
predicated upon commercial and political considerations though such is
often the case in reality. As a last comment on this topic it has to be 
noted that technological developments inevitably also benefit drug traf­
fickers though in different ways. The recent development of a chemical 
which causes detector dogs to become disfunctional in their trained role 
of drug detection is such an example.28
9) Finally, in addition to the recommendations given above, which 
are specifically directed towards the maritime sector, it must be added 
that all other measures and policies of proven worth applied in general 
are to be endorsed. Simply put, anything that prohibits and prevents 
the production, trafficking, distribution and consumption of illicit 
substances must be labelled an effective measure, provided they are 
just. Among these are preventive education, effective policing in 
general and functional legal systems. However, in applied terms, one 
other area of drug control which needs to be more fully implemented is 
the ’forfeiture of assets’ concept. Under this doctrine convicted drug 
traffickers are stripped of all assets they possess which have been 
derived from the proceeds of their trafficking activities. Though 
several OECD states along with states outside the O.E.C.D. have incor­
porated the concept within their legal provisions and are to be compli­
mented that alone is not enough.29 All states should adopt such a 
doctrine within their respective municipal codes thus preventing them 
from being havens for drug proceeds. The basis for this advocacy is the 
international character of financial services and banking today which 
allows traffickers diverse avenues for hiding their money in countries 
whose domestic legislation does not recognize the concept and which 
neither co-operate in investigations by other states into such matters. 
The validity of this point is constantly being confirmed today and thus
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needs to be resolved. The global adoption of the forfeiture of assets 
concept in conjunction with bilateral co-operation pacts on investiga-r 
tion into hidden drug proceeds would become a strong disincentive. Ex­
amples of the latter are the U.S.-Cayman Islands and U.S.-Switzerland 
agreements. Though this would not stop drug traffickers from their ac­
tivity it would make it harder for them to conceal their assets and make 
them more vulnerable to prosecution.
This list is not absolute! However, the implementation of these 
recommendations as befitting a state's drug dilemma and available 
resources would measurably enhance both the national and international 
anti-trafficking campaigns.
8 . 3 A Closing Caveat
As a closing comment and admonition to those responsible for 
developing, implementing and coordinating counter-trafficking measures 
and policies certain social and political realities need to be 
highlighted. On the whole this treatise has presented a rather negative 
perspective of the maritime drug trade in that several of the issues 
discussed and topics analysed appear to suggest that the drug smuggler 
holds the upper hand. It has to be realized that drug trafficking ex­
ploits the weaknesses, corruptibility and inability of states to counter 
such activity. Regardless of the degree to which geography along with 
other natural, technological and technical components favour the 
traffickers, they would not succeed to the degree they do without the 
co-operation of the states themselves. This co-operation, which is in- 
advertant and unintentional, results from deleterious internal forces 
and factors which impede the effectiveness of anti-trafficking
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initiatives. In many of the drug producing and transit states the con­
tributing factors are civil strife, endemic corruption and extensive 
poverty. The prevalency and entrenchment of these factors makes it vir­
tually impossible to stem the trade in illicit drugs from these sources. 
Among OECD states the problem in suppressing the drug trade is rooted in 
economic considerations and the principles of democratic rule. A secon­
dary but under-rated factor contributing to the problem among select 
Western states stems from negatory aspects of human behaviour. All 
governments of the OECD states operate on budgets and thus the resources 
they can allocate to the various facets of drug control sure limited. 
Several of them simply cannot afford the diverse and expensive equipment 
which technologically exists much less maintain and operate it. Patrol 
vessels, helicopters, aircraft, radar installations, observation posts, 
satellites, telecommunications systems, weaponry and data processing 
equipment all require large capital investments. Obtaining sufficient 
personnel, training them and retaining them put further strains on a 
perennial budget which is of limited means. Hence, something less than 
adequate is settled for. Though pessimistic sounding, all of these 
negatory points reflect reality. No state is immune to this phenomenon. 
Illustrative of this point was the $70 million (US) budget cut in 1988 
in the US Coast Guard’s interdiction program.30
In context with the above issue the question arises as to what 
levels of equipment, manpower and overall police presence are enough. 
The question becomes paramount when considered in the context of a need 
for a balance between sustaining the concept of a free society as more 
than a notion on the one hand and the need for law enforcement controls 
on the other hand. The development of enforcement systems of such
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technological, technical and functional capability as to see and discern 
all with unfailing precision would mean the concept of a wholly defen­
sible and enforceable frontier was then a reality. However, the im­
plementation of control measures which are omnipotent, ubiquitous, om­
niscient and result in draconian anti-drug offensives would create an 
interdiction program that is Orwellian in character. Unfortunately, a 
synonym for this is something negatively known as the ’police state*. 
While aspiring to idealistic goals of utopia, crime-free and drug-free 
societies it is highly questionable whether many Western societies would 
be willing to accept such ’perfect settings’ based on omnipresent equip­
ment and observers at the expense of certain freedoms held most dear, 
but in an imperfect world. Ignoring the socio-political perspective but 
focusing solely on the commercial sector one finds an analogous resent­
ment to the above control measures. The antagonism and uproar to be in­
curred from the commercial sector as a result of exhaustive and 
protracted vessel rummages and cargo searches would be immense. In a 
free society based on commerce the government should not and, in many 
cases, could not afford to interfere with the very activity by which the 
state is sustained. Human behaviour is an additional factor which 
regrettably tends to be overlooked. On the individual level one finds 
some law enforcement personnel lack the dedication and diligence 
required for operating an effective interdiction program. Because the 
operatives in the field represent the operational manifestation of an 
anti-trafficking campaign, it is essential they are committed to the 
effort. In reality, however, there are a myriad of reasons rooted in 
either cultural, economic, legal, political, psychological or social 
bases which preclude some individuals from being totally dedicated to
their tasks. On the group level one finds a contextually similar but 
somewhat different predicament. The pervasive presence of drugs means 
that in many countries there will be more than one law enforcement 
agency involved. Unfortunately, for reasons of prestige, reputation, 
employment and funding rivalry sometimes exists between the various 
agencies concerning their roles. Though this will never be acknowledged 
publicly, in reality it is a problem in some countries. The direct 
results of the situation are a lack of communication, co-operation and 
coordination between agencies which leads to bungled counter-trafficking 
offensives. Lastly, compounding the dilemma is the diversity in states’ 
views regarding the threat which various drugs pose to their societies. 
On the international level this divergence in viewpoints fosters discord 
in the anti-trafficking campaign with states pursuing their own anti­
drug initiatives. Regrettably, a solution to this dilemma is difficult 
since states retain the sole right to manage their own domestic affairs.
444
Notes And References For Chapter VIII.
1. The Treaty Of Co-operation Between Denmark, Finland, Iceland« Norway 
and Sweden entered into force on 23 March 1962. Amendments were made in 
1971, 1974 and 1983. Arts. 2 -7 contain the provisions on juridical co­
operation. Refer: 434 UNTS 145; 10 EYB 940 (1982); 1 Peaslee 1135.
2. 21 USC Sec. 955a - 955d (1981).
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5. Also known formally as the Joint Marine Interdiction Command Center.
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7. Law enforcement agencies conceding this perspective include the New 
Zealand Customs Dept., Dutch CRI and Australian Customs Service. See: 
D. J. Blakemore and D. Haigh, A Strategic Study - Cocaine (Christchurch: 
NZ Customs Dept., 1986), p. 11.; A. J. van Doom, (interview with Deputy 
Head of the Narcotics Branch, National Criminal Intelligence Service of 
the Netherlands in The Hague on 10 February 1988); and, D. McDowell and 
B. Waldron, (interview with Intelligence Officers of INTELL Sec., ACS in 
Canberra on 29 September 1987).
8. The distinction between ’hard’ and ’soft’ drugs is difficult to 
define in precise terms. Realistically, it is a relative concept and 
determined on socio-political grounds rather than scientific bases. 
Fundamentally, the distinction should be based on factors of 
addictiveness, effect, potency and the reaction of an individual to a 
given drug. Among the common drug categories cannabis is deemed a soft 
drug while cocaine, heroin and LSD are all labelled as hard drugs.
9. For a comprehensive analysis of controlled delivery see the follow­
ing report: CCC, Report - Customs/Police Controlled Delivery Seminar 
[Doc. 32.934/TE7-80423] (Brussels, 1985).
10. Egypt reinstituted the death penalty for drug trafficking in May
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U.S.A. in 1988 though it remains to be applied in the latter.
11. For an example of this form of extrapolation see: European
Parliament, Recommendations Of The Inquiry Committee On The Drugs 
Problem In The Member States Of The European Community (Brussels, Sep­
tember 1986), p. 9 (para. 18).
12. Calls for new and radical approaches to controlling the drug scene
are increasingly being heard from a broad cross-section of society in­
cluding policy-makers, publicists, governmental executives, the media as 
well as from various quarters of the law enforcement community. For a 
rather interesting perspective covering many of the issues at stake see:
S. Wisotsky, Breaking the Impasse on the War on Drugs (New York: Green­
wood Press, 1986). Demonstrative of the growing support for
decriminalization and legalization of illicit drugs amongst the 
governmental sector has been the call by U.S. mayors and congressmen for 
such responses. (See: P. Kerr, "In U.S., a Growing Call for Legalized
Narcotics,” International Herald Tribune. May 16, 1988 (Paris), pp. 1 & 
5 and C. Brenner, '’Appeal to remove drugs from the underworld,” The 
Times, May 17, 1988 (London), p. 6.) Among the more siginificant repre­
sentatives of the media calling for changes are The Economist. The Na­
tional Review, The New York Daily News and The New York Times. (See: 
"Dr. Nahas Decries Legalization, Urges U.S.-Soviet Cooperation In Global 
War Against Cocaine," PRIDE Quarterly. Vol. 9, No. 4 (Atlanta), p. 8.
13. 18 USC 1385.
14. 10 USC 371 - 378.
15. Refer: Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986. Title III (Interdiction), Sub­
title A (Defense Drug Interdiction Act) signed into law on 27 October
1986.
16. UKHO, Tackling Drug Misuse: a summary of the government's strategy. 
3rd ed. (London, 1988), p. 18 (See Section 4.24).
17. New Zealand Customs Dept., Project Cook [internal circulating
proposal] (Wellington, 1987).
18. See: Council of Europe/Pompidou Group Docs. P-PG (88) 30 of 14 Oc­
tober 1988 and Addendum to P-PG (88) 30 of 22 December 1988.
19. C. K. Luckett, (personal coiranunique from Principal Adminstrative
Officer, Pompidou Group in Strasbourg dated 14 March 1989).
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20. C. E. Robbins, (prepared statement presented by the Chief, Office 
of Operations of the US Coast Guard before the US House Judiciary 
Committee, Subcommittee on Crime on 22 May 1986), pp. 4-5.
21. 22 USC 2291(c).
22. Examples of such agreements include those made by the USCS with 
Flota Mercante Grancolombiana, SeaEscape Ltd. and the Pacific Merchants 
Shipping Association. (Information extracted from various issues of 
Customs U.S.A.)
23. ’’Airliner not liable to drugs forfeiture" - Commissioners of Cus­
toms and Excise v. Air Canada, The Times (Queen's Bench Div., Law 
Report), November 9, 1988 (London), p. 43.
24. USCS, "Carrier Cooperation," Customs U.S.A. 1984 (Washington, D.C., 
1985), p. 22.
25. C. Mayer, "$82m drugs fine levied on Sea-Land," Lloyd's List, 
January 7, 1989 (London), p. 1.
26. Folsom Research Inc., Coastal Security System (CSS) with radar 
remote displays [publicity brochure] (Folsom, California, 1987).
27. British Aerospace, CONDOR - Contraband Detector System [publicity 
brochure] (Bracknell, U.K., 1986).
28. M. Evans, "Drug threat to sniffer dogs," The Times, May 31, 1988 
(London), p. 7.
29. OECD states with forfeiture of assets laws include Australia, 
Canada, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Norway, Sweden, the U.K. and the 
U.S.A. Among non-OECD states having forfeiture of assets laws are Costa 
Rica, Ecuador, Egypt, Malaysia, Panama, Thailand and Venezuela.
30. M. Dukakis, (rebuttal statement made by the Democratic candidate in 
the first U.S. Presidential Debate held on 25 September 1988 in Winston- 
Salem, North Carolina).
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX TABLE I.
Units Of Mass, Weight, Area, Distance And Volume Used In 
Thesis.
Unit of Measure 
(name)
Metric Equivalent 
(in gms. or kgs.)
Unit of Measure 
(name)
Metric Equivalent 
(in gms. or kgs.)
grain 0.064 gms. tahil (tael/thail) 37.800 gms.
ampoule -0.015 gms. oke (okia) 67.330 gms.
phial (vial) -0.015 gms. pound 454.000 gms.
cubic centimeter 1.000 gm. catty (kati) 604.790 gms.
dram 1.770 gms. packet (Opium) 933.039 gms.
dirhem 3.120 gms. seer (Gov’t) 933.039 gms.
drachma 3.200 gms. picul 60.478 kgs.
momme 3.750 gms. chest -60.500 kgs.
mace 3.770 gms. short ton (US) 907.180 kgs.
pastille (tube) 10.000 gms. metric ton 1,000.000 kgs.
tola (tolah) 11.660 gms. long ton 1,016.000 kgs.
ounce 28.350 gms.
Poppy plants yield 9.5 - 10.0% by weight of actual drug (Opium) based 
on total weight of plant (hence, divide by 10 to derive crude opium 
yield).
1.0 Kilometer = 0.622 Statute Miles = 0.54 Nautical Miles
1.6093 Kilometers = 1.0 Statute Mile = 0.87 Nautical Miles
1.852 Kilometers = 1.15 Statute Miles = 1.0 Nautical Mile
1.0 Square Kilometer = 0.386 Square Miles
2.59 Square Kilometers = 1.0 Square Mile
1 hectare = 2.47 Acres 1 Gross Registered Ton = 100 Cubic Feet
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APPENDIX TABLE II.
International Conventions And Multilateral Treaties Regulating 
The Flow Of Drugs Or Providing Related Mechanisms For Control.
Date & Place Official Title of Convention Or Treaty Ratifications
Of Signing And Year Of Entry Into Force________________& Accessions
23 Jan 1912 International Opium Convention [1915 - between 102
The Hague 5 states/1919 - world-wide]
11 Feb 1925 
Geneva
19 Feb 1925 
Geneva
13 Jul 1931 
Geneva
27 Nov 1931 
Bangkok
Agreement Concerning the Manufacture of. Internal 
Trade In. and Use Of. Prepared Opium (as amended 
by the 1946 Protocol) [1926]
Convention for Limiting the Manufacture and 
Regulating the Distribution of Narcotic Drugs 
(as amended by the 1946 Protocol) [1933]
Agreement for the Control of Opium Smoking in the 
Far East (as amended by the 1946 Protocol)
26 Jun 1936 Convention for the Suppression of the Illicit
Geneva Traffic in Dangerous Drugs (as amended by the
1946 Protocol) [1939]
55
International Opium Convention (as amended by the 78 
1946 Protocol) [1928] Note: Also referred to as
the International Convention Relating To Dangerous 
Drugs.
91
31
11 Dec 1946 Protocol Amending the Agreements. Conventions And 
Lake Success Protocols on Narcotic Drugs Concluded at The Hague
on 23 January 1912. at Geneva on 11 February 1925 59
. and 19 February 1925 and 13 July 1931. at Bangkok 
on 27 November 1931. and at Geneva on 26 June 1936 
[1946]
19 Nov 1948 Protocol bringing Under International Control 
Paris Drugs Outside the Scope of the Convention of 13
July 1931 for Limiting the Manufacture and Regu- 109 
lating the Distribution of Narcotic Drugs, as 
amended by the Protocol signed at Lake Success.
New York, on 11 December 1946 [1949]
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23 Jun 1953 Protocol for Limiting and Regulating the Culti-
New York vation of the Poppy Plant, the Production of, 52
International and Wholesale Trade int and Use 
of. Opium [1963]
29 Apr 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the 46
Geneva Contiguous Zone [1964]
29 Apr 1958 Convention on the High Seas [1962] 57
Geneva
30 Mar 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961 119
New York [1964]
23 Mar 1962 Treaty Of Co-operation Between Denmarkf 5
Helsinki Finland, Iceland, Norway And Sweden [1962]
23 May 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 80
Vienna [1980]
21 Feb 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances [1976] 83
Vienna
25 Mar 1972 Protocol amending the Single Convention on 76
Geneva Narcotic Drugs, 1961 [1975]
27 Apr 1973 South American Agreement on Narcotic Drugs and
Buenos Aires Psychotropic Substances
9 Jun 1977 International Convention Cfci Mutual Administra-
Nairobi tive Assistance For The Prevention, Investiga- 22
tion And Repression Of Customs Offences [1980]
10 Dec 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 [Not 40
Montego Bay in force]
18 Dec 1988 United Nations Convention Against Illicit
Vienna Traffic In Narcotic Drugs And Psychotropic
Substances, 1988 [Not in force]
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